The cessation of this community went hand in hand With the material values of society; that is to say, the ideas of enlightenment and of individualism made man independent and forced him to rely on himself. He no longer belonged to a natural community hut as a sum total represented his own interests. The cessation of this metaphysical relation between the individual people brought up questions of order which have not been solved up to this very day. At the same time it endangered the security of the larger states; and this problem has not yet been solved. As a gain of this time which has been achieved for humanity, they have acquired the consciousness of their own willpower and have established themselves as moral human beings. Fascism put itself beyond this gain of centuries. It merely recognized that there were no more natural communities. It opposed the traditional values of Rome to the dissolving tendencies of society, in the Roman Empire in the divine state and in the Roman Empire as an expression of a religious entity and its laws.
Of the first, the traditional value which founded the basis for the State as a final earthly value of the devine will. From the second, it developed humanism in order to add its one picture of individual application to the obligation of the State. A study of Fascist Doctrine, and of the Fascist legislation, especially of the constitution, showed clearly that this is an absolute State, whose efforts on a moral basis were camouflaged. The State was an entity in itself, and the only value to men, society and the people were only to arise as a value from this absolute value of the State. This State alone gave them the moral foundation and the social obligation.
Q As a National Socialist weren't you yourself in adherence of an absolute State - the total State, or of the Fuehrer State, as it said in the Nazi ideology? the Fascist State. National Socialism as such vent out from the recognition that the nature of the natural communities was dissolved by individualism, which also had recognized the idealization of the individual and the insecurity of the individual as regards his place in life. But contrary to Fascism, National Socialism made an attempt to consider human beings as realities, and as having their own value. It saw him as a member of a people. It found a new natural community, namely, the relationship of the citizen to the whole makeup of people in which this man was born as a member. Man was not merely an incidental citizen of it but a link within the people. Thus, man and the people had the primary value, and the State was merely an auxiliary means of caring for and developing these people and its culture.
THE PRESIDENT: May I interrupt you just a moment, please. Was this ideology expressed in the publications of the National Socialist Party, or is this your own individual interpretation, and your own individual philosophy?
this opinion unequivocally. This is the culture speech of 1935, and the speech on the front to the generals of the Eastern Front in the Spring of 1943 where Hitler expects considerable consequences as a result of this opinion, even for the German people insofar as he determined that it belonged to the makeup of the German people, that it is composed of various tribes of various races, and that it, therefore, is the mission of leadership of that State to care for and keep up the various qualities of these different tribes. He assigns the task to the State of uniting these various different characteristics of the different tribes in the German people, and he takes this as his basic conception. The regrettable feature is that these very two speeches by the possibility which was opened to Goebbels were withheld from the public; the culture speech of 1935 did not appear in the newspapers, but the speech of Goebbels appeared from the very beginning to the end. Furthermore, Your Honor, I believe it is hardly in optional Socialist literature which gives any systematic opinion in this respect.
THE PRESIDENT: Do I understand you to say that these two speeches were withheld from publication against the wishes of Hitler? much as it was the official speech before the Reichstag (Reich Party Assembly), but Goebbels, as the Propaganda Minister had the possibility of preventing a further dissemination, since he gave orders direct to the press as to which speech of the Party Assembly was to be published, and which was not. I don't know anything about whether Hitler opposed the dissemination of these speeches.
THE PRESIDENT: Do I understand that Goebbels would have a superior authority to Hitler in the matter of propaganda, if Hitler was interested? one not living through these things. We had a State in which the commanding power of the Fuehrer could not be doubted, but even he had to give way occasionally to the hierarchy below him, Ley, Goebbels and Goering in particular, and, in fact, he had to give them a free hand in their own field as there were no cabinet sessions, there were no regular Fuehrer discussions, and, whatever was brought to him by and for his decision was incidental.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you intend to say that Goebbels opposed the theories advanced by Hitler in these two speeches, and for that reason withhold public dissemination of them? BY DR. ASCHENAUER: doctrines? of the people, which National Socialists embraced, their idea of an authoritarian State, Fuehrer, had to be rejected, and was actually rejected. If this theory of absolute State was propaganda, of the National Socialist Party anyway, this on the one hand goes into the question which the presiding judge just asked; insofar as a man like Ley had an absolute interest to bring out that ultimate power of the Fuehrer and the State in order to be able to have his own absolute power in the State; and, on the other hand it brings with it the tragic moments of National Socialism, namely, because National Socialism up to 1933 had not developed its formuli sufficiently. After 1933 men flocked to it and were fully prepared for any devotion and to make everything available for a program of which they knew that those Fuehrers, who were right with them, were enthusiastic about it. Literature about the total State -- about the Fuehrer State is altogether written by such people, and not one National Socialist will be found among them. These are the same people whom today confess - I mean attempt to say justly that they were never National Socialists.
That is why I from the beginning opposed this type of literature, in student unions I treated the spiritual foundation of such literature, and, I would just like to name one person, the Jurist of Third Reich, Karl Schmidt, This Karl Schmidt as a basis for his political views had the doctrine of Friend and Foe. Nothing could contradict the views of National Socialism more than this doctrine for in a people all members are part of the people; even if they are opponents of a certain point of view, they, therefore, are not enemies who have to be exterminated but they are fellow countrymen who have to be won over. But this doctrine together with the National Bolshevist literature in the field of economics has built up the Total State as a basis of this idea. member of the people. Furthermore, one would have to discuss the difference between the Western Democracy and a Germanic State? philosophies conflicted here without having understood each other. In National Socialism, as an idea, the idea of absolute obedience was seen in this opposition. But the differences between Democracy and National Socialism lie somewhere else.
aim is the equality of its citizens, and the guarantee of their upmost liberty, but it leaves the human side of life, the culture, the economics, the education to the individual himself, that is to say, it makes a difference between the citizens and human beings. This philosophy is opposed to the Germanic tradition. For this tradition the State is a representative of the whole people; for the leadership organization to care for and develop the people and its members. To this extent the Germanic man wants and expects from his representative, namely, the State, the development of the entire human being, and on his part he is prepared to devote himself entirely to this representative. The strongest expression of this was the Germanic Community, which existed without constitution, without limitation of rights and duties, consisted of a community of volunteers who devoted themselves unconditionally to its community, but who expected that the officials of this community would fulfill their living conditions. It Is clear that such a philosophy bears within itself tremendous dangers. If this serving element of the State is not sufficiently regarded, and if the State becomes an entity in itself, and a value to itself, and this danger National Socialism did not evade, this danger for the reason which I mentioned above, a number of Fuehrers and theories developed just the opposite but the strange thing is, that theoretically speaking an absolute Fuehrerism existed, but in particular during the war, especially, a pluralistic anarchy developed. That is to say, below this Fuehrer there were independent power -politics, disobedience and treachery, the Fuehrer State was neither thought out all the way nor, even less, was it formulated all the way through. The Fuehrer did not only deny the State as a purpose in itself, but has destroyed it in an exaggerated form, so that it was no longer available to him as an instrument; in place of the State, the multiple wantonness of the various fuehrers took its place.
Q What wasyour activity in the Party after 1933? District Court in Hildesheim, and as such I lived in my own town once more, I lead my own district group in my own town only temporarily. I directed the legal matters in the District Court at Hildesheim, and, furthermore, within my official duties I conducted training courses. In the clear consciousness of the coning in of a let of non-National Socialists into the Party could no longer be prevented, which made a discussion of the Fascist and Nazi Doctrines in opposite views necessary, and during this tine this theme was the content of my speeches, and despite the efforts, I could not prevent this joining of many non-National Socialists to the Party. This activity lasted until October 1933.
Q Then did you join the Institute for World Economics in Kiel?
Q How did that come about? economics, but since I knew on how little National Socialism was actually based, I accepted an offer from professor Jessen to be able to combine politics and economics, and, he offered no a position at the Institute for World Economics in Kiel, where I became his personal assistant, and at the same time he offered mo the opportunity of building a department, or to setup a department for National Socialism and Fascism. Thus it was our common goal to examine Fascism scientifically, and at the same time to explain National Socialism. Personally, it was my intention to study philosophy and theoretical National Sociology and Economies.
Q How long were you active as a scientific assistant? without him I remained at Kiel until the Fall of 1934.
Q How was it that your activity terminated so shortly?
AAbout new year of 1933 and '34 Professor Jessen and I had objected very strenuously against National Bolshevistic tendencies of the Party at Kiel, especially, because this National Bolshevist circles had built up an organization in almost all Reich Ministries.
As the result of this fight on our part I was in February 1934 arrested at the request of the Party with several other students. Professor Jessen evaded this arrest because he was sich. He had to leave Kiel since his opponent and my opponent, especially in the Ministry of Culture actually held the power. After Professor Jessen left, the Ministry of Culture demanded in the Fall of 1934 that I be dismissed from Kiel, because I was a factor of political unrest there.
Court No. II-A, Case No. IX.
Q. What did this event mean for your scientific plans, for your scholastic plant?
A. Since the departments of the Culture Ministry were against me, my scholastic career was at an end.
Q. What activity did you decide to engage in now?
A. Jessen and I took up the fight against these people with other groups in the Party and formulated the plan to build the commercial high school in Berlin into an economics institute in order to fight these national Bolshevist forces which were especially active in economics, in order to oppose them with real representatives of National Socialism. Jessen was to be provost of this school, and I was to aid him in building up the school. For this purpose I went to Berlin in December, 1934, but these plant fell through also because of the Party, in this case on the part of Rosenberg. In the paper, the Voelkisch Beobachter, an article appeared against Jessen which called a book by Jessen anti-national. Rosenberg objected to Jessen. The Culture Minister, Rust, did not dare to make him director of the school. Thus my scholastic plans were definitely at an end, but simultaneously my political activity was also at an end, insofar as the director of the Reich School of National Socialist Economics, Dr. Wagner, warned me at the request of an organization in Munich and warned me about attacking National Socialist politics in my speeches, such speeches which were epecially directed against the policies of the Reich Food Office would no longer be tolerated.
Q. How long did you remain in the Institute for Applied Economic Sciences?
A. Now I was without any professional goal, directed a library in the Institute for Applied Economic Sciences and furthermore held meetings with students. I had already described them briefly, but those forcer also destroyed my student meetings so that I was definitely at an end in Berlin.
Q. Are you speaking of the time '35, '36?
A. Yes.
Q. In May, 1936, you entered into the service of the SD. How did that come about?
A. This same Professor Jessen who had called me to Kiel and Berlin now offered me a post in the SD, namely specialist on economics, a position which had been offered to him too. Until that time I was not familiar with the SD. Jessen arranged a meeting with the leader of the SD, at that time Professor Hoehn, and in this discussion I told him what my political opinions were, and to my surprise he answered that these very political critical opinions were just the very ideas on National Socialism were needed in the SD. Since there would be no more public criticism, this would be an organization which would have as its mission to inform the leading organizations of the state about National Socialist developments, and especially as regards wrong developments, wrong tendencies, etc.
Q. What was the concrete mission which SD was assigned?
A. I was told to build up an economic news service, to create an organization which would be in a position in the field of economics to give all the information which would tell about mistendencies and mistaken developments in the National Socialist philosophy. This was the motive which then induced me to enter the SD and thus into the SS in 1936.
Q. Now, before going into any more important questions concerning the charges of the Prosecution, I would like to finish the story of your professional career.
How did your position in the SD develop further?
A. The picture in the SD was somewhat different that I had expected. The Chief of the SD had exaggerated to me insofar as the organization of the SD, which in reality did not exist. The whole central organization which I found consisted of about twent young people without any office help, without any registration, without any means at all. It was not a well organized apparatus at all. One did not even know what was wanted. One took up individual cases which in such an embryonic organization happened to come along. The natural interest of the Chief were practically the be-it-all of the SD. He was a political scientist and teacher, and thus the SD was first concerned with that field. Here I began to work in the field of economics, laid the basis for an information service in which information was gathered about economics in Germany, and I tried to find specialists who would be in a position to analyze the economic tendencies and to evaluate these tendencies. This work pleased, and around the turn of the year '36, '37, I became Chief of Staff of the SD inland, that is representative of the chief, with the special mission of transferring the system I had developed to the other fields. The basis for an all-encompassing information service was adopted and was organized along those lines. In 1936 we already find a picture, in a small scale, of the later Amt III of the Reich Main Security Office. The SD Central Department II/2 had three groups which encompassed the entire phases of the spheres of national life, Group I, culture, education and national culture; Group II, law and administration, the questions of Party and State, of the high school and of the student organizations; Group III, all departments of economics.
Q. In your work did you have any difficulty?
what was being developed here. The difficulties came from the culture. sphere and from the economic spheres. In the years 1936 and 1937 the development of the four-year plan and the success of the food ideologies as National Socialist policies had made strong influences within the middle class. Hundreds of thousands of plants were closed. I started to take a part in this development with the new SD. We did not only try to take a hand in these developments and to point out the catastrophic consequences, but we also took a hand personally by personal conferences and strengthening our information material so that in the closing down of these plants many difficulties arose. At the same time we tried to point out to Himmler the damaging effects of these measures. And now there was the first shart difference, because the Reich Food Association under Darre as head was the actual basis and support of Himmler's ideologies, and therefore he objected to my reports as being against Darre. The factual problems were not agreeable to him. Since we also took a hand in the cultural problems and objected against the retirement and recall of the old professors by the Party and called attention to the fact that the opportunistic young knights were certainly not fit to replace the wisdom of the old professors, Himmler called me on the carpet. For the first time he called me a pessimist and this clung to me all the time. Besides Himmler stated that the SD had no business in these questions, but that they were left up to the Party. In the year 1937 the Director of the SD, Professor Hoehn, was dismissed through the intervention of Streicher. After the director had been dismissed the mission of the SD was to be changed, and therefore those forces were removed who had so far determined the direction of this new line. Since I was not prepared to give up my ideas about the subject, I was myself dismissed, not dismissed, I was merely excluded from a policy-making position. I was merely restricted to the economic department. Since I no longer saw any chance for the development of the SD in this position and did not want to participate in any other measures I asked for dismissal.
Heydrich refused this, but after long negotiations I succeeded, in the spring of 1938 to get permission to leave the SD and to become an official in the Economic Administration. November, 1939, I became the top manager of this group. In this time I only worked in the SD sporadically, for after my dismissal the other defendant, Seibert, was my deputy in the economic group who now actually directed the task.
Q Why did you accept a position in the Reichs-Group Commerce? years, '36, '37 and '38 was that unemployment was not only overcome but by the four-year plan and the many tasks which had been created threatened about one million businesses of the middle class. We had taken up this question since in our opinion it was the mission of National Socialism to dissolve the collectivization but not by proletarizing the middle class and by dissolving independent plants to increase this collectivization. The attempt to prevent this -- I only found a chance to prevent this in this Reichs-Group Commerce, and thus I went to this Reichs-Group Handel, Reichs-Group Commerce, in order to pursue my aims further in practical politics which could no longer be pursued in a normal manner.
DR. ASCHENAUER: Your Honor, this would be a convenient time to recess.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, the Tribunal will be in recess for fifteen minutes.
(A recess was taken:)
THE MARSHAL. The Tribunal is again in session.
DR. ASCHENAUER (Attorney for Defendant Ohlendorf): Your Honor, before I proceed with questioning my witness, I would like to clarify a few mistakes which were made in the translation. A list of incorrect points becomes evident from the comparison between the English and German. Professor Hoehn and not in the SD.
Two - it was said : alleged national socialist policies in the Reichsnaehrstand..... "allegedly" was not translated. from SD itself was mentioned, - the dismissal from the Main Office was meant. The Main Office was left out. These three things were incorrect.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Aschenauer, your remarks, of course, will be incorporated into the record and we can assure you that the correct version will appear in the final transcript, because everything which is stated here in court is automatically recorded on a film and from that the transcript is eventually prepared.
DR. ASCHENAUER: Yes, thank you very much, Your Honor. large responsible task in the Reichsgroup Commerce (Handel) in September 1939 you became the leader of the office of the SD Inland in the Security Main Office? the State Police, because of the centralization of the political Police Forces by the Reichsfuehrer SS and the Chief of the German Police, had by then been extended so far that apart from the immediate fighting in the executive, they also took over the SD, the News Agency. and which had been legitimized by the Party, had, in the years 1936 and 1937, become smaller and smaller and in 1938 it had been separated from the State Police and SD and was finally dissolved.
to take up his old plans and form a State Protection Corps. He attempted to do everything in his power to establish this corps after the separation by the State Police and SD. He affiliated them into new organizations and turned them over to the Reichssicherheitshauptamt. The Reich Security Main Office too was supposed to be just a staff for a State Security Corps, which he extended to such an extent later on, that even the inner administration was taken over into the the State Security Corps. The SS Police, the SD Interior Administration were supposed to be taken over into the State Security Corps and the SS was supposed to be responsible for all this. silent about his plans in front of the Party, because the Party had legitimized the SD as a news agency, because the SD was a Party establishment above the SS but it had never been prepared to admit such a task in front of the State and to have it legitimized by the Party. was the news agency which had been legitimized by the SD. Party. It was attempted not to give up the SD as a news agency, because the Party had developed its own news agency and would have had the possibility to require officially this news service for itself, because the Reichsfuehrer SS did not offer them this intelligence service for their purposes. service from the Party in order to amalgamate these intelligence services within the State Security Corps, but this never came about. The Reich Security Main Office, as an institution, until the collapse, had never been an official agency, but officially the Security Police.
that is, the State Police and the Criminal Police, were superior to the Reich Security Main Office which remained an official authority. This Main Office, Security Police, was not dissolved, although in the Reich Security Main Office and State Police formed the office for the Amt IV and the Criminal Police formed Office V. Also the SD Main Office did not remain as an official Party institution, although internally the administration in Office I and Office II were combined with the State organization. This Reich Security Main Office, therefore, was an interior administration set-up of the Reichsfuehrer SS for the purpose of the State Protection Corps, but it never became an official agency within the State or Party. Thus, through a decree, it had been forbidden to use the letterhead of the Reich Security Main Office for any external correspondence. party from extending its own news service to the intelligence service on the one hand in order to use the SD as a function itself; in order to be able to show a facade to the Party as the other news agency was dissolved, which had been handled by the adversary and as this did not exist any longer within the SD, it was only a small beginning of the Lebensgebiet (domestic) News Service, that is Central Department II/2. As the Reichsfuehrer SS did not intend to extend this domestic news service and to develop it, and, also, Heydrich did not intend to reorganize the SD as much as it would have been necessary, the solution of an external facade was sufficient. This was an emergency solution, insofar as the staff which had been in the SD up to the time in the fight in 1936, 1937, 1938, had been used up by the deputy of Heydrich in the Reich Security Main Office. Therefore, there was no person who on this new basis could establish bearable relations with the State Police, but, as the SD was not regarded as a really serious matter by Himmler as by Heydrich, I remained in my main capacity as the manager of the Reichsgroup Commerce and Trade and in NOV, 1939 I was authorized to become the main manager officially, i.e. to takeover the complete organization of about 900,000 members and to represent them officially for all agencies of the Reich.
I remained Honorary Manager of the SD and I only temporarily worked in the SD and I saw no possibility thus to create a different picture from the one I left in 1938.
of a special confidence on the part of Himmler or Heydrich, was it? was prepared to take this over, because there was no serious intention of extending this office. your work done, the work you just talked about? ties and all the setbacks and defeats which happened later on. The SD Inland, the only purpose. as from September 1939, of the SD within the Reich remained illegal. The Party had not approved of this formation of the SD and it was not prepared to approve of it. Himmler himself did not legitimize this SD. He was not prepared to cover it, and he let it and its men down whenever they were attacked by any side; he did not defend it. Thus it was not possible to follow the plan of the administration of the Office III-D, and, too, it was in the interest of the German people, and it was not possible, as far as office personnel went, so that it could really solve the task which was Large extensive. This became evident very soon, especially in my own person. Although in September 1939 I became the manager of Ant III, in the beginning of November we had the first big crisis. Heydrich sent me on official trips with Himmler, and disputes arose, the consequence of which was that in Warsaw he informed me, through his chief- adjutant Karl Wolff, that I should leave his services, that an agreement between us about the work was no longer possible.
Q What is the reason for this disagreement with Himmler? been able to treat the Jews in a manner which he wanted and that, he said, was the product of my education. Heydrich was very pleased by this crisis with the Reichsfuehrer because any possibility of my overshadowing his position had been prevented. He refused to let me have the organization, and he gave reasons to the Reichsfuehrer for abandoning the idea of my dismissal, During the year 1940 there were more disagreements, because the fact of the news service was protested from all sides.
Ley complained to Himmler about me and asked for my dismissal because of criticism by the SD News Service against the development of the DAF and its economic enterprises. Himmler himself criticized a number of reports because he said they are defeatist and pessimistic. They came back torn up. In the negotiations with me Heydrich realized that I was chief of the Reich Group Commerce and Trade and was declared essential as such - that means I was obligated to serve in the Reich Group Commerce and Trade during the war and that he had thus almost completely lost his power over me. Thus, in 1940, the crisis with Heydrich started again in a very acute form, he asked me on various occasions to join the army. This was prevented because, meanwhile, the chief of the Reich Group Commerce and Trade is a soldier, and apart from taking over the management, I also took over the military end of Reich Group Trade, therefore, he asked for my dismissal from the Reich Group Trade.
THE PRESIDENT: May I interrupt, please. Witness, would you please indicate specifically just what were these differences between you and Himmler? Briefly, but specifically.
A (By the witness) The differences of opinion between Himmler and myself were differences of temperament and of politics. I now use his expression: I was the unbearable, humorless Prussian, an unsoldierly type, a defeatist, and intelligence monger.
THE PRESIDENT: Are we to understand that you mean by that, that you anticipated the defeat of Germany? many difficulties which might make the success of the war questionable
THE PRESIDENT: I see.
A (Continuing) What was most disagreeable to him was that in our administrative reports we wanted to bring about constitutional conditions under all circumstances.
We made it quite clear to him that if the order of the state was destroyed the war could not possibly be was. Now, I called Himmler a Bavarian because he called me a Prussian. He did not want orderly conditions. He was the representative of "Personalism". He tried to imitate Hitler in a small way. Hitler himself followed the type of policy so fatal to us, he had the habit of assigning tasks not to organizations but to individual persons, and if possible he assigned one and the same task to several individuals This was imitated by Himmler, although for him there was no reason whatsoever to fear that one of his functionaries would become too powerful, but he believed he could prevent his individual functionaries from becoming more powerful than Himmler himself. Practically the question of national culture dealt with in Case & Will be of interest to the Tribunal - these questions were handled by five different offices without making the conpetency for the individual tasks clear. When I suggested to Himmler to deal with these questions as an entity, this was, a further reason for his utterances which he made in Warsaw to the effect that I should be dismissed. Thus was his basic structure. He was a practical man; he was an opportunist of the day who was in no way prepared to deal with matters objectively and in an organized manner - rather, he liked to employ individual people day by day and to drop them again in the same manner. According to my opinion this Led had to destroy the whole order even in peacetime, and, of course, especially in as serious a war as Germany had to wage and that which separated me most from him was the willfulness of the individual decision not only in regard to the tasks he himself assigned but also in the legitimizing of people who were partly not qualified or so appointed that they could not exercise any leadership - it may even be that he appointed them perhaps for this reason - and on the other hand, by way of intervening in the continuous flow of events in an individual sphere, and thus nary very important matters were never brought to a satisfactory solution.