THE PRESIDENT: You are presenting that document as if you were arguing the case, and of course, you know this is not the time to present the argumentation. In any way that you can enlighten the Tribunal as to the nature of the document you will be helping the Tribunal. We don't object to that, but to draw conclusions from a document and argue on it is not proper at this time.
DR. MINTZEL: On this occasion I only pointed out the difference between an Einsatzkommando of the commanding agency because here it is particularly obvious. May I now come to the Report of Events No. 149 on page 9 of the 22nd of December 1941. Here Strauch is mentioned for the first time as the commander in White Ruthenia. He appears, however, only in a few reports as such because very soon, on the 7th of January 1942, in this excerpt of the Report of Events 152 which is on Page 10, it adds: the present SS-Sturmbannfuehrer Dr. Hofmann deputizing for him, which provides an explanation that he was only for a short time shown here as the commander of the Einsatzkommando in Minsk, while after a few days it became evident that there is a deputy. But I shall come back to that in my final plea. show Strauch merely being mentioned in that capacity and during that tern of office he was there. They refer to the whole time during which Reports of Events were issued at all. This is up to No. 195 of the 24th of April 1942.
My next exhibit is No. 17. It used to be No. 2 but now it will receive No. 17. It is an excerpt from Activity and Situation Report No. 11. This excerpt gives a detailed report about the partisan organization in Minsk and it also shows the part which a number of Jews played in this partisan organization.
My next exhibit is Exhibit No. 18 which was No. 3, but it now will become Document No. 18. This is an excerpt, or at least it contains expcerpts from the reports from the occupied eastern territories. These reports begin at a certain date and they take the place of the former so-called Reports of Events.
What is contained here as evidence material pertains to the constantly proving partisan danger in White Ruthenia, and Report No. 9 is of special importance. It is on pages 31 through 35. This report has been quoted by the prosecution in excerpt and has been introduced as exhibit No. 178, Document No. 5156. The mimeographed copy which I have received of this exhibit from the prosecution shows that those parts are missing which would threw some light on the partisan danger in White Ruthenia and which actually deal with the participation of Strauch in the concerning operations. For instance, this report of events from the occupied territories in the east contains a report of a discussion in the presence of all military personnel and Security Police personnel concerning this question, and Strauch also took part in this meeting. -- detailed description of these discussions and the confirmation of the fact that fighting squads were to be formed and that the Security Police units should carry out the espionage activous in the program of this special action, is missing in the documents as submitted by the prosecution. Therefore, I have here collected the pages which they left out.
MR. GLANCY: I wish to remind defense counsel that the rule in this Tribunal as in others is that when an extract is offered the entire document is offered. He is at liberty and there are no objections on the prosecution's part that he offer this. However, we want it understood that the entire document was open for his perusal.
THE PRESIDENT: You want to exclude the interpretation that you purposely withhold any pages which might be of benefit to the defense?
MR. GLANCY: Exactly, sir, I want that completely understood.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, it will be understood on the record.
DR. MINTZEL: I have only pointed this out, your Honor, because naturally as a rule those who deal with such documents have used the mimeographs which are put at their disposal by the prosecution.
I have to point out the following in the excerpt from No. 17 of the reports from the Eastern occupied countries which you find on Page 7 of the index, there is a printing mistake. After excerpt from the 7 August 1942, Excerpt from No. 15, it should say also "Excerpt from No. 47 of the 26th of March. 1943." What follows there is of the 26th of March. 1943. The excerpts here from the report numbered 43 shows that Einsatzkommando 2 and the commanding agencies are separate entities, both with regard to personnel and space.
The next exhibit from Document Book No. 2 I shall offer as Exhibit No. 19, the document which has born the No. 4 and which is now going to be made No. 19. It is an excerpt from "Soldiers Handbook on the Rules of Land warfare" by an American colonel, Judge Advocate General's Department, in which he explains the rules of land warfare of the Ameridan G.I.'s. The excerpts which I submit here talk about members of the army being not liable to punishment if they carry out orders by their commanding officers which are in contradiction to the rules of land warfare; it says that those that carry out the order are not punishable but those who give the orders are.
Exhibit No. 20 is Document No. 5 which will now become Document No. 20. In the following exhibits we have excerpts from the record, comments by the defendants and the witnesses which have been examined, as witnesses for the defendant Strauch. They are, of course, contained in the records, but they are here with shortened and put into the document book for Strauch.
The Exhibit No. 20 contains the testimony of the defendant Schulz. As a witness for the defendant Strauch, Schulz comments on the fact that in the location reports the name of a commander is being mentioned at a time when the named defendant has not started his service yet.
MR. GLANCY: It seems to be cumulative and merely a burden to the record. It is admittedly in the record already. We see no reason for its further inclusion in this form.
THE PRESIDENT: Judge Speight offers the cement that it is pretty convenient to have it there before us.
MR. GLANCY: On that basis, sir, I withdrew my objection.
DR. MINTZEL: In order to summarize the opinions of these men who testified as to Strauch's character, attitude and activities, I have here put then in a shortened and abbreviated form for the convenience of the Court. I offer former Document No. 6 now as Document No. 21 and as Exhibit No. 21 the testimony of the witness Jost as witness for the defendant Strauch. Jost says, concerning the question whether Strauch could have been chief of the Einsatzkommando 2 or whether he was just a commander of the Security Police or the SD in Latvia in Riga, what he has said during his own examination, the distinction between the Einsatzkommando and the commanding agencies testifies that according to his memory in June or July 1942 no mass executions took place in Ruthenia. He expresses his opinion of the participation of the Einsatzkommando in the partisan warfare and he says that Strauch, at the beginning of March 1942, was still stationed at Riga and not in Minsk ashe had met Strauch at that time in Riga and he had discussed current matters with him. Jost furthermore declares that Strauch had received the authority not to take any anti-Jewish measures so far, and on the occasion of this discussing Jost expresses his comment on the Kube letter.
Then there is No. 22. It is a document which is up to now No. 7 which is now going to be 22. It isthe testimony of Dr. Blume as the witness for the defendant Strauch. Dr. Blume has stated that Strauch, after he had been drafted to Riga as commander, had telephoned him and had asked for this appointment to be postponed ashe had broken his arm.
Court No. II, Case No. IX.
Dr. Blume furthermore states that when he was transferred from Riga to Minsk, which had been planned at an early date, Strauch broke his arm again which prevented him from leaving, and thus it was decided that Strauch, before he was to commence on his new appointment in Minsk, should be cured of his habit of breaking his arm.
As Exhibit No. 23, I submit Document No. 8, which is now going to be Document 23. The testimony of the defendant Sandberger as a witness for the defendant Strauch, and Sandberger states that although he was stationed in the adjoining territory, Estonia, where he was commander of the Security Police and the SD, he had never heard anything about the fact of Strauch was the commanding chief of Latvia, and above all other things, Dr. Sandberger comments upon his affidavit of the 19th November, 1944, in which he says that Strauch participated in Jewish persecutions, but he says here that he could not have any knowledge of incidents that happened in Minsk as he had never been there himself.
My last exhibit in Document Book II is Document No. 8 which is going to be changed to No. 24. It is an excerpt from the total report of the Einsatzgruppe A up to the 15th of October, 1941. From this it becomes evident that two-thirds of the entire Einsatzkommando II were removed to Lenigrad, and that only one-third remained in order to install an agency for the Commanders of the Security Police and the SD in Latvia.
In Document Book No. III -
THE PRESIDENT: Do we have Document Book III?
SECRETARY GENERAL: No, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: If you are willing to present it without our having it before us, we are willing to hear you.
MR. GLANCY: If the Tribunal please, the Prosecution is not in possession of the document book, and I would like to reserve the right to lodge objections at a later time. Also, at this time, Sir, I would like to object to one document in Document Book II. This is Document Court No. II, Case No. IX.
No. 4, Exhibit 19, an excerpt from as Soldier's Handbook, which treats with reprisal measures, and the fact that the soldier will not be prosecuted if he follows superior orders. However, I would like to have the chance to inform myself further. I do believe that the stipulations mentioned here are qualified as to what is patently illegal shall not be obeyed. That is from my memory and not from the book itself. However, I think that is in there as qualification.
THE PRESIDENT: Well then, you are reserving the right to refer to the entire handbook or even to present further excerpts from it.
MR. GLANCY: Yes, sir.
THE PRESIDENT: That right is reserved.
MR. GLANCY: Thank you, Sir.
DR. MINTZEL: Your Honor, it would be welcome, I think, if the three documents contained in Document Book III could be presented. I shall submit these documents now, although the translations have not been available to the Prosecution or to the Tribunal. Yet if you agree, I shall do so now.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, please present them.
DR. MINZEL: I submit as Exhibit No. 25 Document No. 1, in Document Book III, which is now to receive the Document No. 25. It is an affidavit of the defendant Strauch of the 22nd January, 1948, in which he comments upon the matters which are contained in rebuttal Document Book No. V-A, which is a bulky document pertaining also to Strauch's activities. Strauch makes the statement in detail concerning these documents, especially to Prosecution Exhibit 196 that he had nothing to do with the police battalions. In Exhibit 221 he says that Vandenbach's order that seventy Jews who were in the service of Kube were to be executed, was left to his successor in White Ruthenia who had this order carried out. He speaks about the kind of participation in the operations which were mentioned in the Ruebe affidavit. He also says concerning the Exhibits of the Prosecution, Exhibits 224 and 225 that he and the men of his agency did not take part in the operation Court No. II, Case No. IX.
"Harvesting Festival" (Erntefest) and "Jacob", and that no persons were killed who were not either partisans or who could be proved to be aids or abettors of the partisans. Commenting upon Exhibit No. 226 Strauch says that the executions mentioned therein are those of people who had been condemned to death by German courts.
My next Exhibit is No. 26; it was Document No. 2, and the document in Document Book III will now receive the Document No. 23. It is an affidavit of the defendant, Dr. Rasch, of the 26th January, 1948. Rasch says that he visited Strauch in Riga at the end of January or the beginning of February, 1942, and that at that time he, Strauch, had a permanent domicile, and that he, Rasch, had stayed with him in Riga.
The last Exhibit is No. 27, former Document No. 3 in Document Book III; it is now Document No. 27; and is an affidavit of the defendant Dr. Gick, in which he says that in the reports of the events of the 22nd December, 1941, until the 3rd of April, 1942, the commander of the Security Police and SD for Latvia, Dr. Lange had been named.
THE PRESIDENT: Any other Defense Counsel desire to present any documents? Does the Prosecution have anything to offer?
MR. GLANCY: Not at the present time, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: Did Dr. Heim intend to present something for the defendant Blobel? Apparently not.
MR. GLANCY: I don't think so.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Aschenauer, you will be ready to proceed tomorrow morning?
DR. ASCHENAUER: Yes, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Tomorrow morning we will hear the presentation of Ohlendorf's case; then, that will be followed by the presentation of the final pleas for the other defendants. Following that, the Prosecution will make its summation plea.
Court No. II, Case No. IX.
judgment will be rendered. Some reference has been made to a date, but that date cannot be maintained because we have delayed in the hearing of the summation pleas, so that the date of the judgment is unknown to anyone, including the Tribunal.
MR. GLANCY: After the generous offer of the Tribunal to sit as long as was necessary to finish the Defense's case and offer of documents, I suppose we can assume that it is complete in fact.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. It is now understood that there is no further presentation of documents in open court. Should there be a straggling document show up, than it will be presented directly to the Judges with copies going to the Prosecution.
MR. GLANCY: Thank you, Sir.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal at this time will recess until tomorrow morning at 9:30.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 0930 hours, 4 February 1948.)
Otto Ohlendorf, et al., defendants sitting at Nurnberg
THE MARSHAL: The Honorable, the Judges of Military Tribunal II. Military Tribunal II is now in session. God save the United States of America and this Honorable Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Aschenauer.
DR. ASCHENAUER: (Attorney for the Defendant Ohlendorf) Mr. President, Your Honors.
based on the substantive law of Decree No. 10 of the Control Council which was issued by the 4 signatory powers in execution of the Moscow and London Declarations, dated 30 October 1943 and 8 May 1945. Therefore it is to be examined whether and to what extent this law is consistent with the rules of international law. The Tribunal not only is entitled, but is also obligated, to make this examination. It is obvious to choose as a parallel the right of examination on the part of the American judge with respect to the constitutionality of the established law, all the more as the unwritten rules concerning the right of examination by the judge apply to all American judges, therefore also to the military Tribunal which was established by virtue of Decree No. 7. The London statute, the Decree No. 10 of the Control Council end the implementation rules based thereon are called the corner stones of the new international law and, in the opinion of the first Nurnberg verdict, the sentence has come up more than once that everything, called by the London Statute an agreement serving especially the trial of the German war criminals, is in itself nothing else than a generally recognized law, an international law. If this, however, in the case, then this law, on the part of the judge who is called upon to apply it, must likewise submit to the examination which every law is subject to with respect to its constitutionality.
There is no reason whatsoever, if we follow the American conception of the law, to regard an agreement, based on international law, as nothing else but a national internal law. On the contrary: In general, more guarantees are given in the field of national legislation - if only on account of the homogeneousness of the legislative bodies - for the fact that the individual laws keep within the framework and spirit of the constitution more than in international law where the body of legislators is more or less mixed and - as in collective agreements like that now under discussion - is more or less determined by accident. Rules of international law, too, are subject to examination by the Court. Therefore it will be necessary that the Court will examine every sentence of the international law with respect to its consistency with the generally recognized fundamental rules of international law. These fundamental rules the existence of which is today completely undisputed, regardless of the difficulties as to their valuation and definition in the individual case, at a time of reorientationof international law in particular to principles exceeding the legal obligation out also those borne by the "Conscience publique", are here taking - mutatis mutandis the place of the national constitutional law. The basic rules of international law also include the general fundamental rules of the contract law. The rules about efficacy and lack of efficacy of agreements, however, their interpretation in the individual case may be con entious, are the more general, more comprehensive and older sentences with respect to the system of the London agreements; in the same way as an agreement, based on international law, must be regarded as void, if, for instance, it limits the sovereignty of a state in an immoral manner just because of the fact that the corresponding contract regulations are in contradiction to the superordinated, generally applied rules of sovereignty, the ad hoc concluded agreements of international law which are vitiated by a defect, recognized by the general legal principles of international law, are in the same way to be regarded as void.
Consequently, the American Military Tribunal is not relieved from the obligation to undertake an examination of the substantive validity of the London agreement and of the rules applied to its execution, all the more as military Tribunal No. III, in my opinion, has adhered to this conception in its opinion in the trial against Altstoetter and others. The examination as to the "constitutionality" is here replaced by the obligation to examine the London agreement enacted on a fallacious basis with respect to its compatibility with the superordinate, general rules about the efficacy of agreements of international law. Moreover, article 2 of Decree No. 7, issued by the Military Government on 18 October 1946, and dealing with the constitutionality and jurisdiction of specific .Military Tribunals, is no obstacle to this examination. The aforementioned decree ordains that:
"The courts or its members or deputy members cannot be challenged counsels". Article 2e of Decree No. 7 combines twoviews which, as a rule, are dealt with separately according to German penal law namely:
the challenging of the judge and the assertion of procedural objections. The Decree No. 7 authorizes to determine such a restriction of the procedural rights of the defendants. In this case, however, no assertion of such procedural rights is in question. A challenging of certain judges or the entire Court is by no means intended here. Neither do I challenge the procedural jurisdiction of the Court. On the contrary, the objections are of quite a different nature which are not supposed to be ruled out and cannot be ruled cut by Article 2e of Decree No. 7. I raise the question whether the trial, in view of the story of the origin in international law concerning the provisions for the punishment of the war criminals, is admissible at all.
Therefore, not the mere substantive or local jurisdiction of the Court as such is challenged (this would be immaterial according to article 2 of the aforementioned decree) but the fundamental question is raised whether the entire system of the substantive and procedural rules, issued for thejudgment of the War crimes, in view of their origin, has a claim for legal validity at all. Such a statement can obviously not be ruled out through a regulation as it is contained in Article 2e of the Decree No. 7. Bluntly expressed: A materially or formally invlaid law cannot evade the examination by ruling it out; on the contrary, the right and also the duty of a judge to examine any rule will under all circumstances prevail. In my opinion, the London Protocol, dated 8 August 1945, with all its rules issued for its supplementation and implementation represents a new institution of law from the point of view of international law, and from the political point of view , an experiment. The London agreement, including its implementation rules, must be counted to those agreements which, in view of the subtleness of the questions dealt with, can only then have a claim of legal validity and general respect in the future, if those agreements themselves have been concluded in a politicly loyal manner by politically loyal partners. If this is the case, it will be possible that the principles, laid down for the first time in this agreement and applied in practice for the first time in Nurnberg, will be recognized and will have a claim for legal Validity in the future.
If this, however, is not the case, the public conscience will some day, sooner or later, form its negative judgment about this sort of trial, regardless of the number of actually concluded trials and the number of convictions pronounced, and the time is bound to come when this kind of trials is considered an abuse and not a development of international law, and when the conduct of these trials is no longer regarded as a generally binding administration of penal justice.
The sentence: "Nobody can be a judge in his own cause" is considered a matter of course by the national penal law. The slogan of "Judex inhabilis" states: The judge is precluded from the exercise of his duty if he himself is injured by the criminal act or has retained certain close connections with the offender. Another reason for the preclusion of a judge, because this is absolutely obvious, is not even mentioned in the procedural systems. The judge can neither then perform his duty as a judge if he is suspected as an offender or participant in connection with the criminal act on trial. As opposed to the national penal law it is obvious that the principles of "Judex inhabilis" can only claim a lesser significance in international law, Only in very rare cases will it be possible in international tribunals to prevent the participation of those states which themselves have been directly or indirectly injured by the acts on trial, and the objections are based on the very "incompatibility" which have been raised again and again in all countries against the exercise of a judicature which is based on international law. It is not intended in this connection to go into further details with regard to this question. for this case, are those principles which apply to the juridical unsuitability of the person suspect of the act. The accomplice in a war crime or even more so the instigator of such a crime may not be considered suitable to participate as a judge in the trial against war crimes of that kind.
protocol to the non-aggression pact with Germany. From the viewpoint of international law the attitude of the Russian authorities, at least with respect to Poland, represents a breach of the treaty of 25 July 1932; in this treaty the Soviet Union had given guarantees not to take a part in a treaty which was directed against the other treaty partner. Now it is hardly possible to conceive of a harsher form of agreement, directed against another state, than that which prepares and makes possible the military annihilation and partition of the partner. And it is furthermore difficult to think of a cruder form of "adoption" of or "participation" in such a treaty than that chosen by the USSR; for, as seen politically, it involves a partition agreement confined solely to the USSR and the Reich which was made possible by the use of arms. The fact that both States, Germany as well as the USSR, "considered" or "would be willing to consider" the possibility of maintaining a Polish State of reduced territory, has no more weight, with respect to the clear demarcation of the spheres of interest, than the fact that the decisive military campaign was to be undertaken by the Wehrmacht while the Soviet Union .at first remained in the background. based on the "disintegration", or "discontinuation" of the Polish State, which in the eyes of the Soviet Union brought about the end of Polish sovereignty and thus also ended the Soviet non-aggression obligations under the pact of 25 July 1932, does not pertain to this case and can only be regarded as an excuse. For at this time Poland was not even considered incapable of waging war (debellatio) from the German viewpoint, and the German military as well as the Polish government offices were surprised by the premature entry of the Soviet troops into Polish territory. Even this is not relevant. For the Soviet-Polish agreement of 25 July 1932 was not broken on 14 Sept.
1939, the day they marched in, but already on 23 August when the secret treaty was made. Poland according to international law, but a violation of world peace generally, and thereby an offense under international law against the nations of the world. The Soviet Union was also bound, aside from its regional, non-aggression and neutrality pacts, as a signatory to the p rovisions of the Kellog pact, which it attempted to endow with special importance, in its diplomatic negotiations, by describing many of the non-aggression pacts it signed with the border states after the Kellog pact went into effect, as "extending" and "furthering" the ideas of the Kellog pact; and the Soviet-Polish non-aggression pact specifically refers to the Kellog pact. The Soviet Union had a similar duty to ensure the peace in its capacity as a memb er of the League of Nations since 1932. Union does not only fulfill the prerequisites for a so-called violation again international law, which have been recognized by international law long ago. Further than that there is an offense against international law according to the London Statute of 8 Aug. 1945. can only be applied indirectly here. On the other hand it must be considered that the matter goes deeper. The same principles which are valid for the judge must also be valid for him who gives directions to the judge and establishes the norms upon which his decisions must be based. An international agreement which is designed to punish war criminals can only command respect and have value if all of the partners thereto are free from blame in regard to those crimes the judging of which they are turning over to a special court through a special law. If, however, one of the contracting powers has placed itself outside of international law through participation in crimes which form the object of the indictment, then the jurisdiction of the tribunal is vitiated by an irremediable fault, regardless of which victor nation provides the judges.
Considered from a strictly legal point of view, such a trial procedure cannot represent a "contribution to the development of international law", for an agreement so arrived at lacks from the beginning that authorization from the "Conscience Publique" which such a new development in international law must have if it is to be effective. The participation of a disloyal partner destroys the authority of such an agreement and may also put the collaboration of the non-incriminated partners in a light which will unfavorably affect the claim for validity of the international agreement. For it is surely recognized in the civil law systems of all civilized countries that among the required prerequisites, the personal qualities and circumstances of the contract partner are usually used as a tacit, universally subordinate basis for the contract. This is especially the case - if we may first refer to civil law - in contracts which are either long term or have special confidential conditions as a basis. In these cases the personal affairs of the contract partner are especially important. Now if the partner craftily suppresses traits which would make him unfit as a contract partner if they were examined objectively, and would justify the withdrawal of the honest partner from the planned agreement, or if he uses deception concerning their existence, then it is generally accepted that the basis for such a contract has disappeared. al law (which is proved by parallel instances in international treaty law), the destructive and annulling effect of the presence of such contract partners, who themselves have no qualification to contract such agreementss. If, for instance, a continuously neutral country, like Switzerland, joined an alliance which had been formed by two other countries, then, because Switzerland could not act correspondingly, its entry into such an alliance would be illegal and could have no legal effect.
And for this reason, when Switzerland joined the League of Nations in 1920, it made a declaration on 13 Feb. 1920 whereby it relieved itself of any military obligatio ns which were incumbent on all members of the League. Only through such a declaration could Switzerland join the League of Nations. Soviet Union to make agreements in general by saying that its agencies were guilty of certain acts according to the London Treaty. But there is an impediment ex persona in the way of participation by the Soviet Union in such international agreements which regulate the punishment of the authors of crimes against the peace. This follows from the following considerations: the moral meaning of such treaties would be reversed if states which had themselves committed the same crimes or allowed them to be committed by their agencies, could participate in forming such treaties. world opinion that it would not be able to recover. And finally, the remaining, loyal partners to such an agreement would necessarily have to lose their own position as guardians of international legality as a result of making pacts with one outside the community of nations. This so much the more since the bare fact that, in line with the London Statute and Law 10 of the Control Council, the victors are judging the vanquished, which is in itself a great moral encumberment to the agreements. they are made by parties which are not also guilty. This is not the case with Law 10 of the Control Council. Therefore, the Control Council Law 10, after thorough and objective examination - in connection with this (I refer you) to my motion of 9 December 1947, which I have also directed to the Military Tribunal Court No. II - has not gained legal validity because it stands in contradiction to international law.
It is not without reason that Christopher Emmet says in his "Verdict on Nuernberg", on page 138 in the 22 Nov. 1946 issue of "The Commonwealth":
"If, however, all of the judging nations had come to Nuernberg with clean hands, the verdicts might have really been the milestones in history that Judge Jackson believed them to be. Unfortunately, however, against the findings in Nuernberg we must raise the constantly increasing suspicion that the leaders of one of the judging countries should have been sitting on the defendants bench with the Nazi criminals." the basis for this trial.
Article II, 4b of the Control Council Law No. 10 orders:
"The fact that a person acted under orders of his responsibility for a crime; but it can be considered as an extenuating circumstance."
from responsibility could no longer be considered, under any circumstances. Accordingly, the defendants at these trials could not refer to the higher orders they received with the idea of complete exoneration. before the Control Council Law No. 10 was passed. Even in the Anglo-Saxon countries the prevailing school of thought generally favored the conception that the defendant in a war crimes trial had to be allowed the defense that he acted on higher orders.
I add the following quotations to this statement: in the 1914 edition, which was valid until 1944, states word for word as follows:
"Members of the combat forces who commit violations the enemy."
further determines that acting on higher orders constitutes complete justification so far as war crimes are concerned. This conception ruled British jurisprudence for decades, almost until the end of World War II.
It says further in the British manual:
"They can punish the officials or commanders who are measures that are described in this chapter."
the head of the state, the members of the government, as well as the higher commanders of the armed forces and other commanders who are independently responsible for an original order. 1940, which is still valid today, agrees with these directives almost verbatim. It says:
"Individual members of the armed forces are not to or commanders."
Prof. Max OPPENHEIM, co-author with Col. EDMONDS of the rules of warfare of the British MANUAL OF MILITARY LAW and for many years chief advisor of the British admiralty on questions of international law, has this to say on the subject, in his work on "INTERNATIONAL LAW", volume II, 1st to 5th edition, paragraph 253:
"Violations of the rules pertaining to warfare are concerned.
If the members of the armed forces by the enemy; the latter may then use reprisals.