the old concept of sovereignty and the egoism of the individual States prevailed again and were embodied anew in the Charter of the League of Nations of 1919. President Wilson's program, however, remained for the most cart unrealized. tive security was created within the framework of the League of Nations. It was to be supported by the Briand-Kellogg Agreement of August 1938, To how great an extent, however, the sovereign States actually remained the masters of international law even at that time, can be seen from the note of Secretary of State Kellogg dated 25 June 1938 to all negotiating States where if says:8 "...The right of self-defense ... is inherent in treaty.
Every nation ... alone is competent to to war in self-defense."
And not later than at the outbreak of the war between Italy and Abyssinia in 1935 did the system of collective security break down completely. 8) During the second World War the individual States were more than ever before the absolutely highest plenomena on earth. tion at this point already that unfortunately a development similar to that after 1018 can be recognized now, after the end of the second World War. For even the Charter of the United Nations leaves the sovereignty of the individual States untouched, The recognition of the right of Veto is a direct consequence thereof. the attitude of the Union of the Socialist Soviet Republics. 8) Cf. the Final Plea of Prof. Jahrreiss before the The so-called Bolshevism, it is true, certainly aims at a world state, as the dictatorship of the proletariat of the earth, organized in a Union of all States as Soviet Republics.
But as long as every State in the world did not experience a revolution in this sense, those States in which the dictatorship of the prolotariat has been established can by no means subordinate themselves to a community under international law in which the BourgeoisStates would hold the majority. It is just in order not to endanger the world dictatorship of the proletariat that the Soviet Republics thus far established have to preserve their sovereignty strictly curing this "transition-period" as a basis for the further world revolutionary struggle. This is the urgent reason why they cannot do without the right of Veto. parallel can be found between 1919 and the period since 1945. During the Paris negotiations of 1919 it became apparent that the victorious powers, in contrast to the program of President Wilson were not ready to abandon the sovereignty and the egoism of their own nations. For Germany the terms of peace meant a violation of the principles laid down in the armistice and a dictate forced upon her, they were the expression of the unrestricted raison d'Etat of the victorious States. Like all sovereign States they came to conclude their right from their power. In a similar way there exists an undoniable contradiction at the present time: On the one hand, according to the Nuernberg Judgment and Control Council Law Mo. 10, the principles of the Hague Convention on Land-Warfare and the Geneva Prisoner of War Convention are alleged to be generally valid international law, for the violation of which even German individual persons are indicted and convicted, and on the other hand the four occupation powers do not observe the limitations imposed by these legal regulations of the Hague Convention on Land-Warfare and the Geneva Convention in their attitude towards occupied Germany.
The two most important examples in this respect are the forcible eviction of about 15 million Germans from Eastern Germany and German Bohemia which had been their German homeland for about a thousand years, and the retention of German Prisoners of War which is contrary to international law. for the victory of "inter"-national law or much better "super" national law over the concept of the raison d'Etat has not yet come. in that statement of the Nuernberg Judgment which is the most important one and at the same time the most difficult one to carry out, said:9) "On the other hand the very essence of the Charter dience imposed by the individual State."
It is obvious that this sentence in reality anticipates the facts and the basic law of a future World State. It is true that Justice Jackson said in his speech before the University of Buffalo in October 1946:10) "At all events, whether they be regarded as a codi teen others.
They are now embodied in the tri bunal's judgment.
That these rules of law apply without dissent at Nuernberg."
9) Official Edition, vol. I, p. 223. 10) Quoted from "New Yord Herald Tribune" of October 6, 1946.
But opposed to that, the Charter of the United Nations only provides for col ective responsibility of the States as such for violations of the Charter; that is to say, the State responsible for the violation is called to account, not the individual concerned. And the General Assembly of the United Nations in its resolution of 11 December 1946 only took note of these new principles, affirmed them and turned them over to a committee for further action.11) The Charter of the United Nations was, however, not amended accordingly. In reality, therefore, there is no State on earth which at this time recognizes the precedence of international law over national law, for all of them are soveriegn. Nor is there any organized supernational power able to protect the individual who finds himself in a position where his national duties of obedience clash with his international duties. 11) This resolution runs as follows: paragraph 1, subparagraph a, of the Charter, to initiate studies and make recommendations for the purposes of encouraging the progressive development of international law and its codification; and of an International Military Tribunal for the prosecution and punishment of the major war criminals of the European Axis signed in London on August 8, 1945, and of the Charter annexed thereto, and of the fact that similar principles had been adopted in the Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the trial of the major war criminals in the Far East, proclaimed at Tokyo on January 19, 1946. nized by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the judgment of the Tribunal; national law established by the resolution of the General Assembly of December, 1946, to treat as a matter of primary importance plans for the formulation, in the context of a general codification of offences against the peace and security of mankind, or of an International Criminal Code, of the principles recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal in the judgment of the Tribunal (Journal of the General Assembly, No. 75, p. 945). (Quoted from "The International Law Quaterly", Vol I, p. 170.)
DR. LUMMERT: I beg your pardon, Your Honor, it has been forgotten to underline these two sentences. I think them to be important - the view point of wanting protection can be decisive. give preference to the international duties would be ruthlessly punished e.g. for military disobedience or hightreason or treason. Mankind is not organized at all; as before it is still divided in the populations of the different States, the so-called Nations, and the individual citizen of such a State - almost like a piece of cattle is treated like part and parcel of his State and has to take a collectivistic part in the fate of his State. d'Etat is of such fundamental importance because they constitute the principle by reason of which actions, which when normally committed by private individuals would constitute murder, arson, robbery, extortion or property damage, are not considered as such if a State committed them. The moral standard, to be applied to the State differs from that of the individual. This concept has thus far been, accepted throughout the world. In every war, no matter how far back we go, innumerable human beings had to lose their lives on either side of the belligerents. But killing within the framework of military measures is not considered murder. It is generally agreed that the leaders of States and Supreme Military Commanders have to observe the rules of international law and the laws of warfare as recognized by all civilized nations. They may be held personally responsible for violations according to the new principles asset forth in the London Agreement dated 8 August 1945 and the Charter of the IMT which were to be included as valid international law in the Charter of the United Nations, but which unfortunately have not been inclouded to this day.
But which penal provisions are applicable to the individual soldiers and officers in the case that the supreme national and military leadership issues orders in violation of international law and law of warfare? This question constitutes one of the main problems in this trial.
Considered from the viewpoint of "unexpectability" the question is as follows. Could the defendant be "expected" independently to examine the order they received from the sovereign Chief of State as to whether it was in compliance with or in violation of international law and if the latter should be case to refuse to carry out the order and to take all consequences upon themselves; up to the forfeiture of their own lives, even though there was no international authority to protect them? and even more so, if the further special circumstances are taken into consideration which I am going to discuss in a minute. lowing: pangs of the new World State. Hitler issued that cruel Fuehrer-order in the middle of 1941 to assure Germany's victory over Bolshevism, i.e. he issued it under the concept of the raison d'Etat, a concept which caused Friedrich Nietzsche, the philosopher, to coin the phrase that the State is the "coldest of all cold monsters." We have to bow in deep sympathy to the unfortunate victims of this order in the East from middle of 1941 onwards which was a result of the concept of the raison d'Etat.
But these defendants here, too, are victims of that concept, Because it is their personal tragedy that fate caused them to become members of these Einsatzgruppen.
b) Secondly I should like to direct the Tribunal's attention to a viewpoint which is rather remote to AngloAmerican thinking but which is worth mentioning for an understanding of the defendant's general attitude. It is the concept of legitimacy and state discipline which was developed above all in Germany. It is easy to explain this viewpoint to a Frenchman, for example, because the same attitude is observed in France though not to the same extent as in Germany. But it is really difficult to explain this mentality to an Anglo-American because as a rule he is not able to understand it and considers it to be absurb. Mr. Winston Churchill dealt with this continental line of thought in his wellknown second secret speech before the House of Commons on 10 December 1942, a few weeks after the Allied landing in North Africa, in answer to the protests raised against the Allied cooperation with Admiral Darlan. I should like to quote from this speech of Mr. Churchill's as follows:12) "I now turn to examine a peculiar form of French men which has overtaken their country.
I am not at all tality.
But it would be very foolish not to try to understand what is passing in other people's minds they respond.
The Almighty in His infinite wisdom Englishmen.
In a state like France which has ex12) Quoted from "Life", Overseas Edition, Vol. 20, No.
5, p. 34.
"of many French officers and officials in times of revolution and change.
It is a highly legalistic sheer anarchy.
For instance, any officer who obeys tions.
From this point of view many Frenchmen who of Verdun and the sole hope of France.
Now all this may seem very absurd to our minds.
But there is one aspect about it which is important to us.
..." It is interesting to hear what a Frenchman has to say about the Germans. Professor Donnedieu de Vabres who was the French judge on the IMT said in a speech delivered in March 1947 before the Association des Etudes Internationales and the Association des Etudes Criminalogiques on the first Nuernberg Trial13) "Defense counsel understood that well.
They have been berty for propaganda purposes.
On the contrary I am of gree, conducted themselves as correct aids to justice," Here a Frenchman who, according to Mr. Churchill, in this connection is almost suspected of being absurd confirms the fact that this discipline has been developed to a particularly high degree in Germany.
No matter whether this fact merits irony or admiration or criticism to the effect that it is absurd, this high degree of discipline must not be disregarded in passing a just judgment on the happenings in Germany under the so-called Third Reich. Moreover, this discipline has historical reasons. In contrast to England which is protected by nature through the sea or to the USA which never in their history have been the objective of a foreign invasion Germany's borders are unprotected all around and she has experienced numerous invasions from the West, North, South-East and East. Since, according to Macchiavelli's wisdom whose opinion was recognized during the past centuries, the neighboring State was the natural enemy and only the neighbor's neighbor a friend, it was a consequence of natural conditions that Germany in the interest of self-preservation had to organize herself in a disciplined way, and Prussia took the leading part in this organization during the past 250 years. The limited economic possibilities of Germany furthered 13) -"Le proces do Nuremberg". - Original text of the quotation.
"Les avocats de la defense l'ontbien compris. Certains lour ont re proche d'avoir abuse do leur liberte pour faire do la propagande.
J'estime, au contraire, et c'est aussi, je crois, la pensee du Tri auxiliaires corrects do la justice."
the tense organizing additionally. All this influenced the German mentality. The Christian Churches supported the State in this development, above all by the quotation from the Bible that Each man should render obedience to his master who has power over him. Expressed briefly, the German people is obedient to the State and to orders.
If any mere proof is needed to corroborate the German people's particular public discipline this proof can be found in the incredibly small percentage of acts directed against the occupation powers. The German people subordinates itself in a matter of fact way to the military dictatorship which succeeded the brown dictatorship. sharp distinction between public law and private law as we find it in Germany and as it is not known in Anglo-American legal doctrine. Furthermore, it must be mentioned here that in German Law acts of State officials are not to be evaluated as acts done by these individuals but as acts of the State only. lation as provided by the Weimar Constitution of 1919 was no longer able after 1930, to meet the difficult economic and political situation in Germany. Several years before the so-called seizure of power of 30 January 1933 the Government in Germany used a dictatorship, based upon Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution. Hitler's Government was nothing but a continuation, though a stricter one, of the method of governing already previously adopted. cipline which was brought about by the increased penalties for violations of the duty of obedience during the war. In this connection I should like to refer to documents Blume Nos. 1 - 3.14) 14) - Cf. Transcript pp. 1766 and 1853 - 1857.
cipline of the State is not relevant in this connection because this abuse was not clearly recognizable within Germany and partly because no criticism of any kind was tolerated. I shall come back to this problem in the next paragraph. it can be said that only within the framework of this special discipline of the German people and State could such actions as are at issue here be ordered and executed by the State-Government.
c) In the third place, the point of view of the so-called mass-psychology must be mentioned. Here again this brief plea cannot possibly deal with this point of view exhaustively. I only went to stress one fact: it is a fact in mass-psychology that every people wants to have its heroes. These heroes are glorified, sometimes even idolized by propaganda, no matter whether or not they actually merit adoration to such extent or any adoration at all.
Such a hero e.g. for the majority of the Germans was formerly Fieldmarshal v. Hindenburg and for the majority of the French Marshal Petain. A popular hero of that type is e.g. General Eisenhower; no loyal American would permit anybody to talk disrespectfully about him. such a hero for the overwhelming majority of the German people. In this connection it is of no importance, that Hitler, as it appears to-day, had a Janus-head, i.e. on the one hand he showed the ideal characteristics of a hero and almost infallible leader of the German people as contended by the German propaganda and on the other hand, at any rate during the last years, the characteristics of a criminal or maniac carefully concealed by the propaganda. The mysteries about Hitler's personality have not been solved up to this day. The only relevant fact in this connection is that the bulk of the German people in the years following 1933, more and more considered Hitler as stateman whose qualities of leadership and conduct were almost those of a superman and of whom only the very best could be expected.
He solved the big problem of unemployment (whether this was done through the rearmament which in the beginning was strictly secret has been contested and was not known to the bulk of the people or at least they were not conscious of it). And there was no event in the later years which consolidated Hitler's position with the bulk of the German people as much as the Anscluss of Austria in the Spring of 1936. It must be borne in mind that the reunion of the Germans living in Austria and German-Bohemia with the rest of Germany had been a unanimous demand of all Germans, German Austrians and German-Bohemians in 1919, that, however, the peace treaties of Versailles and St. German had forbidden such a reunion, in flagrant violation of the right of self-determination of peoples which constituted one of the most important points of President Wilson's program. The tremendous support for the Anschluss of Austria within the German people is shown by document Blume No. 9: One must imagine what it meant if at that time a.o. the Austrian cardinals and bishops welcomed the Anschluss of Austria to Germany with the words "Heil Hitler".
It was this ideal side of Hitler's Janus-Head in which the bulk of the German people had unlimited confidence and to which it was definitely obedient.
Three circumstances played a particular part in this connection?
1) The recognition granted to the Third Reich and Hitler personally by foreign countries. I should like to refer e.g. to the glorification of Hitler in Eiscount Rothermere's book "Warnings and Prophecies" published in 1939.
2) The extraordinary effectiveness of the propaganda within Germany.
15) The judgment of the IMT states: 15) - Official Edition, vol. I, p. 182.
"Through the effective control of the radio and the press, ance of the regime.
Hostile criticism, indeed criticism imposed on those who indulged in it.
Independent judgment,
3) Hitler's contention which he already presented in his book "Mein Kampf" was: "Terror can only be broken by terror".16)This sentence meant that the red and communist terror could only be broken by strict force on the part of the State. Many people in Germany acquiesced in various terror-measures under the Nazi-regime of which they heard because they considered such dictatorial measures indispensable as defense against and for avoidance of the red terror, even though on principle they did not approve of them. The following words of the Austrian bishops were to be similarly understood:17) "We are also convinced that the danger of the all-destroying the National-Socialist movement."
men and foreigners who maintain that in case the moderate parties in France should not be able to remain in power a dictatorship by de Gaulle would still be preferable to a communist dictatorship. A similar attitude can be found in many instances with regard to the dictators Franco and Salazar.
For many Germans, however, Hitler's abuse of the command-power of the State became obvious at the outbreak of World War No. II. But at this moment it was too late. For actually at that time nobody in Germany could offer resistance to the development which led to the catastrophe. Moreover every campaign was explained and presented to the German people by its Government as a purely defensive war, and this was also true of the Russian campaign, I refer to Blume document No. 14 end the borderlines between an 16) - Cf. e.g. pp. 44-46 in "Mein Kampf", 489-493, Ed., 1939. 17) - Blume document No. 9, p. 4 (Doc. Book I, p. 98) aggressive and a defensive war are not fixed.
President Roosevelt in his radio speech on 11 September, 1941, in giving the reasons for his order to shoot at German and Italian submarines, said very strikingly:18) "If one sees a rattlesnake rising one does not wait for it to jerk but smashes it before."
Summarizing I might say: At least until about the middle of 1943 the bulk of the German people believed in Adolf Hitler as an eminent statesman and General and German hero in a manner which in the last analysis can only be explained by making use of the experiences in mass-psychology and psychology of nations.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Lummert, do you agree this might be a good point at which to suspend for lunch?
DR. LUMMERT: Yes, certainly.
THE PRESIDENT: Then we will be in recess until :45. summations after we reconvene.
(The Tribunal reconvened at 1345 hours, 9 February 1948)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
DR. KOESSL: Dr. Koessl for the defendant Braune. The defense counsel discussed.
In view of the fact that his final plea is to be ready
THE PRESIDENT: Do you want him taken into Room 57?
DR. KOESSL: Yes, please.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Braune will be excused and taken to Room 57 so he may confer with his counsel.
Proceed Dr. Lummert.
DR. LUMMERT: It is on page 20, Your Honor.
In the fourth place, as regards the "unexpectability" as set forth the East.
In order to avoid repetitions I should like to refer to the detailed expert opinion of Professor Dr. Maurach (Document Ohlendorf No. 38) and I should like briefly to call attention to the Soviet fact which was set forth by Prof.
Maurach in detail that at that e.g. in Poland and in Russia.
Everybody in Russia and Poland knew and still knows what the word "horpom" or "pogrom" means.
In Germany pronounce or spell it with an "r" in the wrong place, namely "program" (as if the word contains the Latin prefix "pro"). Without the compel Last but not least, in connection with the "unexpectability", the Fuehrer Order to the Einsatzgruppen in the East and the direct orders of the superiors, e.g. of Brigadefuehrer Nebe to the defendant Blume, and the urgent character of these orders must be taken into consideration.
Here "unexpectability" and the legal aspects of necessity, in particular necessity caused by orders issued, overlap. Since these questions are dealt with in some detail by my colleagues Dr. Aschenauer and Dr. Gawlik I take the liberty of referring to their statements.
Summarizing I may say: If the Tribunal is to pass a fair judgment in this phenomenal trial, all the special conditions with regard to the legal problem of "unexpectability" with which the defendants were faced in 1941 have to be considered, from the point of view of the defendants at that time. In effect J u s t i c e - without any feelings of hatred or revenge and without any prejudice - can only be administered in that way.
I now turn to the case of the defendant Dr. Blume who is represented by me before this Tribunal. ed i.e. the actions of the defendant Blume in his position as temporary commander of Sonderkommando 7 a in the East in the summer of 1941, from the beginning of July until 15 August, 1941, the Prosecution and I as defense counsel are fundamentally in agreement as far as I can see. This is the reason why neither the Prosecution, as I was told by Mr. Ferencz, nor I myself drafted a closing brief for the defendant Blume. 7a can clearly be seen 20)
a) from his own examination and the two supplementary affidavits he gave (Blume documents nos. 4 and 13). 20) Cf. Transcript pp. 1764-1846, 1858 - 1863, 1867 - 1875, 1881
b) from the reports of events for the time in question (see Blume Document nos. 5 and 6).21)
c) from his affidavit NO-4145, Prosecution's Exhibit No. 10, in connection with the letter written by the defendant Blume to Mr. Wartenberg on 29 June 1947, to complete this affidavit (Blume Document No. 8);
d) from the affidavit of the witness Radl (Blume Document No. 11);
e) from the affidavit of the witness Krueckemeier (Blume Document No. 12);
f) and finally from the excerpts from the newspaper (Voelkischer Beobachter) offered as a supplement (Blume Document No. 7) and some additional evidence, i.e. the two affidavits of the defendant Steimle (Prosecution's Exhibits nos. 119 and 61) and the examinations of the witnesses Naumann, Schulz, Six and Steimle by me as counsel for the defendant Blume. roughly credible way. They are borne out by the entire evidence. I believe I can say that the Tribunal in examining the defendant Blume gained the impression of a frank, upright and truthful character. (Blume documents no.s 15 - 29 and 31 - 35). Sonderkommando 7 a during the period of time up to 20 August, 1941, in the report of events no. 73 (Blume document No. 6, 0. 25) there is such a bulk of material in evidence before the Tribunal concerning the exaggerated figures of liquidations usually reported by Brigadefuehrer Nebe, who was Chief of Einsatzgruppe B, that this alone is sufficient to consider this figure as refuted.22) 21) Cf. transcript pp. 1805 - 1822. 22) Cf. examination of witness Blume, transcript pp. 18-3, 1807-1808, and 1818; affidavit Radl (Blume doc.
No. 11), p. 5; furthermore the Ott in this respect (transcript pp.
535, 825, 2234, 3768) as well as the affidavit of the witness.
Fumy (Ohlendorf document no, 32) approve of the Fuehrer -Order concerning the liquidations and-that as far as at all possible he evaded its execution.
but when executing it he acted because of extreme emergency 23) and finally, as early as in the middle of August 1941, he was relieved as being too "soft and burocratic" and was ordered back to Berlin.
Concerning this latter Six, and Steimle and Steimle's two affidavits.
24) charge of it, are the following:
1.) On 7 July, 1941, in the morning the shooting of 50-60 persons from Minsk.
This liquidation had been categorically ordered the the reluctance of the defendant Blume.
Nebe had directly ordered defendant Blume because of his obvious aversion to it.
For this liquidation.
In view of the order issued by Nebe to Foltis, Blume
2.) On 19 or 20 July, 1941, the liquidation of about 80 persons in Witebsk.
The defendant Blume himself ordered Hauptsturmfuehrer Foltis left Witebsk.
The defendant Blume on the witness stand, testified as the liquidation; I should like to refer to this testimony.
25)This is 23) Cf. trans.
pp. 1768-1770, 1777-1779-1790, and 1837-1840; affidavit Radl (Blume document No. 11), pp.
3-5 24) See trans.
pp. 847, 1025, 1378, and 2024 as well as Pros. Exh.
nos. 119 and 61 (cf. trans. p. 1823) 25) Cf. transcript pp.
1787-1790; furthermore aff. Radl. p. 5) On the other hand the defendant Blume had nothing to do with the shooting of 27 Jews in Witebsk who refused to come to work and which took place a short time before, because Foltis carried out this execution under the Fuehrer Order on his own initiative without the defendant Blume having issued such an order or having any knowledge of it.
July and beginning of August 1941 - Hauptsturmfuehrer Foltis was ordered to Welish to fight partisans. There Foltis independently and on his own initiative carried out the liquidation of 50 - 60 people. The defendant Blume did not issue an order in this case either, on the contrary, this liquidation was in contradiction to the firm resolution Blume had made in Witebsk after the liquidation there to avoid any similar situation by all means. The defendant Blume only learned about it when Foltis returned from Welish. He therefore had no chance to prevent the execution. Foltis acted within the framework of the Fuehrer Order. armed partisans or saboteurs in very rare cases only, altogether about 10 - 15 persons within 6 weeks. On the witness stand the defendant Blume testified that in such cases careful interrogations used to take place, and that executions which were ordered according to the Fuehrer Order concerning such cases were carried out only if the guilt of the partisans or saboteurs had been clearly proved. I believe I need not go into further details in this connection.
The above mentioned enumeration is complete (paragraphs 1-4). This has been confirmed by the defendant Blume on the witness stand under 26) oath.
only remains the shooting of about 80 Jews in Witebsk on 19 or 20 July 26) Cf. transcript p. 1805 (on this page the translation unfortunate ly is incorrect and incomplete.)
1941, carried out by the defendant Blume by strict order of his superior Nebe. I want to call Your Honor's attention to the fact that the defendant Blume, from the beginning, admitted this case voluntarily and on his own. There is no report of events and no other evidence concerning this case. The defendant Blume in this connection is incriminated only by his own testimony which he gave voluntarily.
I should like to request the Court, in deciding the defendant Blume's guilt or innnocence in this case - Witebsk - to take into consideration all statements which I made in the first part of my plea concerning "unexpectability", and which the defendant Blume made on the witness stand about the details of the state of emergency in which he found himself at that time. The conclusion can only be as follows:
The defendant Blume could not be "expected" to act differently in the Witebsk case.
He had no other choice at that time. If he had refused to obey Nebe's order, a court martial proceeding would certainly have been started against him which would have resulted in a death sentence. This alternative, however, left no moral choice for him. as his good character is concerned - was and is the very contrary of what the Prosecution has contended at the beginning of this trial. The Prosecution stated in its opening statement:
"Each of the defendants in the dock held a position of responsibility or command in an extermination unit. Each assumed the right to decide the fate of men, and death was the intended result of his power and contempt."
None of this has been proved against the defendant Blume. On the contrary, it is proved that the defendant Blume never wanted the killing of Jews, that he ordered it in a single case - Witebsk - only under extreme compulsion limiting it to able-bodied men and sparing women and children, that from Witebsk he sent a courageous report to his superior Nebe with the aim of preventing the liquidation of the Jews and of having the Fuehrer Order revoked ,27) that in his conversation with the local commander at Wilna he did not intend the killing of Jews, but recommended very limited measures under the necessity of the Fuehrer Order.