be punished; for the commanders are alone responsible and the latter may therefore be punished by the enemy as war criminals when they are captured."
Prof. OPPENHEIM, who for many years was the leading authority on international law in Great Britain, held to this opinion throughout his life.
English and American law agrees on this point. George MANNER, the American expert on international law, in an article on "the legal Nature and Punishment of Criminal Acts of Violence contrary to the Laws of War" in American states the principle that members of the armed forces of a nation could not be held personally responsible for acts that violate the rules of warfare which they commit by order or with the consent of their government or their military superios, should be considered a rule of the usages of warfare that a universal tenet of International Law that reference to higher orders is excluded, existed neither during the 1st nor during the 2nd World war.
Nor has it materialised yet since 1945. In this respect however Control Council law No. 10 is in opposition to International Law. It cannot, as a one-sided act of the victorious powers, invalidate the pertinent international norms. Therefore it cannot hinder reference to a higher order either as justification of acts violating International Law, On this point, the already mentioned Prof. Lauterpacht declares:
"The cause of International Law demands not merely crime.
It demands also that such a punishment takes place in conformity with International Law."
these statements to higher orders for the purpose of achieving exoneration in full. In the event of the Honourable court not following this argumentation by reasons of the "being bound by a statute (positives) law" then it is faced with a further weighty problem which can be summarized in the following way: limited to a punishment of their own choice of those provided for in Art. II No. 3 of Law No. 10; a limitation in accordance with the rules of International Penal Law of the power of jurisdiction of the Court result in the selection of the punishments names in Art. II No. 3. Trials already carried through. There was no occasion for opening it either in view of the wording of Art. II No. 3 of the Law in so far not to be misunderstood. In the meantime, however, legislative facts have entered which make necessary legal examination of the extent of the authority to inflict punishment by the Court. abolished capital punishment for the sphere of its jurisdictional competence. Therefore the question arises: has to decide and pass sentence in accordance with a statute based on international agreement, even then when the death penalty provided by this Statute has been abolished subsequently and on principle by one of the Treaty States of the Statute? all the immediate decision on two preliminary questions. First of all, the international range of Control Council Law No. 10 has to be checked, as to the penal sanctions of which the deeds of the defendants are subject, according to paragraph 1 of the indictment, in the first instance.
Further, the international range of the Abolition Law of the USSR dated 20 May 1947 has to be ascertained. After these preliminary questions have been clarified the deductions for the concrete case are reached. International Range of Law No. 10. Law No. 10 was issued by the Inter-allied Control Council for Germany. By unanimous interpretation at home and abroad, however, it did not become thereby primarily a "German Law"; only in so far as in certain exceptional eases, Art. II 1c, the trial of crimes against humanity directed against Germans has been handed over to German Courts might one speak of a "transformation" of Law No. 10 into a national international German Law.
In all other cases the character of Law No. 10 remains unaltered, and indeed it is a statutory, interallied - that is "foreign law", passed by an Interallied authority (Control Council) aiming at German war criminals. Looked at materially however, a "foreign Law" as such does not exist; looked at from a legal validity point of view, Control Council Law 10 as already explained is therefore no Law but a State Treaty between the Four Allied Main Powers, looked at as a treaty from a technical point of view, an international (created by the Control Council as an international organ) Agreement implementing the Moscow Declaration dated 30 October 1943 and the London Agreement dated 8 August 1945. That the Allied Powers themselves wished to ascribe such a character to Law No. 10 is revealed beyond doubt by the following points:
(a) the circumstance that the preamble of Law No. 10 30 October 1943/8 August 45.
(b)the fact that national German Courts are expressly forbidden judicature on the basis of Law No. 10 in special orders of the Zone Commander (Art.
III No. 1 within limits.)
Law No. 10 is therefore first and foremost an International Agreement between the four signatory powers for punishing war criminals. Since, however, the Courts of the Treaty Powers have to base their decisions directly on this agreement Law No. 10 has become simultaneously an integral part of the internal law of the Treaty States. Thereby it has the same dual nature as the majority of international conventions. of the abolition of capital punishment in the USSR on this norm must be investigated firstly in its capacity as international Agreement and secondly in its capacity as national law.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Aschenauer, may I interrupt you for a moment please? If you regard Control Council Law 10 as in effect a treaty between the signatory powers how do you argue that any change in the internal law of the Soviet Union affects this international agreement?
DR. ASCHENAUER: Your Honor -
THE PRESIDENT: Let's suppose that the Soviet Union changed the law of succession or in some way modified the law of property, how would that effect an international treaty?
DR. ASCHENAUER: Your Honor, this question will be answered to in the following statements in my plea, if I may continue, I shall answer to your question in the rest of my final plea. The International Range of the Abolition Law of the USSR dated 20 May sovereign state can at any time undertake an alteration of her internal national law, and indeed particularly even if this internal law is based on an International Agreement. The Soviet Union is consequently justified to alter Law No. 10 in its capacity as National Soviet Law with effect for the Soviet sphere of jurisdiction, particular, to determine that the death sentence provided for by Art. II No. 3a of this Law may no longer be pronounced. Law No. 10 has become also a part of the internal law of the remaining parties of the Treaty, the USA, England, etc. that the Abolition Act pronounced by the USSR does not affect in itself the corresponding legal system of the USA, England, etc; looked at from a concrete point of view, the remaining parties to the Treaty can therefore continue to apply the death penalty in accordance with Art. II No. 3a of Law No. 10 for the sphere of their jurisdictional authority without taking into consideration whether the Soviet Union has abolished capital punishment or not. This is inherent in the already mentioned character of Law No. 10 which is not merely an international convention but also an internal law of the Treaty States. Such a way of looking at it and a result of this kind would only be impartially justified however if Law No. 10 were only a norm of the Internal Law of the Treaty States. This, however, is not the case as explained. Law No. 10 is at the same time an International Agreement. The question is therefore whether the Law of the USSR dated 20 May 1947 cannot be regarded as a tacitly undertaken notice of termination of this Agreement in so far as this provides for the death penalty in Art.
II No. 3a, at least however as a tacitly given explanation that the USSR no longer looks upon this agreement as valid as regards the means of punishment (death sentence) provided for and therefore advocates the point of view that, from a treaty point of view, the other signatory powers were no longer justified in pronouncing the death sentence. Looked at from a concrete point of view, the fact as to whether Law No. 10 is still supported by the "communis opinio" of the parties to the Treaty as regards justification for pronouncing the death sentence has to be examined.
Law No. 10 as repeatedly stressed by its originators and its immediate predecessor, the Nuernberg Statute, is issued to make victory possible for the so-called material justice. In the interests of this high aim the Nuernberg Statute and the subsequent Control Council Law No. 10 have put up even with constructions foreign to continental legal thought like for example the sacrifice of the sentence "Nulla poena sine lege poenali praevia". The circumstance that the Nuernberg Statute as well as Law No. 10 are satisfied with the element of violation of international law and the element of violation of public morals of the deed as norms of the time of the deed establishing criminal responsibility, showsclearly that in the interests of material justice express declaration of punishableness of the incriminating actions by defining special criminal facts of the case of the national legal system is to be desisted from. With that it is established that the Nurnberg Statute as well as Law No. 10 wanted to give precedence to the idea of material justice rather than the restriction rooted in continental thought "Nulla poena sine lege poenali praevia". Examination of the legal and political expediency of a step of this kind exceeds the limits ascribed to the plaideyer. From this fact however the obligation results, it is true, to advance the following sentence:
the general conviction (communis opinio) of the objection It results that the provisions of Art.
II No. 3 of Law No. 10 without detriment to their further continued validity are to be subjected to revision then if forcible proofs are given for the fact that such a communis opinio between the signatory powers no longer exists at all or at least no longer exists in the sphere of selection of means of punishment in question. however, such a fundamental significance which causes the material continued effectiveness of Art. II No. 3a of Law No. 10 to be in question. The reasons for this may be classified in two groups:
a) The penal law of the Soviet Union has always been inclined to abolitionism in principle. 1919 as in the federal principlesof the penal legislation, as also in penal codes of the states (save for individual groups of crimes), the penal law in the USSR, notwithstanding Article 14 Subsection 21 of the Federal Constitution of 5 December 1936 is essentially still states' law, i.e. regulated by the laws of the individual federal republics; in 1922 and 1926, capital punishment is designated always and only as a temporary measure caused by the then existing circumstances, bound to be abolished in principle or without exception as soon as conditions would permit. The fact that, by the penal coes in force, a relatively great number of acts was punishable by death cannot, in agreement with authoritative soviet-official conception so far, be taken as an argument against the basically provisional nature of this institution. This is given expression also by the so-called federal law of 20 May 1947, specifying that the promises for the application of the death penalty no longer exist and thereby emphasizing again the basically provisional nature of the supreme penalty.
b) Also, the Soviet Union did not restrict itself to abolishing the death penalty ex nunc only and with effect in its own national territory only, in the sense of internal state's law. Rather does the law, in connection with implementation instructions decreed by the Soviet Military Administrations in occupied foreign territory, make it clear that the abolition shall have an absolute and comprehensive effect:
1. The abolition applies also to former enemy territory occupied by the Soviet forces within the framework of the Potsdam Agreement;
2. the abolition applies not only to ordinary civilian courts but as well to proceedings before military end special courts, and especially also to those Soviet Courts which have been established in the East-Zone and in the USSR proper to prosecute the crimes specified by Control Council Law No. 10:
3. the abolition has effect ex tune (a consequence of the principle postulated by Article 3 of the Introductory Law to the Penal Code of the UDSSR of 1926; retroaction of the more lenient, i.e., in thiscase, of the abolitionary law, is obligatory. in the meantime been drawn by the courts of the USSR. In the trial against the members of the 9th Police Reserve Battalion, who, in particular also had to answer charges specified by Article III 1c of the Law No. 10, no death penalties were pronounced, although the court in its sentence stated that according to the previous Legal Penalty the conditions calling for capital punishment had existed; instead, they were sentenced to hard labor for different length of time, i.e. a maximum of 25 years, in accordance with the limitation by Soviet Federal Law of 20 May 1947. It must, therefore, be considered as being beyond doubt that the internal legislation of the Soviet Union has in principle changed course since the publication of Control Council Law No. 10. Concretely it looks like this: if, in the case under consideration, a military court of the Soviet Union had to decide, the inapplicability of Article II subsection 3 would be incontestable. In the relation of the Signatory Powers to each other the communisopinio, therefore, in matters concerning the quality and quantity of punishment has disappeared which yet existed at that time, when every one of the four Signatory Powers knew the possibility of the death penalty in accordance with the law of their nations. of International Penal Lay:
Law. For, as stated, Law No. 10 is not only an international treaty but also an internal norm of penal law of the signatory nations. In itself, the contents of this internal norm is not, as regards the remaining signatories, especially the USA, affected by the unilateral change of the law by another signatory nation (USSR). Regarded generally and basically, therefore, the military courts of the USA judicating on the strength of Law No. 10 are, without question, justified to apply Article II subsection 3 a. The question is only whether this jurisdiction power is not restricted in cases in which there exists a cogent point of contact regarding international penal law with the jurisdictional powers of the USSR. It is, therefore, to be examined in how far reasons of international penal law restrict the applicability of Law No. 10 in its character as internal norm of penal law of the signatory powers. I shall show that in this present trial, too, for reasons of fairness and the generally accepted ideas of justice, Control Council Law No. 10 is not to be implemented by the legal institution of European average penal law. This my opinion is supported by the verdict of the Jurist Trial, Case III, where it says on p. 41 of the German version: "Although this tribunal is composed of American judges, trained in the system and the rules of Common Law, it, nevertheless, is in session on the strength of international authority and can let itself be guided only by the basic principles of justice and fairness which underlie every civilized conception of law and legal procedure." International or even national military courts exercising penal jurisdiction on the strength of an international statute, are a novum in the history of International Law. This is the reason for the lack of cases of precedence which would permit an immediate solution of the quetion under discussion. Yet, International Law - in a steady evolution of now almost hundred years duration - has developed legal doctrines which are applicable to the case in hand at least by analogy. I have in mind the legal principles, created in international extradition laws, and which are, today, universally acknowledged.
We shall discuss these principles in subsection a), in subsection b) will be shown the reasons why these principles apply to the case on trial. a) The International Principle of not Sentencing to Death a Defendant Compared with the other acknowledged principles of international extradition law (non-extradition of one's own national; reciprocity; speciality; non-extradition for political offenses; extradition only if the offense is punishable also by the laws of the state applied to; non-extradition if the offense cannot be prosecuted in concrete by the laws of the state applied to;), the principle of exclusion of the death penalty plays a corresponding part. This principle, regularly, becomes acute in the extradition relation between such states (applied to) which have no capital punishment, and those (applying) states the penal system of which provides for the death penalty. In cases of this kind, the system of inter-state extradition laws regularly and unmistakably shows the tendency of states in favor of abolition to refuse extradition or to make it dependent on the understanding that the applying state will not exact the death penalty. and agreements of European, as well as non-European states. Thus, Article 5 of the Swiss Extradition Law of 22 January 1892 determines:
"If the penal code of the applying state provides for the offense, for the commission of which extradition is requested, corporal punishment (this includes death), then extradition will be consented to only on condition that the punishment, eventually, is commuted to imprisonment or a fine." further yet, prohibiting extradition if the laws of the applying state are in concrete stricter about the offense in question than the terms of Dutch penal law.
on condition that the applying state, which, contrary to the one applied to, employs the death penalty, assumes the obligation not to pronounce it in the case in question. This, e.g., is the case in the BelgianRoumanian Extradition Treaty of 18 August 1880 (See Mertitz: International Legal Aid in Penal Cases (Internationale Rechtshilfe in Strafsachen) 897, Vol. II p. 48 Foot note No. 15); the same practice has always been applied by abolition-conscious Italy. Belgium, the classical land of extradition law, made corresponding reservations in particular in relation to its South-American treaty partners (Brazil, Peru, a.o.) In connection with this, the circumstance must be mentioned that, in analogous extension of this principle, in extradition law the tendency of any state, absolutely, prevails to refuse extradition if the extradited person faces a penalty or a kind of punishment unknown to the laws of the state applied to and obnoxious to its public opinion. Into thiscategory belongs the tendency not to extradite if the extradited faces eventually corporal punishment. In these cases, even countries not in favor of abolition tend to refuse extradition either altogether or to make it dependent on the condition that such punishment, distasteful to the ordr* publique of the state applied to, isnot inflicted. Thus, in discussing the German Extradition Law of 23 December 1929 in the Reichstag, a corresponding passus was not included in the law only for fear of invoking international entanglements by criticising foreign penal laws; yet, the Reichstag, in this respect, took the following resolutions:
"the Government of the Reich is to be requested to consider ment unusual in Germany will be inflicted."
These examples may suffice, For, they show already that there is in international extradition law a principle which has attained such little practical significance only due to the, up to now, small number of states favoring abolition, but the theoretical import of which is on equal standing with the other extradition principles: the principle of the prohitition of the death penalty in the relation of the abolitionist state to the non-abolitionist state.
b) The Application, to this Trial. of the Principle of theExclusion of the Death Penalty in International Legal Aid Relations. Here, it must be examined if and to what extent the principle established under a) also has validity for the proceedings before the American Military Tribunal, Since, here, it isnot a question of extradition proceedings the principles found in a) can be applied only in analogy; however, the analogous applicability of the afore-said principle to the subject-matter of the present case is a cogent necessity.
According to Art. I of the Law No. 10, the Moscow Declaration of 30 October 1943 "concerning responsibility of Hitler followers for atrocities committed" and the London Agreement of 8 August 1945 "concerning prosecution and punishment of war criminals" are an inseparable part of Law No. 10. This means that the regulations set down in the last paragraphs of the Moscow Declaration about the competency to sentence war criminals also apply to proceedings to Low No. 10; thereby, the following rules are established: 1. for crimes locally not determined the competency of the international military courts is indicated; 2. for locally determined crimes, primarily, the competency of national military courts is indicated.
The indictment shows the acts of the defendants to be "locally determined" in the sense of the Moscow Declaration: the acts the defendants are charged with took place, without exception, in the national territory of the Soviet Union. a court of the Soviet Union, which, by the Moscow Declaration, would have had to decide "according to the laws of these liberated countries". But since they were placed before an American Court, this results for the latter in certain limitations of decision* for the American court derives its competency not from their own primary rights, but from their being public administrators or trustees of the primarily touched Soviet interests.
One of these limitations is the Law of the Soviet Union of 20 May 1947, by which the defendant cannot be sentenced to death, but, at the most, to 25 years of penal detention. concrete is irrelevant for the judgment of the situation with regard to its material legality. For, in this case, too, the American court remains the trustee only of the state primarily entitled to inflict punishment. But it would be in contradiction to the promises of international law applying to such a public legal trusteeship if the American court, exercising jurisdiction in the concrete case only "by proxy", would inflict penalties the law of the primarily affected state has expressly abolished for analogous cases, to be sure, also in regard to war criminals. including the jurisdiction in the territories in Germany occupied by the Soviets.
In conclusion, therefore, it must be scertained: 1. Inasfar as the Law No. 10 represents itself as an International agreement between the signatory states, it has, to be sure, formally not been influenced by the Law of the USSR of 30 May 1947. But it must be examined if, due? to the no longer existing communis opinio of the signatory powers, the stipulation of Art. II subsection 3 a did not become materially irrelevant. This examination, being foremost a questio facti, is up to the court.
2. Independent of the decision on point 1 above, the applicability of Art II subsection 3 a of Law No. 10 in its character as internal law of the signatory states did, by acknowledged principles of international penal law, become inadmissible then, as the Soviet Union is the party primarily entitled to inflict punishment. In these cases, even a nonSoviet court may not pronounce the penalty of death provided for in Art, II subsection 3 a.
DR. ASCHENAUER: Your Honor, that is the end of the section, and it would be a suitable occasion to have the recess.
PRESIDENT: Very well. The Tribunal will be in recess 15 minutes.
(A recess was taken.)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
THE PRESIDENT: You may proceed, Dr. Aschenauer.
DR. ASCHENAUER (ATTORNEY FOR THE DEFENDANT OHLENDORF): with membership in organizations, which the IMT has declared to be criminal: namely membership in the Schutzstaffel of the NSDAP (generally known as the "SS") and in the "Security Service of the Reichsfuehrer SS" (generally known as"SD"). judgment. Because he neither was (comp. IMT Judgm.) a member of the Allgemeine SS, nor the Waffen-SS or the SS-death head - units nor an SS-member within a Police Department, but rather he was an SS-Fuehrer, at last SS-Gruppenfuehrer in the "Security Service of the Reichsfuehrer-SS" (this is what was written on his membership card), that is member of the SS-formation SD.
This kind of SS-membership, however, is according to the IMT judgment treated as membership in the Security Service of the RFSS (gnerally known as the SD) not within the scope of the SS, but in the judgment against the SS it is in respect to this membership referred to the judgment against the Gestapo and the SD. I quote page 113 of the "Judgment of Nuernberg":
Court No. II, Case No.IX.
"Conclusions": "..........the Tribunal includes in the SS all persons who officially were accepted as members into the SS including the members of the General SS, the members of the Waffen-SS, the members of the SS-Deathhead units and the members of the various Police departments, "Then the judgment goes on to say: "The Tribunal does not include the so-called Reiter-SS. The Security Service of the Reichsfuehrer-SS will be dealt with in the judgment of the Tribunal against the Gestapo and the SD." tion or group within the SS for the purpose of the judgment by the IMT, especially in regard to the SD, is in harmony with the real situation. For after the SS became independent in 1934 there was no "general membership in the SS." No applicant was accepted generally into the SS, but the acceptance into the SS and the membership therein became cemented into a certain organization or group of the SS. The judgment on the declaration of criminal organizations or groups corresponds to this situation, by, in leaning on the legal institute of conspiracy, predicating the charge of membership in an organization upon the supporting membership to a certain perpetrator-organization or perpetratorgroup, namely conscious cooperation in a criminal group for criminal purposes (compare IMT-Transcript, page 16,503). that OHLENDORF belonged to an organization or to a group of the SS outside of the SD, I may in my comments on Count III of the indictment limit myself to OHLENDORF's membership in the SD. IMT judgment the SS special formation SD was not convicted as a whole. And in view of the goal of the indictment in the IMT Trial there would have been no room for that, like with any conspiracy indictment to obtain punishment for assistance in the crime, and according to the opinion of the judgment that "criminal organization" means essentually "cooperation for criminal purposes" (comp. official edition, Court No. II, Case No. IX.
Vol. I, p. 258). For the SS-formation SD was a purely summary designation for SS-members of certain branches of service, who were administered by this organization merely in personnel matters. The SS-formation SD itself neither was charged with any material tasks nor did it carry out any material work of its own. Also no SS-service was done in this formation. It was not even organized in units. Its members did not meet within the aegis of its organization. Therefore the members could not obtain a common opinion on objective purposes of the organization, much less combine for common purposes. This is the reason why actually it has now become a general practice with the Spruchkammern in the American as well as the British Zone to evaluate the larger number of members of the SS-Special formation SD (for instance members of the Kripo, Stapo) as mere wearers of uniform and to exonerate them of membership with the SS in spite of their membership in the SS by way of the SS-Special formation SD. of the Security Service of the Reichsfuehrer SS (commonly called SD) as membership in a criminal organization therefore, has been limited by the IMT in its judgment to the members of the Offices III, VI, and VII of the RSHA, although also from the RSHA the SD-members of the Offices I and II belonged to it. The SS-activity stated to be criminal membership in the SD, therefore, is according to the IMT judgment to be found in the work of theSD-Offices III, VI and VII. All other members of the SD count as uniform wearers.
The defendant OHLENDORF was honorary member of Office III (SDdomestic service) of the RSHA, the so-called Spheres of Life-Intelligence Service.
According to Article 10 of the Statute "the criminal character of the troup of organization is considered as proven and cannot be contested." of which the organizations were declared to be criminal, belongs Court No. II, Case No. IX.
however "that the guilt within the meaning of Criminal Law is a personal one and that mass punishments are to be avoided", "innocent persons should not be punished." (P. 96 "The Verdict of Nuernberg").
Furthermore, the following is to be taken into consideration:
"Since .... the declaration concerning the organizations and groups will determine the criminal character of their members, this declaration should except those who had no knowledge of the criminal aims oh actions of the (that means "of these") organizations, as well as those who were drafted into the organizations by the State, unless they participated personally in the actions which were declared to be criminal by Article 6 of the Statute. The mere fact of membership is not sufficient to make one subject to such declarations". (B. 96 "The Verdict of Nuernberg"). tioned actions must be crimes of which the defendant became aware as having been committed within the framework of the organization of the SD, or in which he participated within the framework of his organization - in this case the SD - Office III - that means, not actions which are considered as criminal and which were committed outside the SD or in which the defendant participated outside of his organization - in this Case the SD Office III. cause of his membership of theSD- Office III Reich Main Security Office - is incumbent on the Prosecution. The Military Tribunal II v. OSWALD POHL and others expressly stated in the opinion concerning the defendant SCHEIDE (official text of the Verdict, p. 95 ff.) that the Prosecution has to produce evidence which may be considered as being beyond every reasonable doubt. The "high" position of the defendant SCHEIDE alone would not be sufficient to constitute a suspicion of criminal knowledge sufficient for a conviction.
"Knowledge of the crime" must be proved. It is not sufficient that one "must have known" (carelessness). As far as it is a question Court No. II, Case No. IX.
of a compulsory membership in an organization, perpetration of or a sufficient form of participation in a war crime or a crime against humanity, within the framework of the organization, must be positively proved. According to the verdict on SCHEIDE in Case IV it must be incontestably proved that an accused person during his membership in an organization had had a positive knowledge of crimes committed in the framework of this organization, or, as far as he was a compulsory member, that he participated personally in criminal actions. According to this verdict it is, therefore, not sufficient that a defendant receives, at any time or place, outside of his organization which was declared to be criminal, knowledge of crimes against the laws of war and humanity committed by other organizations, or that he was himself guilty of War crimes or crimes against humanity. generally of membership in criminal organizations, more precisely the SS and the SD. In this Count 3 it only refers to the verdict of the IMT, according to which the SS and the SD were declared to be criminal organizations, and that the IMT frequently referred to this decision to the crimes with which the Einsatzgruppen are charged. Consequently the Prosecution considers it to be already a proof of criminal activity within the framework of the SS and SD, if the defendant is convicted of crimes against humanity during his activity with the Einsatzgruppen. That means, the Prosecution considers the Einsatzgruppen as parts or agencies of the SS or the SD. this in its description of the Einsatzgruppen as military units of a special kind, it nevertheless brings the SD into a connection with the Einsatzgruppen by declaring the SD in the Offices III, IV and VII of the Reich Main Security Office to be criminal. I shall make clear at another place of my plea that the Einsatzgruppen in fact were no agencies or parts of the Offices of the Reich Main Security Office.