of the Fuehrer-decree can be deducted unequivocally from the aforementioned actions of the Kommando. It must be conceded to the accused that it was not consistent with his character to order the death of defenseless people only because they were members of a certain race. In view of the fact that the Fuehrer decree was a binding law, he must be given credit for having intentionally taken advantage of the situation existing in the area of SK 7a in order to evade the implementation of the Fuehrer decree. He was perfectly aware of the fact that he was responsible to his superiors in this matter. However, the serious danger, represented by the partisans, was a sufficient justification for him to shelve the Fuehrer decree -without endangering his own personand give priority rather to other operations of his Kommando which he intentionally and deliberately ordered for this purpose. The reports sent to Einsatzgruppe B by his sub-detachment left no doubt in the mind of STEIMLE's superiors about the nature of his activities. These were obviously approved of by the superior authority, as he never was called to account in a disciplinary way. This fact must not be allowed to prejudice him today. Reich Main Security Office - his second assignment in Russia as Commander of Sonderkommando 4a of Einsatzgruppe C. He held this command up to 15 January 1943, when he returned to Germany for an assignment with Office VI of the Reich Main Security Office. Reference is made to the defendant's statement made on the stand with regard to the events which took place during this second commitment in Russia and in the aforementioned period (pages 1985 to 1993 of the English transcript) . There is no need to go into this lucid presentation of the matter once more. The defendant's statements correspond with the truth and even a very sharp cross-examination could not reveal any contradictions. assignment of STEIMLE in Russia. His second mission was not a matter of his own initiative, nor was it based on the fact that he had previously been in charge of a Sonderkommando.
The only real reason was - strange as it may sound - the personal friction existing between two Office Chiefs in the Reich Main Security Office. This state of affairs prevented STEIMLE from being assigned to Office VI of the RSHA, as had already been planned in the middle of 1942, and the outcome was that STEIMLE was detailed to Russia for a second time. Document STEIMLE No. 10. Exh. No. 10 establishes this very clearly.
The operations of STEIMLE's Sonderkommando 4a were marked by the fact that the individual sub-units had to operate far in the field and that an exceptionally large area had to be covered by the operations of the Kommando. At times, SK 42 had to detail sub-units to 3 different armies; these sub-units in turn maintained direct contact with the prospective troop units by their own liaison officers. Thus, the great distance between the various details resulted in the unorthodox situation that these details were temporarily subordinate to the corresponding Feldkommandanturen. STEIMLE found this situation was already existing when he arrived, and local conditions did not allow this state of affairs to be changed. The strength of personnel of Sonderkommando 4a amounted to about 80 man, that is to say, considerably less than the usual strength of personnel assigned to the other Einsatz- and Sonderkommandos. In addition, the defendant STEIMLE had to turn over, whilst he had charge of SK 4a, additional personnel to the Commander of Cha*kow. From these facts, it can be easily seen that the exploits of SK 4a and its sub-units cannot have been of great purport. Here again, the main object of the activities was, of course, the combatting of partisans. These, however, had but small opportunities for major operations in the wide, open, and sparsely settled region of the river Don, no suitable hiding places quickly to be reached being available. The engagements with partisans were, for this reason, only few during this period. As the Kommando was partly operating immediately behind the front line, its tasks were often of a different nature.
The sub-units were also affected by the movements of the armies in the sector, which were necessitated in the course of strategic regroupings; this affected the details insofar as they had to take part in these movements in order to maintain contact with the forces they were assigned to. This epoch of the SK 4a under STEIMLE is thus also marked by marching movements.
The zone of operations assigned to SK 4a. especially the region around Kursk, where STEIMLE set up his command post - had been in German hands for some time, viz. for more than a year. Security tasks thus comprised only cases of active, hostile resistance such as espionage, sabotage and communistic agitation in defiance of Wehrmacht regulations. All such cases, the number of which was small anyway, were decided upon after a close interrogation for which trained personnel was available. Here again, the defendant STEIMLE checked on these proceedings and confirmed the decisions insofar as they became known to him. The details, operating very far in the field, had, of course, to be given independent authority in this matter and were subordinate to the Feldkommandaturen. not a single action against Jews implementing the Fuehrer decree was carried out. In this connection, it is interesting to note that the defendant has pointed out that he was never advised of the fact that the Fuehrer decree covered not only Jews, but also asocial elements, Gypsies and Asiatics. As already mentioned in this connection with his activity as Commander of SK 7a of Einsatzgruppe B, STEIMLE Had not been indoctrinated on the subject of the Fuehrer decree in Pretzsch or in Dueben. Thus, it is understandable that he has never heard the full wording of this decree, since he depended solely on the information derived from his superiors and from the men of his Sonderkommando. The context of these informations, however, depended on the actual requirements of the situation at any given time, I have shown that the defendant STEIMLE never heard that according to the Fuehrer decree Jews had to be shot, before members of Sonderkommando 7a told him that at one time, under his predecessor, they had been obliged to shoot Jews, and before the Einsatzgruppe leader NEBE once told him that the SK 7a had not shot any Jewish women and children yet.
He never learned of the order to shoot the remaining groups of persons mentioned nor did any such executions take place within the area with which he was conversant. know, viz. the shooting of Jews, had not changed before he was sent to Russia for the 2nd time, to take charge of Sonderkommando 4a. No wonder then that under his command SK 4a did not shoot any Jews. In this connection, we must also keep in mind that the prosecution does not incriminate STEIMLE for this period and no evidence has, therefore, been submitted for this period. Reports were still made to the Reich Main Security Office in 1942 and 1943. These reports still mention executions of Jews; it appears, however, that the number of such executions had considerably decreased as compared with the incident reports available for 1941. The evacuation measures started in 1941 wherein the Jews were given priority, had necessarily resulted in a new situation: regions which prior to the war had been sparsely inhabited by Jews were now practically devoid of Jews. If the defendant STEIMLE asserts that there were no Jews left in his area, this is true. This cannot be challenged, as there is no proof to the contrary. The fact that in other areas a small number of Jews still existed at that time, is in no way inconsistent with STEIMLE's assertion. the prosecution-the first of which took place as early as in 1945 and on the stand, the defendant STEIMLE has stated frequently and truly that he found a gas-van when he first reached SK 4a. He then described at full length how he happened to come across this van and in which condition he found it. Utilization of the gas-van for its original purpose was no longer possible at that time. If the defendant emphasizes that he did not utilize this car, this is not only credible because no Jews were to be found in his area any more but also because any proof to the contrary is lacking and because the prosecution has not even tried to bring such evidence.
To sum up,we conclude that also during the period of STEIMLE's second mission in Russia neither he himself nor the men of Sonderkommando 4a ever committed any acts which could justify the charges. The only document submitted by the prosecution which to a certain extent admits any conclusions for this period at all is prosecution document NO-3247, Exh.121. This document, however, does not contradict the above conclusions. It rather indirectly supports the defendant's statement covering the time he spent with Sonderkommando 4a. On pages 7 and 8 of the original document, which contain a suggestion of promoting the defendant STEIMLE, it is pointed out in particular that Sonderkommando 4a was frequently involved in combat actions during the winter battle of 1942/43 and that it had proved its worth. It is quite obvious that the term "combat" covers only actual fighting engagements with the enemy in the battle field. From this sentence, we are bound to conclude that the SK 4a was engaged in the very front line combatting the Red Army jointly with Wehrmacht units. That is the only feature concerning STEIMLE's activities in the East where is mentioned in this suggestion of promoting the defendant STEIMLE, and it was obviously considered the only point worth of mention. There can be no doubt whatsoever that in such a document it would have been stressed with the utmost emphasis and even by way of overstatements, that the defendant had been particularly efficient in the implementation of the Fuehrer Decree - as it is now charged against him - if it had been at all possible to support such assertion by facts. Since no such mention has been made in the exhibit, this is striking proof for the truth of STEIMLE's statements. This proof, however, not only covers the time of his second mission in Russia but also a period when STEIMLE was commander of Sonderkommando 7a of Einsatzgruppe B.
principles which are internationally acknowledged, the infringement of national penal laws, and an utter disregard of the most primitive protection a human being is entitled to in his sphere of life in this connection. The indictment bases itself on Control Council Law No. 10 and on the offenses, the elements of which are enumerated in Article II thereof. These provisions, however, only represent an outer framework. It has been pointed out again and again by the defense in all proceedings before the Military Tribunals in Nuernberg that Control Council Law 10 cannot be applied as long as its application is inconsistent with the generally acknowledged legal maxims of "nullum crimen sine lege" and "nulla poena sine lege". I do not want to repeat all the arguments already submitted to the effect that it is impossible to punish a person for an offense which at the time of commission had not yet been declared criminal in penal law, and that nobody can be subjected to a punishment which had not been provided for at the time when the crime was committed. These legal maxims are the most fundamental axioms forming part of the criminal jurisprudence of every civilized nation. In logical consequence, we thus reach the conclusion that Control Council Law No. 10 can be taken as a legal basis for this proceeding only insofar as the elements of offenses enumerated there as criminal coincide with those for which the defendant Steimle was liable to punishment according to the law effective at the time of commission. This is, therefore, the pattern according to which the frame-work provided by Control Council Law No. 10 must be filled in. Insofar as this applies to substantive law, it is of no purport for the case of the defendant Steimle. The defense believes to have proven that the defendant Steimle neither during the time he was employed in the East, nor before or after, ever committed any punishable acts which must be atoned for according to international law or the penal law code of any nation.
laid down in Control Council Law No. 10 are a direct violation of the fundamental principles mentioned above. Special reference is made to Arti. II, sections 2c - e. These forms of participation are now rulings inconsistent with all continental penal codes. In particular, they are completely unknown in German penal law, to which the defendant Steimle was subject. I shall, therefore, discuss these provisions only as a subsidiary argument, in order to show that they do not apply to the facts of the case, as such, and that the defendant Steimle cannot be found guilty even in case these provisions were applied. while employed in the East kept within the established rules of international law and of the law of warfare then actually in force. The combatting of partisans and spies has been carrried out persistently in all wars and by all nations. Nobody can challenge the validity of the legal rules which have been developed with regard to this fight. Despite the special nature of warfare against the Red Army, waged on the part of the Soviets in defiance of the laws of warfare, the defendant Steimle never deviated from the course prescribed by the law. did not commit any crimes in the meaning of Control Council Law No. 10 nor did the members of the Kommando under him commit such crimes. He can, therefore, neither be convicted as principal nor as instigator nor as accessory. Similarly, the other forms of participation defined in Art. II section 2 c of the Control Council Law (but not contained in the continental penal codes) do not apply to him at all. On the basis of the evidence submitted by the prosecution, he cannot be charged with having taken a consenting part in any crimes whatsoever. Neither was he in any way connected with the planning and committing of such crimes. This assumption would only be justified if Steimle had been conversant with the purpose and aims of the Einsatzgruppen prior to their first commitment and if he had, in addition, taken part in the planning of their organization.
The evidence submitted by the prosecution has furnished no indications in this direction. It seems, therefore, superfluous further to discuss the elements of these forms of participation.
However, a last form of participation has been laid down by Art. II, sec. 2. According to this provision, an individual is guilty of a crime in the meaning of Art. II, Sec. 1 of Control Council Law No. 10, if he or she was a member of an organization or group connected with crimes of the character listed in sec. 1. independent "militant" units; they were by no means departments or branches of the organization of the Chief of the Security Police and of the SD. Even less were they departments or branches of one or the other of the offices of the Reich Main Security Office. This is very clearly shown by the fact that the Einsatzgruppen and their sub-units were subordinate to the Army Groups and/or Armies. It is made still clearer by the variety - so frequently proved in this proceeding - of those groups of persons with which both the rank and file and the leader corps of the Einsatzgruppen were staffed. Beside SD members, we find in the Einsatzgruppen members of the Stapo, the criminal police, the Waffen-SS, the regular police and the Wehrmacht. The findings of the IMT particularly stress this variety. They also stress the fact that in the front areas the Einsatzgruppen were under the control of the permanent commander in chief of the army. The assignment to these independent units of the Einsatzgruppen was effected by an order of the superior command authority having jurisdiction over the individual in question, in the same way in which Wehrmacht members were assigned to special units of the combat troops. In this connection, the IMT has acknowledged the fact that SD members were, particularly during the war and in the occupied territories, not in a position to refuse - without incurring the most severe punishment - to accept an assignment given to them.
There can be no doubt that Steimle's two periods of employment in the Sonderkommandos were brought about by official orders, and that he joined the Sonderkommandos in compliance with orders which he was in no position to refuse. The notion of membership, in the general meaning of the term, implies the voluntary decision to become a member; it cannot apply to a man who joined the Sonderkommandos in the way described above, no consideration whatsoever being given to his own intentions. When judging on this matter, it is absolutely necessary to take as a basis the conditions actually prevailing at that time and, in particular, to consider that Germany was under a dictatorship which knew only too well how to secure complete compliance with its orders. There again, the mental elements implied by the term "membership" must also be considered. The very fact that the Einsatzgruppen included members of all the various organizations of the Party and the State, militates against the conclusion that a man who volunteered for one of the SS organizations, viz. the SD, and who was later assigned to the Einsatzgruppen, became a member of the latter in the general meaning of the term. The concept of "membership" implies not only cognizance of the group or organization which an individual is joining, but it also requires that the prospective member approves of the effect, in other words, that he intends to be a member in that organization. A man who volunteered for the SD knew which organization he was joining and acquired the membership by his own free will. A man who was assigned to the Einsatzgruppen by way of an order, on the other hand, was in no way in a position to determine whether or not he wanted to be a member. Furthermore, the members of a group can only be considered members, if they have the definite intention to cooperate in the fulfillment of the purpose of the group or organization. Prior to his arrival in Russia, the defendant Steimle had no idea of the purport of his tasks.
In practice, he adapted his activities to the conditions prevailing; by the way he performed his tasks, he clearly showed that he did not approve of the implementation of the Fuehrer-Decree. As for himself, he kept, therefore, aloof from it; thus, he clearly disrupted the unity of purpose common to the members of such an organization. He never furthered the purposes and aims with which the Einsatzgruppen are charged by the prosecution, nor did the fact that he was a member ever contribute to their implementation. The defense is , therefore, convinced that the defendant Steimle cannot be convicted even of that form of participation which I discussed just now; this applies quite apart from the fact that this conception of participation violates in my opinion the fundamental rules of criminal law which I mentioned before. According to the maxim that every defendant is presumed not guilty until the contrary is proved, the evidence produced by the prosecution is by no means sufficient in order to refute this presumption without any reasonable doubt. It must be kept in mind that the men in the dock were not the inaugurators of the events now under the judgment of this Court, but that they were, at the utmost, tools in the hands of a dictator. Not every tool is equally apt for the purpose for which it was designed. It must not be overlooked that not all leaders of the Einsatzgruppen and not by far all leaders of the Einsatz- and Sonderkommandos are in the dock. We must not succumb to the impression - an impression which could be formed easily - that the events in the East, of which the prosecution has produced evidence, had been implemented only and exclusively by those leaders who are present in this Courtroom. This notion would mean a conviction based on a superficial and misleading aspect, in other words only on the fact that the defendants served in the Einsatzgruppen. This wrong inference can easily be avoided by applying to the determination of the personal guilt of the individual defendants those standards of diligence which we can safely expect from this Court.
evidence militates for the defendant and supports his deposition on the stand so unambiguously, that it is impossible to deem the defendant guilty, particularly under counts one and two. I am convinced that the Court will roach the same conclusion.
I shall now tackle count three of the indictment, viz. the membership in criminal organizations. The SD has been declared a criminal organization by the IMT; this also includes office VI of the Reich Main Security Office. It has been established beyond any doubt that in 1936 Steimle voluntarily joined the SD, an organization of the SS, and that the later entered the Office VI of the Reich Main Security Office, again on a voluntary basis. It may be mentioned cursorily that Steimle was never a member of the general SS, but that his activities were restricted to his work in a special SS organization, viz. the SD. These facts have been stated by the defendant from the outset and they have been confirmed by the evidence. Prior to the discussion of those considerations which have caused the IMT to declare the SD a criminal organization in the above sense, I feel it is indicated to give you a character-study of the defendant Steimle, as resulting from the documents produced by the defense. Only if this entire picture is taken into consideration, a proper verdict can be rendered on this count. In this connection, I re-iterate that it is indispensable to consider the actual conditions as they then existed and to make them your starting point. It will then be revealed that the activities of the defendant Steimle in the East followed the same trends in which he had been brought up, as a human being, even before 1933, and to which he had adhered during his SD activities in Stuttgart and in the Office VI of the Reich Main Security Office.
1.) The affidavits submitted by me as Documents No. 1-8, exhibits No. 1-8, unanimously describe the defendant as an honorable man of innate decency, striving to propagate this decency in his surroundings and trying for his part to ensure that the political leadership of the State conformed with this attitude.
The motive causing him to enter the SD was that this job gave him an opportunity of counteracting abuses in the Party and unjustified measures of the authorities. May I point out that it was one of the characteristics of the Nazi regime to eliminate every trace of criticism of measures taken by the Party and the State. The SD alone offered a possibility for cautious criticism (later on even developing into unveiled frankness); at the same time, it offered a safeguard from the consequences otherwise automatically incurred by such a rash act. The fact that within the scope of his activities Steimle availed himself fully of this opportunity for criticism, is made particularly clear, i.e. by the document Steimle No. 3, Exh. No. 3, in which a former executive of the Wuerttemberg Ministry of the Interior furnishes detailed facts concerning Steimle's criticisms and their extent. intrinsic sincerity of the defendant, who intervened on behalf of all those whom he found decent and worthy themselves. If such persons, not being party members, criticized the measures of the Third Reich, he did not feel himself called upon to persecute them; on the contrary, he was instrumental in stopping or neutralizing such persecutions. When individual cases were submitted to him, in which persons had been put into concentration camps, he never grudged his assistance. This clearly shows that he endeavored to prevent sinister and unjustified measures initiated by other quarters or to have them rescinded. The fact that Steimle was far from advocating unjustified political measures, is made particularly clear by his attitude toward the Jewish problem. According to the documents submitted by me, he more than once lent his assistance to persecuted Jews, and it is an established fact that he took no part in the anti-Jewish program of November 1938. This is repeatedly proved by Exh. No. 6, Doc. Steimle No. 6. In particular, I would like to stress the document Steimle No. 5, Exh. No. 5. It contains actual facts which clearly illustrate that Steimle was by no means one of those fanatics who adhere to any policy whatsoever without any qualms and who lack any convictions of their own.
As far as possible under the conditions prevailing, he surely was an idealist devoted to, and working for, a cause which he considered right, and he was not in a position to foresee the final outcome.
Court No. II, Case No. IX.
We would not do justice to him if we disregarded these facts. At the time when STEIMLE joined the organization, even foreign countries did not profess a negative attitude toward the Nazi regime; the defendant STEIMLE then had no reason to disbelieve the often re-iterated public slogans calling for integrity within the state. As to the Jewish problem, he never knew of the final solution actually planned, because the plitical leadership of the state kept this plan absolutely secret. Personally, he believed in the possibility of a solution similar to the solution at present sponsored by the United Nations. In this connection, reference is made to doc. No. 5, Exh. 5. Had he been a fanatic unscrupulously backing any police whatsoever against the Jews, he would never have dreamt of making the slightest move when asked to help a Jew to be released from the concentration camp. This attitude toward the Jewish problem, proved by acts, makes it again understandable that STEIMLE did not implement this part of the Fuehrer-Decree while in charge of the Sonderkommandos. V) With regard to the specific groups of actions which caused the I.M.T.
to declare the S.D. a criminal organization, and to include the co-operated in any of these actions.
It was not the task of the tion in a concentration camp.
At the time of the persecution of charge of political security in that country; it is, therefore, a priori impossible that he took part in these activities.
Of the this was treated as a secret until the end of the war.
If it has Court No. II, Case No. IX.
in the office VI STEIMLE was ever concerned with this matter. The same applies to the finding of the I.M.T. that the SD took part in misused for the commission of crimes.
In order to reach a proper sidered.
As far as STEIMLE, while serving with the Einsatzgruppen (an organization not forming a branch of the SD as such), heard of ascribed to the SD as such.
It must also be kept in mind that the subject to criminal prosecution by the German authorities.
Today, we are relieved from the pressure of dictatorship.
Today, it is easy refused, because it purported the commission of common murder.
At office VI of the Reich Main Security Office (first in group VI B, Western Europe, and later on in the group for military affairs), they, too, could in STEIMLE's mind not result in the assumption that this organization was misused for criminal purposes.
As to Court No. II, Case No. IX.
the documents STEIMLE No. 9, No. 9, and STEIMLE No. 10, exh.
No. 10. He was then concerned with the gathering of information.
the SD by the I.M.T. On the contrary, it again reveals the which reasons and in which spirit the defendant STEIMLE was a member of the SD and of the office VI. The decision on whether or not he is guilty under count three must be left with the court. But a general remark seems indicated: The leadership of the Nazi regime deliberately deceived a large number of people in order to exploit their idealistic convictions. I leave it undecided to which extent this may constitute individual guilt. It remains a fact that the defendant STEIMLE was a member of the SD and of the Office VI of the Reich Main Security Office. But even if the attitude of the defendant which I have explained fully should not be considered a justification in the legal sense, it must at least be condired on attenuating circumstance, as far as Count three is involved. Another indication pointing in the same direction is the finding of the I.M.T. that after the outbreak of the war the members of theSD were not free any longer to choose their assignment and that they were at the same time barred from resigning the SD membership. In these circumstances, the personal guilt of the defendant under count three can only be found in the fact that he voluntarily joined the SD in 1936, in other words at a time in which he was not at all in a position to foresee which duties would be assigned to individual SD members by the leadership of Court No. II, Case No. IX.
the state. I reiterate: It must be left to the court to reach a just verdict.
Your Honors, I have reached the end of my address, but I don't want to conclude without a reiterated appeal for the application of your vast experience and your usual diligence to the decision of this case. I do know that you are facing a difficult task. But I do also know that your professional ability and your experience are devoted not to the cause of revenge, but to the ideal of justice, and that the decision is in the most capable hands. Your verdict will ensure that an individual a man who in the position assigned to him successfully tried to assert his personal decency - does not suffer for the monstrous guilt of the regime.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Hoffmann, if you don't mind, we will let Dr. Bergold begin the first thing Monday morning because, as you know, he has an engagement elsewhere. That will be agreeable to you?
DR. HOFFMANN: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: And then, Dr. Lummert, you, of course, will follow, thirty o'clock.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 9 February 1948, at 0930 hours.)
COURT NO. II, CASE NO. IX.
THE MARSHAL: The Honorable, the Judges of Military Tribunal II.
Military Tribunal II is now in session. God save the United States of America and this Honorable Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: You may proceed, Dr. Bergold.
DR. BERGOLD (Attorney for the Defendant Biberstein):
Mr. President, Your Honors!
"In February 1934; mentally disturbed by the event of the National-Socialist revolution, I retired to a quiet mountain village high in the Bavarian Alps. The form of German democracy, existing at the time, which seemed to me until then correct and just, appeared suddenly as questionable and wrong, not because National-Socialism in my opinion could have justified and proved itself, but because of its Inherent character. It seemed, as if the right of democracy, the way in which it existed at the time, had changed and become a make-belief. It is my hobby to write poetry, because a real man should cultivate hobbies to widen his horizon. Tearing myself from deep reflection on right and wrong under German democracy of the time, I indulged in this hobby in February 1934. and wrote the verse with which I would like to preceed my statements concerning the jurisdiction of this Tribunal. The verse reads as follows:
"'Can just beginnings turn to unjust ends?' I would like to remind the Tribunal, that I have already pointed out in the case against Oswald Pohl, during the "defense of Horst Klein, that it seemed to me, as if in the cation to speak for humanity.
I have said that before the London Conference.
Since this conference has failed, I formal competency.
Tribunal IV, which passed sentence in Law No. 10 it is competent, basing its competency on the authority in Germany.
The Court has not examined, on which reasons for the execution of Governmental power; force "Force, Your Honors, never means Justice.
You, countries at the time.
The Control Council can therefore man People.
This the allied powers are doing now. They "Every agreement, and unconditional surrender is conditions, which result in agreement.
Thus the unity of ally only to the so-called Western Powers.
The so-called "Western Powers have rejected such a surrender, made to them alone, by pointing out that they are Russia's allies, Allied armed forces.
Therefore, the unity of the Allied surrender.
Otherwise, the then already well known plan of Germany's partition into zones would not have seemed "Even if unconditional surrender gives victorious "If international law claims to be ethical, then a justifiable manner.
This legal principle is already incorporated in civil law.
But today, where international al law must be adapted to" civil law, if the term of a new members of defeated nations.
The partition of Germany "in agreement and achieve a truly cooperative administration, able and unfair for the people concerned; moreover, it be "At the moment we have reached the point where the each pursues its own ideas and interests.