At that time I could not accept the Ukrainians into the army, but the Tartars put 10% of their male population at my disposal within three weeks, absolutely voluntarily. Here, selfgovernment and self-administration was granted to all parts of the population that is, those units, those communities with a Ukrainian majority had a Ukrainian mayor; the Tartars got a Tartar for their mayor; the Greeks got a Greek; and the Great Russians got a Great Russian. These measures were extended in winter as a support when the danger of famine arose in the south. Thus, the actual security task was permanently a positive one and was to be achieved by positive measures.
Q Did the combatting of armed bands belong to your sphere?
A No, that was not within my sphere. But, in the Crimea - especially, after repeated landings of the Russians in Feodosia, Kersch and Eupatoria from the North, East and the West, with the ultimate aim of the Jaila Mountains, the whole Crimea was systematically filled with enemy agents and spies and those strongly executive tasks, as, for instance, band intelligence, became an essential task which was assigned to us by the army. To my great regret the forces of the army in the Crimea were so small that for months the Commando 10b and parts of the Commando 11b had to be assigned to fight armed bands. This assignment, as well as the combatting of armed bands, was under the army command, that is, the command of the various army units which held the front sectors. We ourselves were only subordinates and were outside our actual field of activities. this activity of the Einsatzkommandos? the Einsatzgruppe very small. I had merely one, or possibly two, departmental experts, and one adjutant, the defendant Schubert, who was also the manager of the business office. That was my whole staff, who had to deal with the matters.
I had to be in the headquarters of the army, the local headquarters, that is, in order to establish and guarantee the permanent contact between the Einsatzgruppe end the Army; I was actually the point of contact between the army and the Einsatzkommandos. My main task was to carry out the orders of the chief of the SD, the Security Police end the too frequent orders of the army, and to adjust them, and to take care that the Einsatzkommandos, on the basis of the general situation in an area, were committed in the right tactical manner. Thus, for instance, we had to hunt down saboteurs, enemy agents, or make out intelligence reports, or gather intelligence about partisans, or whatever the situation required.
Q I now turn to the documents. I note the Document Books I, II-A, II-B, II-C, II-D and III-D. I don't know whether the Prosecution had these document books at their disposal at present.
MR. WALTON: While the document books mentioned by the defense are not all here I don't think that will hamper Dr. Aschenauer at all - I think we can take enough notes, and enough notes appear in the record for our own purposes.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. BY DR. ASCHENAUER:
Q My first question on this subject: Introducing the evidence against the members of the Einsatzgruppe D, the Prosecution under Exhibit 149 produced document No. 2661, Volume III*D, and they have remarked that the operation and situation report No. 10 concerning activities of the Einsatzgruppe D from the last until the 28th of February 1942, in which it is shown that all Jewish areas in the Eastern territories are to be cleaned, as it were, by transporting the Jews to Ghettos and those who resisted the German regulation would be shot. Jews would also be shot in order to prevent the spreading of epidemics. Would you comment on this, witness?
insofar as it is not a report from the Einsatzgruppe D, because in this document, independently from individual reports of the group, collective notes - summaries, as it were - reports which were made Independently of the original reports. Only from the location signs can one conclude which territory is meant for the individual Einsatzgruppen. Of Einsatzgruppe D there is only one small remark three of four times in this lengthy document, the content of which is quite independent from the charge of the Prosecution, This paragraph is mentioned twice. The error seems to me based on the fact that the Prosecution confuses the term "Eastern Territory" - "Ostland", Evidently it takes the term "Ostland" to mean the whole of Russia, while in reality "Eastern territory" in German usage, is an administrative term by which the three Baltic countries are meant - Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, and the charge of the Prosecution against Einsatzgruppe D is the content of what is being reported from this Eastern territory. It is your own affidavit of 5 November 1945, and there it says:
"In the course of the year while I was leader of the Einsatzgruppe D they liquidated", (the Einsatzgruppe, that is), "90,000 men, women and children."
What do you mean by "approximately"?
COURT II-A CASE IX Einsatzgruppen for two and a half years now; and during all that time I have always tried to avoid naming figures because the numbers of executions I do not actually know.
I don't know anyhow today. I know under what conditions these sentences were signed by me. It is an affidavit which was chosen from a number of ten or twelve. Even then, that "approximately meant that I did not actually know. I can assure the Tribunal that in any oral remarks I might have made during these interrogations, I avoided as long as I could naming any figures whatsoever. If, of course, the figure 90,000 was named by me, I always added that of this, fifteen to twenty per cent are double countings. That is on the basis of my own experiences. I do not know any longer how I could have remembered the number of just 90,000 because I did not keep a register of these figures. The "approximately" must have meant that I was not certain. evident--and my own men reproached me for it--that I was wrong in naming the figure 90,000. It is evident that I mentioned this number 90,000 by adding a number of other figures. I do not mention this in order to excuse myself as I an perfectly convinced that it does not matter for the actual facts whether it was 40,000 or 90,000. But I mention this for the reason that, in the situation in which we are today, politically speaking, Fibures are being dealt with in an irresponsible manner. The material and the value of man seems to become so unimportant that the play with millions does not seen to be of any particular importance either. Herr Auerbach mentions the figure of 11,000,000 in relation to Germany. A very small part of these millions have ever COURT II-A CASE IX seen a concentration camp.
The IMT named the number 2,000,000 for elimination in the Eastern territories. The prosecution in this trial is slightly more modest and only mentions the number of 1,000,000. It is not for nothing that the prosecution deals with only a small portion of time concerning the activities in the Eastern territories because after this period there were no activities on the part of the Einsatzgruppen. prosecution in these documents, figures occur up to 46,000. I must now state solemnly that in the Reich Security Main Office, Heydrich, Mueller, and Streckenbach, and all the others who knew about these matters, intentionally exaggerated and invented the numbers of Einsatzgruppen A,B and C. By that, B, I mean during the period of NEBE. I am convinced that these figures, which, if I add the numbers in the documents, are not even half of what the prosecution charges me with, are exaggerated by about twice as much. I believe that it is quite evident that these figures should be compared with others and looked upon as the Soviet, the Bolshevist figures. Compare these figures, as I say, with the numbers of civilian population figures which for the same reasons even from other motives, perhaps, but in an inhumane manner were murdered because this is what happened while I was in command of the Einsatzgruppen.
Q. Witness, you speak of exaggeration and double counting. Do you refer, when you maintain that, to Exhibit 95, Document Number 3,148, Volume II, Page 57, of the 20th of September, 1941, and Exhibit 96, Document Number 3,147?
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Aschenauer, I have been conducting a campaign, very unsuccessfully up to this moment, of COURT II-A CASE IX trying to get defense counsel and the prosecution counsel, when referring to an exhibit to give us the largest unit first--the book number, the page, the exhibit, the date, then the paragraph.
But you start off with the paragraph, and it's very difficult.
DR. ASCHENAUER: I shall try, your Honor, to comply with your wish.
Q. In maintaining this, do you refer to Volume II-D, Exhibit Number 95, Document Number 3,148, in the German Document Book Page 57; and Document Book II-D, Exhibit 96, Document Number 3,147; furthermore, to Document Book II-C, Exhibit 76, Document Number 3,137; furthermore, Volume II-D, Exhibit 85, Document Number 3,159? In these documents there are numbers which I would like you to comment on.
A. I should like to contest this figure, the figure mentioned in Volume II-C, Page 49 of the German text. There it says that from the 16th of September until 30 September, 22,000 Jews and Communists were executed and that the total figure is 35,000. In Document Book II-D, German text Page 57, it says, "Under Einsatzgruppe D," Location Kikerino, Work commandos of this area freed of Jews. From 19 August to 25 September 8,890 Jews and Communists were executed. Total number, 17,315." There's a question mark. In the next sentence it says, "At the moment the Jewish question is being solved in Nikolajew and Cherson. In each case approximately 5,000 Jews were comprenended." This operational situation-report is from the 20th of September. On the next page, Document 3,147, the operational situation-report from the 26th of September 1941, There under "Einsatzgruppe A the Location of Kikerino is stated. I do not know whether that was an actual garrison of the Einsatzgruppe A, but at any rate COURT II-A CASE IX I know that this Location was never a location of the Einsatzgruppe D. In this operational-situation report almost Literally under Einsatzgruppe D with the location of Nikolajew the same subjects are mentioned as in the operational situation report of 20th of September.
were submitting as documentary evidence the reports of activities of Einsatzgruppen A and D; but actually up to this moment, apart from the reports of the Einsatzgruppen to the army, they have submitted no original reports. These two subsequent operational-situation-reports, which could be controlled and checked up on very easily in Berlin, show very clearly how far the original reports are removed from the contents of these operational-Situationreports. It is my opinion that from the operationalsituation-reports not a single sentence can be identified with a sentence of an original report from the Einsatzgruppen and the Einsatzkommandoes, but, on the contrary, as becomes evident from these two reports, the operational situation reports are made up from the original reports, and they are full of mistakes and are not compiled with the view point to pass on actual reports.
one another in copy. But as a matter of fact they have been dealt with. According to my memory, these reports concerning the fivethousand Jews in Nikolajev zone are correct, but, of course, only once, not twice. If now on page 49, II C, under 2 October, it says that between 16 September and 30 September 22,000 Jews and Communists had been executed, this is an amount which during the occupation of the Einsatzgruppen in this territory did not exist in that area. During this time the Einsatzgruppen was in charge of operations in the Nikolajev-Keresov territory and the territory east of the Dnjeper River, so far as it was already within our own territory of command. In the operational situation report of 18 October, in Document Book II-D, on page 60, Document II-D, page 60, it says, "During the time of report, the solution of the Jewish question was dealt with especially in the territory east of the Dnjeper River; the territories newly occupied by the commandos here freed of Jews". Then it says, "including those territories east of the Dnjeper River 4897 Jews and 46 Communists were executed". This figure is first of all outside the report of the tine of 26 September and secondly, it states the actual figure on which existed as to this territory at the time it becomes evident that the report of 22 October cannot be correct, under any circumstances. It can only here be an addition, or in using the reports from other Einsatzgruppen. There must be another exhibit, tie number of which I don't remember, from which this becomes quite evident, namely the fact from the operational situation report of the beginning of November. May I have this. That must be the operational report No. 129 of 15 November 1944, Exh. 85 in Document Book II-D, on page 21. Here approximately 4 weeks later on page 21 of the German version, this report of Einsatzgruppen D in that period reports 11,000 Jews were executed. It must be noted that in situation report 5 November, although in October, the total num ber had been mentioned as 40,000, the situation report of November states there are 31,000.
Here is a contradiction which cannot be clarified from the documents which only prove the questionability of the evidence of these documents, not only regarding these figures but these individual reports in these documents.
Q I further offer the documents in Volume II-B, Exhibit No. 58, Document 2837, in the German Document Book, it is on page 6. It is an operational situation report from the 29 August 1941. Furthermore, in Document Book II-D, Exhibit 89, Document No. 2943, German Document Book on page 37; also from Document Book III-D, Exhibit 154, Document No. 2840, in the German Document Book page 46; would you comment on the statements in these documents concerning other statements, whether they contradict each other?
A May I put a question? I think there is a mistake here in this document. This is Document Book II-B, page 6, Exhibit No. 58, which is Document No. 2837. I think it ought to say 57.
Q It should he operational situation report of 29 August?
A There is something missing. (Counsel and defendant consulting document at witness dock) I would like to point out two facts. On one occasion it says in the Document 2837, Document Book II-B, page 8 of the German text that in Mogilaw-Podolsk approximately 27,500 Jews were transported to the Rumanian territory, although in the report of 26 August it says that in the immediate vicinity of Mogilaw there were approximately 7,000 Jews who until the time the official duties were taken over were sent from Rumanian into this territory. A Jewish transport of about 6,000 people was in spite of protest by the Rumanian Bridge-Commandant transported into the Eastern territory at this time. Even if I add these 6,000 to the 7,000 and I do not think they are contained in this 7,000, then I arrive at the result of the number of 13,000 and this is the number which I remember. But here it states until the taking over of office from the reports of 7 August, it became evident that at that time the Einsatzkommando X-B, location at Mogilaw-Podolsk and I quote:
"Prevents the Jewish transport Into territory, taken over by the Germans." This, therefore, is quite Unlikely that when during the period of report of 7 August a transport which could only he carried out over two bridges end was stopped, and, on 26 August, 7,000 Jews should have gone from the Rumanian territory into the German territory; that then 2 days later 27,000 could have been there to be driven back.
submitted reports are. The same is valid for Document 2837, Page 8, where it says that in Chernowitzzat the time of the report through large-scale actions which took place in the Eastern territories some 3,000 Jews and 34 Communists were liquidated. For from the operational report of the 7th of August, it becomes evident - that is on Page 38 that the location of Kommando 10-B was Mogilev Podolsk and no longer Chernovitz, The figures under Chernovitz I shall deal with in another document.
Q. I now submit from Volume II-D, Exhibit 94, Document No. 2841. That is the page of the German boo, Page 95. The Prosecution charges you that the Einsatzkommando 12 in Babtschinzy had murdered 94 Jews.
A. From the text of the document itself it becomes evident that these Jews were executed as a counter-measure for the facts which are mentioned in this document itself. I quote verbally; "Only in Babtschinzy resistance was partially shown toward an orderly harvesting caused at the instigation of Jewish inhabitants and such Jews, who had only come to this territory a few months ago. By spying on the population, the Jews had already created a basis for numerous deportations to Siberia."
Q. I now take Document Book III-D, Exhibit 153, Document No. 4538. It is in the German Document Book, Page 36. The Prosecution charges that the Einsatzgruppe D from their own initiative founded a ghetto and used the Jews for executive works.
A. From the document itself the contrary becomes evident. I quote literally. "On the initiative of the Einsatzkommando the Rumanian town-commander in the old city erected a Jewish ghetto." The subsequent report that from this Ghetto Jews were assigned to working groups is a logical measure, which was taken by the town commander of Rumania who wasin charge of the administration of the Ghetto.
Q. In the same volume there is Exhibit 155, which is Document No. 641 which I submit to you. It is Page 40 of the German Document Book, and it says the following. The Prosecution wants to prove from this document that the sub-units of Einsatzgruppe D carried out conscientiously the execution orders.
A. This document is one ox the very few which are a true copy of the original report. However it does not become evident from this that the Prosecution wants to prove.
On page 43 it says verbally, "also otherwise, "all executions which were ordered by me and carried out by me," that is the man who wrote the letter, the report, "were carried out in the manner as ordered by Einsatzgruppe D, "which is exactly the contrary of what the prosecution claims. But this document is very interesting otherwise on the following page and that is in a double manner. First the Army here gives an instruction to the Einsatzgruppe D which is signed by the Ic AO "e", that means Riesen, who is a major on the general staff. This is countersigned by "RU". That must have been a mistake. It probably should read "RA". That is Major Rank, the superior, the superior of the major. In this it says that the Einsatzkommando of the Security Police with the Twenty-Second Infantry Division is within the combat front of the division-- That is in a condition in which all commandos or part commandos of the Einsatzgruppe found themselves. It says verbally, and I quote: "It is to be expected that all measures, especially public executions in the town of Genitschesk for setting up and determing, etc. of a Ukrainian protection unit, etc., will be taken after the division I-C, as proved, previously agreed to it." This document speaks for itself and I do not have to comment on it, but as the document is now being dealt with I should like to deal with another point of the document which is not being under debate yet. Although at that time I had the highest rank of a Standartenfuehrer, and as it is not customary in the Army, in particular as to public executions that an order to another unit should be signed by a man who is inferior or at least not as high as the receiver in his rank, the major here writes to the chief of the Einsatzgruppe who is a Standartenfuehrer, which incidently at that time had the even higher rank of an Oberfuehrer.
THE PRESIDENT: I think this may be a convenient point at which to recess until tomorrow morning at nine-thirty.
(The Tribunal afjourned until October 9, 1947, at 0930 hours.)
America, against Otto Ohlendorf, et al., de 9 October 1947, 0930-1650.
Justice Musmanno,
THE MARSHAL: The Honorable, the Judges of Military Tribunal No. II-A.
The Military Tribunal No. II-A is now in session. God save the United States of America and this Honorable Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: Before we begin the morning proceedings, and the testimoney of the defendant Ohlendorf, I should like to make this short announcement. Dr. Aschenauer has asked upon the termination of todays session that he be allowed a very brief time in which to prepare the final part of his case in behalf of his client. He asked for a recess until Monday noon. We will grant the request, and I would like to add that whatever time Dr. Aschenauer is permitted naturally goes to the benefit of all counsel, so that you also can be working on the preparation of your individual cases. So instead of reconvening Monday afternoon, we will allow the entire day of Monday with the understanding that on the following Saturday, not this Saturday, next Saturday after this week end, we will hold a session to make up for little of the time we will have lost. So that, when we complete todays proceedings, at such time as Dr. Aschenauer feels he has done all he cares to do today in connection with his case, we will then recess until next Tuesday morning at 9:30 o'clock.
DR. ASCHENAUER: Your Honor, may I proceed.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. BY DR. ASCHENAUER:
Q. I take Document Book II-C, and I submit to you, witness, Exhibit 71, Document No. 2952, that would be in the German Document Book at page 18, wherein the Prosecution charges that Kommando-XII had murdered 45 Jews. According to this document what was the real state of affairs?
A. In this document book it shows literally that these 45 Jews had been disposed of because they were not following police measures, and because they had attacked a German Military Unit.
This, therefore, was a counter measure.
Q. Document Book II-D, I show you now Exhibit 89, Document No. 2948, in the German Document Book, from pages 28 to 39, and the document has been introduced by the Prosecution in order to prove the murdering of 561 Jews?
A. The same state of affairs is valid for that document as for the last one, which says literally here, because participation in sabotage acts 351 and 400 counter measure for shooting at the German Medical carriages, and other such acts.
Q. I have the same document book II-D, and I show you the following three documents. First, Exhibit 92, Document No. 587, Exhibit 91, Document No. 4135, Exhibit 80, Document No. 2950; page number would be in the German Document Book page 40 to 48. Based on these documents the Prosecution is going to prove that the Einsatzkommando X-3 at the time of the report had been in Czernowita, and had murdered 16 Communists, and 682 Jews in Czernowitz, and 150 in the vicinity of Chotin. Apart from that caused the liquidation of 500 people in Znernowitz; I show you these three documents and I will ask you to clarify those questions in these documents?
A. Could you repeat the document numbers, please?
Q. Document Nos. are 587, on page 48 of the German Book, and the next is Document 4135, which is on page 43, and then document No. 2950, on page 40?
A. These documents contain two reports over the period of reporting, beginning with the 9th of July, the other one 14th of July and the last one of the first of August. If you compare these three documents it becomes evident that there is a strong contradiction between them, although it is the same period of reporting. Document No. 487 is a report of the Einsatzkommando 10-B to the Army Group South. Here it says, among other things, from the time of report from the beginning of July a major raid was carried through in the course of which the Jewish leadership could be apprehended almost completely.
In Document 4135 on page 46 of the German Text, it says, "In Rumania" prison in Czernowitz a large number of Jewish lower class population , hardly any intelligencia. There were no members of the Heeresgruppe Sued within the next stage. There was a further explanation. I can give a further explanation here. Those that were caught here in one place, those that are caught here and in the other place they said, no Jews are imprisoned. I also want to add that Kommando 10-3 had no prison of its own. The same applies for a further statement which we find in document, No. 5871, of the following date, which was 9 July, in which it says that 100 Communists were shot by the Kommando, but were executed together with Jews by the Rumanian Army Unit, and by police, and that the leading Jews were shot during the course of 8 and 9 July. In the Report No. 3145 on 14 July, which was the same period there are no reports about shootings. In the report of 1 August, 1200 people arrested are being talked about, and of more than 600 people having been shot. Although in this report of 14 July, it already states that Kommando 10-3 was in charge of executing the task in Czeriwitz, and would take three to four days for it. From my own knowledge the conditions in Czernowitz itself was contrary to these documents as stated in the about Czernowitz, when the following situation prevailed: In Czernowitz the general liquidation of Jews was prohibited, because Czernowitz was Rumanian territory. Actually the Jewish leading persons here not arrested, and as I remember, was never arrested. On the contrary the Rumanians made business with these Jews, and these Jews were in a position to make politics against the occupying forces, therefore, I ordered measures to be taken such as:
That these people should be arrested, and they should he interfered with. When in the course of these reports I myself went to Czernowitz, and I found out first of all who was the leader of the Kommando who was very much excited, because the Rumanians, that is the militia, in an unexplicable mannder had carried out liquidations. First of all, it was protested strongly against these liquidations, and for these very reasons had refused the request of the Rumanians to take part in these liquidations. The only interesting part of these reports is that Document 587, of 9 July, shows that the Army Group South in Czernowitz, which was being informed by members of the Army from the very beginning is informed about the liquidation of Jews from the very beginning. For this report was sent directly to the Army by the command and the activity of this Kommando has not been caused by myself, as this Kommando had already been cut away from the Army, before I myself entered this territory in Rumania. Furthermore, according to my own experience in Czernowitz, I think these arrests as well as the liquidation which is mentioned in this report, a tactical report of success which was meat for the sake of the Army, and I think it has not been submitted to me by Bersterer, the Kommando-Leader, for this very reason, because I knew that the content was not right. It says in Document 4135, amongst other things , which is on page 45 of the German text, the Einsatzgruppen Chief had a free hand over the assignment of Kommando. That is said to be the result of my discussions with General von Schobert, who was commander-in-chief of the XIth Army; in fact, however, the reception I got from General von Schobert was his showing a cold shoulder to me, as it were, and it was certainly of no value to me, General von Schobert did not even think it necessary to receive me in his office, but he passed me in the passage, after I had been kept waiting for some time, and only spoke to me while passing. Furthermore, just a few days after this report we had a few disagreements with the Army, because contrary to the free hand which it says here, the Army kept issuing orders in this district disregarding my own order in that territory under their command without informing me before hand.
It was at this time that the Army tried to go over my hand completely, and to treat the Einsatzkommandos as they would treat their own units. Therefore, either the statement in this document is only a tactical report or it has been taken from another report.
Q. If I how take Document Book III-D and Exhibit 158, Document No. 2859, German page No. 60 and submit it to you, witness, I take from this document the text which is an affidavit of the defendant Willy Weibert, and I quote: "I never had the order to segregate Communists in the Russian prisoner-of-war camps; however, the fact is known to me that members of the Security Police, and of the SD received the order to interrogate camp inmates in these camps, and to carry out executive measures." I would like you to comment on this; I would like to ask you were such Kommando instituted in your field of command by Willy Seibert and were prisoner-of-war camps actually combed?
Document No. 2422, which is on page 93 of the German book. In this document a distribution list is shown about the Kommandos which should he instituted in the prisoner of war camps, Stalag and Dulag by Chief of the Sipo and the Security Police. In Enclosure 1, which is on page 101 it says: "Every week the leaders of the special Kommandos report to the chief of their own Einsatzgruppen and special forces." If I go on quoting from page 102 I find the following part: "The chiefs of the Einsatzgruppen decide about executive proposals on their own responsibility and they pass on the orders to their Sonderkommandos (to the special Kommando troops)". If we nay just put these two together, these are the two most important parts of the document. Please comment on this. such camps, in which actually persons were singled out. The reason for this might he that our field of activity and our quarters were in the immediate front and we could not institute camps for any length of time. Anyhow, I do not remember that such Kommandos were ever put into force, but I know for certain that I was never submitted a list of people who were singled out and that I never accepted or refused a list of the kind that is mentioned in this document. I have never seen such lists.
Q In Document Book, Volume I, there is Exhibit No. 11.It is Document EC-307/1. It is page 48 of the German documents. I am showing you this document and I am asking you whether the decree mentioned in this was ever handed over to you? I was never handed this decree nor did I ever find out about the content of this. I should like to add that from the wording as well, and especially from the facts in 1939 to 1941, the term "final aim" in Paragraph 2 on Page 1 must not be mixed up in this case with the term "final solution" as it was coined in 1942.
From 1939 to 1941, according to my knowledge, no killings of Jews were carried out in Poland; but even here in Poland, in a parallel way to the migration measures of the Reich such measures were carried out. Document No. 2934. It is on the German page 55, page 4 of the document itself, page 6 of the original, there is the following sentence: "Paleski considerably devastated. Rumanians content themselves with looting everything. Pogroms could not be achieved so far". I should like you to comment on this quotation.
A The sentence, "Pogroms could not be achieved so far", means a tactical term for the sake of the Berlin office, because contrary to the orders of Berlin I had forbidden my command to instigate pogroms. I refused to take such measures because I did not agree with the method and the effect.
Q I have here Document Book II-D. I an talking about Exhibit 84, which is Document No. 3359. It is on German page 7. This is an operational situation report of 8 April 1942. From this document I quote as follows: "Inhabitants of the village of Laki near Bachtschissaraij were in constant contact with partisan groups; they gave them billets at night and supplied them with food. On 23 March a penal action against this village produced such huge quantities of food that the partisans would have been able to live on this until the next harvest. The 15 main participants, among them the mayor, were shot, all inhabitants were evacuated and the village was burned down." I should like you to comment on this document.
A This document is an example for many. I should like to repeat and state again that combatting the armed bands and the retaliation measures which were carried out for such villages as insisted on bands, all came under the order of the staff for partisan combatting and usually those actions were fought by the local army units, that is by the field divisions of the territory.