COURT II-A CASE IX These thirty-one men had bean treated as I have already described. Therefore, I don't have to say it again. partisans. They plundered and robbed whatever they needed, animals, clothes, utensils, or anything they thought they might need. The inhabitants were killed. or if they resisted unsuccessfully they were killed. Their houses were burned, and in that way the partisans carried on warfare in the East. I could talk about this for hours and even days, about many, many details which I remember.
Q. I now submit to you a document which the Prosecution up to now has not submitted. It is the operation report, No. 186 of 27th March, 1942, Document NO-3236, which I do not want to submit as evidence but only to be identified, and which I give the number, "Naumann No. 1" for identification. In how far does this document show the main tasks and activities of Einsatzgruppe B?
A. On Page 20 of this operation report No. 186 of 27 March the following can be read: "On 9 March 1942 a discussion took place at the headquarters of the Rear Army District about a large-scale Army operation against the partisans. To carry out this action against the partisans two active Army divisions with heavy armament and with units of the air force were selected in addition to the already existing security brigades. Einsatzgruppe B, at the instruction of the Commander of the Rear Army Area, had to see to it with its troops operation, that the operation be properly prepared. For that reason, until the conclusion of the operation in the operational areas the number of fortifications and strongpoints is to be increased in those areas and more men are to be sent there from Sonderkommandos 7-A and 9.
COURT II-A CASE IX The task of the Security Police and the SD is to carry on an intensive intelligence campaign through V-men and agents. At the beginning of the discussion the commander of the Rear Army Area, General of the Infantry von Schenkendorf, talked to Einsatzgruppe B and expressed his thanks for the work of the Security Police and SD without which the success of the Army operation would not be possible. He pointed out that the forces of the Security Police and the SD, on the basis of the experiences of the Eastern campaign, were indispensable."
Q. That will be sufficient. What did these partisans do?
A. Murder, plunder, looting.
Q. Were these only small sallies?
A. No, they were regular partisan battles. It was a regular partisan war.
Q. Is this also shown in the document?
A. Yes, it is shown from the other document, Document 3276, Document Book II-B. There it says, on Page 55 of the German text, in the first third - at the end of the first third of the page: "The methods learned in the partisan schools are systematically carried out in practice by the partisans so that in some areas of the Einsatzgruppe one can talk about a real partisan war with Bolshevistic methods."
Q. Were the attacks of the partisans only directed against the German troops?
A. No, also against the population of the country.
Q. To what extent does the Document 66 show this?
A. Following the paragraph I just read it says, "The innumerable ambushes, especially at night, frighten and depress the village population. People are somewhat COURT II-A CASE IX disappointed by the allegedly insignificant activity of the German agencies in combatting the partisans.
In the threatened villages hardly anybody is prepared to accept an official position. The natives have to watch passively while the partisans seize their cattle and food, as self-defense, because of lack of arms, is ineffective in warding off the raids."
Q. Did the Russian inhabitants take part in fighting these partisan?
A. Yes.
Q. Is this shown in the document?
A. This is also shown in the document. Following what I just read, "It has been established, that where partisans are threatening the people only in weak numbers, the villagers defend themselves vigorously. It may furthermore be said that the rural population in general takes up the fight against the partisan pest with gusto and gladly refuses assistance whenever they can destroy the partisans by themselves."
Q. What was the attitude of the Russian population towards the work of the Einsatzkommandos?
Einsatz-kommandos is being extensively facilitated by informers among the Russian population. The auxiliary police and the contact menare reported everywhere to have proved their worth in the detection of partisans.
Q I now come to the final questions. were you a member of the General SS, after 1 September 1939?
Q When?
Q What was your rank in the Waffen SS?
Q Did you volunteer to join the WaffenSS?
Q What was the reason for your membership in the Waffen SS? or the Navy or the Air Force.
Q Then, was your membership the result of a law?
Q Could you evade the draft orders?
A No, that would not have been possible. I would have been condemned to death for desertion. member of the SD?
A I don't knew that. I don't think so. As far as I know, at that time in 1940, certain age groups had been released for service in the Waffen SS. 1939?
A The SD?
Q Which SD? SD voluntarily? impossible to leave. There was no such thing in war time.
Q Can you give any reasons for that? What laws applied to you?
A The Army laws. I was considered essential for the Security Service during the war. My duty in the SD was considered my war service.
Q I now submit to you the verdict of the IMT. According to this verdict the SD is accused of the following crimes:
First, the extermi nation of the Jews, cruelties and murders in prisoner of war camps; excesses in occupied teritories, fourth, carrying out the forced labor program; fifth, ill treatment and murders of prisoners of war.
Did you knew that the SD Information Service, that is the organization in Office III of the Reich Main Security Office, committed such crimes and was used to commit such crimes against humanity?
Q Can you give reasons for that?
A The SD was merely an information agency. It had no executive tasks.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Gawlik, on a point of information, the SD originally was, as I understand it, a news gathering agency, an intelligence organization.
DR. GAWLIK :Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: But it would appear that many misused the phrase to refer to something else and even, according to the Defendant Ohlendorf, Hitler erred in his reference to the SD so that I ask you new, was there any organization or outfit or group of individuals involved in violence which became known as the SD, even though incorrectly, so far as the original organizational chart was concerned?
DR. GAWLIK: Yes, Your Honor. This name SD included -- that was -the concept was not clarified and by SD one often described the Security Police and the Secret State Police, and the Criminal Police. The reasons for this were that all the officials of the criminal Police uniform, and unfortunately it was quite common in Germany that the high-ranking leaders wanted power. Now Heydrich wanted to show that these are the people who belonged to him and therefore he gave them a gray uniform and all these people were insignia on their sleeve with the word "SD", Security Service, but they were Secret State Police officials and Criminal Police Officials, so that in the occupied territories every secret state police official and every Criminal Police official was described as an SD man.
This is shown in the submitted documents. For example, the Grebe document, which was submitted to the IMT. It describes persons who doubtlessly were Gestapo and Secret Police members, as SD members, and therefore, when one talked about police measures, one often meant SD. Keitel explained this in an affidavit before the IMT. He stated, there, if he did not know which police division was competent, he merely said, "Security Service", people had the opinion that the Police looked after the public order and the security and therefore, and therefore, it was the security Service, while this Security Service of Office III is quite a different thing.
It had no executive power. It could not even arrest a man.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
Q (By Dr. Gawlik) In your capacity as Oberhauptsturmfuehrer in the SD after 1 September 1939, did you commit any crimes against humanity or any war crimes? crimes?
DR. GAWLIK: Your Honor, I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Cross-examination on the part of Defense Counsel?
DR. KOESSL (Attorney for the Defendant Ott): Would you permit me to ask a few questions, please. BY DR. KOESSL ( Attorney for the Defendant Ott): over Sonderkommando 7A?
Q When was this?
Q After that was he again put in charge of Sendorkommando 7B? continued ti Bryansk where Kommando 7B was and there he stayed with his predecessor Rauch for about three weeks and trained. That was the usual thing when a new Kommando leader came. We tried to make him work with his predecessor for about three weeks in order to train him well.
Q What opinion did you have of Ott? who did his duty, was a good leader to his men; I had no complaints about him.
Q How did the Army judge the defendant Ott?
A I remember two occurrences: One during a visit of the AOK 2 in Ord and the other one in a letter which the Commander in Chief, General Schmidt, wrote to me, when Ott was to be relieved, that Ott should remain, because the Army cooperated very well with him. command?
A I don't know about any during Ott's activity in Kommando 7B.
Q. Can you remember long periods when Otto was prevented from taking part in leading the Kommandos?
A. Yes, that occurred twice and then for some time: The first journey took about four weeks -- I am not quite certain -- about four weeks. It took place about April or May; and the second time he was absent even longer, because he had broken his leg and therefore he was ill, and then he had to recuperate and went on leave. During that time the RSHA relieved him. He returned once more, because the Commanderin-Chief of the AOK 2, General Schmidt asked for it in writning and this letter had been handed on to Berlin with my approval.
Q. Do you remember that the prosecution submitted Exhibit 123, in Document Book III-B on page 129 - 130, which has the NO number 4747? The transfer is mentioned and, as you pointed out, they asked for him to be transferred from Russia.
A. May I have the document, please?
Q. Do you there find a decree according to which Ott was ordered to return to the Reich?
A. This is the decree I already mentioned.
Q. This decree was not complied with and Ott was sent to Russia again, because the Army asked for it.
A. Yes, because the Army asked for it and because I had sent this letter on to Berlin.
DR. KOESSL: Thank you very much. I have no further questions. JUDGE MUSMANNO: Any furhter questions by defense counsel? BY DR. FRITZ (Attorney for the defendant Fendler):
Q. Witness, you said in your direct examination that you were in charge of D, a department in the RSHA, in the Central Department III A 21 and that you worked on the plant protection there, is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Did your department have judiciary departments in the SD and in the Subdepartment of the SD?
A. Yes, departments and some subdepartments were concerned with this.
Q. Did a department unit in III 21 also work in a subdivision plant protection?
A. Of course.
Q. Did those members of the 3D who worked on plant protection have any executive police powers?
A. No, they did not have that.
Q. Therefore, if I understand you correctly, a departmental chief in III 21 in a subdivision of the SD did not have any executive power.
A. Definitely not.
DR. FRITZ: I have no further questions.
BY DR. STRESS: (Attorney for the Defendant Schulz)
Q. Witness, at the beginning of your examination, you stated that you did not learn anything about the execution order in Bruisk or Dueben, but even later. How do you know that this execution order in Bruisk, Dueben or Schmideberg was announced?
A. I heard about that for the first time through Gruppenfuehrer Heydrich before I left for Russia.
Q. Was it told to you by anyone else?
A. Nebe discussedit with me, of course.
Q. When did your departure to Russia take place? When did you discuss it with Heydrich?
A. Between the 1st of November and 21st of November, between my assignment and the date of my departure.
Q. 1941?
A. Yes, 1941, closer to the 20th than to the 1st.
DR. STRESS: Thank you.
BY DR. ERICH KARL MAYER (Attorney for the Defendant Steimle):
Q. Witness, do you know the defendant Steimle?
A. Yes.
Q. Since when did you know him?
A. I met him in Russia.
Q. On what occasion did you meet him?
A. During my visit to his position in Reshev.
Q. What position did he hold at the time?
A. He was in charge of Sonderkommando 7a.
Q. What position did he hold under you?
A. He was under me.
Q. For how long was Steimle under you?
A. Only for a short time, approximately until the middle of December 41
Q. Can you describe briefly Steimle's activity in Sonderkommando 7a while you were there?
A. I remember something about this, owing to a visit I paid to Steimle in Kalinin and Reshev soon after I took my office. On that occasion Steimle talked about the work there and I remember that in the narrow front near Kalinin considerable espionnage activity was going on. He described to me one case in particular in which a Russian female student carried out espinonnage and gave messages to missions. This I remember of the activity of Sonderkommando 7a at the time when I worked there and visited Steimle.
Q. Did you, during the time Steimle was subordinated to you, hear about execution acts of any sort, particularly against Jews? Were they reported to you?
A. The time when Steimle was my subordinate was so short that I know that during that time no such actions were reported.
Q. During your activity asChief of Einsatzgruppe B did you hear whether Sonderkommando 7a under Steimle before you started to work there carried out such actions?
A. I don't know that.
Q. Can you state when Steimle left Sonderkommando 7a?
A. I already said about the middle of December.
Q. Why?
A. In order to go on leave.
Q. Who granted his leave to Germany?
A. I did.
Q. Did Steimle return after this leave to Sonderkommando 7a?
A. No, Steimle did not return; when Steimle had not returned after his leave I either inquired in Berlin or was informed by Berlin that Steimle would not return because he had become ill meanwhile.
Q. Can you tell us to which Army Sonderkommando A was attached, during Steimle's time?
A. Always the 9th Army.
in which Sonderkommando 7-A was active on the map?
A Yes. The 9th Army in the territory of Sonderkommando 7-A were the same. The 9th Army was on the left wing of the Army Group Center. Therefore, Steimle was always furthest to the north of the northern commands. In the norht of this territory, there was Kalinin. Then the border ran along the front 'til just before Moscow. The south frontier of this territory was the division line of the 9th Army and the 4th Tank Division, which was 20 or 30 kilometers north of the top point from Smolensk to Moscow. The western border was the division line between the Rear Army and the rear territory. In general, it went from north to south approximately like the Dnjepr that is from east of Smolensk up to the Valday Mountains to the south of the Ilmen Lake, which is blue on the map and there again along the front, which ran from west to east there.
Q Witness, do you have Document Book II-B infront of you, still?
DR. MAYER: Your Honor, the witness will got the document book. BY DR. MAYER: NO-2824, Exhibit 62. It is the operation report No. 148 of 19 December 1941. During the examination it had already been discussed... In this document, in the territory of Einsatzgruppe B places are named but it is not stated which Einsatzkommando or Sonderkommando was assigned for these places. Please tell me, as Chief of Einsatzgruppe B - whether the following places, which I will read to you, were in the territory and were under the competency of Sonderkommando 7-A. The places are mostly on page 36, 37 and 38 in the German Document Book. I name the locations: Gshatsk.
A Gshatsk was not there. Gshatsk was near to Moscow.
Q Kurhle?
A Orel also further south; did not belong to 7-A.
A Bobruisk is south of Mogilew. It belongs to Einsatzkommando 8, not to 7-A. Vitebsk. In general, west of Smolensk. But since the border of 7-A was east of Smolensk it cannot have belonged to 7-A. to 8; Kormu is also down there, near Gomel -- I don't know the exact situation - but it is not under 7-A.
Q On the next page the following locations: Ljubawitschi.
A Ljubawitschi - I know the exact situation not very well. It is west, or southwest, of Bobruisk or Gomel, near Marinagorka, on the northwest border of the swamp region. That belongs to 9 or 8.
Q May I add another question. According to the situation of Ljubawitschi, 7-a cannot have anything to do with it, either. Einsatzkommando 8.
A Roslawl is east of Smolensk. It could not belong to 7-a.
DR. MAYER: Your Honor, I only have a few questions as defense counsel for defendant Klingelhoefer.
THE PRESIDENT: Vary well, proceed. BY DR. MAYER: on what occasion did you meet him.
Q On what occasion, and where?
Q What position did Klingelhoeffer have at that time? Gshatsk -- not far from Moscow. that Vorkommando Gruppenstaff had the task, when Moscow was attacked to set up billets, to look after the staff of the Einsatzgruppe for a command which wanted enter Moscow. they were in Gshatsk? it existed. Afterwards it was dissolved because I had realized that we would not get to Moscow vary soon. about measures or actions as contained in the indictment? had no more work for them. They had no space, either, because in Moshaesk there was part of Kommando 9. returned? I travelled together with Klingelhoeffer. I had met him in Smolensk while I stayed in Gshatsk. I visited him in his billets. I left him there.
I travelled on to Wjasma and to Kalinin, and then again to Smolensk. Meanwhile, Klingelhoeffer had already gone on leave.
Q When did he return? leave? Klingelhoeffer on my staff. Klingelhoeffer had been born in Moscow. For many years he had lived in Moscow. He therefore know he Russian language very well. He could treat Russian people very Well. He was the most suitable man. I needed him in particular for the necessary SD work because I could not use an interpreter who could just conduct conversation at a very low level, but he had to know the language so well, in writing and speech, so that material found in the Archives, or reports, could be translated by him; he could conduct conversations with some Russians whose knowledge was of importance to us, with professors, older gentlemen from the Czarist day and so forth. was Sturmbannfuehrer? itself did not matter, but his linguistic ability, and his mental ability apart from that, when I considered the entire work of Klingelhoeffer and the very valuable work he has done for the SD, the rank Sturmbannfuehrer in adequate with the way in which he solved his task. or did you also give him tasks which took him to other places? for about two weeks. This exception consisted of the fact that Klingelhoeffer got an order from me to make inquiries about partisans in Drasnin, that is about 25 kilometers to the west of Smolensk. The reason why Klingelhoeffer got this order was actually not in Klingelhoeffer' field; the reason was that as far as I remember the Chief of the staff in the Rear Army territory called, and reported that now the partisans had approached Smolensk and were getting dangerous, and that they were already 25 kilometers away.
He asked me to send a suitable man who could find out what the position was in Krasnin and in the woods south and east of it. This order I gave to Klingelhoeffer although Kraesnin was in the territory of Einsatzkommando 8. the local commander in Kraesnin, and why?
A This had to be done because it was ordered; and secondly, General Schenkendorf, the commander of the Rear Army, had ordered that in all these cases when Security Police commanders were put in charge of some limit they would report to the competent army officer. Krasnin to Smolensk? the Iron Cross first class? them were given out. Einsatzgruppe B was given one or two such distinctions. Since Klingelhoeffer at the time was one of the few leaders who had been in the east from the beginning, and apart from that, his reports were extremely valuable, and as the officers appreciated this I recommended Klingelhoeffer for this distinction: The Iron Cross with Guards first class.
Q What can you say about Klingelhoeffer's personality?
A Klingelhoeffer was formerly a singer. He has an artistic manner which is very evident. He is a soft, sensitive, a decent man, a good comrade and a good, cooperative worker.
DR. MAYER: Thank you, witness, I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will be in recess until tomorrow morning at nine-thirty.
(Tribunal recessed until 0930 hours 17 October 1947,)
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the courtroom will please find their seats.
Military Tribunal II-A is now in session. God save the United States of America and this Honorable Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: If no other defense counsel intends to cross-examine the witness the Prosecution may now begin with its cross-examination. BY DR. LUMMERT (For Defendant Blume): to ask you first of all, Witness, when did you become the successor of Nebe as the man in charge of Einsatzgruppe B?
Q Do you know the Defendant Blume? 7-A?
A I do, and I know that from Nebe. He told me that. That was prior to my time. was in charge of Sonderkommando 7-A from its establishment, in other words, from June, 1941, until approximately the middle of August, 1941. I would like to ask you, Witness, did you at any time hear anything from your predecessor Nebe about the way in which Dr. Blume lead the Sonderkommando 7-A?
A Yes, indeed. Nebe spoke to me about Blume. He told me that Blume did too much for his men and that very, very often he spent the time with his men at Lakeside Places. I can very well remember the name of the Lake Roswita which I got to know myself later. Blume's inactivity as the man in charge of that kommando?
A I drew from Nebe's words that wanted to express his dissatisfaction.
DR. LUMMERT: Thank you very much. No further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. I take it that no other defense counsel desires to cross-examine the witness. Mr. Ferencz, you may now begin. BY MR. FERENCZ: that you never committed any crimes. Please explain to the Tribunal why you assumed an alias and moved from farm to farm as a common laborer after your discharge from a P.W. camp? official announcement that the Germans would be given the possibility to continue their struggle against Bolshevism. this would no longer be possible. That, for me, as an old National Socialist within a matter of minutes a whole world collapsed, can only be comprehended by someone who experienced those minutes or hours in a similar situation. It was a spontaneous decision, not having been considered previously that as an officer to avoid, if possible, being taken P.W. That was the reason why I wrote myself out a false release paper, and I received false papers altogether on a false name.
command of Einsatzgruppe B on 30 November 1941, and not on 1 November, 1941, is that correct.
A Did I understand you correctly, was it the 30th? Yes. whether Rasch or Thomas would be assigned instead of you, and that explains why the 1 November date was wrong. the 1st of November, 1941. The first which I learned about my commitment to Russia was a telephone call from Streckenbach, which also took place on the 1st of November, probably. During that telephone call Streckenbach told me about the fact that I was being sent to Russia as an Einsatzgruppe chief, and at the same time he told me that I had to prepare myself but that I had to await additional orders. A few days later, maybe two, three or four days afterwards, I can't remember the exact number of days, Streckenbach again called me up and he informed me that it was not quite clear whether I was to be transferred to Smolensk or Kiev. Whether at the time it was discussed that Rasch or Thomas was to be sent to Smolensk I don't know, because it was quite a mix-up, and it is still all mixed up. I still can't find my way around. In any case, the situation was such, that I was being discussed back and forth whether I was to be sent to Smolensk or Rasch was to be sent to Smolensk, or Thomas. At the same time it was also stated that Rasch was to be sent to Kiev and I was to be sent to Smolensk, or Thomas was to be sent to Smolensk. At the same time it was also discussed that Rasch was to be transferred to the Continental Oil Company in Berlin or that I was supposed to go there.
This back-and-forth discussion ended to the effect that I was finally told that I was to be transferred to Smolensk; Rasch was to be transferred to Berlin; and Thomas was to be transferred to Kiev.
Q How long did the confusion last? I mean, when were you certain as to the time you were to take command? retroactively - starting on the 20th or the 21st, which date I probably departed. I believe that we were clear about everything around the 15th or 16th. of Einsatzgruppe B from 1 November on? I started my service, as stated before, on the 30th of November, and of course there might be a difference of one or two days in that. were chief of Einsatzgruppe B from 1 November on? chief of the Einsatzgruppe B is dated the 1st of November. However, the actual starting of service, and therefore taking over the power of command as chief of Einsatzgruppe B, only took place around the 30th of November. Those differences between the transfer order and actual taking over of the service can always be found. You can see that from my personnel file as well. I would like to refer you, for instance, to my transfer date from Holland to Nuernberg, which was dated 1944. I know even today, and I know that very well, that I started my service on the 9th of June 1944, here in Nuernberg, and that my order of transfer was dated, I believe, May. I can't remember the correct date, but anyway, it was May, and now you can see, there was a certain lapse of time, between the order of transfer and actual starting of service.