First of all I shall deal with Membership in the SD. The defendant Seibert was a full-time employee of Office III (SD) of the Reich Main Security Office. But that fact alone does not justify a verdict of guilty because of membership in an organization which has been found criminal by the verdict of the IMT. The IMT has expressly stated:
"The mere membership is not sufficient for a person to be affected the these findings." (Records: Page 16503 German). that the fact that a group of persons has been declared a criminal organization must not result in wholesale convictions of its members. (Records: page 16503 German transcript) But if the mere membership were found sufficient for a verdict of guilty, then the result would be mass convictions.
DR. GAWLIK: I shall interpolate something here. I unfortunately find that outside in the denazification boards in the British as well as in the American Zones, mass convictions do happen of members contrary to these expressed statements by the IMT - mass punishment merely on the basis of the membership in a circle of people generally declared to be criminal.
organizations may be summed up as follows: Individual members may only be found guilty of membership in criminal organizations when the following conditions have been fulfilled:
1. The member must have supported the criminal aims of the organization in co-operation with the other members, because, according to the IMT verdict, a criminal organization is similar to a group of criminal conspirators (Records: page 16503, German transcript):
"In both cases, the co-operation for criminal purposes is the essential factor."
2. The member must have been cognizant of the criminal aims or actions of the organization. That also can be unequivocally concluded from the IMT verdict. According to the IMT verdict, those members who had no knowledge of the criminal aims or actions of the organization do not belong to the condemned group of persons. This limitation rests on the principle, expressly recognized by the IMT, that the criminal guilt be a personal one. The IMT has recognized this principle of personal guilt as one of the most important principles of criminal law. (Records: page 16503, German).
3. The membership must be voluntary, for, according to the IMT verdict, all those members are expressly excluded from the group of persons declared criminal I refer in particular to the statements of the Chief Prosecutor of the USA, Justice Jackson, and to the statements of the British Prosecutor, Sir David MaxwellFyfe, in the session of 28 February 1946.
Among other things Jackson has stated:
"Organizations with criminal aims are regarded everywhere as criminal conspiracies in keeping with their character, and their criminal character is viewed according to the principles of their conspiracy."1 1) Page 400 of the official text "The Trial against the Chief War Criminals before the IMT", Volume 8 Thus the following result may be obtained:
The fact of more membership does not suffice for conviction. The member must in addition have fulfilled the prerequisites of the conspiracy, and indeed a conspiracy to commit the crimes designated by the IMT in the sense of Section 6 of the Statute. facts of the conspiracy. the following must be differentiated:
1.) his activity in Group D of Office (Amt) III,
2.) his activity as Chief III in the Einsatzgruppe, With respect to 1): (The activity of this Group D of Office III)
a) The activity of Seibert as Group Leader III in the sphere-oflife work was concentrated on the Sector Economy. and of the Party in Economy and to work the result of these findings into reports. State and of the Party in question, to show up possible deficiencies. In the opinion of the IMT it was established that the SD (Office III) pursued tasks and aims, which are war crimes or crimes against humanity according to Section 6 of the Statute. a judging of this sort with respect to Amt III (SD) will not have a support in history. SD in the reasons for the verdice were not carried out by the SD. I have demonstrated this in detail in my final plea before the IMT. As a matter of fact the very evidence in the proceedings has shown that the organization Office was merely an intelligence service. the purpose of which was to investigate the frame of mind (Morals) of the people toward measures of the State and of the Party, and to forward the results of this work to the authoritative offices.
for example, as is set down in the judgment of the IMT, to shoot hostages, to arrest relatives within the blood kinship, to carry our the "Nacht und Nebelerlass" (Night and Fog Decree), "Kugelerlass" (The Bullet Decree), and the Kommando orders, to commit any given atrocities and murders in concentration camps and to put through the slave-labor program of the German Reich, In fact this very Court will know, for example, from the proceedings against Pohl and others, that other main offices bore the responsibility for the conditions in the concentration camps, and that one cannot ascribe responsibility to Office III for the latter. The findings may be presupposed before this Tribunal to be a fact known to the court. ever be regarded as a support of any criminal tasks in the sense of Article 6 of the Statute. The presiding judge of this Tribunal has declared this activity as legal in the course of this Trial (Record p. 2521 German). commission of war crimes or of crimes against humanity by being employed in Office III (SD), For that reason already the first premise is lacking, for the punishment of Seibert for belonging to a criminal organization because of this activity. justify a conviction of this kind, are also lacking.
b) Since the SD (Amt III) Was not party to a conspiracy for the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity, article 6 of the statutes, the knowledge that Amt III was pursuing such aims does not obtain. ion of Seibert because of membership in the SD as a criminal organization is lacking.
with the Einsatzgruppe had knowledge of the execution of the Hitler Order.
The Einsatzgruppen were not an integral part of the SD. They were units of a specific kind. That they did not belong to Office III is demonstrable in particular from the following facts:
1. The formation of the Einsatzgruppen was not ordered by Office III.
2. They weren't under the command of Office III.
3. Not all members of the Einsatzgruppen were members of the SD.
Only a small percentage (approximately 3%) of the members of the Einsatzgruppen belonged to the SD.
The Police, the II A, page 1, submitted by the Prosecution. in the Document Books submitted, this classification regarding the composition of the Einsatzgruppen is not contained. entrusted to the Group Staff but to the parts of the Kommando charged with the executions. The carrying out of the Hitler order thus was not a task of Amt III (SD). Hence, the knowledge of the execution of the Hitler Order Decree was no know of the tasks and the activities of office III. For this reason having knowledge of the execution of the Hitler order cannot be looked upon as having knowledge of a criminal activity on the part of office III (SD).
c) The defendant Seibert was not a voluntary member of the SD during the war. In Seibert's case it is proved particularly clearly that this membership after 1 September 1939 could never have been a voluntary one. At that period, the defendant Seibert served with his army unit and was ordered back to the SD office III on 1 September 1939 without his knowledge and against his will subject to the National Defense Act. He therefore did not volunteer for service with the SD. His repented applications for a retransfer to the army were rejected as proved by the evidence mentioned heretofore. Seibert had already previously been a volunteer member of the SD. This opinion of the prosecution is not correct, however, The IMT verdict expressly rules that an activity before 1 September 1939 could on no account justify a conviction for membership in a criminal organization. The time before 1 September 1939 must therefore be eliminated when judging this case. The crucial point is, whether the membership after 1 September 1939 has been a voluntary one or whether it was subject to a lawful command.
Seibert's membership in the SD after 1 September 1939 was not voluntary. which would justify a conviction for membership in a criminal organization based on the fact that Seibert had been active in Office III.
Seibert's activity as Chief III in the Einsatzgruppe staff does not justify any such conviction either, because the Einsatzgruppen did not form parts of Office III (SD), as explained already.
Moreover, Seibert's activity as chief III in the staff of Einsatzgruppe D was not voluntary, but was subject to a lawful command, i.e. the German National Defense Act. Seibert had no means of evading this lawful command. He was drafted into this activity for the Einsatzgruppen staff.
verdict, whereby the members of the Security Police and the SD had no free choice with regard to their activities, and that a refusal to accept any particular post, especially for service in the occupied territories, could have meant severe punishment. (Page 16544 in the German transcript) member of the criminal circle of persons in the SS. have been expressly enumerated in the IMT verdict; they are the members of the General SS, of the Waffen SS, of the SS-Death-Head-Units and of the various Police Departments who had been members of the SS,(Page 16527 of the German transcript) as he has stated during his examination on the witness stand.
Document NO-2969, Exhibit. 162, Vol. III D, page 192,-proves that after 1 September 1939 and this is the date of importance, Seibert had only been a member of the SD.
As such he was a member of the SS-Special Formation SD. The SSSpecial Formation SD is not mentioned in the IMT verdict as being one of the parts of the SS which were declared criminal. from the SS which was declared criminal, because it was not an SS-unit, no part of an organization either, especially not a part of the SS or the SD. The Special Formation SD was in fact a mere enrollment of members of the State-Police, the Criminal Police, the SD and also that group of the Criminal Police Office V which was not declared criminal.
no special activity either, the members never met for a joint service, not had them any other joint meetings, There was no feeling of community in this circle of men. This group of men was not organized at all; e.g. it had no leaders. organization declared criminal by the judgment of the IMT, it would not be justified to pronounce Seibert guilty because of being a member of this group of persons. nor perform any common tasks, its aim cannot have been the commission of war crimes of crimes against humanity within the meaning of *rt. 6 of the statute, or, in other words, this group of persons could not participate in any conspiracy. consequence of his political attitude at that time. He never was a fanatic as the Prosecution istrying to make him out. It was not political fanaticism which prompted him to join the SD. after he had finished his studies, Seibert saw no chance of making a living as political economist. After his attempt to get a position as official in the armed forces had failed, he took advantage of the opportunity to work as a political economist for the SD then in the stage of organization, This was the reason why he joined the SD, during the whole time of his membership in the SD this attitude of Seiberts' did not change. He approached and handled all his assignments from a merely economic point of view. I refer to the numerous affidavits as proof for these facts. 1) Affidavit Borst, Doc. Seibert No. 2, Exhibit 6, Vol. I, P.1 German " Beyer, " " No. 3, " 7, " I, P.3 " " Beecke," " No. 4, " 8, " I, P.5 " " Bommerich " " No. 5, " 9, " I, P.8 " " Kroeger, " " No. 6, " 10, " I, P.10 " " Petersen," " No. 7, " 11, " I, P.12 " " Stackelbeck " No. 9, " 13, " I, P.15 " " Schieber " " No. 33, " *), " III, P.45 " *) Not yet submitted at the time this Final Plea was drafted.
life, has never shown a fanatical attitude, not even towards people who had convictions different from his.1) In this connection it made no difference to him if the person concerned was Jewish.2) Thisis proved especially by the affidavit of Frau Bolte, a Jewess.3) Moreover, Seibert was a soldier. He was an officer of the German army. It would have been quite inconsistent with his soldierly mentality to concern himself with war crimes. 1) Affidavit Paul Seidel, Doc. Seibert No. 25, Exhibit 25, Vol. I, P.
" Berners, Doc. Seibert No. 26, Exhibit 26, Vol. I. P.
" Seegers, Doc. Seibert No. 26, Exhibit *), Vol II, P.
" August SeidelDoc. Seibert No. 32, Exhibit *), Vol II, P.
" Driesch, Doc. Seibert No. 35, Exhibit *), Vol. III, P. 49 German 2) " Kellner, Doc.
Seibert No. 21, Exhibit 4, Vol. I, P.
" Klingemann, Doc. Seibert No. 24, Exhibit 24, Vol I, P. 3) " Bolte, Doc. Seibert No. 23, Exhibit 34, Vol. I, P. 4) " Hemmiche, Doc, Seibert No. 20, Exhibit 3, Vol I, P. *) Not yet submitted at the time this Final Plea was drafted.
THE PRESIDENT: Before you begin. Dr. Link, we would like to take inventory of the summations yet to be delivered. I am sorry that Dr. Gick and Dr. Koessl are not present here because they follow next in the order of the defendants. Nearly every defense counsel who has addressed the Tribunal has taken more time than that allotted, so because of that fact we have fallen behind somewhat iin the schedule perhaps we ought to have an evening session this evening in order to catch up.
Now, Dr. Belzer, will you be ready to follow Dr. Link?
DR. BELZER: Your Honor, certainly at the request of the Tribunal I will be ready at any time to present my final plea. For tactical reasons I would prefer personally if I could follow Dr. Ratz because in both pleas the same basic question of the emergency war status is treated, and the client of my colleague Ratz is first of all charged by the prosecution on the basis of this emergency war status, but, of course, I am ready to waive these personal reasons if the Tribunal wishes.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. MINZEL: Your Honor, I am in a position to present the final plea for Strauch after Dr. Link if the Tribunal so desires.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. All right then, which two counsel will be ready to present their pleas this evening? You would be willing to do so, Dr. Fritz for the defendant Fendler, and who else would be ready? If we can have two this evening that will sort of even up the schedule. Anybody else ready?
(No response.)
TEE PRESIDENT: Well then, you will need to find Dr. Koessl.
DR. MAYER: Your Honor, I am prepared to present the final plea for the defendant Klingelhoefer.
THE PRESIDENT: Well then, I think that would take care of it. We will have Dr. Link now followed by counsel for Strauch, and then this evening Dr. Mayer for Klingelhoefer and Dr. Fritz for Fendler.
Is that agreed?
DR. MAYER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. In the event that Dr. Mayer and Dr. Fritz should leave before we adjourn this afternoon, let it be understood that we will reconvene at seven-thirty this evening to hear those two pleas.
DR. MAYER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, Doctor.
DR. LINK: May it please the Tribunal, two brief preliminary remarks. After the technical prerequisites now exist, I am now able to present the final plea for the defendant Ruehl. I am aware of the fact that it is not yet my turn actually. Secondly, I have to ask for the patience of the Tribunal. If my time is not quite sufficient I hope for the indulgence of the Tribunal because in the case of the defendant Ruehl the Tribunal does not need to work through a closing brief for the defendant Ruehl. I did not think it necessary to submit one. Finally I would like to say that up to this point I did not receive from the prosecution any closing statements against Ruehl either in German or in English, but I am certain that this Tribunal will give me the possibility of replying to it in the proper form as far as is necessary.
THE PRESIDENT: Proceed. DR. LINK: In my Opening Statement of 4 October 1947, I expressed my surprise at the fact that my client Felix RUEHL has been indicted in this case. In this respect I was able to refer to a large extent to the presentations made by the Prosecution, and to maintain that all the actual incidents on which the Prosecution seems to depend as a possible basis, do not permit holding the defendant Felix RUEHL responsible and sentencing him as requested by the Prosecution. I stressed the fact that, up to the serving of the indictment, Felix RUEHL never had the position which could and should have provided the Prosecution with a possible basis for its assertions.
Finally I expressed, my hope and confidence that it would he possible to prove these facts, if that would still be necessary at all, to the Court in the course of these proceedings in an absolutely clear and unmistakable manner. of which my client had only a very insignificant role for factual reasons, I am able to state complacently that all my expectations have come true. guilty of the crimes with which he is being charged, To be sure, such convictions will not always hold good as regards the judgment of the judge. It happens often enough, unfortunately, that the concientious counsel is subject to inner conflicts and backs the man whose interests he has to look after, only as a jurist.
That is not the case here. As a defendant in these proceedings, Felix RUEHL has not only been a client whom I had to defend to the best of my abilities, but he came closer also to me as a man because of his clean personal attitude. very outset and with all sincerity.
The defendant RUEHL was born in an industrial city in 1910. His father was a civil servant and wanted to impart to his son a good education and professional training. First Felix RUEHL attended and completed high school and then became a merchant and was thus removed from the middle-class surroundings of his parents home. His childhood and early adolescence fell into the troubled times which followed the First World War. The economic decline influenced the professional development of Felix RUEHL, After a three year's commercial apprenticeship and after a short stay in England which had to be discontinued for financial difficulties, he could not find employment in his profession, worked for some time as an unskilled industrial worker, became unemployed again, until, in the spring of 1931, he succeeded in getting a modest position with some public agency.
Like many other people in his age group whose lives were also early affected by economic need, he gave thought to the possibilities of contributing his share for the relief of the critical economic and social conditions which were especially blatant in his home town. At first he was an active member of the youth group of the trade union of the employees and remained a member from 1926 until it was dissolved in 1933. Besides, he advocated the goals of the Youth Association of Greater Germany which, without following the policies of any particular party, aimed at the moral and national education of the youth. The deliberations which were responsible for his getting into contact with the NSDAP have been explained by him to the Court on the witness stand. He became a member of the NSDAP not because he strove for radicalism in connection with the prevailing political situation, but because of the conviction that only a socialist Party would be able to basically improve conditions. The idea of class-conflict, as maintained by the Social Democratic Party, was alien to his middle-class education, and the anarchist slogans of the Communist Party were even more repellent. Neither then nor later, RUEHL took an active part in the development of the NSDAP, but, as young Party members used to do in the years prior to 1933, he joined the SA, and, at the end of 1932, was transferred to the SS. Since he was a member of an SS-company, he was chosen to become a police recruit by a committee which was in search of such recruits, but he himself had done nothing to that end. 1933, his future professional career was already cleanly outlined, RUHL, upon his own request, was assigned to the counter-intelligencedepartment and worked in this special field for a number of years until the fall of 1940. The affidavits submitted by me as RUEHL Exh. No. 8. 9, 7 and 27, disclose the nature of his tasks, his professional qualifications, and his personal attitude during these years. They prove the statements which RUEHL has made on the witness stand, namely that this activity did not emanate from National Socialism, but was an activity which is one of the main duties of the police of any civilized state.
The affidavit SCHMITZ of 21 January 1948 (Exh. No. 27) equally proves that the police officers who worked in the field of counterintelligence were a class by themselves, and that it would have been contrary to all custom to remove the individual officials from this special field of tasks. This was the situation in which RUEHL found himself in 1940. His career as a police official in the counter-intelligence service seemed to lie cleanly before him, That things nevertheless took another turn did not depend on him; this was due to decisions which were ordered with regard to him and to which he had to yield. the Berlin University as a candidate for the executive service. Harmless though these studies may appear to the outsider and harmless though they were themselves, RUEHL nevertheless was immediately aware that he was being removed from his previous professional career and that he had to expect employment in another branch of the police service later on. He therefore did all in his power to have this summons cancelled and began with his studies only when all his remonstrances had proved without success. It goes without saying that he could not foresee at that time that these studies would be interrupted and that he would be detailed to one of those units which played so crucial a role in this trial. On the contrary, the further events developed quite suddenly. In May 1941 all the candidates for the executive service studying in Berlin were told by the then chief of Amt I that, on the order of the chief of the security police, their studies had to be discontinued immediately. A few days later, the whole study group was collectively moved to Pretzsch and the people assembled there were finally distributed. Einsatzgruppen and Einsatzkommandos were being activated and the defendant was assigned to one of the latter. The history of the origin of the Einsatzgruppen and Einsatzkommandos, which is pictured here only in a concise form, has been described in this trial repeatedly and in a manner not contested by the Prosecution, so that I can dispense with going more thoroughly into this matter.
That must be borne in mind is the fact that RUEHL, up to that date and even beyond it, was not prepared for the imminent commitment either indirectly or directly. The notions with which he approached the new task, which was unknown to him, were those of a police official trained on a peace-time basis who up to that time had performed his duties in the special police branch mentioned, in an objective and personally irreproachable manner and who lately had been working as a student for his further training. Prosecution seems to be of the opinion that, by reason of their previous political and professional development, all these defendants were predestined to play an essential part in the units which it termed extermination units. right from the beginning - as I think I have made clear. reluctantly - would have reconciled himself to his new task and there would have either himself committed any acts considered by you, Your Honors, as crimes, or if he would at least have held a position that had aided in, or permitted in any form, the committing of such acts, so that one night speak of a responsibility for acts committed by other persons. It will therefore be essential to make sure to what extent Felix RUEHL himself took part in the events which are the subject of this indictment, or what the position was which he held in his unit. attempt to incriminate my client. In my opening statement I claimed the prognosis of the Prosecution (Opening Statement page 59 English, page 35 German), according to which some of the defendants' direct participation in criminal acts might not he provable, for Felix RUEHL.
There has not appeared a thing in this trial which would decide against this supposition of the Prosecution, b within Einsatzgruppe D.
He was in the field with this unit up to the end of Sept. 1941, that is to say, for approximately 3 months. On 1 October 1941 he was recalled to the University of Berlin, just as were the other members of that group who, on higher orders, had had to interrupt their studies. This limitation in time has been unequivocally established in the course of this trial, among other things by the testimony on the witness stand of the co-defendant SCHULZ (p. 1056 English, p. 1069 German, dated 20 October 1947). In this I refer, above all, also to my RUEHL documents No. 23 and 24 (RUEHL Exh. No. 1 and 2). change during those 3 months but remained always the same - the Prosecution itself apparently is not sure. Already in my opening statement I pointed out that the indictment has mentioned RUEHL merely as an officer of that Special Kommando and also on its charts and maps has designated him as a mere member of that unit; but that, on the other hand, the Prosecution in its opening statement (page 24) appointed RUEHL deputy of the Kommando Chief who has died.
Concerning this the evidence has shown the following:
Already in his SS-home-unit, in 1932/33, RUEHL had been in charge of the administrative matters. Also later on, during his job as a police official in the counter-intelligence service, he was not concerned with tasks of the executive proper. The fact that he was selected to study jurisprudence offers a clue that in the opinion of his superiors he disposed of the mental equipment necessary for scholarly studies and that he was not chosen to be an executive official. It is therefore only a logical consequence that the co-defendant OHLENDORF as chief of Einsatzgruppe D made RUEHL economic and administrative officer within Kommando 10 b (Testimony OHLENDORF dated 14 October 1947, p. 606 English, p. 614 German). The field of activity connected with this position was the sane as in any peace-time or wartime unit of any country having military organizations.
It was clearly defined and extended to the administration of the agency both in personnel and economic respects, to housing. supplying and equipping its members. to do with the operations as such. Considering the absolute clarity of this range of tasks it is hardly necessary to go into fuller particulars in this connection. OHLENDORF as chief of the group, by the affidavits of a series of members of SK 10 b (Exh. No. 3, 4, 5, The above mentioned affidavits were made by witnesses who during those months in question had been continuously in official contact with RUEHL and never knew him in any capacity other than that of an administration officer.
It is also apparent from them that RUEHL was never introduced as Deputy of the Kommando-Leader or has put in an appearance as such nor that he has ever led a Teil-Kommando of that units Persterer did not have any deputy at all, - at least at the time when RUEHL was attached to the Kommando. Even in the case of a short absence of the chief, RUEHL's rank or seniority would not have entitled him to represent him, quite apart from the fact that no administrative officer, on principle, is ever appointed anywhere as deputy of the respective commander. Moreover,RUEHL was at that time Obersturmfuehrer (1st Lieutenant) and shared this rank with four other leaders in the unit, of whom at least two had the same, if not a higher seniority and would have been considered in the first place as entitled to present Persterer, in view of their status as sub-Kommando officers and Chiefs of an Executive-Department. Finally it must in particular be pointed out that the Kommando 10 b also had a Hauptsturmfuehrer (Captain) by the name of Finger, which fact would have solved the question of the deputy without difficulty, if it had become acute. (Compare in this connection the statements of RUEHL himself, transcript of the session on 18th December 1947, furthermore the Statement of Ohlendorf transcript of session on 14th and 16 October 1947.
It must be taken into consideration therefore: RUEHL was according to rank and seniority at the most-in the sense of the Prosecution-the 4th man. As far as his official position was concerned, he was out of the question as far as an independent responsible leadership of the Kommando or a part of same was concerned, even if only temporarily.
In his capacity as specialist I and II (Administration and Economics) he could not issue any directives to other Departments in particularly to the Department IV. As is disclosed by his statement in the witness stand he actually had never carried out or ordered interrogations, arrests or other executive measures.
has only the sworn statement of a certain Robert Borth (Doc. Book of the Prosecution No. 5 C, page 32 English, page 42 German, Prosecution Ex. Do. 232) The following can be Said with regard to this Document; an Austrian, in what capacity he had actually been attached to the Einsatzkommando 10b. He merely mentions that been "had been with the Einsatzkommando 10 b" during an undefined period of time.
Kommando, belonged most, likely to the enlisted ranks, is for this reason too uncertain and too doubtful, as to enable him to draw reliable conclusions. All the moreas, as he himself speaks only of an absence of Persterer of 2 to 3 days at a time. affidavit and its author, which deprive the Document completely of its already small probative value. at the time when Ruehl took the stand. Ruehl was charged, with the statement of Barth made for the prosecution that Ruehl had been the chief of Advance which had been sent from Czernowitz to Chotin and allegedly carried out liquidations on a considerable scale (transcript of session on 19th December 1947, page 4455 English, page 4541 German) that Ruehl and his people had chased the Jews, whom they had driven together in Chotin, through the ruins and had shot at them (page 4457 English, page 4542 German). Furthermore Ruehl allegedly gave Robert Barth - also according to the cross examination carried out by the Prosecution-orders concerning the retransfer of the Jews in Mogilow-Podolsk, which will be discussed in detail later on (transcript of session on 19th December 1947, page 4478 English, page 4563 German). Ruehl in the witness stand had insisted that he has never been in Chotin, nor that he had ever led a Vorkommando to this place. He just as clearly contradicted the alleged statements of Barth with, regard to his.
part in the case of that re-transfer.
In spite of this, the Prosecution refrained from refreshing Ruehl's memory by introducing the sworn affidavit of Barth or putting him ion the stand. It confined itself merely to submitting that Exhibit No. 232 in the rebuttal (Doc. Book 5 D. page 32 English, page 43 German) which does not contain any of the points brought out during the cross-examination. I have no reason to doubt that the Prosecution is fully aware of the contradictions between the statements of Ruehl and the allegations of Barth. If, in spite of this, the prosecution has made no use of its incriminating material, I can only draw the conclusion that Barth has revoked these allegations, so important for the Prosecution, or that they did not seem to be of any use for other reasons. But then, apart, from any other things Barth cannot lay claim to any credibility with Exh. No. 232. of the Kommando, as well as the repeated and express testimony of the chief of Einsatzgruppe D - Ohlendorf - contradict his statement. established evidence the position and activity of Ruehl In SK 10b. itself has set up for the question of responsibility of the sphere of persons against which it prefers charges. Ruehl held neither "a responsible position nor a post of command", nor did he possess "by virtue of his position the powers to order executions", nor were his rank and his position of such a nature that they included the power and duty to exercise control over the subordinates, (Page 58 English, page 36 German Opening Statement) be explained by his position - Ruehl could have been connected with any of the events With which the Prosecution charges the unit as such.
Above all one might think that in view of the relatively small numerical strength of the unit, Kommando members, who according to their position and sphere of duty had nothing to do with executive tasks, also gained knowledge of this sort of events and became somehow tied up with them.