I believe, therefore, that when history has come to an end, that this conflict will not have started in 1941, but with the victory of Bolshevism in Russia, that then only can the judgment of history be made which will inform about various phases of this conflict. Fuehrer order which was given to you? that any other order but the goal of the war was present, namely, a momentary and permanent security of our own area, inopposition to that area, in which the belligerent conflict is taking place. execution was the part of a systematic program of genocide which had as its aim the destruction of foreign peoples and ethnic groups. Will you please comment on this?
A I did not have any occasion to assume any such plan. I assure you that I neither participated in plans nor did I see any preparation for such plans which would have let me assume that such a plan existed. What was told to us was our security and those persons who were assumed to be endangering the security were designated as such. objective prerequisite that the executions of populations according to the Fuehrer order were re necessary?
the propaganda of Goebbels was not clearly enough delineated. I was convinced that this order, in order to grin its ends internally, had torn many millions from their families, when dispossessing the Kulaks had taken the adult population away three tines from rural districts, and that the same thing was true of the other states. This state would have even less consideration for a foreign population. relation to the Bolshevist authorities, was a very, very snail number, much lower than the Jews who occupied leading positions. The Prosecution has submitted a report from my Einsatzgruppe. In this report in Enclosure No. 2 it explained the situation of Jewry in the Crimea. Unfortunately this enclosure is not available. It would have shown that in the Crimea, for example, up to ninety percent of the administrative and leading authoritative positions were occupied by Jews. The information service in the sane field, conversations with innumerable Ukrainians and Russians and Tartars, and the documents which the Prosecution submitted show that this was not a sporadic happening in the Crimea. For us it was obvious that Jewry in Bolshevist Russia actually played a disproportionately important role.
Three times I was present during executions. Every tine I found the sane facts which I considered with great respect, that the Jews who were executed went to their death singing the International and hailing Stalin, that the Communist functionaries and the active leaders of the Communists in the occupied area of Russia posed an actual continuous danger for the German occupation which the documents of the Prosecution has shown.
of Stalin for ruthless partisan warfare would be followed without any reservation. Orally and in written from the Bolshevists have attested enthusiastically to the fact that this partisan warfare was not only waged by the Communist Party and not only by the Communist functionaries, hut as Stalin requested, it was waged by the population, by peasants, by workers, men, women and children. This same literature is proud of the fact that it was waged with great treachery, which the call of Stalin evoked in order to wage this war successfully. Thus our experiences in Russia were a definite confirmation of the Bolshevist theory and of the practice as we had learned about it before.
Q. What orders did you give for the security of the rear area in regard to killing of civilians?
A. Before I testify to the various facts, I would like to say the following: The men if my group who are under indictment here were under my military command. If they had not executed the orders which they were given they would have been called to account for it by me. If they had refused to execute the orders they would have had to he called to account for it by me. There could he no doubt about it. Whoever refused anything in the front lines would have met immediate death. If the refusal would have come about in any other way a court martial would have brought about the same consequences. The jurisdiction of courts-martial was great, but the sentences if the SS were gruesome. The orders for the executions in the East given in Pretzsch, went to all Einsatzgruppen commanders or Einsatzkommando leaders who went along during the beginning of the Russian campaign. They were never revoked. Thus they were valid for the entire Russian campaign as long as there were Einsatzgruppen. Thus it was, therefore, unnecessary at any time to give another order of initiative. Therefore, I did not give any general order of initiative and did not give any individual order to kill people. I emphasize this, even though I was told in England two and a half years ago that the Russians had found a written order. My mission was to see to it that this general order for executions would, be carried out as humanly as conditions would permit, Therefore, I Merely gave orders for the manner of carrying out these executions.
Q. What were these orders?
A. These orders had as their purpose to make it as easy as possible for the unfortunate victim and to prevent that the brutality of the men would lead to inevitable excesses. Thus I directed first that only so many victims would be brought to the place of execution as the execution commandos could handle. Any individual action by any individual man was forbidden. The Einsatzkommandos shot in a military manner only upon orders. It was strictly ordered to avoid any mistreatment, undressing was not permitted. The taking of any personal possessions was not permitted. Publicity was not permitted, and at the very moment when it was noted that a man had experienced joy in carrying out these executions it was ordered that this man may never participate in any more executions. The men could not report voluntarily, they were ordered.
Q. What did you do to prevent a wide interpretation of these orders?
A. It was forbidden that the commandos undertake any executions outside of the territory occupied by the German Army. This became necessary in Czernowiz. This was especially necessary after 10,000 Roumanians had been driven into the German area of occupation, and it became acute for Odessa, when the Roumanians tried to carry out executions beyond our orders. The commandos had the order during the execution of Communists to execute only these persons who by their proved deeds and conduct do definitely represent a danger to security. A family was never seized, neither by a high functionary nor by a commissar nor by any other person. If, on the other hand, it was said that children were executed at Kertsch this was done without any connection to the Einsatzkommando there.
Q. Why did you not prevent the liquidations?
A. Even if I used the most severe standard in judging this I had as little possibility as any of the co-defendants here to prevent this order.
There was only one thing, a senseless martyrdom through suicide, senseless because this would not have changed anything in the execution A this order, for this order was not an order of the SS, it was an order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and the Chief of State. it was not only carried out by Himmler or Heydrich. The Army had to carry it out too, the Supreme Command of the Army as veil as the commanders in the East and Southeast who were the superior corianders for the Einsatzgruppen and Einsatzkommandos. If I could imagine a theoretical possibility, then there was only the refusal on the part of those persons who were in the uppermost hierarchy and could appeal to the Supreme Commander and Chief of State, because they had the only possibility of getting access to him. They were, after all, the highest bearers of responsibility in the theater of operations.
THE PRESIDENT: May I ask a question, Dr. Aschenauer 7 the East, that is of the Wehrmacht, also had orders to carry out this program of execution?
THE WITNESS: I know that the Supreme Command gave the Supreme Commanders for the Eastern Campaign who had assembled on the 30th of March, not only information about the measures planned, but also directives to support the execution of these measures. The fact that SS and Police units were used for these executions had only one reason, namely that there was no guarantee for a systematic execution of these orders in the Army troops but that one expected demoralization if Army troops would be used, AS the war progressed in the Southeast this principle was abandoned.
THE PRESIDENT: Would you say that the Army commander not only countenanced this program of executions but lent their active support to it?
THE WITNESS: Yes, that is what I want to say. If I my give you two examples for that, the executions in Simferopol by the Einsatzgruppe 11-B were executed on the order of the Army, and the Army supplied the trucks and the gasoline and the drivers in order to bring the Jews to the places of execution. The arrests of hostages were expressly carried out by order of the supreme commander of my army. He did not agree with the executions of those hostages, because the numberof executions did not seem high enough to him and afterwards he told Seibert, the defendant here, to tell me that He himself would henceforth carry out the appropriate number of executions. from this order. sense, because in agreement with the army, we had excluded a large number of Jews, the farmers, from the executions. When the Reichsfuehrer SS was in Nikolajew on the 4th or 5th of October, I was reproached for this measure and he ordered that henceforth, even against the will of the army, the executions should take place asplanned. assembled all available commanders of my Einsatzgruppe. The Reichsfuehrer addressed these men and repeated the strict ordered to kill all those groups which I had designated. He added that he alone would carry the responsibility, as far as accounting to the Fuehrer was concerned. None of the non would boar any responsibility, but He demanded the execution of this order, even though he knew how harsh these measures were. pointed out the inhuman burden which was being imposed on the men in killing all these civilians. I didn't even get an answer.
order? and the possibility of appealing to a higher authority, but I had neither of them. this order by sickness? myself as an individual person who only could think and act responsibly for himself. After I had once become Chief of the Einsatzgruppe, I felt responsible for the 500 men of this group. By simulating illness, I could have evaded the mission, but I would have betrayed my men if I had left this command. I could not leave this task and I would not have been convinced that my successor would care for his men in the same manner as I did. I considered this which I was able to do for my men - despite everything, I considered this duty and I shall consider it today as much more valuable than the cheap applause which I could have won if I had at that time betrayed my men by simulating illness.
Q Did you issue orders of execution? executions?
A It is in three points. As far as the transportation conditions permitted, I convinced myself before the large executions whether measures had been taken at the place of execution, which would make possible the conditions I set down for these executions. ordered that other distant Kommandos be detailed to support that Kommando which had to carry out an execution, and through my men to carry out unexpected inspections during these executions, I wanted to make sure in that way whether my orders were being carried out about the manner of execution.
was, in the first place to follow the German Army into the Eastern territories and to kill Jews, Gypsies, political functionaries, communists, and other elements of the civilian population which were considered racially inferior or politically unwanted. Will you please comment on this?
THE PRESIDENT: Just a moment, please. That is a rather large question and it takes up, perhaps, another phase of the indictment. Suppose we have our recessnow? Recessfor fifteen minutes.
(A recesswwas taken.)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
DR. ASCHENAUER: I may repeat the last question, if it please the Court. BY DR. ASCHENAUER: was, first, to follow the German Army into the Eastern territories, and to eliminate with Soviet functionaries, Gypsies, Jews, and other elements of the civilian population which were considered racially inferior, or politically unwanted. Would you say something about that, witness? to eliminate groups of the population because they were racially inferior, and that was not the main task. It was an additional task which, in itself, was foreign to the actual task of the Einsatzgruppen and Einsatzkommandos, because never was such a task a task of the Security Police or of the SD for that matter - and never by any means, as it is mentioned in another place in the indictment, were they trained in such exterminations and executions. Rather the general task of the Einsatzgruppen and the Einsatzkommandos was that the security of the army territory in the operational theaters should be guaranteed by then, and within the framework of this security task the execution order was, of course, one of the basic orders. But, in reality, the Einsatzgruppen's task was a positive one, if I do not consider this basic order for exterminations and executions. It must be realized, of course, that a group of about 500 people who, on the average, had charge of an area of 300 to 400 square kilometers, could not terrorize such an area, even if they had wanted to do so. Therefore, if we regard it intelligently these tasks could only be called positive ones, and as such they were developed by myself. The first experiences I collected was when the task was transferred to us by the army to harvest in the Transistria. The larger number of Kommandos only dealt for weeks with this task of harvesting in Transistria, and I had assigned various tasks which were the basis of my policy altogether which were, first, the institution of a self-administration, as it were, in the communities so-called "Kolchos", and also in the municipalities; secondly, a recognition of private property; thirdly, the payment of wages which the population received for each fifth collection.
I guaranteed this wage, even to the Rumanian authorities. Fourth, cultural places were restored - that is, the population was supported in restoring the cultural centers and they were inspired to take up a new cultural life. It is not for me now to describe or disucss the success which this had with the populations of such places. I can only state that because of these measures the population was on our side, and they themselves reported any disturbances which might happen in these territories. Therefore, by this positive winning over of the population, the security of the territory internally could be guaranteed, and actually, in our territory a partisan resistance movement did not come into existence, but it was formed by external elements and was artificially extended. to the army about the atmosphere within the population, the reaction of the population to German measures, and what disturbances and damages happened in the area on the part of the Germans. In this manner plebiscites could be arranged which were useful to the population and which saved us any police measures. The situation in the Crimea was much more difficult, although I was there a longer time than any where else at a stretch, and I had the possibility to prepare political measures. Even here the increase of my positive measures succeeded in establishing a sort of confidence relationship between the population and the SD agencies. When, in January 1942, the danger arose that we would lose the Crimea, the Tartars, also the Ukrainians, voluntarily put themselves at our disposal for military service. The army left it up to me to deal with the political situa tion in the Crimea.
At that time I could not accept the Ukrainians into the army, but the Tartars put 10% of their male population at my disposal within three weeks, absolutely voluntarily. Here, selfgovernment and self-administration was granted to all parts of the population that is, those units, those communities with a Ukrainian majority had a Ukrainian mayor; the Tartars got a Tartar for their mayor; the Greeks got a Greek; and the Great Russians got a Great Russian. These measures were extended in winter as a support when the danger of famine arose in the south. Thus, the actual security task was permanently a positive one and was to be achieved by positive measures.
Q Did the combatting of armed bands belong to your sphere?
A No, that was not within my sphere. But, in the Crimea - especially, after repeated landings of the Russians in Feodosia, Kersch and Eupatoria from the North, East and the West, with the ultimate aim of the Jaila Mountains, the whole Crimea was systematically filled with enemy agents and spies and those strongly executive tasks, as, for instance, band intelligence, became an essential task which was assigned to us by the army. To my great regret the forces of the army in the Crimea were so small that for months the Commando 10b and parts of the Commando 11b had to be assigned to fight armed bands. This assignment, as well as the combatting of armed bands, was under the army command, that is, the command of the various army units which held the front sectors. We ourselves were only subordinates and were outside our actual field of activities. this activity of the Einsatzkommandos? the Einsatzgruppe very small. I had merely one, or possibly two, departmental experts, and one adjutant, the defendant Schubert, who was also the manager of the business office. That was my whole staff, who had to deal with the matters.
I had to be in the headquarters of the army, the local headquarters, that is, in order to establish and guarantee the permanent contact between the Einsatzgruppe end the Army; I was actually the point of contact between the army and the Einsatzkommandos. My main task was to carry out the orders of the chief of the SD, the Security Police end the too frequent orders of the army, and to adjust them, and to take care that the Einsatzkommandos, on the basis of the general situation in an area, were committed in the right tactical manner. Thus, for instance, we had to hunt down saboteurs, enemy agents, or make out intelligence reports, or gather intelligence about partisans, or whatever the situation required.
Q I now turn to the documents. I note the Document Books I, II-A, II-B, II-C, II-D and III-D. I don't know whether the Prosecution had these document books at their disposal at present.
MR. WALTON: While the document books mentioned by the defense are not all here I don't think that will hamper Dr. Aschenauer at all - I think we can take enough notes, and enough notes appear in the record for our own purposes.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. BY DR. ASCHENAUER:
Q My first question on this subject: Introducing the evidence against the members of the Einsatzgruppe D, the Prosecution under Exhibit 149 produced document No. 2661, Volume III*D, and they have remarked that the operation and situation report No. 10 concerning activities of the Einsatzgruppe D from the last until the 28th of February 1942, in which it is shown that all Jewish areas in the Eastern territories are to be cleaned, as it were, by transporting the Jews to Ghettos and those who resisted the German regulation would be shot. Jews would also be shot in order to prevent the spreading of epidemics. Would you comment on this, witness?
insofar as it is not a report from the Einsatzgruppe D, because in this document, independently from individual reports of the group, collective notes - summaries, as it were - reports which were made Independently of the original reports. Only from the location signs can one conclude which territory is meant for the individual Einsatzgruppen. Of Einsatzgruppe D there is only one small remark three of four times in this lengthy document, the content of which is quite independent from the charge of the Prosecution, This paragraph is mentioned twice. The error seems to me based on the fact that the Prosecution confuses the term "Eastern Territory" - "Ostland", Evidently it takes the term "Ostland" to mean the whole of Russia, while in reality "Eastern territory" in German usage, is an administrative term by which the three Baltic countries are meant - Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, and the charge of the Prosecution against Einsatzgruppe D is the content of what is being reported from this Eastern territory. It is your own affidavit of 5 November 1945, and there it says:
"In the course of the year while I was leader of the Einsatzgruppe D they liquidated", (the Einsatzgruppe, that is), "90,000 men, women and children."
What do you mean by "approximately"?
COURT II-A CASE IX Einsatzgruppen for two and a half years now; and during all that time I have always tried to avoid naming figures because the numbers of executions I do not actually know.
I don't know anyhow today. I know under what conditions these sentences were signed by me. It is an affidavit which was chosen from a number of ten or twelve. Even then, that "approximately meant that I did not actually know. I can assure the Tribunal that in any oral remarks I might have made during these interrogations, I avoided as long as I could naming any figures whatsoever. If, of course, the figure 90,000 was named by me, I always added that of this, fifteen to twenty per cent are double countings. That is on the basis of my own experiences. I do not know any longer how I could have remembered the number of just 90,000 because I did not keep a register of these figures. The "approximately" must have meant that I was not certain. evident--and my own men reproached me for it--that I was wrong in naming the figure 90,000. It is evident that I mentioned this number 90,000 by adding a number of other figures. I do not mention this in order to excuse myself as I an perfectly convinced that it does not matter for the actual facts whether it was 40,000 or 90,000. But I mention this for the reason that, in the situation in which we are today, politically speaking, Fibures are being dealt with in an irresponsible manner. The material and the value of man seems to become so unimportant that the play with millions does not seen to be of any particular importance either. Herr Auerbach mentions the figure of 11,000,000 in relation to Germany. A very small part of these millions have ever COURT II-A CASE IX seen a concentration camp.
The IMT named the number 2,000,000 for elimination in the Eastern territories. The prosecution in this trial is slightly more modest and only mentions the number of 1,000,000. It is not for nothing that the prosecution deals with only a small portion of time concerning the activities in the Eastern territories because after this period there were no activities on the part of the Einsatzgruppen. prosecution in these documents, figures occur up to 46,000. I must now state solemnly that in the Reich Security Main Office, Heydrich, Mueller, and Streckenbach, and all the others who knew about these matters, intentionally exaggerated and invented the numbers of Einsatzgruppen A,B and C. By that, B, I mean during the period of NEBE. I am convinced that these figures, which, if I add the numbers in the documents, are not even half of what the prosecution charges me with, are exaggerated by about twice as much. I believe that it is quite evident that these figures should be compared with others and looked upon as the Soviet, the Bolshevist figures. Compare these figures, as I say, with the numbers of civilian population figures which for the same reasons even from other motives, perhaps, but in an inhumane manner were murdered because this is what happened while I was in command of the Einsatzgruppen.
Q. Witness, you speak of exaggeration and double counting. Do you refer, when you maintain that, to Exhibit 95, Document Number 3,148, Volume II, Page 57, of the 20th of September, 1941, and Exhibit 96, Document Number 3,147?
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Aschenauer, I have been conducting a campaign, very unsuccessfully up to this moment, of COURT II-A CASE IX trying to get defense counsel and the prosecution counsel, when referring to an exhibit to give us the largest unit first--the book number, the page, the exhibit, the date, then the paragraph.
But you start off with the paragraph, and it's very difficult.
DR. ASCHENAUER: I shall try, your Honor, to comply with your wish.
Q. In maintaining this, do you refer to Volume II-D, Exhibit Number 95, Document Number 3,148, in the German Document Book Page 57; and Document Book II-D, Exhibit 96, Document Number 3,147; furthermore, to Document Book II-C, Exhibit 76, Document Number 3,137; furthermore, Volume II-D, Exhibit 85, Document Number 3,159? In these documents there are numbers which I would like you to comment on.
A. I should like to contest this figure, the figure mentioned in Volume II-C, Page 49 of the German text. There it says that from the 16th of September until 30 September, 22,000 Jews and Communists were executed and that the total figure is 35,000. In Document Book II-D, German text Page 57, it says, "Under Einsatzgruppe D," Location Kikerino, Work commandos of this area freed of Jews. From 19 August to 25 September 8,890 Jews and Communists were executed. Total number, 17,315." There's a question mark. In the next sentence it says, "At the moment the Jewish question is being solved in Nikolajew and Cherson. In each case approximately 5,000 Jews were comprenended." This operational situation-report is from the 20th of September. On the next page, Document 3,147, the operational situation-report from the 26th of September 1941, There under "Einsatzgruppe A the Location of Kikerino is stated. I do not know whether that was an actual garrison of the Einsatzgruppe A, but at any rate COURT II-A CASE IX I know that this Location was never a location of the Einsatzgruppe D. In this operational-situation report almost Literally under Einsatzgruppe D with the location of Nikolajew the same subjects are mentioned as in the operational situation report of 20th of September.
were submitting as documentary evidence the reports of activities of Einsatzgruppen A and D; but actually up to this moment, apart from the reports of the Einsatzgruppen to the army, they have submitted no original reports. These two subsequent operational-situation-reports, which could be controlled and checked up on very easily in Berlin, show very clearly how far the original reports are removed from the contents of these operational-Situationreports. It is my opinion that from the operationalsituation-reports not a single sentence can be identified with a sentence of an original report from the Einsatzgruppen and the Einsatzkommandoes, but, on the contrary, as becomes evident from these two reports, the operational situation reports are made up from the original reports, and they are full of mistakes and are not compiled with the view point to pass on actual reports.
one another in copy. But as a matter of fact they have been dealt with. According to my memory, these reports concerning the fivethousand Jews in Nikolajev zone are correct, but, of course, only once, not twice. If now on page 49, II C, under 2 October, it says that between 16 September and 30 September 22,000 Jews and Communists had been executed, this is an amount which during the occupation of the Einsatzgruppen in this territory did not exist in that area. During this time the Einsatzgruppen was in charge of operations in the Nikolajev-Keresov territory and the territory east of the Dnjeper River, so far as it was already within our own territory of command. In the operational situation report of 18 October, in Document Book II-D, on page 60, Document II-D, page 60, it says, "During the time of report, the solution of the Jewish question was dealt with especially in the territory east of the Dnjeper River; the territories newly occupied by the commandos here freed of Jews". Then it says, "including those territories east of the Dnjeper River 4897 Jews and 46 Communists were executed". This figure is first of all outside the report of the tine of 26 September and secondly, it states the actual figure on which existed as to this territory at the time it becomes evident that the report of 22 October cannot be correct, under any circumstances. It can only here be an addition, or in using the reports from other Einsatzgruppen. There must be another exhibit, tie number of which I don't remember, from which this becomes quite evident, namely the fact from the operational situation report of the beginning of November. May I have this. That must be the operational report No. 129 of 15 November 1944, Exh. 85 in Document Book II-D, on page 21. Here approximately 4 weeks later on page 21 of the German version, this report of Einsatzgruppen D in that period reports 11,000 Jews were executed. It must be noted that in situation report 5 November, although in October, the total num ber had been mentioned as 40,000, the situation report of November states there are 31,000.
Here is a contradiction which cannot be clarified from the documents which only prove the questionability of the evidence of these documents, not only regarding these figures but these individual reports in these documents.
Q I further offer the documents in Volume II-B, Exhibit No. 58, Document 2837, in the German Document Book, it is on page 6. It is an operational situation report from the 29 August 1941. Furthermore, in Document Book II-D, Exhibit 89, Document No. 2943, German Document Book on page 37; also from Document Book III-D, Exhibit 154, Document No. 2840, in the German Document Book page 46; would you comment on the statements in these documents concerning other statements, whether they contradict each other?
A May I put a question? I think there is a mistake here in this document. This is Document Book II-B, page 6, Exhibit No. 58, which is Document No. 2837. I think it ought to say 57.
Q It should he operational situation report of 29 August?
A There is something missing. (Counsel and defendant consulting document at witness dock) I would like to point out two facts. On one occasion it says in the Document 2837, Document Book II-B, page 8 of the German text that in Mogilaw-Podolsk approximately 27,500 Jews were transported to the Rumanian territory, although in the report of 26 August it says that in the immediate vicinity of Mogilaw there were approximately 7,000 Jews who until the time the official duties were taken over were sent from Rumanian into this territory. A Jewish transport of about 6,000 people was in spite of protest by the Rumanian Bridge-Commandant transported into the Eastern territory at this time. Even if I add these 6,000 to the 7,000 and I do not think they are contained in this 7,000, then I arrive at the result of the number of 13,000 and this is the number which I remember. But here it states until the taking over of office from the reports of 7 August, it became evident that at that time the Einsatzkommando X-B, location at Mogilaw-Podolsk and I quote:
"Prevents the Jewish transport Into territory, taken over by the Germans." This, therefore, is quite Unlikely that when during the period of report of 7 August a transport which could only he carried out over two bridges end was stopped, and, on 26 August, 7,000 Jews should have gone from the Rumanian territory into the German territory; that then 2 days later 27,000 could have been there to be driven back.