Is that agreed?
DR. MAYER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. In the event that Dr. Mayer and Dr. Fritz should leave before we adjourn this afternoon, let it be understood that we will reconvene at seven-thirty this evening to hear those two pleas.
DR. MAYER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, Doctor.
DR. LINK: May it please the Tribunal, two brief preliminary remarks. After the technical prerequisites now exist, I am now able to present the final plea for the defendant Ruehl. I am aware of the fact that it is not yet my turn actually. Secondly, I have to ask for the patience of the Tribunal. If my time is not quite sufficient I hope for the indulgence of the Tribunal because in the case of the defendant Ruehl the Tribunal does not need to work through a closing brief for the defendant Ruehl. I did not think it necessary to submit one. Finally I would like to say that up to this point I did not receive from the prosecution any closing statements against Ruehl either in German or in English, but I am certain that this Tribunal will give me the possibility of replying to it in the proper form as far as is necessary.
THE PRESIDENT: Proceed. DR. LINK: In my Opening Statement of 4 October 1947, I expressed my surprise at the fact that my client Felix RUEHL has been indicted in this case. In this respect I was able to refer to a large extent to the presentations made by the Prosecution, and to maintain that all the actual incidents on which the Prosecution seems to depend as a possible basis, do not permit holding the defendant Felix RUEHL responsible and sentencing him as requested by the Prosecution. I stressed the fact that, up to the serving of the indictment, Felix RUEHL never had the position which could and should have provided the Prosecution with a possible basis for its assertions.
Finally I expressed, my hope and confidence that it would he possible to prove these facts, if that would still be necessary at all, to the Court in the course of these proceedings in an absolutely clear and unmistakable manner. of which my client had only a very insignificant role for factual reasons, I am able to state complacently that all my expectations have come true. guilty of the crimes with which he is being charged, To be sure, such convictions will not always hold good as regards the judgment of the judge. It happens often enough, unfortunately, that the concientious counsel is subject to inner conflicts and backs the man whose interests he has to look after, only as a jurist.
That is not the case here. As a defendant in these proceedings, Felix RUEHL has not only been a client whom I had to defend to the best of my abilities, but he came closer also to me as a man because of his clean personal attitude. very outset and with all sincerity.
The defendant RUEHL was born in an industrial city in 1910. His father was a civil servant and wanted to impart to his son a good education and professional training. First Felix RUEHL attended and completed high school and then became a merchant and was thus removed from the middle-class surroundings of his parents home. His childhood and early adolescence fell into the troubled times which followed the First World War. The economic decline influenced the professional development of Felix RUEHL, After a three year's commercial apprenticeship and after a short stay in England which had to be discontinued for financial difficulties, he could not find employment in his profession, worked for some time as an unskilled industrial worker, became unemployed again, until, in the spring of 1931, he succeeded in getting a modest position with some public agency.
Like many other people in his age group whose lives were also early affected by economic need, he gave thought to the possibilities of contributing his share for the relief of the critical economic and social conditions which were especially blatant in his home town. At first he was an active member of the youth group of the trade union of the employees and remained a member from 1926 until it was dissolved in 1933. Besides, he advocated the goals of the Youth Association of Greater Germany which, without following the policies of any particular party, aimed at the moral and national education of the youth. The deliberations which were responsible for his getting into contact with the NSDAP have been explained by him to the Court on the witness stand. He became a member of the NSDAP not because he strove for radicalism in connection with the prevailing political situation, but because of the conviction that only a socialist Party would be able to basically improve conditions. The idea of class-conflict, as maintained by the Social Democratic Party, was alien to his middle-class education, and the anarchist slogans of the Communist Party were even more repellent. Neither then nor later, RUEHL took an active part in the development of the NSDAP, but, as young Party members used to do in the years prior to 1933, he joined the SA, and, at the end of 1932, was transferred to the SS. Since he was a member of an SS-company, he was chosen to become a police recruit by a committee which was in search of such recruits, but he himself had done nothing to that end. 1933, his future professional career was already cleanly outlined, RUHL, upon his own request, was assigned to the counter-intelligencedepartment and worked in this special field for a number of years until the fall of 1940. The affidavits submitted by me as RUEHL Exh. No. 8. 9, 7 and 27, disclose the nature of his tasks, his professional qualifications, and his personal attitude during these years. They prove the statements which RUEHL has made on the witness stand, namely that this activity did not emanate from National Socialism, but was an activity which is one of the main duties of the police of any civilized state.
The affidavit SCHMITZ of 21 January 1948 (Exh. No. 27) equally proves that the police officers who worked in the field of counterintelligence were a class by themselves, and that it would have been contrary to all custom to remove the individual officials from this special field of tasks. This was the situation in which RUEHL found himself in 1940. His career as a police official in the counter-intelligence service seemed to lie cleanly before him, That things nevertheless took another turn did not depend on him; this was due to decisions which were ordered with regard to him and to which he had to yield. the Berlin University as a candidate for the executive service. Harmless though these studies may appear to the outsider and harmless though they were themselves, RUEHL nevertheless was immediately aware that he was being removed from his previous professional career and that he had to expect employment in another branch of the police service later on. He therefore did all in his power to have this summons cancelled and began with his studies only when all his remonstrances had proved without success. It goes without saying that he could not foresee at that time that these studies would be interrupted and that he would be detailed to one of those units which played so crucial a role in this trial. On the contrary, the further events developed quite suddenly. In May 1941 all the candidates for the executive service studying in Berlin were told by the then chief of Amt I that, on the order of the chief of the security police, their studies had to be discontinued immediately. A few days later, the whole study group was collectively moved to Pretzsch and the people assembled there were finally distributed. Einsatzgruppen and Einsatzkommandos were being activated and the defendant was assigned to one of the latter. The history of the origin of the Einsatzgruppen and Einsatzkommandos, which is pictured here only in a concise form, has been described in this trial repeatedly and in a manner not contested by the Prosecution, so that I can dispense with going more thoroughly into this matter.
That must be borne in mind is the fact that RUEHL, up to that date and even beyond it, was not prepared for the imminent commitment either indirectly or directly. The notions with which he approached the new task, which was unknown to him, were those of a police official trained on a peace-time basis who up to that time had performed his duties in the special police branch mentioned, in an objective and personally irreproachable manner and who lately had been working as a student for his further training. Prosecution seems to be of the opinion that, by reason of their previous political and professional development, all these defendants were predestined to play an essential part in the units which it termed extermination units. right from the beginning - as I think I have made clear. reluctantly - would have reconciled himself to his new task and there would have either himself committed any acts considered by you, Your Honors, as crimes, or if he would at least have held a position that had aided in, or permitted in any form, the committing of such acts, so that one night speak of a responsibility for acts committed by other persons. It will therefore be essential to make sure to what extent Felix RUEHL himself took part in the events which are the subject of this indictment, or what the position was which he held in his unit. attempt to incriminate my client. In my opening statement I claimed the prognosis of the Prosecution (Opening Statement page 59 English, page 35 German), according to which some of the defendants' direct participation in criminal acts might not he provable, for Felix RUEHL.
There has not appeared a thing in this trial which would decide against this supposition of the Prosecution, b within Einsatzgruppe D.
He was in the field with this unit up to the end of Sept. 1941, that is to say, for approximately 3 months. On 1 October 1941 he was recalled to the University of Berlin, just as were the other members of that group who, on higher orders, had had to interrupt their studies. This limitation in time has been unequivocally established in the course of this trial, among other things by the testimony on the witness stand of the co-defendant SCHULZ (p. 1056 English, p. 1069 German, dated 20 October 1947). In this I refer, above all, also to my RUEHL documents No. 23 and 24 (RUEHL Exh. No. 1 and 2). change during those 3 months but remained always the same - the Prosecution itself apparently is not sure. Already in my opening statement I pointed out that the indictment has mentioned RUEHL merely as an officer of that Special Kommando and also on its charts and maps has designated him as a mere member of that unit; but that, on the other hand, the Prosecution in its opening statement (page 24) appointed RUEHL deputy of the Kommando Chief who has died.
Concerning this the evidence has shown the following:
Already in his SS-home-unit, in 1932/33, RUEHL had been in charge of the administrative matters. Also later on, during his job as a police official in the counter-intelligence service, he was not concerned with tasks of the executive proper. The fact that he was selected to study jurisprudence offers a clue that in the opinion of his superiors he disposed of the mental equipment necessary for scholarly studies and that he was not chosen to be an executive official. It is therefore only a logical consequence that the co-defendant OHLENDORF as chief of Einsatzgruppe D made RUEHL economic and administrative officer within Kommando 10 b (Testimony OHLENDORF dated 14 October 1947, p. 606 English, p. 614 German). The field of activity connected with this position was the sane as in any peace-time or wartime unit of any country having military organizations.
It was clearly defined and extended to the administration of the agency both in personnel and economic respects, to housing. supplying and equipping its members. to do with the operations as such. Considering the absolute clarity of this range of tasks it is hardly necessary to go into fuller particulars in this connection. OHLENDORF as chief of the group, by the affidavits of a series of members of SK 10 b (Exh. No. 3, 4, 5, The above mentioned affidavits were made by witnesses who during those months in question had been continuously in official contact with RUEHL and never knew him in any capacity other than that of an administration officer.
It is also apparent from them that RUEHL was never introduced as Deputy of the Kommando-Leader or has put in an appearance as such nor that he has ever led a Teil-Kommando of that units Persterer did not have any deputy at all, - at least at the time when RUEHL was attached to the Kommando. Even in the case of a short absence of the chief, RUEHL's rank or seniority would not have entitled him to represent him, quite apart from the fact that no administrative officer, on principle, is ever appointed anywhere as deputy of the respective commander. Moreover,RUEHL was at that time Obersturmfuehrer (1st Lieutenant) and shared this rank with four other leaders in the unit, of whom at least two had the same, if not a higher seniority and would have been considered in the first place as entitled to present Persterer, in view of their status as sub-Kommando officers and Chiefs of an Executive-Department. Finally it must in particular be pointed out that the Kommando 10 b also had a Hauptsturmfuehrer (Captain) by the name of Finger, which fact would have solved the question of the deputy without difficulty, if it had become acute. (Compare in this connection the statements of RUEHL himself, transcript of the session on 18th December 1947, furthermore the Statement of Ohlendorf transcript of session on 14th and 16 October 1947.
It must be taken into consideration therefore: RUEHL was according to rank and seniority at the most-in the sense of the Prosecution-the 4th man. As far as his official position was concerned, he was out of the question as far as an independent responsible leadership of the Kommando or a part of same was concerned, even if only temporarily.
In his capacity as specialist I and II (Administration and Economics) he could not issue any directives to other Departments in particularly to the Department IV. As is disclosed by his statement in the witness stand he actually had never carried out or ordered interrogations, arrests or other executive measures.
has only the sworn statement of a certain Robert Borth (Doc. Book of the Prosecution No. 5 C, page 32 English, page 42 German, Prosecution Ex. Do. 232) The following can be Said with regard to this Document; an Austrian, in what capacity he had actually been attached to the Einsatzkommando 10b. He merely mentions that been "had been with the Einsatzkommando 10 b" during an undefined period of time.
Kommando, belonged most, likely to the enlisted ranks, is for this reason too uncertain and too doubtful, as to enable him to draw reliable conclusions. All the moreas, as he himself speaks only of an absence of Persterer of 2 to 3 days at a time. affidavit and its author, which deprive the Document completely of its already small probative value. at the time when Ruehl took the stand. Ruehl was charged, with the statement of Barth made for the prosecution that Ruehl had been the chief of Advance which had been sent from Czernowitz to Chotin and allegedly carried out liquidations on a considerable scale (transcript of session on 19th December 1947, page 4455 English, page 4541 German) that Ruehl and his people had chased the Jews, whom they had driven together in Chotin, through the ruins and had shot at them (page 4457 English, page 4542 German). Furthermore Ruehl allegedly gave Robert Barth - also according to the cross examination carried out by the Prosecution-orders concerning the retransfer of the Jews in Mogilow-Podolsk, which will be discussed in detail later on (transcript of session on 19th December 1947, page 4478 English, page 4563 German). Ruehl in the witness stand had insisted that he has never been in Chotin, nor that he had ever led a Vorkommando to this place. He just as clearly contradicted the alleged statements of Barth with, regard to his.
part in the case of that re-transfer.
In spite of this, the Prosecution refrained from refreshing Ruehl's memory by introducing the sworn affidavit of Barth or putting him ion the stand. It confined itself merely to submitting that Exhibit No. 232 in the rebuttal (Doc. Book 5 D. page 32 English, page 43 German) which does not contain any of the points brought out during the cross-examination. I have no reason to doubt that the Prosecution is fully aware of the contradictions between the statements of Ruehl and the allegations of Barth. If, in spite of this, the prosecution has made no use of its incriminating material, I can only draw the conclusion that Barth has revoked these allegations, so important for the Prosecution, or that they did not seem to be of any use for other reasons. But then, apart, from any other things Barth cannot lay claim to any credibility with Exh. No. 232. of the Kommando, as well as the repeated and express testimony of the chief of Einsatzgruppe D - Ohlendorf - contradict his statement. established evidence the position and activity of Ruehl In SK 10b. itself has set up for the question of responsibility of the sphere of persons against which it prefers charges. Ruehl held neither "a responsible position nor a post of command", nor did he possess "by virtue of his position the powers to order executions", nor were his rank and his position of such a nature that they included the power and duty to exercise control over the subordinates, (Page 58 English, page 36 German Opening Statement) be explained by his position - Ruehl could have been connected with any of the events With which the Prosecution charges the unit as such.
Above all one might think that in view of the relatively small numerical strength of the unit, Kommando members, who according to their position and sphere of duty had nothing to do with executive tasks, also gained knowledge of this sort of events and became somehow tied up with them.
These theoretical reflections are confronted by the following facts; departments were under the personal command of the Kommando Chief. The latter issued the orders in person, and reports were made to him personally. There was neither a common file keeping between administration and the executive branch nor did the Kommando maintain a business office. In particular, Department IV, which was engaged in executive measures, worked wholly independently and even in rooms separated from the rest of the Kommando, so that only those who were working there in the immediate place had an insight into these tasks. Moreover, it must be added, that the Kommando was on the advance as long as Ruehl was a member, and that thus it was split up into individual groups, which established different local headquarters independently. Thereby it became more than ever impossible for a Kommando member to get a survey of events with which he was not occupied in line of duty.
THE PRESIDENT: It isn't necessary that you read those, Dr. Link.
DR. LINK: Yes, Your Honor.
(Cf. Statement Ruehl as witness Record page 4463 German.)
the Kommando membersof officers rank, did not know that their unit had been designated by the Fuehrer Decree or by other orders from the highest quarters to practice a so-called extermination policy. Felix Ruehl. and suddenly to the SK 10b, and with what conceptions he approached the tasks which awaited him there. At first it was not even clear whether the marshalling of the most different kind of units, which pointed to use in battle, would turn to the West or to the East. When after the outbreak of the War with the Soviet Union there was no longer any doubt on this point, the whole group was sent off to the (Einsatz) the assignment with an address by the chief of the Sipo and of the SD in the customary military manner, without any special instructions.
Ruehl has neither taken part in the conversation with Gruppenfuehrer Streckenbach, which has several times been mentioned in this trial, nor did he learn about it. Nor did his unit commander instruct him in the sense of the presentation of charges. He explained the tasks merely to the effect, that certain actions of the enemy were to be prosecuted and punished with the application of the severest standards. Neither on this occasion nor subsequently was there any talk of liquidating individually guiltless persons without trial because of their race, their political convictions or similar reasons. (Compare Record of Session page 4373/77 English, page 4456/59 German and page 4382/85 English, page 4464/66 German.) drawn appropriate conclusions as to a general execution decree, at least through the knowledge of such events, even if gained only from hearsay, and whether he could not have helped but do so. which the Prosecution considers itself justified to reproach all those in whose case the evidence is negative in its opinion. What he heard in a roundabout way and by chance from his comrades he stated frankly.
This concerns three executions. In one case it was a measure against civilians who had perpetrated a treacherous firing-attack on Roumanian troops and members of the Kommando in Czernovitz. This measure was carried through upon orders by the Roumanian General in authority on Roumanian sovereign territory as far as Ruehl can remember, some 12 - 15 persons were said to have been shot on the basis of drumhead court-martial. This took place after many more suspects had been investigated and the guilty ones identified in due course. In another instance German fliers having made forced landings and got into Russian captivity, when forcibly dragged out of the prison by the population, abused and finally beaten to death in a bestial manner.
Also here, detailed investigations were made and the persons found guilty were shot in the end. about a third execution, by which at still another location agents and saboteurs were said to have been punished.
(See testimony Ruehl, Transcript page 4471/79 English page 4579 German.)
individual criminal acts, which everywhere are characterized as such. It is clear that from a knowledge of these actions, gained from hearsay, no conclusion of a general order for the execution of Jews, gypsies and communists could be drawn. part which Ruehl played, or could have played, during the three months of his membership in Sonderkommando 10b, and also his position and his activities, his considerations and possibilities without finding, a responsibility of his in the sense of the indictment. Prosecution has tried to connect with Ruehl, are commented upon below, this must not be misconstrued. It is done upon the risk of exposing Ruehl to the reproach by the Tribunal, why he should deal with matters which are no concern of his, as has already happened once during his hearing if on the stand. Since he has been accused and had to see this trial through, he also wants as I already emphasized in my opening statement, to contribute his part which necessarily is very modest - to the solution of the various contradictions and to the establishment of the plain truth by the Tribunal. He therefore insists on maintaining this line, already followed during the examination on the witness stand, also in these concluding statements.
DR. LINK: This would be a good time to recess.
DR. FRITZ: Pardon me, your Honor
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Fritz?
DR. FRITZ: Dr. Fritz as a representative for Dr. Lummert for the defendant, Blume. Your Honor, Dr. Lummert has asked for the defendant, Blume, in order to speak to him this evening, and I, therefore, ask that the defendant, Blume, may he excused from the session this evening after 4:30.
THE PRESIDENT: The defendant, Blume, will be excused from attendance in court this evening.
DR. MAYER: Dr. Mayer, representing Dr. Schwarz for the defendant, Jost. My colleague, Dr. Schwarz, requests the Tribunal to excuse the defendant, Jost, from the tomorrow morning session in order to go over the final plea.
THE PRESIDENT: The defendant, Jost, will be excused from a attendance in court tomorrow morning. The Tribunal will be in recess 15 minutes.
(A recess was taken.)
Court No. II, Case No. IX.
THE TRIBUNAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
DR. FICHT: Representing Defense Counsel Ulmer. Your Honors, I would like the Defendant Six to be excused tomorrow afternoon so that he cah confer with his counsel for a reply to a closing brief, and I have a similar request to make, representing Defense Counsel Dr. Hoffman, to the effect that the Defendant Nosske should be excused this evening, because he had arranged for a conference with him this evening.
THE PRESIDENT: The Defendant Nosske will be excused from attendance in Court this evening and the Defendant Six will be excused from attendance in court tomorrow afternoon.
DR. LINK (ATTORNEY FOR THE DEFENDANT RUEHL): In detail I would like to make the following statement:
PERSTERER's report to Army Group South, (Document Book II-D English, page 45, German page 48, Prosecution Exhibit 92) in the first place admits of certain doubts in the truth of the facts reported in it. was bound to report immediately to the latter. It is therefore surprising that Sturmbannfuehrer PERSTERER, without any official reason, should make such a report to the distant Army Group South, yet neglect this very same duty towards his superior. (Compare letters of 11 July 1941 and 14 July 1941, with the statements from the witness box of the Defendant Ohlendorf on 9 October 1947.) of the Einsatzgruppe, in contrast to the far distant Army Group, would have found out the untruth of this report, in other words, PERSTERER wanted to feign a particular activity of his unit. in Czernowitz at all, because he only arrived there in the evening of the 9 or 10 July.
RUEHL-Exh. # 3, 4 and 6 and then the statement of Ruhl. PERSTERER's report was incorrect.
Court No. II, Case No. IX.
RUEHL for reasons of time. had been sent to Chotin. On 11 July this report was supplemented to the effect that the Teilkommando had been forced to withdraw again by the Russian occupation. The alleged measures of that Teilkommando, reported on 14 July, cannot be connected with RUEHL according to the time of their taking place, because he only arrived in Czernovitz after the dispatch of that Group and did not leave this town during the period in question. That is shown in Ruehl Exh. 3, 4, and 6. RUEHL himself testified under oath that he never was in Chotin and never gained knowledge of alleged actions on the part of a Teilkommando sent there. Einsatzgruppe gave instructions to the Kommando 10 b to influence Roumanian authorities to take action in regard to the Jewish problem. OHLENDORF himself, who gave this order, expressed himself in detail on this subject in the witness stand. This concerns an order, which the Sturmbannfuehrer PERSTERER received personally and orally on the occasion of an inspection. It is obvious that in the case of RUEHL all assumptions are lacking for his participating in the execution of this order. During his interrogation he even denied expressly the more knowledge of it. No. 90 states in regard to the activity of the Kommando 10 b in the area of Czernowitz that up to then 16 persons out of 1200 arrested Jews arrested Communist functionaries had been shot. In this connection, one is struck by the following facts: ings by the Kommando in Czernovitz. On the other hand, the report Of 14 July states expressly that Kommando 10b was scheduled to complete its assignments in Czernovitz in 3 - 5 days. Afterwards, the Kommando Court No. II, Case No. IX.
was to stay there, ready to join the advancing Army Corps. These assignments, however, as is evident from the reports of 11 and 14. July, did not consist in the liquidation of Jaws in Czernovitz. The contrary is the case. As shown by the statement of the Defendant OHLENDORF in the witness box, the commander of Kommando 10b was explicitly prohibited to carry out such a measure in territory under Rumanian sovereignty. That Czernovitz was regarded as territory under Rumania sovereignty is demonstrated conclusively by the report of 11 July which states that:
"The Rumanians have taken over the civil administra tion in Czernovitz", as well as from the report of 14 July stating:
"the Rumanians declare Northern Bukovina as territ ory under Rumanian sovereignty."
Consequently, the commander of Kommando 10b would have been acting in contravention to the explicit instructions of his direct superior, the chief of the Einsatzgruppe D, if he had taken part with his Kommando in the liquidation of the Jews in Czernovitz. As the Defendant OHLENDORF stated in the witness box during a tour of inspection in Czernovitz he found the commander of Kommando 10b in a state of great excitement, because the Rumanians had carried out liquidations in an unimaginable and unspeakable manner. PERSTERER had launched a most vigorous protest against these liquidations and, by this very protest, again rejected the invitation of the Rumanians to participate in liquidations. As a matter of fact, neither the Defendant RUEHL nor the signers of the affidavits HANSEN, KAUFMANN, NISPEL and WERNER had any knowledge of liquidations of Jews in Czernovitz. Consequently, the passage in the report of 1 August 1941 "in Czernovitz, 658 out of an approximate total with the Rumanian Police" was probably a deliberate misstatement inasmuch as the shootings were carried out by the Rumanians alone.
These comments, too, are made only for clarification, having regard to the documents presented in the course of this trial. The fact that RUEHL himself had been informed Court No. II, Case No. IX.
of only 3 executions which, however, were carried out, not for political or racial reasons, but as punishment for criminal acts and after due investigations had been made in each case, has bean mentioned by me in another context before. inasmuch as they concern that retransfer of Jews. I am going to demonstrate that there, too, RUEHL held not commanding function, as the Prosecution assumed, but was involved in that matter only in part and incidentally owing to purely external circumstances unrelated to the events themselves. several documents presented by the Prosecution itself; furthermore from statements of the Defendant OHLENDORF in the witness box, from the interrogation of the witness HARSCH and, finally from the exhaustive account which RUEHL gave as witness and which served as supplement and commentary to his affidavit presented in court by the Prosecution.
According to all that, what actually took place was this;
tion. There he was to commandeer billets for the other administrative tasks.
Already several in advance to Mogilev-Podolsk.
That the Kom Court No. II, Case No. IX.
the Kommando. Consequently RUEHL could not possibly took a marching column, consisting, as it appeared, for the most part of Jews and escorted by Rumanian soldiers. There were men, woman and children in it, obviously a whole population on the trek; it was a proper procession of misery. On arrival in Mogilev-Podolsk, RUEHL talked with the leader of the local unit about his observations and learned that this procession consisted of Jews who had been compelled by the Rumanians to leave their homes in territory under Rumanian sovereignty to be shifted to German-held territory. RUEHL learned furthermore that a large number of these Jews, expelled by the Rumanians and utterly destitute were already in the German-held Mogilev area. According to what the local leader told, these Jews were without shelter, food and medical attention and, therefore, in a desperate plight. Their presence there also constituted a danger for the command of the German Wehrmacht, as they resorted to theft and looting and, moreover, were a potential source of epidemics. Finally, RUEHL also learned that the local leader had already notified the commander and endeavoured to prevent a further influx of Jews from the Rumanian sphere of sovereignty and interests. in Mogilev-Podolsk are borne out by Prosecution Exhibit No. 39 which mentions the prevention of an influx of Jews into the German sphere of interests. cumstances was there an occasion or even only a possibility for RUEHL to take any action. find out how the misleading statement of RUEHL in the affidavit taken Court No. II, Case No. IX.
down by Mr. WARTENBERG came to be made (Prosecution Exhibit No. 169) subsection 3. RUEHL himself never attempted to concentrate the Jews near Mogilev-Podolsk in order to return them as a body. came ever more untenable, Sturmbannfuehrer PERSTERER, in his capacity as Kommando leader, took occasion to report to Group Leader OHLENDORF and to ask for his orders. PERSTERER ordered RUEHL to accompany him on this trip and to bring the Group Leader's decision back to Mogilev, as PERSTERER himself would not return there immediately. OHLENDORF decided that the Rumanian Jews were to be sent back to their homes across the Dnjestr, RUEHL transmitted the Group Leader's order to the local leader and that was the end of his part as courier which he had had in this matter.
(Compare also deposition OHLENDORF Session Record.) thwarted by the stubborn resistance of the Rumanians. It turned out to be necessary to inform the Group Leader of the New development, and to ask for his further orders. It was only natural that RUEHL who already had accompanied PERSTERER on his trip to OHLENDORF once before should be charged with the job, the more so as PERSTERER had not returned yet and the leader of the sub-unit stationed in Mogilev was bound in his station. which was still in German hands. As this bridge was in the area of the neighboring Kommando 12 under NOSSKE, NOSSKE was instructed directly by OHLENDORF to take charge of that transport. OHLENDORF, when on the witness stand, remembered all these events in detail and confirmed that RUEHL acted as a mere messenger transmitting that order. given to anybody and that from the interpolation of RUEHL neither an authority of command with respect to the leader of the Teilkommando nor the capacity of deputy with respect to the leader of the Commando could be inferred. The locally competent leader had to see to it that also Court No. II, Case No. IX.