"The Gestapo and the SD were coordinated for the first time on 26 June 1936 by having Heydrich, Chief of the SD, appointed Chief of the Security Police, which was intended to comprise both the Gestapo and the Criminal Police."
(The Nuernberg Verdict, p. 102).
"Himmler.....in his capacity as Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police, issued......his decree of 26 June 1936, which enrolled both the Criminal Police or Kripo and the Gestapo in the Security Police and placed the Security Police as well as the SD under Heydrich's orders."
Concerning this the following must be said :
1. The SD was not placed under Heydrich for the first time by Himmler's decree of 26 June 1936, but on the contrary Heydrich had already been in charge of the SD since 1932. He held this command without interruption from 1932 until his death in 1942.
2. Heydrich did not take charge of the Gestapo for the first time on 26 June 1936, but had already become Leader of the Secret State Police Department in April 1934.
3. Heydrich's appointment as Chief of the Fain Office Security Police on 26 June 1936, therefore, was not a transfer of the business of the Security Police to the Chief of the SD, but merely a further extension of the position he had held up to then as Leader of the Secret Police Department. The Main Office Security Police was merely the new organizational form of an already existing condition. Since, of course, the State Police force of the provinces had been under the leadership of Himmler and Heydrich since 1934, the centralization and nationalization of the police forces, which had already been carried out in fact, also required a suitable outward form.
Nor were the Gestapo and the Kripo "enrolled" in the Security Police, but rather the term "Security Police" was invented as a common, inclusive term for the Gestapo and the Kripo, which besides that also retained their old names of Gestapo and Kripo, independently. In spite of the newly created Main Office Security Police, the Secret State Police Department and the Reich Criminal Police Department were also kept as central executive heads for the Gestapo and Criminal Police respectively.
purely a matter concerning the police, as a result of Himmler's appointment as Chief of the German Police in the Reich Ministry of the Interior.
The SD was not affected by this. The SD Main Office had already existed since 1933; it remained independent as before. The reorganization produced no new situation for the SD with respect to the *---* Gestapo or the Security Police, since the SD Main Office and the Secret State Police Department had already been directed simultaneously by Heydrich in person since 1934.
In particular, however, no "coordination" whatsoever of the tasks of the Security Police and the SD, was now effected, nor was any attempt made to secure this by decree. Nothing was changed in 1936 in the SD's work as the Party's information service.
4. Likewise erroneous is the view of the IMT that the consolidation of the Security Police and the SD was in every way confirmed through the foundation of the RSHA by the decree of 27 September 1939 and that both were merged together in a single administrative unit. Also erroneous is the conclusion drawn from the foundation of the RSHA that the SD was now definitely established and active as counter-intelligence organization for the Security Police. which the IMT believed it was able to declare about the development of the SD in connection with the Security Police. the creation of the Main Office Security Police under Heydrich in 1936 the SD drew constantly farther apart from the work of the Gestapo in its range of tasks. To be sure, the SD retained its independent office in the SD Main Office; as representative of its Chief, Heydrich, it also had its own Staff Director who for all practical purposes was the chief superior of the members of the SD Main Office.
(Heydrich himself personally saw only a few members of the SD Main Office on official business, since after 1934 he had his offices in the building of the State Police.) Thus, the SD was also independent in its range of tasks, which were specified by a decree of the Deputy of the Fuehrer in 1934. But for the SD the legitimization of the Party applied only to an information service employed against the Party's enemies. And since in the meantime enemies of the Party and enemies of the State had for all practical purposes been placed on the same footing by the political and constitutional development of the Third Reich and by the creation of the Gestapo, whose principle task and purpose was to combat them, the State police naturally now endeavored, after its organization was definitely established, to concentrate in its own hands the informational aspect of its work on political enemies as well. The justification for this claim is easily discernable. To every investigating service it is obvious that cases to be prosecuted or investigated and its own informational work of investigation and prosecution cannot be separated from each other and that a competing information service is only harmful to its own work. Thus, during the period from 1936 to 1939 things develop to such a point in the SD that through the initiative of the leading State Police officials, Best and Mueller, the SD's original task, which was set for it by the Party as that of collecting information against its political enemies, is first limited and then finally taken away from it. In 1938/39 every tangible enemy information service in the SD comes to an end. A Central Department II/I of the SD Main Office, which up to that time, had done the work of collecting information about the opposition, is dissolved and, insofar as this had not already been done before, its work is transferred to the Gestapo. In the meantime, however, along with the SD's Party work of collecting information about the opposition, a service for collecting information about the various occupational classes had developed in Central Department II/II. It was a miniature copy of what I have described above concerning Department III, Domestic SD, of the RSHA. Its aim, purpose and activity were concen trated exclusively on a service for obtaining factual information of a political and critical nature.
ties and business relationships -- and these things alone are under discussion in this trial -- the founding of the RSHA by the decree of 27.9.1939, contrary to the opinion of the IMT, was not the final arrangement for a coordination, but rather the final arrangement for a partition between the respective tasks and activities of the Gestapo and the SD, which were definitely separated from each other. Henceforth the Domestic SD has sole possession of political and critical business assignments and the Gestapo has sole possession of the intelligence service and executive authority for combatting tangible political and criminal enemies of the State. And neither does the henceforth definitely fixed business assignment and activity of the Domestic SD offer any reason for the assumption that it was definitely established as a counter-intelligence organization for the Security Police by the foundation of the RSHA, nor is any attempt ever made to verify this pure allegation with documentary material. However,the allegation that the Sipo and SD were merged into an organizational, administrative unit by the RSHA cannot be brought into harmony with the actual situation, either.
Himmler's plan was actually to use the RSHA as an opening wedge towards a unified State Police Corps (SS, Sipo and SD). However, in actual fact, apart from the so-called assimulation of ranks the transfer of SS ranks to police officials, this plan remained more wishful thinking on Himmler's part, and the essential reason for this lay in the fact that the Party refused to permit any consolidation of Party and state functions, the supervision of Party tasks by state agencies or even the consolidation of State organizations and Party organizations, and did not abandon this opposition up to the time of the collapse. agency, nor even one which was known to the general public. It remained an internal, administrative structure of the Chief of the Security Police and the SD, which was recognized neither by the Party nor by the State, that is, the organizations of the Security Police and the SD were not merged into one unit; contrary to the assumption of the IMT the RSHA at no time became a department of the Reich Ministry of the Interior.
The Main Office Security Police remained the department in the Reich Ministry of the Interior for the Gestapo and Kripo, and the Secret State Police Department and the Reich Criminal Police Department were retained as before as structures of the Gestapo and the Kripo. Both signed letters to the general public and both drew up their orders within the Reich Ministry of the Interior under these official names.
separately dinanced by the Party, and just as before every position on the SD's TO sheet had to be approved by the Party. The pensions which were also fixed for SD members were not pensions of the RSHA but those of the Party. The founding of the RSHA brought no changes for the Party in its relations with the organizational structure of the SD. For the Party, just as before, the SD Main Office was the only Party organization of the SD. The RSHA did not exist for the Party. Neither should this fact be misconstrued, that the administrative business of the Gestapo, Kripo and SD appeared to be jointly managed in Departments I and II of the RSHA, for in reality separate groups were employed for each of the three branches in Departments I and II, which were staffed by men from these branches. Indeed, in the case of the Criminal Police, not even all personnal and administrative matters were included in the business calendar of Departments I and II of the RSHA. property and was managed separately. The RSHA was not a property holder at all. For example, the buildings and automobiles of Department III, Domestic SD, and of the SD Sections out in the country were Party property and not in any way property of the RSHA. different basic structure of the offices of the Security Police and the SD as irrelevant by referring to the Law for safeguarding the Unity of Party and State of 1. December 1933, then it must be pointed out that contrary to its programmatic title this law in reality only regulates the legal position in the State of the NSDAP, itsformations and its attached units. On the other hand, the law offers no reason for permitting separate agencies of the Party and of the State to become one unit. The presidency of a province does not become one and the same unit with the office of the Gauleiter through the fact that it is usually directed by the local Gauleiter in his capacity as Provincial President.
Likewise, the fact that young candidates for higher administrative positions in the Ministry of Justice, the internal administration and the Party were secured jointly from the ranks of law graduates entering government service as a profession does not make those offices become one unified authority or bring about a coordination of their respective tasks any morethan the partially joint training of the candidates for higher career positions in the Security Police and the SD offers any reason for unification of the Security Police and SD. Nor is this picture changed by the organization of the Security Police and the SD in the regional sphere and in the occupied territories. The IMT itself must admit that for Germany and the territories which were incorporated within the civilian administration of the Reich "the local Gestapo, Criminal Police and SD offices took separate forms". ("The Nuernberg Verdict", p. 103.) If it attempts to discount this actual,territorial and business separation by declaring that the separate officesswere nevertheless subject to the supervision of Security Police and SD inspectors attached to the staffs of the local Higher SS and Police Leaders, then in reply to this it must be said that, first, the inspectors did not belong to the staffs of the Higher SS and Police Leaders and, secondly had no real right whatsoever to issue orders to the offices of the Security Police and the SD. They did not even have any knowledge of the actual work of the local offices. Therefore, they were not able to coordinate the latter in their work, either, apart from the fact that they did not have any orders to do so. Police and the SD in the occupied territories too performed only a Security Service activity, receiving from Office III only such tasks as were in conformity with the area of jurisdiction of Office III. They too were not co-ordinated with the tasks of the Security Police. And if, as a measure of transition to independent offices of the State Police, Criminal Police and Security, only subordinate departments for the tasks of the Reich Main Security agencies were created, the reasons for this have been explained in the WANNINGER document, in every detail.
In no event one of these reasons may lead to considering a co-ordination of the activities of Security Police and Security Service an established fact. The question of the organization of the Einsatzgruppen in connection with the offices of the Reich Main Security Office will be dealt with later on, when the problems of the organization and the activities of the Einsatzgruppen will be broached, in as far as that question has not been dealt with already above. Here I only point out that the Einsatzgruppen must be treated as military units of a peculiar kind, apart from the other organization of the Reich Main Security Office, and are not apt to contribute to the support of the assertion that the Security Police and the security Service were co-ordinated within the offices III and IV of the Reich Main Security Office. Reich Main Security Office was working independently, autonomously, without consideration to, and co-ordination with, the Gestapo or Kripo. While Office III as a party office was busy with technical questions, with an intelligence service concerning the problems of the spheres of life, the task of the Gestapo was investigation into, and fight against, persons dangerous for the state in Germany and the occupied territories. Apart from that, the criminal police had the task of searching for the civilian offender -- as opposed to the political one -and of bringing him to punishment. after 1936, but especially by the year 1939, had the result of coordinating the tasks of the Security Police and Security Service. same chief. This fact of a personal union, however, was no peculiarity in Germany, but could be found in numerous places.
I need only point to GOERING as an example to make this plain. Now, as little as the simultaneous direction of the Reich Air Ministry, the Reich Forestry Office, the 4 Year Plan, and the Reichsjaegermeister Office by GOERING made for a co-ordination of the spheres of these offices, as little did that happen as between Security Police and Security Service by the fact of their joint direction by HEYDRICH. The "Chief of the Security Police and the SD" was only a letter heading of HEYDRICH's, but no authority or co-ordinated agency. The Reich Main Security Office, however, was no uniform authority of the Security Police and SD, which might have co-ordinated their activities, but rather a faction devoid of all reality, and devoid of all power of reformation for the independent structure and the spheres of tasks of Gestapo, Kripo and Security Service which in each case remained independent from other.
I have attempted to give the Court a picture of Ohlendorf's work and goals in the SD, as well as his attitude to human existence. I do not believe that anyone believes this man, who in spite of brusque rejection of his proposals by Himmler and Heydrich repeatedly insisted on a just trial for every last person in protective custody and on establishing the basic rights of the Jews, was capable of any intentions of racial extermination. For exactly this reason the question becomes urgent: under what conditions was the defendant Ohlendorf connected with the events in the East?
The main Counts of the indictment are Counts I and II (indictment pg. 5 and pg. 14ff), i.e. the charges that the defendants committed war crimes and crimes against humanity. of systematic murder of peoples and races.
In the questioning of the individual defendants the "Fuehrer Order" which initiated the measures against certain parts of the Soviet population on which the charges are based was mentioned repeatedly. Reference was made to the repeated defense and acknowledgement of this order by Himmler, Streckenbach. man troops all Jews, Gypsies, Communist officials, active Communists and all other persons who could endanger the security, were to be killed.
The only motive for this order, the "danger to security", was not only expounded in detail by Streckenbach in Pretsch and Heydrich in Berlin before the Einsatzgruppen left for Russia, but was also repeated by Himmler in Nikolajew in October 1941, when he again demanded the strict execution of this order.
When the defendant was asked in the witness box "Did you know of plans or intentions that sought extermination for racial or other reasons?" he answered:
"I expressly assure you that I neither knew of such plans nor was I called on to cooperate in any such plans.
The Obergruppen ted for the Russian campaign.
This is not only true for the were arranged; financial funds even were formed in order to help aid the poorer Jews to make this emigration possible.
Until representatives of the I. G. Farben approached me in order to overcome difficulties with the State Police.
It was then their intention to let so-called bearers of secrets emigrate.
Up to the very end I succeeded in giving such aid.
Thus at the begin the fine cooperation with the Russian population.
They were never objected to.
When Himmler was in Nikolajev, in the begin nor did he give me any other directives.
I am rather convinced it was the work of individual people."
This statement of Ohlendorf's is confirmed in many ways. The witness Wisliczeny, one of the closest collaborators of Eichmann, who was assigned to handle the Jewish questions by Heydrich, said before the I.M.T. that the order for the extermination of Jews was only issued in April 1942 (Doc. bk. Ohlendorf Ia, exhibit 58, doc. No. 37). foreign populations in the East, which were issued in 1940 and expressly approved by the Fuehrer, also speaks against the thought that an extermination of Jews or of other races was planned at that time. (Doc. Ohlendorf No. 63, 64, exh. no. 63).
The letter from Goering to Heydrich dated 31 July 1941 - Doc. PS 710) - which the Prosecution also has presented, still sees the allover solution to the Jewish question in German-dominated Europe, contrary to the conception of the I.M.T., expressly in emigration or evacuation. When in the last part of the letter the word "final solution" is used, it can be seen from the unmistakable meaning of the letter that at that time this word was not a code word for execution.
Ohlendorf's statement that he personally helped Jews to emigrate until 1941, is confirmed by document Ohlendorf No. 31, doc. ing to the Fuehrer order were not sent to Referat IV B 2 (Jews), but to the Referat department IV A 1 (Communism). The Einsatzgruppen were not connected with the Jewish Referat under Eichmann in any way (see the various statements of the defendants on the witness stand and the affidavit of Rudolf Fumy (Doc. Ohlendorf No. 32, doc. bk. Ia,) In my exposition on Ohlendorf's work with the SD I have supported the claim sufficiently that he did not personally think of or strive for an extermination of the Jewish race.
had a knowledge of plans or measures that were designed to exterminate the Jews.
in their closing statement against Otto Ohlendorf, that the executions in the Soviet Union resulting from the Fuehrer order actually were carried out for the "present and permanent security" by the Einsatzgruppen. I quote:
"These executions were carried out for the purpose of "present and permanent security" in the theater of operations of the this defendant."
Prosecution, another error which weakens their position has crept in. For it says in the record, as a quotation of Ohlendorf's statement:
". . . that these Jews are to be killed, and for the reason that German Reich."
while word for the word the quotation is used, on page 634 of the German record, goes like this:
"... that these Jews are to be killed, and for the reason that German Reich."
small extent in the Crimes, was based on the same point of view. of an extension of the Fuehrer Order to goals which were to serve a "permanent" (i.e. future) securing of the territory, has been elaborated, I do not have to go into this question any further because it does not go beyond the problems covered by the Fuehrer Order. Ohlendorf himself has made a statement on the witness stand concerning the fact that after this war other nations themselves were faced with difficult decisions which pertained to a permanent securing of a territory or to a hostile population.
(Record pg. 544, pg. 755). In support of his statement I would like to refer the Tribunal to the speech of the U. S. Senator William L a n g e r, held in the U. S. Senate in April 1946, and to the publication "The Land of the Dead", a study of the deportation from eastern Germany, Committee against Mass Expulsion, New York City. ethnic groups. Insofar as charges might be made in this connection from Document No. 2894 - doc. bk. V-D (Affidavit of Erwin Lahousen), I will discuss them when I come to the charge of "Segregation from Prisoner of War Camps". Fuehrer Order, the decree of the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of 13 May 1941 (Doc. Ohlendorf No. 44), the "Decree for the Administration of Military Jurisdiction in the "Barbarossa" Territory and for Special Measures of the Troops", or according to the Special Decrees of the Commander in Chief of the Army as bearer of the Executive Power in his Army territory, are designated as "murder" by the Prosecution because the guilt was established without a formal trial. At this point I would only like to say that on account of the above quoted decree of the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht of 13 May 1941 all the Armed Forces in the Russian campaign were directed not to have courts martial for the cases that the Prosecution has cited. Over and above the procedure ordered in the decree (bringing suspicious elements before an officer, to see whether they should be shot) the Einsatzgruppen made thorough investigations, held hearings etc.
and only then decided on the question of guilty or not guilty. Concerning this, the defendant Ohlendorf directed, through special orders, that in determining guilt a suspicion was not sufficient, but that the suspect must be proved to have committed an act or to be a real danger to security. made in the above quoted Decree of the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of 13 May 1941 for the Einsatzgruppen working in the theater of operations. This, therefore, was outside of the authority of Ohlendorf and his subordinates. This side of the operating methods of the Einsatzgruppen must also be considered in connection with the circumstances of international law in the territory of the Soviet Union, as I shall show later. grounds against Ohlendorf. Prosecution's cross examination of Ohlendorf. For the representative of the Prosecution argued here against Ohlendorf with the contention that the Kraimen on the Crimea were not killed although they were Jewish by religion. But their execution was stayed in agreement with the Fuehrer Order and due to the directives from Berlin which Ohlendorf received in regard to the Karaimen. nor attempts to bring proof that would show any act or intention of religious persecution by Einsatzgruppe D. not only made repeatedly in the indictment, but also played a big part in the examinations of the defendants on the witness stand. This charge and these questions can only be understood if one does not take into consideration that, in connection with Bolshevism, the political activist and the political official or the active carrier of Communist ideology are equal to extreme danger to the security of the "hostile non-Communists", class enemies or enemies of the Soviet Union who oppose them.
The Court is presented with a series of documents (Stalin Order, etc) which show how, according to the teachings and orders of the Soviet State and Army leaders a Communist official and a Communist activist are put on an equal footing with leading Partisans, saboteurs and terrorists. the witness stand have shown, simple Communist party members were not persecuted as such, and local officials also remained further in the administration, and only the active Communist was persecuted for his activity against the occupation force, then this shows, to what extent the persecution for political and ideological reasons corresponded here with the persecution that was motivated by a real danger to the security of the occupation force. According to the directions of the Einsatzgruppe D no one was to be persecuted or executed who was not guilty of a deed or action which was punishable by death under the law in force. But this method of operating is not a persecution for political or ideological reasons as usually understood, but a persecution which all occupying powers use in their own interest.
Segregation of prisoners of war. Apart from that, the defendant Ohlendorf has been charged by the Prosecution , particular in the Closing Brief, with the screening of Prisoner of War and transit camps for Communists and Party functionaries by his units. It refers to an Operational Order No. 8, issued on 17 July 1941 (Doc. Book I, Exh. No. 14) and its enclosures, in which directions were said to have been "given to the Einsatzgruppen chiefs." It then draws special attention to the Operational Order No. 14, dated 29 October 1941 which it calls a "supplementary direction" (Pros. Exh. 19). Furthermore, it is asserted that these screening kommandos could operate in the prisoner camps independently of the Army and the camp commandants.
(page 9 Closing Brief against Otto Ohlendorf). To this point I have to make the following statements: 1) Contrary to the assertions of the Prosecution, Order No. 8 of 17 July 1941 has not been given to the Einsatzgruppen in order to be carried out, but rather, as is clearly shown by page 4 of the original, only for the purpose of information which means, in the German usage "to the attention" rather than for action. That the said order was not forwarded to the Einsatzgruppen for action should not have escaped the Prosecution also, for on p. 2/3 of the original it says:
"With regard to the screening of the transit camps in the newly occupied territories (which means Russia) a separate direction will be issued to the chiefs of the Einsatzgruppen and the Security Police." "the Reichsfuehrer SS makes available Einsatzkommandos of the Security Police and the Security Service", which are "under the direct command of the Chief of the Security Police and the Security Service." of the Einsatzgruppen A-D which are being dealt with in this trial . They were instead, as shown by order of 17 July 1941, to be organized by the offices in Cracow, Radow, Warsaw, Lublin, as well as at Koenigsberg, Tilsit, Ziechenau, Allenstein and Stettin, i.e., only by the offices in the Eastern part of the Reich, and/or in the conquered Polish towns rather than in the occupied Russian gerritories. 2.) To support its assertions, the Prosecution has further submitted the Doc. NO-2894 Exh. 228, Pros. Doc. Book V-D, p. 16, an affidavit by Erwin Lahousen. In this affidavit Lahousen states that he took part in a conference in summer 1941, soon after the start of the Russian campaign. Interrogated before the IMT he makes this additional statement: (I quote) ".... approximately in July". During that conference at the Headquarters of the OKW he says, he opposed among other things the way the Einsatzgruppen used to sort out the Russian prisoners of war according to quite peculiar and arbitrary principles. The probative value of this deposition is, I think, best shown by the fact that the first order for the screening of the prisoner of war camps, issued to the Einsatzgruppen, was not sent to the Einsatzgruppen previous to the 29 October 1941, so that it reached the Einsatzgruppen as late as November.
This was the Operational Order No. 14, in Document Book III D, page 93 ff., Doc. NO-3422. This order was directed only to the Einsatzgruppen and Kommandos, as the distribution list shows on pages 1 and 2. The fact that this was the first operational order directed to the Einsatzgruppen, is shown on page 1 where it says:
"The Einsatzgruppen,will immediately detail Sonderkommando in appropriate strength in relation to the size of the camps located in their operational area under the command of an SS officer." gruppen had been ordered to do the screening before. So it cannot be explained, where Herr Lahousen might have got to know as early as in summer 1941 that the Einsatzgruppen made their selection according to peculiar and arbitrary principles, if the order, as I just proved, was really issued to the Einsatzgruppen as late as November 1941. 3.) Contrary to the statement of the Prosecution in its Closing Brief against my client that the Sonderkommandos "could operate independently from the Army and camp commandants", the Operational Order No. 14 of 29 October 1941 reads:
"Close cooperation with the camp commandants and intelligence officers is obligatory", and enclosure 1 to this order says:
"It is a matter of course that the Kommandos remain in close contact with the camp commandants and intelligence officers"; and, "Outstanding conduct on duty and off duty, best cooperation with the camp commanders is, above all, obligatory for the chief of the Sonderkommandos." 4.) Apart from the fact that the order was issued to the Einsatzgruppen not in July, but rather as late as on 29 October 1941, the defendant Ohlendorf stated as early as in his direct examination with regard to that order that in his area of command there were no such camps, which had its reasons in the fact that his Kommandos had their quarters only in the immediate combat zonem and that there no camps with a view to a longer duration were established.
Then he goes on:
"But I am positive about the fact that I had never before me a list of segregated persons, and that I never approved or rejected such lists in accordance with the direction provided for in this document. I have never seen such lists." necessarily have known of it, for he would have had to set them up according to the order, the members of these screening Kommandos would have had to send him weekly reports and he would have had to decide about the suggestions for executions, giving the screening Kommandos corresponding directions. Beginning from November, when Special Order No. 14 was issued the Einsatzgruppe of the defendant was in the Crimea. There were no prisoner of war camps here, and therefore no screening. The Prosecution has proved nothing to that effect. vit of 1 April 1947, who said:
"I had never the order to segregate Communists in Russian prisoner of war camps, but I know of the fact that members of the Security Police and the SD received the order to interrogate inmates of those camps and to carry out executive measures." interrogations, nor whether or not they became at any time practical in the area of the Einsatzgruppe D. On the other hand, Seibert elucidated the facts in an unequivocal way both in his direct and in his cross-examination. In his direct interrogation Seibert answers the question: "Do you know whether such orders were carried out?"
During his cross examination Seibert says:
Einsatzgruppe D."
"I did not got acquainted with any screening Kommandos at all within the Einsatzgruppe D." received the Operational Order No. 14 for his information when serving with the Einsatzgruppen, or whether he had heard of it subsequently in Berlin. But he had told Mr. Wartenberg that he was unable to give any details. Seibert also gave the explanations for that, he said:
"Remembering the conditions in the Crimea, e.g., I cannot help saying that there I did not see any camp. This I explain by the fact that there I did not see any camp. This I explain by the fact that we were staying with the group in the combat zone and the prisoner of war camps had been established further in the rear area." client, is no proof against him. Lindow only says that there existed ordinances and orders issued by Himmler, to the effect that captured Soviet Russian political commissars and Jewish soldiers were to be executed. He goes on saying:
"To my knowledge suggestions arrived for executions of such prisoners of war from the individual prisoner of war camps. Koenigshaus then had to prepare the execution orders and submitted them to the Office Chief IV, Mueller, for his signature." of segregations within the area of the Einsatzgruppen A-D, for there the Einsatzgruppen chief had to decide, rather than Mueller. Lindow's statements, therefore, can only refer to the activity of the Kommandos mentioned in the Operational Order No. 8 in the Eastern part of the Reich and in Poland.