office?
Q What were you working at in full capacity?
A I was university professor that was my only capacity. As such I was paid and as such I carried out my activities. to you as a General, designated you as a General. Were you a General? Did you have the title of a General?
A No, it was one of the few titles I did not have. I was Honorary Brigadier General, but that is to say, Brigadier General in the General-SS. In the Waffen-SS I was Untersturmfuehrer; I never held a rank of the Police as a General. you had held this rank in the Waffen-SS, or in the Police Service, that you were actually a general in the Police Service? the Police and the Waffen-SS, or something like that.
THE PRESIDENT: What do you mean by "Honorary Brigadier General"? I became Brigadier General in January 1945. This was done in accordance with my promotions to a higher class envoy. That is, to say, my appointment to Brigadier General was honorary.
Q Were you at the time addressed as a General? weren't you so addressed? people in the service of the State to give them ranks in the SS in order to give them equivalent ranks according to heir official civil service ranks. Accordingly, I became a SS-Brigadier General.
Q Well, you were entitled to that designation, were you not?
A Your Honor, I would have to explain it linguistically. The meaning of Brigadier General in German does not mean a General, but in English it is translated as Brigadier General. In order to be a General in Germany it would have to say "Brigadefuehrer und General, this is an Army Brigadier General and SS Brigadier General. would be Brigadier General? rank in the English concept of the word. value in the English language, it would be Brigadier General, would it not? equivalent would be Brigadier General? for in German there is a difference between the rank in the SS and the military rank in the Waffen-SS, or in the Police. For if this were not this way, every State-secretayr, or every official of a ministry who held an honorary rank in the SS would have to have a rank such as major, or general, or something like that, or some other rank, but this was not the case. Did I explain that sufficiently, Your Honor? confusion into my mind in this respect. That you are the first officer that I ever heard ow who was entitled to be called a General, but didn't want to be called a General.
A May I answer this, please?
Q No, I don't think it is necessary?
A This is a very basic question. As an university professor, and as an official in the diplomatic service, I could not very well assume a Police rank, and I didn't think there was adequate connection in the rank and positions. As an university professor, I could hardly call myself General of the Police, I have always refused to do it, and today I am saying that I did so rightly, and for my inner convictions.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, counsel, General or Corporal, let's proceed.
DR. ULMER: Your Honor, may I just state in conclusion that as the translation brings about a mistake, perhaps Brigadier-leader would be the translation in the SS rank, and Brigadier General, that is, General Major in German, which is the designation of an equivalent to a uniformed soldier, or a Police officer.
THE PRESIDENT: I assure you that despite the witness's efforts to extricate himself from what he regards as an ignominy, of being a General, that even if the Tribunal were to ascertain him as holding a General rank, we would not impute to him any additional incriminality because he was a General. BY DR ULMER:
Q Why did you join the Nazi Party?
A I was born in an industrial city, and grew up in one. I came from a working class family. From my sixth to twenty-fourth year, I saw most of the social questions, and its root, namely, in my own home, and in my development. I had to earn my living early in my life, when I was still going to school, and then the situations were often so difficult that I had to leave school in order to be able to earn my living, and in order to continue to go to school, and continue my studies at the university, which I could only make possible by hard work and going short. In all these years I did not get any assistance from the State, or any scholarship. But I had no chance that there would be any prospect for that from the State. In view of this unfortunate situation, and my hopeless future, I set my hopes on the Party, which would bring about a justifiable solution of the social question. Many of my generation faced this decision either to become Communists or National Socialist. I became a National Socialist. Less for reasons of the program, but from recognizing the potential power of National Socialism, which promised me to solve the social question not from the class point of view, but from the whole peoples point of view.
But perhaps, that is not a reason that I became a National Socialist when I was twenty years of age, and, for this reason I would like to site two examples which were decisive for me. In my home town, I witnessed the bloodiest class sturggles through the years of 1918 until the year of 1933, that is, for fifteen years workers rose on every First of May, for fifteen years the regular police, or the Reich Militia, came in and put down these revolts with machine guns. I asked myself at that time if the State was still in order; if the request for bread and employment is not by a machine gun and rifle. The second example, I carried on my studies at Heidelberg, for four years on an average of twenty marks a month. I needed elevne marks to live in an attic, and that left me nine marks to live on. Nine marks, that meant thirty pfennigs a day, at ten pfennigs for the lunch in the kitchen for the poor, ten pfennigs for four rolls in the evening, and ten pfennigs for cigarettes, and this I lived through for four years in the midst of Heidelberg Student Romanticism, where the main problems were welfare and donation and then I asked myself, whether society was still healthy, if it finds so much camplacency, and how it can reconcile this complacency with so much distress. The answer which I gave myself was joining the Nazi Party. much the reasons?
in those years did not mean anything, or nothing at all. It was known as a temporary program, and that is how we judged it. I would just like to give a few examples. There was the interpretation of the "Feder" ideology and the interpretation of "Rosenberg" ideology. There was the school of Spain and the school of Greek; there were western ideologies, and eatern ideologies. There were believers in Germanic Divinity, and there were positive Christians -
THE PRESIDENT: Witness, when did you begin your scholastic career at Heidelberg?
Q Your affidavit states"from 1933 until 1934 I studied Social, Political Science, History and Journalism at the University of Heidelberg."
A That is a mistake, Your Honor. It means 1930.
THE PRESIDENT:Yes. Socialist Party?
Q Yes. Now you have given us a heart-rendering tale of eating in a garret for four years, and then you joined the National Socialist Party, but apparently jou joined the Party before ever these trials and tribulations had developed at the University of Heidelberg, where there was so much complacency in the midst of distress; now did you anticipate what you were going to suffer at Heidelberg at the time? worked for two years before I graduated; I saw this and actually experienced it. ing at the University of Heidelberg, you then joined the Party?
lead me to become a Nazi. the University of Heidelberg?
A Yes, that is right? could draw upon while you were at the University?
A I didn't understand what advantage - what profit I could draw from it. that you found yourself that your only resource could be was to join the National Socialist Party. You found that was the only escape that you could find from this distress in which you were?
Q Yes, all right, then you became a Nazi in 1930? titled to have from 1930? could be derived from this political affiliation with a certain Party you could get from 1930. but you have described to us the harrowing experience and your distress at the University of Heidelberg when you already were a fullfledged Nazi? Party that did not help any while you were at the University of Heidelberg?
Q Or did it ever help you?
Q THE PRESIDENT: All right.
BY DR. ULMER: Heidelberg, or in the hope that this Party will keep its promises and realize then out of the entire German distress? and in the year of 1930, one didn't think about that a Party would distribute any advantages. It was a really inner will and hope that there would be an ideal of a community where class struggles would be eliminated, and the advantages of social order would be brought about. and when? the time the Party issued a decree that every member of the Party would have to become a member of the professional organization. Accordingly I became a member of those two organizations.
Q And then in 1935 you also became a member of the SD. Why? and press expert. A University colleague suggested to me to build up a press department in the SS agency. That made the material of the world press available to me which was no longer available in a common way. For this reason I decided to take over this activity as a sideline, and this was in the year of 1935. the SD; what did you know about the SD at the time this offer was made?
A Until the year of 1935 I had no connections with the SD. It was nothing more to me than an agency of the SS, just like many others.
Q You were not then with the SS. Why did you become a member of the SS, was there any connection between them? SS automatically. Merely to mention it, I never made an application to enter the SS. I didn't fill any racial questionnaires either. I was just taken in and then later had to be dismissed from the SA.
Q You were in the SD Main Office from 1935 to '39. What branches did your activity include? and Writing, and from the year of 1937 to 1939, Domestic Department. University? professor and as a sideline I was Department Chief in the SD from '35 to '39.
Q Then in '39 you handed over these activities in the SD. Why? ship with Heydrich. In the year of 1939 I was dismissed from my job.
Q And why did your relationship with Heydrich become worse?
A We had human end political reasons. Human reasons since a purely power political terroristic character like Heydrich could not bear intellectual arguments for any length of time, every co-worker who had his own intellectual opinion sooner or later had to be suspected of being soft and agreeing to compromises, that is intellectually. Heydrich's political attitude was to divide the entire German people into supporters and opponents and therefore disregarded education and personal opinion completely.
A (Continuing) For this reason I had an increasing number of disputes which then led to the bad relationship and finally to my dismissal.
Q And what were the results of this dismissal?
Q Was it possible to be dismissed from the SD? dismissal. Furthermore I was university professor in full capacity and financially independent so that I could permit myself this stop.
Q And Heydrich approved the dismissal, or didn't he? and how an SS Leader can leave the SD.
Q And Why didn't Heydrich approve this dismissal? This was one of the characteristics of Heydrich which has often been described here. No one could be honorably dismissed from his service. Either something was said about him or he just ruined him. September, 1939, on? start completely new office, the office for science and research.
Q What was the name of this institute?
Q What were its missions? questions.
Q What type of research purposes? no modern problems but historical ones in the manner of a historical university institute. It was to undertake cultural history, intellectual history, an intellectual history of foreign countries. The reason why Heydrich founded such an institute during the war can only be seen from his own snobbishness.
He just wanted to have his own office of science which would, so-to-speak, be a decorative office in his RSHA. with them? necessary research workers impossible. Thus there were only a number of publications about the history of liberalism and Free Masonry.
Q Could these research results be used practically? lished in a series of publications. Therefore, they could not be used in the Reich or anywhere else.
Q How many collaborators were there in office VII?
A The Office VII was in charge of 15 referents, experts. In addition there were some translators, some archive workers and liberians and some stenographers. All told there were forty people.
Q And how large were the other offices in comparison? Police Office included 800 people.
Q All others had several hundred? occupied territories? 40 people.
Q How long were you director of this office? from December, 1941, until July, 1942. about? 1940, I was called up.
A My relationship to Heydrich had not improved. Office VII did not seem important to me as far as the war was concerned, but the important thing was for me, that like every other German I believed I had to do my duty as a soldier.
Q How long were you with the Waffen-SS?
A From May, 1940, until April, 1942. actively from May, 1940, to June, 1941.
Q Where were you with the Waffen-SS? battalion for retraining. From September to December I was in the war school, 1940, war academy. From December, 1940, to July, 1941, I was in the Division Reich.
Q And where were you with this Division Reich? the eastern border.
Q What was your position in the Waffen-SS ? kommando.
Q What military rank did you have in the Waffen-SS? so long, was that agreeable to him?
A No, it was not. He tried to call me back several times.
Q And you were still able to remain with the Waffen-SS? all my heart, and that I wanted to remain with the division until the end of the war. Therefore they always designated me as indispensable for lack of officers.
Q And when were you finally recalled after all?
A Two days before the war with Russia began. On that date an order signed by Himmler arrived in the division headquarters that I was to be sent to Berlin.
attempts to remain with the troops?
A I tried by all means to stay with the troops. It was a matter of my honor not to leave the troops two days before the beginning of this War.
Q And what did the Army say? but I was informed that an order of Himmler had to be complied with and they could not do anything further.
Q When did you leave the division?
Q Were you dismissed from the Waffen-SS? to it.
Q Why? to the division.
Q And when did you arrive in Berlin? 1941.
Q Was the outbreak of the war on the 22nd?
Q Where did you report in Berlin? to the main office of the Waffen-SS. This referred me to the RSHA because the RSHA had called for me. Thereupon I reported to Heydrich.
from the front?
A No, the transfer had come as a complete surprise. I had no idea why I had been ordered to Berlin.
Q What did Heydrich tell you about it?
A Heydrich didn't even receive me. His adjutant, Plotz, told me that I had bean with the Waffen-SS long enough, He intended to give me an archive command in Moscow which I would have to organize and set up . The kommandos of the Einsatz Staff Rosenberg and of the Battalion Kunzberg of the Foreign Office which were archive kommandos of other agencies were already on the road, and therefore I was to see to it and I should arrive in Moscow first. For this reason I was to take up a connection with the Chief of Einsatzgruppe B, Nebe, who was responsible for the Moscow area.
Q You were to arrive in Moscow first? What do you mean by that, with the combat troops? these duties in Moscow as soon as the German troops arrived there. kommando would be subordinate to Einsatzgruppe B?
A No, I had received my order from Heydrich. As Chief of Office VII, I could not be made subordinate to another chief of an office. without objection? be compromised before the officers of my division if I would leave my troops shortly before the outbreak of war, and I asked that I be sent back to the division.
Q What was Heydrich's reaction, did he consider this objection?
A No, he refused it. Plotz told me it would be out of the question. It was up to me later to advance with my division.
research and international politics, or were similar security orders given previously to this office? the office of Rosenberg. The office of Rosenberg by a special Fuehrer order had received the mission to secure certain - to confiscate certain objects of an artistic value in the occupied territory. As a result of the agreement between Heydrich and Rosenberg in the spring of 1940, the Security Police was given the right to confiscate certain documents and archive material from the time after 1933. This special order was given to Office VII in the spring of 1940.
Q Was Office VII active according to this order, and where? Athens and in Belgrade where it was busy with such archive orders.
Q In what form was this activity carried out? these documents and had to evaluate them. carried on. What was the activity, for example, in Paris?
A In Paris the great political organizations were secured. All the ministries, together with the historical work of the foreign office, all those documents were photostated. A number of archive documents which were requested by offices in Berlin, such as the Surete or the Alliance Francaise, they were taken to Berlin. These are just a few excerpts from this work. from your answer. You said we secured the great political organizations. organizations.
Q Could you yourself confiscate these?
A The procedure was as follows: The confiscation was carried on by the Secret Field Police, a military organization, and then the evaluation was taken up by the Kommandos of Office VII.
DR. ULMER: I am referring to a translation error, "confiscation",
THE INTERPRETER: They are arguing here about the translation of the word "Beschlagnahme" which to me means confiscation.
THE WITNESS: The difference is not great. Confiscation would be a final taking away, and here we mean confiscation for the purposes of evaluation and then the documents are returned.
THE PRESIDENT: Do we know that those documents were returned?
DR. ULMER: Yes.
THE WITNESS: Not all documents were taken away. Mostly they were left in the buildings More examined, and were then again returned to the offices.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, would you say then that it was a temporary seizure of documents?
THE WITNESS: Yes, with those which were not carried away from the place of origin it was a temporary seizure, yes. Others, of course, which were needed in Berlin were confiscated.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Well, then, you might make that distinction between confiscation, where the documents were taken and not returned, and temporary seizure where the documents were merely temporarily taken for the purpose of study, scrutiny, and then returned.
THE WITNESS: Yes.
Q. Thus you received the order from Heydrich to set up a similar kommando for Moscow?
A. Yes.
Q. Did Heydrich or his deputy issue a written order to set up such a kommando?
A. No, this was not customary. The setting up of such kommandos was an exclusive function of Office VII.
Q. It is not customary then. Did office VII carry out its task without Heydrich issuing an order?
A. Yes.
Q. Thus this became a work of experts in Office VII?
A. Yes.
Q. Was there a difference between this kommando to be organized for Moscow and the former archive Kommandos of Office VII?
A. No, not their missions. No, there was no difference only in the importance of the objective, the interest in the Soviet Russian documents was especially great. For this reason I was given the mission in Moscow.
Q. Was Moscow especially important within the interest for these Russian documents?
A. Well, it was known that the Russian centralization has Moscow as the head of all important agencies of the State, of the Party, and of the cultural life and likewise, the way in Paris, Brussels, and the Hague were important for their countries, so Moscow was the city in Russia, which was the city in Russia which was most important.
Q. How did you prepare this Kommando?
A. I informed my co-workers in Office VII. I gave them the orders to prepare the materials necessary for Moscow , that is, city maps guides and organizations there and the other materials which are necessary to carry out such a mission. Furthermore, I reserved the right to ask for these co-workers.
Q. When was that?
A. After I had made contact with Nebe, which had been ordered by Heydrich.
Q. Where Was Nebe at that time?
A. Nebe was in Warsaw.
Q. What were the results of your conferences with Nebe?
A. Nebe was not very agreeable to this mission. He already had thought himself of securing the documents in Moscow and he didn't think a special kommando was necessary.
DR. ULMER: Your Honor, now we will have to go into detail about this advance Kommando Moscow, the actual Count I. I think this would be a good point to recess.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal agrees with you. The Tribunal will be in recess for 15 minutes.
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session. BY DR. ULMER: discussion with Nebe and you said that Nebe had not been pleased, that you received this particular assignment, and you have said that he thought that the security of files could be done by, and that he did not need a special commander for this purpose. How did you react to this answer of Nebe's? assignment.
Q Did you go to Heydrich and speak to Heydrich about it?
A Yes, but he did not receive me. But he said that he had given me the assignment, the order, and I had to carry it out.
Q How did he let you know - in writingg? Ploetz? towards Heydrich. For a long time after I tried not to return to Berlin and to shirk from this duty, and I was certain that if I now made any moral objections once more I had to reckon on very severe measures against myself.
Q You mean arrest?
Q You then went back to Warsaw, did you?
Q Did Nebe now agree?
A No. Nebe again made some objections and he said that now he had to discuss it first with the chief of the authority in Minsk, the AOK, which is the superior commando to the Army. That was General Field Marshal von Kluge.
Q Where was he? Was he in Warsaw?
Q And did Nebe actually talk to Kluge?
Q Was it about this Archives Commando?
Q Was von Kluge in agreement with this?
A Yes, Kluge agreed. He referred him for further discussion to his major in 1-c Helmdaeh. He was a major in the general staff.
Q What were your further steps then? for a meeting and a discussion of the departmental experts.
Q And did they arrive?
A No, only two of these arrived. Streckenbach said that he could not dispense with any more experts, and the rest should have been taken from reserve leader corps of the Einsatzgruppen.
Q Who was Streckenbach?
A Streckenbach was the Department Chief 1 of the SD. He was in charge of the personnel department.
Q Office I was only personnel?
Q What did you do then under the circumstances? back to Berlin again. For this reason I declared myself satisfied with the state of affairs and I asked Nebe to put at my disposal a few interpreters whom he had in Moscow. detachment?
A Two arrived from Berlin. Two of them were actually from the staff, two came from the detachment VII-B, and two from the Einsatzkommando IX.
Q Two, did you say, from Group Staff?
Q Thank you. And how were they sub-divided, according to their origin?
A Mahnke and Augsburg came from Berlin. Engelhard and Siebert came from the Staff. Klingelhoeffer and Noack from Commando VII-B, and Luther and Feldmann from Einsatzkommando IX.
Q Mahnke and Augsburg, e.g. were scientists? who were put at your disposal? or they had to have some scientific knowledge of archives.
Q Did the Archive Commando have a special name?
A Yes. I just called it "Advance Commando "- "Vorkommando Moscow" - in order to make clear its special character and its special purpose. in the preliminary syllable "Vor"? this Commando a name? connection with this particular Commando - armaments, clothing, giving of names - everything, was my assignment as the chief of Office VII. assignment? for Moscow and had such material prepared which I took with me. On the basis of this material I appointed these men and prepared them for their task.
Q What kind of material was it? and in German. There were statements, and drafts, and distribution plans of Ministries which gave a full picture of the whole administrative system of Moscow.