of the Defendant NOSSKE: He rail confine himself exclusively to what he can state out of his own personal experience. and what were his reactions to it. afterwards till the end of the war. into consideration the personal fate of the Defendant NOSSKE.
DR. MANDRY: Dr. Mandry for the defendant Martin Sandberger. responsible for measures of persecution taken against Jews and Communists, at the Sonderkommando la respectively during the period when he was commander of the Security Police and the SD for Estonia. reports, reports on activities and the situation. These reports are a compilation of individual reports not available in the original of several Kommandos subordinate to the Einsatzgruppe. From these general reports the clear and unobjectionable proof for criminal actions of certain persons can be deducted, For this reason the prosecution, taking three affidavits given by my client as a supplement in connection with these reports, drew the conclusion that SANDBERGER is guilty in the sense of the indictment. prosecution.
1) SANDBERGER's assignment in the East was effected upon order of his superior authority and constituted a war assignment in enemy territory.
He was subject to the laws of war like any soldier. It had become impossible for him to shun the carrying out of the orders given to him.
The verdict of the IMT (Page 16514 of the German transcript) takes this into consideration. The reasons on which the sentence is based with regard to this point are as follows:
"During the war a member of the Security Police and SD did not have a free choice of assignments within that organization and the refusal to accept a particular position, especially when serving in occupied territory might have led to serious punishment." committed under the compulsion of the laws of war in enemy territory and under the compulsion of orders and control measures issued by the superiors HIMMLER and HEYDRICH, the Amtschefs STRECKENBACH and MUELLER at the RSHA, as well as by the higher SS and Police leaders for Northern Russia (the SS Obergruppenfuehrer and generals of the Waffen SS PRUETZMANN and JECKELN) and also especially by the chief of the Einsatzgruppe STAHLECKER, SANDBERGER's immediate superior. I shall prove that in carrying out the orders he received STAHLECKER developed a great amount of energy and that JECKELN was just as hard and unpredictable a superior, who would have broken the slightest resistance with all means of the power at his disposal.
II) propaganda declared time and again before the beginning of the Russian campaign and during it that, in keeping with the ideology of bolshevism, the Soviet Union was on principle aggressively inclined, that it represented an acute danger for the life of the German people and the entire Western world, that it had planned an attack on the German people and that that was a matter of life and death for Germany. The Defendant who had been a National Socialist since his 20th year believed in these statements.
when the campaign in the East started: The Soviet Union had not joined the Hague Rules of Land Warfare and the Geneva Convention: neither did they feel bound themselves by other custons of war. For that reason the general international rules of war would not apply for the Germans either in their war against Russia.
III) STAHLECKER with the High Command of the Army Group North my client was destined for an assignment in Estonia. He was attached to the 18th Army. When he arrived at the territory of the assignment given to him, he was told the following: During the time of the occupation of Estonia by Soviet Russia in 1940/41 many Estonian citizens had been killed by Soviet authorities without any justification and without any proceedings; several tens of thousands had been arrested and had been removed from Estonia against their will. The entire property in real estate as well as the greater part of commerce and industry had been expropriated and the former liberty of the Estonian population had been destroyed. for years the republic of Estonia had prohibited communism by a law and that any communistic activities had been liable to serious punishment. He furthermore learned that the government of the Soviet Union had instituted an organization in Estonia, which had orders to carry out sabotage and espionage after the Red Army had withdrawn from Estonia and the country was occupied by German troops. The entering German troops were especially impressed when they learned that before evacuating the city of Derpat in the middle of July the Soviet authorities had shot all political prisoners of the Derpat prison, 250 of them, in the court of the prison. population, numbering approximately 4,500 persons, in general had gone over to the Soviet side during the time of the bolshevist occupation.
They were holding important offices in key-position of the Soviet state and party machine, especially in the secret police, the NKWD. the Jews in Estonia confirmed to the defendant all that he had been told at the beginning of the campaign in the East by the Fuehrer order and by the motivation for that order given him by his superiors. Especially in Estonia it was more evident than any where else that the Soviet Union had violated international law, the national laws of Estonia and the laws of humanity in general.
IV) of assignment seemed necessary for the protection of the territory assigned to that Kommando. Upon request of the Army High Command and upon order of chief of the Einsatzgruppen STAHLECKER its foremost task during the first weeks was to attach itself with Teilkommandos to the fighting troops and mostly to take care of tasks of the intelligence. In addition to that the field of activities of the Sonderkommando included the prevention of sabotage and espionage, which was carried out especially by Jews and communists. had never been active in the service of the police. He therefore had no experience in this field and personally was not especially eager to do that kind of work. His former activities in the SD never included andy police work, but during his membership in the SD he was occupied with making reports about German spheres of life. statements about the contencts of those reports, to which I refer herewith. perience of my client were in the field of political intelligence and in exploiting that for politics and administration, I will prove in detail that the authorities of the Wehrmacht as well as the official authorities of the now German civil administration and the Estonian authorities of the re-instituted sovereign administration claimed a great deal of the time of my client for their purposes and tasks.
He received especially trained, and indepently working specialists for the special departments IV and V, i.e. the Secret State Police and the Criminal Police. They were given special independence in their work. SANDBERGER's activity in connection with them was limited to inspecting their work. Teilkommandos were given full independence and responsibility of their own. The superior authorities, especially the chief of the Einsatzgruppen STAHLECKER had ordered that expressly. My client was anxious to respect at all times this responsibility and independence of his subordinates.
V) arrests and trasfers to camps and in a number of special cases in executions. In accordance with the above-mentioned orders of the chief of the Einsatzgruppen, the leaders of the Teilkommandos were responsible for the decisions in each individual case, and later on, after everything was centralized in Reval, the leaders of the departments State and Criminal Police were responsible.
While the fighting in Estonia was still in progress my client's own proper activity in this sphere consisted mainly of drawing up regulations in the frame work of the existing orders on the special jurisdiction in the Barbarossa territory according to the followingprinciples?
a) Individual statement of guilt and legal hearing: into the actual facts and statement of the guilt and without the accused having been given the opportunity to defend himself.
b). Problem of collectivity.
c). Executions were only permissible if the person concerned had been convicted of and had confessed to have perpetrated sabotage or espionage or if during the years 1940/41 of the Russian occupation he had committed crimes against the life of any Esthonian citizen.
d). The execution of all measures against the population and connected with the Security Police was effected by the Esthonian police and under the control of a member of the Sonderkommando, In doing so any harshness not necessary for the purpose of the measure should be evaded in its execution.
VI) in 1941, this did not happen under the responsibility of my client, but under the exclusive responsibility of STAHLECKER.
In order to be able to report as executed STAHLECKER's order, to free Estonia of the Jews immediately, however, without personally having to order the executions of Jews, finally my client in November 1941 had all remaining Jews in Esthonia brought from the internment camp at Revel to a camp near Pleskau.
Pleskau is situated outside Esthonia on Russian territory, but at that tine it belonged into the office district of my client. of 1942 in Pleskau, does hot come under the responsibility of my client, because it had been personally ordered by the Higher SSand Police Leader Jeckeln, who was the competent legal magistrate at the same time, pad to the execution of which a subordinate of my client had been forced, without my client having been present or having been informed of its execution. my client under the pressure of the orders given, but he had then retarded far beyond the time given already for the execution of the Jews. admissible according to principles of international law, analogous to the internationally approved measure of interning enemy aliens. not take actively part in the extermination of Judaism. As to the criminal responsibility concerning the internment of the Jews as caused by my client, it has to be considered that Sandberger as a National Socialist official had sworn an oath of allegiance to Adolf Hitler and to his superiors as appointed by him. Furthermore, he felt bound to his military duty of obedience and he had to decide either to contribute to the ordered extermination of the Jews or on his own initiative to alter and to interpret the measures ordered which at least for the time being saved the Jews from immediate death. There was no other possibility for my client in this terrible state of coercion. In this connection I shall extensively enter on the problem whether or not an open refusal to obey orders end the consequences this would entail could be expected.
the Einsatzgruppen in general and, with certain exceptions, in his Kommando, But there was no possibility for him to prevent these events, for they had been ordered by his superiors, If he would have taken any stand against these orders of his superiors and measures to prevent their execution, the consequences would have been that his superiors would have ordered his death, without anything having been altered in the events. in the East, respectively the Security Police and. the SD, were so Mechanical, that if one leader was lost, automatically a replacement took his place, who then had to see that the order was being immediately executed. My client was of the opinion that his successor would have executed these orders without any reservations. several tines the disapproval of his superiors in the Security Police, which I will prove.
As to point No. 3 of the indictment (membership in criminal organizations) I will show, that according to the IMT Verdict the prerequisites for sentencing my client are not given. Though Sandberger was with the SD after 1 September 1939, first of all he was only active in Department I of the RSHA. When later on in 1941 my client joined the Osteinsatz, he was ordered to do so, and it was not possible for him to get out. The same applies for his assignment in Offices III and VI of the RSHA. client I shall bring evidence by submitting documents, witnesses and statements of the defendant himself, whom I intend to call to the witness box.
THE PRESIDENT: counsel for the Defendant Seibert.
DR. KLINERT: Deputy for Dr. Gawlik for Seibert. the case against the Defendant Seibert will be based on the legal principles laid down already by Tribunal II in its judgment in the Milch case and also by t he Supreme Court in the Yamashita Case. plained by me in my Opening Statement for the Defendant Naumann: 1. Did the Defendant Seibert personally take part in executions? 2. Were these carried out under his direction or under his orders? 3. Did he have any knowledge of the executions before they were carried out? 4. If so, did he have the power or the opportunity to prevent them or to stop them? 5. If this is also the case, did he fail to act and did he in this manner become a particeps criminis and accessory to the act? ad 1.) Seibert did not kill any of the persons mentioned, in the Documents presented against him. While he belonged to Einsatzgruppe D he never served in an Einsatz- or Sonderkommando, which alone had to carry out the executions. But just as little did he supervise the executions or participate in them in any similar manner. Such tasks were never assigned to Seibert in his capacity as Deputy to the Chief of the Einsatzgruppe. This is already impossible for the simple reason, that he never was Ohlendorfs Deputy. task it was not to carry out executions. Therefore he also never received orders for the carrying out of such measures, Nor was his field of work connectedin any way with such tasks. Seibert had been assigned to the Staff of the Einsatzgruppe only as Chief III (Leiter III).
In this capacity he had to make the reports. In all essential points this was the same kind of work that Seibert had to deal with, when he was in Amt III of the Reich Security Main Office in Berlin; this was also the reason, why he was assigned to the Einsatzgruppe. This task occupied Seibert's whole time, which is easily understandable in view of the enormous size of the area of the Einsatzgruppe. wise had nothing to do with the executions he is charged with. These tasks included especially liaison with the Army. Owing to this activity Seibert, acting for Ohlendorf, signed the reports to the High Command of the 11th Army, dated 9 October 1941 and 16 April 1941, which have been submitted by the Prosecution as Documents NOKW-629 and 628, Exhibits 159 and 160. It cannot be understood, how the Prosecution wants to deduct from the text of these Documents Seibert's responsibility for the measures mentioned in the documents. Ad 2.) orders for the carrying out of these executions. Nor did he ever transmit any orders to the Einsatz- and Sonderkommandos under his command for the carrying out of these executions. He could not do this for the simple reason, that Seibert was not a Chief of the Einsatzgruppe D, who was invested, with the power of command; moreover, he himself never received such orders. I have already emphasized, that Seibert was merely specialist III in the Staff and entrusted with the writing of reports. Seibert had been assigned to the Einsatzgruppe only for this purpose. This follows from the mere fact, that, as I shall prove, Seibert never had anything to do with the executive, either before or after, not even as regards information. satzgruppe D. To this extent the statement of the Prosecution is incorrect, as I shall demonstrate in detail in my Case in Chief. As far as any doubts on that point might be possible on the strength of the documents submitted by the Prosecution, I shall clarify in my Case in Chief, that Seibert never was deputy of the Chief of Einsatzgruppe D and especially never commanded Einsatzgruppe D in Ohlendorf's absence.
gruppe neither by Ohlendorf nor by any other superior agency nor had he ever been entrusted in practice with the functions of such a position. Seibert could not hold such a position for the simple reason, that he was not the senior Chief with the Einsatzgruppe. In Ohlendorf's absence the Einsatzgruppe was led by the individualChiefs of Kommendos for their areas. Ad 3.) dommandos under Einsatzgruppe D carried out executions. However, this knowledge is not in itself sufficient to establish Seibert's criminal responsibility. To this extent I refer to my argument in my Opening Statement for Haumann. previous knowledge of the executions he is charged, with. establish criminal responsibility. The Prosecution moreover had to prove that Ad 4.) the carrying out of these orders and to stop them, and Ad 5.)
Already according to the Prosecution's own statement these conditions do not exist. D Seibert had neither the power nor the opportunity to prevent the the executions carried out by the Einsatz- and Sonderkommandos under Einsatzgruppe D. Not even the Prosecution has asserted this and I therefore believe that the Prosecution will so far agree with me.
In any case the Prosecution had to show what the Defendant Seibert could do and would have had to do to prevent the carrying out of the executions. The Prosecution has offered nothing to that effect.
Einsatzgruppe D was under the Defendant Ohlendorf's command. The execution orders, in virtue of which the Einsatz- and Sonderkommandos acted, were based on orders of Hitler, which were transmitted by Himmler and Heydrich and the execution of which was supervised by these persons.
The Defendant Seibert had a *---*er rank than the Defendant Ohlendorf and was subordinate to the latter Sonderkommandos under him, which were partly commanded by men with a higher military rank than Seibert's.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will now he in recess for fifteen minutes.
At the request of Sandberger's counsel the Defendant Sandberger will be excused from attendance in Court for the rest of the day.
(A recess was taken.)
Court No. II-A, Case No. 9.
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
THE PRESIDENT: Counsel for the Defendant Steimle.
DR. LUMMERT (ATTORNEY FOR THE DEFENDANT BLUME): Your Honor, I would like to be permitted to ask the Tribunal whether it would be possible for the Defendant Blume to be excused from the session tomorrow also, because I have to prepare his defense with him.
THE PRESIDENT: The Defendant Blume will be excused from attendance from court tomorrow in accordance with request by his counsel.
DR. LEIS (ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANTS STEIMLE AND KLINGELHOEFER): Your Honors, I would like to inform you that I have received the opening statement for Steimle yesterday. Perhaps I can continue with the opening statement for Klingelhoefer. trial to establish the actual facts and to examine their connection with the individual defendant. The Defense will also have to examine factors not contained in the evidence of the Prosecution which are nevertheless of great, if not of decisive importance. There would be no difficulty in dealing with this case if one could assume from the beginning that everything contained in the action reports presented here, was done on the strength of the defendants own decision. One can hardly deny that such an opinion would be incorrect. The question arises therefore, what was the cause for the defendants' cooperation in the Einsatzgruppen, the Sonderkommandos and the Einsatzkommandos. The answer to those questions will necessarily constitute a considerable part in the work of the Defense. It will become evident that the defendants were not the instigators, but the executive organs, subject to the inexorable law of a command, not issued by some individual, but deriving from the highest state authority. May I refer in this connection to the statements which I have made already in my opening speech for the defendant STEIMLE. The case of the defendant KLINGELHOEFER is to be judged from the same point of view. He was a member of an Einsatz Court No. II-A, Case No. 9.gruppe without having the possibility to decide freely whether he ever wanted to become a member or whether he wanted to remain one.
His own attitude with regard to this membership was of no importance, he had to fill out the place where he was told to stand. as a starting point when examining how he behaved in this situation into which he had been forced. logical order, first a member of the Sonderkommando 7b, deputy chief of the Vorkommando Moskau, furthermore, leader of a smaller Vorkommando and finally member of the Gruppenstab of the Einsatzgruppe B. From about the middle of the year 1941 until December 1943 he was active in the Einsatz in the East. In the course of my argumentation I will first attempt to explain the actual positions held by the defendant within the Einsatzgruppe B, which Kommando he had led and which were his tasks in connection with that. is concerned, I shall explain that he was assigned to that Kommando on account of his command of the Russian language. The defendant was born in Moscow, the son of German parents, and spent the first fifteen years of his life in that city. This factor was the only reason, why, in 1935, he was taken into the SD. The description of his activites with the SD-sector Kassel will explain the nature of his activities for the period prior to his assignment to the Sonderkommando 7b. It will, however, also show the contents and goals of his field of activities, during the Einsatz Russia, and which in fact, did not change regardless of the positions he held. It does not seem to be surprising that a man who had a command of Russian and had gone to school in Russia, was especially suited for taking over the evaluation of the captured documents for the purposes of the intelligence service. no time charged with the independent command of the "Vordommando Moscow", Court No. II-A, Case No. 9.It will be seen that for a short time only he was formally reported as the deputy commander of that Kommando.
This was caused by the interval elapsing between the date, when the former head of the "Vorkommando Moscow" was recalled, namely Defendant SIX, and the date when his successor, SS-Obersturmbannfuehrer KOERTING arrived. The actual command over "Vorkommando Moscow" for this interval was taken over by the head of Einsatzgruppe B, NEBE, whose offices were located in the same building in Smolensk anyway. I shall produce evidence for the clarification of these organizational circumstances by submitting an affidavit by the Defendant, which was taken down by the interrogator of the Prosecution, Wartenberg, on 17 September 1947. the independent command of the Defendant and which were his duties there. In the course of this it will become clear that the "Vorkommando Moscow" was dissolved about the end of September 1941 and that KLINGELHOEFER was entrusted with the command over a newly formed unit, the socalled "Vorkommando Gruppenstab". The latter was to secure archives for the purpose of the intelligence service in case Moscow was taken, following directly behind the advancing German troops. In order to realize this intention, the "Vorkommando Gruppenstab" was called to Shatsk, where the Army High Command for this sector of the front was stationed. The Kommando remained there inactive until its dissolution in December 1941, as it was out of the question to take Moscow. of Einsatzgruppe B did not effect any changes in the type and purpose of his field of activity. The Prosecution did not produce any action reports for this period which extends to the end of 1943. In the witness stand, the Defendant will, however, give account of his sphere of activities during that time. It will be seen, that although he was incorporated into the organization of Einsatzgruppe B, he was one of those people who had to apply himself to the requirement of the intelligence service on the strength of his special knowledge of the Court No. II-A, Case No. 9.conditions in Russia.
It goes without saying that he was also serving as an interpreter during his entire term of duty in Russia. In spite of these facts, KLINGELHOEFER took part in two executions. The circumstances leading up to and the part he himself played in these events require detailed explanations by himself in the witness stand. Prosecution and Defense will have to screen them very carefully for their real probative value as far as it concerns the Defendant. For it is obvious that owing to the nature of these reports which covered a wide area and were a summary of a multitude of individual reports, errors occurred. They are not alone due to human inadequacy, but can and probably did originate from the generous tendencies of the reporting officers themselves. I know myself to be in concord with the Tribunal, that the Defendant shall only be charged with such acts, in which he actually participated in person and exercised decisive influence.
THE PRESIDENT: Counsel for the Defendant Strauch.
DR. GICK (ATTORNEY FOR THE DEFENDANT STRAUCH): Your Honors, in order to facilitate a better understanding of my defense for defendant STRAUCH, it is necessary to make the following definitions which are of fundamental significance: created in order to protect the territorial gains of the Armies advancing in the East. the Army units.
Consequently, it follows that: 1.) The Einsatzgruppen and Einsatzkommandos were directly subordinated Groups and the Einsatzkommandos under the commanders of the Armies. 2.) Einsatzgruppen and Einsatzkommandos received their orders regarding Court No. II-A, Case No. 9.
3.) Einsatzgruppen and Einsatzkommandos existed only in areas under They were replaced by:
1.) The chief commanders (Befehlshaber) of the Security Police
2.) the commandants (kommandeure) of the Security Police and agencies of the Civil Administration. They had nothing to do with army units. They were agencies of the civil administration system which had been instituted in the East and which were headed by Reichcommissioners and higher ranking officers of the SS and Police for "Ostland". chief commanders lay within the civil administrative sphere. Their activities were exactly the same as those of the corresponding administrative authorities and police offices in the Reich, for example the observation and enforcement of laws and ordinances issued in the respective area under civil administration, such as the collection of political news, the prosecution of criminal offenses etc. structure consisting of six different sections. with the Einsatzkommandos. They operated, as described above, in the advanced army areas. Entirely different persons were used there as leaders who were with their units at the front. was similar. Only in so far did a certain connection of personnel Court No. II-A, Case No. 9.*---*st here, as the chief commanders of the Sipo and SD combined their positions with those of the chiefs of the Einsatzgruppen through a personal union.
But as far as their work was concerned, they had nothing to do with each other, a fact which becomes clear through the following example: the chief-commander of the Sipo and SD Ostland had his headquarters in Riga, that is in the area of the civil administration, although his headquarters as Chief of Einsatzgruppe A was in Krasnowardeisk, that is directly within the Army area. hearing of witnesses and the presentation of documents. Einsatzkommando 2 of Einsatzgruppe A. I shall establish proof that defendant STRAUCH came to Latvia and WhiteRuthenia on March 22, 1942, that is at a time during which these territories already were under civil administration. Einsatzkommando 2, as, in fact, he was not. 1941 in the area around Leningrad. It seems that at that time this was Sturmbannfuehrer PLOETZ. Einsatzkommando 2 merely had a school in Riga for training purposes of the kommando. Their teaching staff comprised one leading and five subaltern officers who instructed one to two Latvian companies. Both, teaching staff and trainees, were exclusively under the command of the Chief of Einsatzkommando 2. Latvia, only for a few days. However, as I shall prove later he was transferred to White-Ruthenia as commandant of the Sipo and SD. Einsatzkommando 2 is erroneous. activities for which Einsatzkommando 2 must be blamed.
Court No. II-A, Case No. 9.
fact that Strauch for the period in which he is charged with the responsibility for the incidents as defined in the indictment, cannot even be considered the responsible commander of the Security Police and the SD. Although in the indictment STRAUCH is mentioned on November 4, 1941 as Commander of the Security Police and the SD; he only arrived in Latvia on November 10, 1941, and assumed his duties only from that date on.
Approximately one week after this date, however, i.e. around November 18, 1941, he became incapacitated due to a complicated fracture of his arm. He was replaced by a deputy commandant, a certain Dr. LANGE, who from this point on conducted all affairs entirely independently and without any possibility of interference from the side of STRAUCH, - and who remained in this position until he was formally appointed commander. chief commander of the Sipo and SD. appointed commandant of the Sipo and SD in White-Ruthenia in the meantime. had the same independent position as commander there as Dr. LANGE in Latvia. over the command in White-Ruthenia. He arrived in Minsk on March 22, 1942. Before that he never had been in White Ruthenia. independent and responsible one and is therefore not comparable with a mere substitution during an absence, STRAUCH cannot be made responsible for the events which occurred during the regime of his deputies, not considering the fact that these deputies were never in charge of the Einsatzkommando 2.
Court No. II-A, Case No. 9.
and presentation of documents. mentioned in the documents as lying within the area of the commandant of Sipo and SD of White Ruthenia, actually were not situated in that area. Consequently, a connection of defendant STRAUCH with the events that took place in these localities, cannot be considered. Kube-letter of July 31, 1942, submitted by the prosecution - Document 2829, Exhibit 111 - and through hearing of witnesses and presentation of documents prove this letter to be objectively incorrect.
THE PRESIDENT: Counsel for Defendant Fendler.
DR. LEHMANN (ATTORNEY FOR THE DEFENDANT FENDLER): May it please the Tribunal, in the case of the defendant FENDLER the prosecution has referred in all to six of the documents which it introduced into the proceedings. From these documents may be seen, according to the statements of the prosecution, that FENDLER belonged to Sonderkommando 4 b as an officer and during his membership in this Kommando he learned unofficially that executions had been carried out. According to the statements of the prosecution, such executions were carried out by Sonderkommando 4b at places where FENDLER was stationed at that time with this Sonderkommando. a member of the SS and also of the SD and thus considers as proven his membership in an organization declared to be criminal by the International Military Tribunal. guilt under counts 1, 2 and 3 of the indictment. course of the introduction of its evidence that during his membership in the SD the defendant FENDLER performed only duties connected with intelligence and information. Thus, for instance, during the time when Court No. II-A, Case No. 9.he belonged to the SD before the Eastern campaign commenced in 1941 he worked in various offices of the SD, dealing with the protection of industrial plants.