submitted reports are. The same is valid for Document 2837, Page 8, where it says that in Chernowitzzat the time of the report through large-scale actions which took place in the Eastern territories some 3,000 Jews and 34 Communists were liquidated. For from the operational report of the 7th of August, it becomes evident - that is on Page 38 that the location of Kommando 10-B was Mogilev Podolsk and no longer Chernovitz, The figures under Chernovitz I shall deal with in another document.
Q. I now submit from Volume II-D, Exhibit 94, Document No. 2841. That is the page of the German boo, Page 95. The Prosecution charges you that the Einsatzkommando 12 in Babtschinzy had murdered 94 Jews.
A. From the text of the document itself it becomes evident that these Jews were executed as a counter-measure for the facts which are mentioned in this document itself. I quote verbally; "Only in Babtschinzy resistance was partially shown toward an orderly harvesting caused at the instigation of Jewish inhabitants and such Jews, who had only come to this territory a few months ago. By spying on the population, the Jews had already created a basis for numerous deportations to Siberia."
Q. I now take Document Book III-D, Exhibit 153, Document No. 4538. It is in the German Document Book, Page 36. The Prosecution charges that the Einsatzgruppe D from their own initiative founded a ghetto and used the Jews for executive works.
A. From the document itself the contrary becomes evident. I quote literally. "On the initiative of the Einsatzkommando the Rumanian town-commander in the old city erected a Jewish ghetto." The subsequent report that from this Ghetto Jews were assigned to working groups is a logical measure, which was taken by the town commander of Rumania who wasin charge of the administration of the Ghetto.
Q. In the same volume there is Exhibit 155, which is Document No. 641 which I submit to you. It is Page 40 of the German Document Book, and it says the following. The Prosecution wants to prove from this document that the sub-units of Einsatzgruppe D carried out conscientiously the execution orders.
A. This document is one ox the very few which are a true copy of the original report. However it does not become evident from this that the Prosecution wants to prove.
On page 43 it says verbally, "also otherwise, "all executions which were ordered by me and carried out by me," that is the man who wrote the letter, the report, "were carried out in the manner as ordered by Einsatzgruppe D, "which is exactly the contrary of what the prosecution claims. But this document is very interesting otherwise on the following page and that is in a double manner. First the Army here gives an instruction to the Einsatzgruppe D which is signed by the Ic AO "e", that means Riesen, who is a major on the general staff. This is countersigned by "RU". That must have been a mistake. It probably should read "RA". That is Major Rank, the superior, the superior of the major. In this it says that the Einsatzkommando of the Security Police with the Twenty-Second Infantry Division is within the combat front of the division-- That is in a condition in which all commandos or part commandos of the Einsatzgruppe found themselves. It says verbally, and I quote: "It is to be expected that all measures, especially public executions in the town of Genitschesk for setting up and determing, etc. of a Ukrainian protection unit, etc., will be taken after the division I-C, as proved, previously agreed to it." This document speaks for itself and I do not have to comment on it, but as the document is now being dealt with I should like to deal with another point of the document which is not being under debate yet. Although at that time I had the highest rank of a Standartenfuehrer, and as it is not customary in the Army, in particular as to public executions that an order to another unit should be signed by a man who is inferior or at least not as high as the receiver in his rank, the major here writes to the chief of the Einsatzgruppe who is a Standartenfuehrer, which incidently at that time had the even higher rank of an Oberfuehrer.
THE PRESIDENT: I think this may be a convenient point at which to recess until tomorrow morning at nine-thirty.
(The Tribunal afjourned until October 9, 1947, at 0930 hours.)
America, against Otto Ohlendorf, et al., de 9 October 1947, 0930-1650.
Justice Musmanno,
THE MARSHAL: The Honorable, the Judges of Military Tribunal No. II-A.
The Military Tribunal No. II-A is now in session. God save the United States of America and this Honorable Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: Before we begin the morning proceedings, and the testimoney of the defendant Ohlendorf, I should like to make this short announcement. Dr. Aschenauer has asked upon the termination of todays session that he be allowed a very brief time in which to prepare the final part of his case in behalf of his client. He asked for a recess until Monday noon. We will grant the request, and I would like to add that whatever time Dr. Aschenauer is permitted naturally goes to the benefit of all counsel, so that you also can be working on the preparation of your individual cases. So instead of reconvening Monday afternoon, we will allow the entire day of Monday with the understanding that on the following Saturday, not this Saturday, next Saturday after this week end, we will hold a session to make up for little of the time we will have lost. So that, when we complete todays proceedings, at such time as Dr. Aschenauer feels he has done all he cares to do today in connection with his case, we will then recess until next Tuesday morning at 9:30 o'clock.
DR. ASCHENAUER: Your Honor, may I proceed.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. BY DR. ASCHENAUER:
Q. I take Document Book II-C, and I submit to you, witness, Exhibit 71, Document No. 2952, that would be in the German Document Book at page 18, wherein the Prosecution charges that Kommando-XII had murdered 45 Jews. According to this document what was the real state of affairs?
A. In this document book it shows literally that these 45 Jews had been disposed of because they were not following police measures, and because they had attacked a German Military Unit.
This, therefore, was a counter measure.
Q. Document Book II-D, I show you now Exhibit 89, Document No. 2948, in the German Document Book, from pages 28 to 39, and the document has been introduced by the Prosecution in order to prove the murdering of 561 Jews?
A. The same state of affairs is valid for that document as for the last one, which says literally here, because participation in sabotage acts 351 and 400 counter measure for shooting at the German Medical carriages, and other such acts.
Q. I have the same document book II-D, and I show you the following three documents. First, Exhibit 92, Document No. 587, Exhibit 91, Document No. 4135, Exhibit 80, Document No. 2950; page number would be in the German Document Book page 40 to 48. Based on these documents the Prosecution is going to prove that the Einsatzkommando X-3 at the time of the report had been in Czernowita, and had murdered 16 Communists, and 682 Jews in Czernowitz, and 150 in the vicinity of Chotin. Apart from that caused the liquidation of 500 people in Znernowitz; I show you these three documents and I will ask you to clarify those questions in these documents?
A. Could you repeat the document numbers, please?
Q. Document Nos. are 587, on page 48 of the German Book, and the next is Document 4135, which is on page 43, and then document No. 2950, on page 40?
A. These documents contain two reports over the period of reporting, beginning with the 9th of July, the other one 14th of July and the last one of the first of August. If you compare these three documents it becomes evident that there is a strong contradiction between them, although it is the same period of reporting. Document No. 487 is a report of the Einsatzkommando 10-B to the Army Group South. Here it says, among other things, from the time of report from the beginning of July a major raid was carried through in the course of which the Jewish leadership could be apprehended almost completely.
In Document 4135 on page 46 of the German Text, it says, "In Rumania" prison in Czernowitz a large number of Jewish lower class population , hardly any intelligencia. There were no members of the Heeresgruppe Sued within the next stage. There was a further explanation. I can give a further explanation here. Those that were caught here in one place, those that are caught here and in the other place they said, no Jews are imprisoned. I also want to add that Kommando 10-3 had no prison of its own. The same applies for a further statement which we find in document, No. 5871, of the following date, which was 9 July, in which it says that 100 Communists were shot by the Kommando, but were executed together with Jews by the Rumanian Army Unit, and by police, and that the leading Jews were shot during the course of 8 and 9 July. In the Report No. 3145 on 14 July, which was the same period there are no reports about shootings. In the report of 1 August, 1200 people arrested are being talked about, and of more than 600 people having been shot. Although in this report of 14 July, it already states that Kommando 10-3 was in charge of executing the task in Czeriwitz, and would take three to four days for it. From my own knowledge the conditions in Czernowitz itself was contrary to these documents as stated in the about Czernowitz, when the following situation prevailed: In Czernowitz the general liquidation of Jews was prohibited, because Czernowitz was Rumanian territory. Actually the Jewish leading persons here not arrested, and as I remember, was never arrested. On the contrary the Rumanians made business with these Jews, and these Jews were in a position to make politics against the occupying forces, therefore, I ordered measures to be taken such as:
That these people should be arrested, and they should he interfered with. When in the course of these reports I myself went to Czernowitz, and I found out first of all who was the leader of the Kommando who was very much excited, because the Rumanians, that is the militia, in an unexplicable mannder had carried out liquidations. First of all, it was protested strongly against these liquidations, and for these very reasons had refused the request of the Rumanians to take part in these liquidations. The only interesting part of these reports is that Document 587, of 9 July, shows that the Army Group South in Czernowitz, which was being informed by members of the Army from the very beginning is informed about the liquidation of Jews from the very beginning. For this report was sent directly to the Army by the command and the activity of this Kommando has not been caused by myself, as this Kommando had already been cut away from the Army, before I myself entered this territory in Rumania. Furthermore, according to my own experience in Czernowitz, I think these arrests as well as the liquidation which is mentioned in this report, a tactical report of success which was meat for the sake of the Army, and I think it has not been submitted to me by Bersterer, the Kommando-Leader, for this very reason, because I knew that the content was not right. It says in Document 4135, amongst other things , which is on page 45 of the German text, the Einsatzgruppen Chief had a free hand over the assignment of Kommando. That is said to be the result of my discussions with General von Schobert, who was commander-in-chief of the XIth Army; in fact, however, the reception I got from General von Schobert was his showing a cold shoulder to me, as it were, and it was certainly of no value to me, General von Schobert did not even think it necessary to receive me in his office, but he passed me in the passage, after I had been kept waiting for some time, and only spoke to me while passing. Furthermore, just a few days after this report we had a few disagreements with the Army, because contrary to the free hand which it says here, the Army kept issuing orders in this district disregarding my own order in that territory under their command without informing me before hand.
It was at this time that the Army tried to go over my hand completely, and to treat the Einsatzkommandos as they would treat their own units. Therefore, either the statement in this document is only a tactical report or it has been taken from another report.
Q. If I how take Document Book III-D and Exhibit 158, Document No. 2859, German page No. 60 and submit it to you, witness, I take from this document the text which is an affidavit of the defendant Willy Weibert, and I quote: "I never had the order to segregate Communists in the Russian prisoner-of-war camps; however, the fact is known to me that members of the Security Police, and of the SD received the order to interrogate camp inmates in these camps, and to carry out executive measures." I would like you to comment on this; I would like to ask you were such Kommando instituted in your field of command by Willy Seibert and were prisoner-of-war camps actually combed?
Document No. 2422, which is on page 93 of the German book. In this document a distribution list is shown about the Kommandos which should he instituted in the prisoner of war camps, Stalag and Dulag by Chief of the Sipo and the Security Police. In Enclosure 1, which is on page 101 it says: "Every week the leaders of the special Kommandos report to the chief of their own Einsatzgruppen and special forces." If I go on quoting from page 102 I find the following part: "The chiefs of the Einsatzgruppen decide about executive proposals on their own responsibility and they pass on the orders to their Sonderkommandos (to the special Kommando troops)". If we nay just put these two together, these are the two most important parts of the document. Please comment on this. such camps, in which actually persons were singled out. The reason for this might he that our field of activity and our quarters were in the immediate front and we could not institute camps for any length of time. Anyhow, I do not remember that such Kommandos were ever put into force, but I know for certain that I was never submitted a list of people who were singled out and that I never accepted or refused a list of the kind that is mentioned in this document. I have never seen such lists.
Q In Document Book, Volume I, there is Exhibit No. 11.It is Document EC-307/1. It is page 48 of the German documents. I am showing you this document and I am asking you whether the decree mentioned in this was ever handed over to you? I was never handed this decree nor did I ever find out about the content of this. I should like to add that from the wording as well, and especially from the facts in 1939 to 1941, the term "final aim" in Paragraph 2 on Page 1 must not be mixed up in this case with the term "final solution" as it was coined in 1942.
From 1939 to 1941, according to my knowledge, no killings of Jews were carried out in Poland; but even here in Poland, in a parallel way to the migration measures of the Reich such measures were carried out. Document No. 2934. It is on the German page 55, page 4 of the document itself, page 6 of the original, there is the following sentence: "Paleski considerably devastated. Rumanians content themselves with looting everything. Pogroms could not be achieved so far". I should like you to comment on this quotation.
A The sentence, "Pogroms could not be achieved so far", means a tactical term for the sake of the Berlin office, because contrary to the orders of Berlin I had forbidden my command to instigate pogroms. I refused to take such measures because I did not agree with the method and the effect.
Q I have here Document Book II-D. I an talking about Exhibit 84, which is Document No. 3359. It is on German page 7. This is an operational situation report of 8 April 1942. From this document I quote as follows: "Inhabitants of the village of Laki near Bachtschissaraij were in constant contact with partisan groups; they gave them billets at night and supplied them with food. On 23 March a penal action against this village produced such huge quantities of food that the partisans would have been able to live on this until the next harvest. The 15 main participants, among them the mayor, were shot, all inhabitants were evacuated and the village was burned down." I should like you to comment on this document.
A This document is an example for many. I should like to repeat and state again that combatting the armed bands and the retaliation measures which were carried out for such villages as insisted on bands, all came under the order of the staff for partisan combatting and usually those actions were fought by the local army units, that is by the field divisions of the territory.
general activity and a general situation report is given. That means naturally in reporting, the situation in the territory is discussed, and not only our own activities but also all the other happenings and events of the locality itself, quite independently of who created these situations.
THE PRESIDENT: Witness, just as a matter of information, looking at this page about which you have been testifying and directing attention particularly to the phrase, "and the village was burned down", would you please explain just what military objective was being aimed at in destroying the village? Let's assume for the purposes of the question that there was a reason for liquidating those who were opposing your forces, that is to say the partisans. Just what was attained in the actual physical destruction of the buildings?
THE WITNESS: These villages which I talk about were at the foot of the Yaila Mountains. The Yaila Mountains fill the southern part of the Crimes near the coast. In the Yaila Mountains there were about 10,000 partisans at my time. Naturally, these partisans were not sufficiently supplied with food because the mountains and the south coast had already been territories where there were famines even during peace. Therefore, the villages, that is the north part, were natural reservoirs for food supplies for the southern part. That means these villages were the only bases or the only places where partisans could go, especially in winter. The reason for burning and destroying these villages were two-fold; one, at first the village that is talked about here was a hiding place for partisans, and thus a base, was to be destroyed for partisan activities; and secondly, after the Army had threatened, on verification, to burn down villages if the villages supported the partisans actively, in such a case when a village actually supported the partisans it was then to be a deterrent for the inhabitants of the village.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. BY DR. ASCHENAUER:
Q I have Document Book II-a in front of me. It is Exhibit 54, Document No. 3235, page 139 of the German document book. It is an operation situation report of 23 March 1942, It is reported about shooting of mentally insane people. Even if it is not evident from the document how many mentally insane people were actually shot. Could you comment on this? place at a time at which I myself was not present in the Crimea, but I can assure the Tribunal that my Kommandos did not carry out shootings of mentally insane. I have forbidden this explicitly, and I repeated this again and again because the Army asked us on various occasions to carry out shootings of mentally insane people. It is for this reason that it is impossible that this report deals with actions carried out by one of my own Kommandos. Furthermore, I think this is a false report because the territory at the south of Karasubasar consisted mainly of woodlands and clay huts. There were no major villages and there was certainly no asylum for insane people.
Q.- Witness, I must remonstrate you here and that is from Document Book III-D, I want to put to you Exhibit 150, Document No. 604. I shall show you this document and I should like you to comment on it.
A.- This Document 604 is a report of the Sender Kommando 11a to the army. In the last paragraph it says, that Romanenko, on the 9 December 1941, for heriditary biological reasons, was executed, I do not remember this case in detail, but the reason probably was that - or at least this becomes evident from the document - that the Sonder Kommando 11a received a direct order from the Commander-in-Chief of the Army that Romanenko should be punished as deterrant, if possible should be executed in public by hanging. The Kommando investigated this case, as becomes evident from the document, and did not find the reasons confirmed for this request by the commander-in-chief. It does not become evident from the report why the kommando, in spite of this, executed the order, especially as it gives the reason for heriditary biological reasons, I do not know whether I ever saw this report, but if I had seen it I would not have agreed with it, but I assume that he reported to the Commander-in-Chief immediately after the Commander-in-Chief had been put in charge of this kommando.
Q.- Witness, from the same document book I now turn to another document. Would you look on page 15. It is Exhibit 151, Document No, 631, I ask you on this document, why did you try to justify yourself with the Army; why did you have to justify yourself concerning the confiscations of watches and other valuables taken during the Jewish actions?
A.- I remember the incident very well which led to my writing this report to the Army, Some officers had complained to the Chief-of-Staff that I refused to turn over money to the town of Simferopol without a receipt. Furthermore, complaints had been received that I had failed to turn over as many watches as I should have done after the confiscations had taken place. The Army sent a remonstration to me and asked me where the valuables were.
As the Army, by their own position, had the authority to ask me for such an explanation of the facts, this is the answer to the complaints of the Army.
Q.- I should like you to keep the same document, that is III-D, and to look at Exhibit 152, which is on page 21 of the German. This is Document No. 4439. The Einsatzgruppen is charged that they had looted Jewish apartments and had taken away property which they put at the disposal of Ethic Germans.
A.- What is called looting here was the carrying out of the confiscation, - and utilization decrees - which I simultaneously had received from the Reich Security Main Office and the Army. The apartments as well as the furniture, were put at the disposal of people who had lost all their property and who could prove that or it was administered by the local commander in their respective localities of command and was put at the disposal of those people who were looking for apartments. Furthermore, apart from these two lines, this report, which contains about twenty pages, is an excellent explanation of the terror under which the German territories lived for twenty years, and which only proves what I said yesterday, that as a rule three male grown-up members of each family in the course of this time were taken from the family and their fate could not be established.
Q.- That is those who looked for accommodations were, therefore, Tartars, Ukrainians and Etnic Germans, witness during what period in the war were you Chief of Einsatzgruppe D?
A.- I was chief of the Einsatzgruppe D from June 1941 until June 1942, inclusive, However, from March 1942 to July 1942 there were considerable interruptions.
Q.- What was the nature of these interruptions?
A.- From the beginning of March until 26th April I was on leave in Berlin. At the end of April I had to go back to Berlin until the begin ning of May.
After the death of Heydrich on the 4th of June, 1942, I was called to Berlin, and I only returned in order to give over my office to my successor.
Q.- Did you, as the Chief of the Einsatzgruppe, operate with the Einsatzgruppe and its units in Russia independently?
A.- No. My official office position was Plenipotentiary to the Chief of the Security Police and the SD in the 11th Army. As such, for the tasks which I had to carry out within the Army, Einsatzkommandos had been subordinated to me as units with whom these tasks were to be carried out.
Q.- Will you explain to us the importance of this position in the Army and the activity of the Einsatzgruppen and Einsatzkommandos?
A.- I was given this assignment on the basis of an agreement between OKH and OKW (The Command of the Army and the Armed Forces) on the one hand and the Security Police and the SD on the other. This decree was known as the so-called Barbarossa decree. On the basis of this decree the institution of these mobile units had a two-fold significance within the framework of the Army units. On the one hand, special units were subordinated to the Army for tasks which they had so far carried out on their own authority and with their own units. On the other hand, Heydrich, Chief of the Police and the SD, the sole authority, to give immediate instructions to these Einsatzkommandos, and, also to receive the new reports direct with the reason and the purpose to prevent an expected collaboration of the adversaries in the Reich itself and in the occupied territories at the front. The essential thing was that these activities were carried by me and the Einsatzkommandos in the assigned territories and was within, the territory of the Army, this means that the task and activities of the Einsatzkommandos were under supreme authority of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army. He held the executive power within his territory, and his power of attorney had been laid down in the Reichs Defense Law, as well as in a decree of the OKW, the high command of the Army, regarding the position of a commander-in-chief in the operational theatre.
of the Army were of primary importance and had to be complied with first. Therefore, it was necessary for the units to carry out all activities and tasks in a form which was in agreement with the intentions of the Army. That means the Army had either to agree or comment upon this, or, at least, show their agreement concerning the activities of the units within the framework of the tasks of the Army. By this term I mean that the activities of the Einsatzkommandos, Special Task Forces, were formed from the tasks of the army itself. That is, it had to attempt to fulfil the task which was meant for these special units within the framework of tasks of the army. It wasits duty to accept special tasks, which, according to the authority of the Barbarossa Decree could be asked for by the army.
Q This is the general framework. Was this factual and legal relation - to the army hirarchy and to the Einsatzgruppe and Einsatzkommandos also defined individually by a decree? agreement I mentioned. It was left to the discretion of the Army to determine the operational theatre of the individual kommandos, the strength of the kommandos, and the period of activity of the kommandos. Furthermore, it also had been determined for operative necessities the regulations and decrees of the army had priority. What had not been determined, however, was the current competition of orders which might occur within the decrees of the Chief of SD and the Security Police and the Chief of the Army. It was often the case, that it was more or less left to the skill of the officers in charge of the respective agencies to find an objective solution in case of such competitive orders. For operative reasons, however, the highest instance always in the end had the right to make the final decision. Barbarossa Decree for your own position and your activities and the activities and the position of the Einsatzkommando?
tried from the very first day not to take notice of me at all as the Chief of the Einsatzgruppen and to treat the Einsatzkommandos as their own army Units. We were auxiliary units, of the TC/AO. This becomes evident also from another document. It is Document 584. It is in Document Book III-D, in which IC/AO gives us a picture of how in his own tasks of espionnage of armed band activities and the setting up of plans for combatting such bands, apart from the Field Constabulary and his own units, and also the SD, delivered news reports which he himself used for his own purposes.
Q What was your relationship to the Chief-of-Staff of the Army? nor the Chief of Staff really took notice of mo at all when I first reported to them. When therefore, on the strength of describing the actual situation. The Army made use of the Kommandos without my knowledge. I had a serious dispute with IC, the consequence of this was that I was called to the Chief of Staff, Colonel Woehler, and he received me with the words, if the collaboration between the Army and myself would not improve, he would ask for my dismissal in Berlin. I believe that this fact gives a good picture of my relationship with the Chief of Staff, For although the Chief of Staff was a colonel, and, I, as a Standartenfuehrer apparently was - colonel, also the actual position becomes evident which I had within the framework of the Army. By the Army I was considered an unit leader of just about 500 men. That equals a commander of a battalion and I was treated accordingly. I was not only ordered to see Oberst Woehler but even a major and IC Rank and, he avoided expressly to address me with naming my rank, a custom usually exercised in the army in order to show that he, even as major, was above a Standartenfuehrer.
THE PRESIDENT: I understood you to say he was a colonel.
THE WITNESS: Who?
THE WITNESS: Who?
THE PRESIDENT: This officer with whom you were speaking.
THE WITNESS: The last one I mentioned was a Major. The IC with whom I had to deal immediately, and from whom the Einsatzgruppen received most of the orders, was a major.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Were you so under the control of the army that a recommendation from him for your dismissal would have had weight and effect in Berlin?
THE WITNESS: I didn't hear the question.
THE PRESIDENT: I see. I am sorry. Were you so under the command of the army that a recommendation from this officer to Berlin could have worked the dismissal which he threatened?
THE FITNESS: Immediately, yes. There is no doubt, because it was Himmler is interest as to this assignment to extend this first footing he had won for the territory of the army by means of a close collaboration with the army, and it is generally known that, as rule, not one officer of Himmler was ever covered by him when in the case of complaints the complainant was a person who was of importance to Himmler himself, and this was certainly the case of the Chief of the OKW, Keitel. What was your field of command? What was your power of decision? I repeat the question. Would you tell the Tribunal the content value of your position? What were you in command of? What was your power of decision and your authority? What was the territory of your authority? were at the utmost auxiliary organs of IC. The field of tasks which had been concretely established was to get a secure collaboration with the Security Service and the SD and to guarantee such collaboration with the army. That was the general framework of the order, and within the framework the order frequently discussed here -- to liquidate certain groups of people wasone concrete order, that had been issued, in order to achieve the goal of guaranteeing the security within this territory.
My authority consisted in safeguarding the communication lines of the army as well as the police security and in deciding whether or not the Einsatzgruppen should carry out such executions. It was outside my authority to stop the Einsatzkommandos from carrying out such executions, because this was the basic order which came from the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces and which was not within the power of authority of the unit leaders. My authority only started in carrying out these orders, that is, when deciding in what manner these orders were to be carried out, which was determined within the task or security. The orders which were issued by the OKW currently in this connection prove that the competence and the possibility of securing and guaranteeing security in these territories was not fully used, but that these orders with their possibilities were never exploited by me. Furthermore, the fact that in winter 1941/1942 currently Kommandos were never exploited by me. Furthermore, the fact that in winter 1941/1942 currently Kommandos were taken away from my own units by the army and became subordinated to the combatting troops. This, as I say, proves perhaps best that I, with my own kommandose, was only a little wheel at the lower and of the machinery, which the Army units kept in the Russian territory. might be of interest here, for instance, in the assigning of combatting units?
A I think I have given an example for this just now. There is only to be added that, as I have already basically explained before, special tasks were transferred to me by the Army which I just had to carry out and I could determine the way in which they should be carried out, for instance, in espionnage of armed band activities or recruiting of Tartars, or, for instance, the harvesting or establishing of district administration, or whatever the case might be. My authority and power of ordering was not left to me at all; and only insofar as the army did not deal with it itself, for me it was only a way of carrying out these orders.