with partisan reconnaissance and the combatting of partisan troops in collaboration with the army, counter intelligence against espionage and sabotage, searching for parachutists, and the reconnaissance by agents of the region towards Petersburg. vocally the chain-of-command relationship of the Einsatzgruppe to the Wehrmacht and to the Chief of the Security Police. ment of the Defense. We shall refer to it later.
c) The joint statement of the Defense will also deal with the problem of how far the measures taken by the Einsatzgruppe A in the course of their military duties can be thought justified from the point of view of international law in view of Russia's behavior.
d) The occurrences, with which JOST was charged in the indictment under I S and T, were not initiated by units of the Einsatzgruppe A. submitted by the Prosecution in the course of this proceeding.
e) Apart from his appointment as Chief of Einsatzgruppe A, JOST also was Commander-in-Chief of the Security Police and the SD Ostland in the Reich Kommissariat Ostland. In this capacity, his activities were restricted by HEYDRICH, since his duties chiefly concerned the organizational structure of the offices of the commander-in-chief within the sphere of the Reich Kommissariat Ostland and within the framework of the civil administration, and because matters of an executive nature and those dealing with the Einsatzgruppe were to be excluded.
The problem of executive orders became acute when JOST at the end of April 1942 received instructions by HEUDRICH to the effect that all Jews with the exception of the age groups from 16 to 32 should be subjected to "special treatment". In this connection, it is necessary that the relationship between JOST and HEUDRICH is clearly outlined. After having been active since 1934 in the SD for seven years, JOST left the Reich Security Main Office at the end of August 1941, after having had most serious disagreements of a professional, political, and personal nature with HEYDRICH. From the beginning JOST tried with every means at his disposal to make HEYDRICH revoke his appointment as Chief of Einsatzgruppe A. Up to then, HEYDRICH had been considerate of JOST's attitude by not having issued executive orders to him. the above mentioned order or taking the consequences of insubordination, JOST decided not to relay this order but to have it rescinded, and to make the attempt to talk to HEYDRICH and see that this order would be annulled. At the same time, JOST again handed in his resignation. them act more in line with his way of thinking, and by this saved the lives of approximately 40,000 Jews. view with regard to the shooting of Jews against SS Obergruppenfuehrer JECKELN, with special emphasis on the fact that his men could not be expected to carry out such orders. novardeisk command to the effect that the inmates of the insane asylum in Krasnovardeisk be liquidated since the asylum was needed for billets. of freeing Ostland from Jews, and thereby contributed toward saving these people.
During Jost's command from March until August 1942, no executions were carried out upon his order or with his sanction.
g) This attitude that JOST displayed merits emphasis even more because he is as such not one of the most robust of men, and besides because of illness he never was in possession of his full strength and natural resistance, either physically nor psychologically. He suffered and still suffers from thyroid disease, from disturbances of the vegetative nervous system, and from an artrosis deformans of the spine. This is the reason for his frequent disability, and especially after Easter 1942, he was 1 me and confined to bed for 12 days. more than he could possibly have been expected to do. was phrased in the judgment of the IMT as the question of whether or not a choice corresponding to a code of morality was possible at all. (Chapter 5 at the end). The American Military Tribunal II in their judgment against Erhard MILCH said the following on page 96 of its opinion: "It was never our intention, and it has never been suggested by us, that he (MILCH) should have chosen any course of action which could have culminated in the loss of his life." And this was the great danger in JOST's case.
h) With this attitude that JOST exhibited it was inevitable that he was taken to task for it by the people then in power. After JOST's efforts towards being recalled from his post as Chief of Einsatzgruppe A were finally successful in August 1942, HIMMLER, at the beginning of March 1944, caused him to be inducted as Unterscharfuehrer into the Waffen-SS, without regard to age, health or previous training. HIMMLER wanted to get him out of the way.
2a) JOST's duties at the SD after 1 September 1939 as Chief of the Office VI, SD Ausland, at the Reich Security Main Office, consisted in getting information from foreign countries for the respective competent Reich authorities. Office VI never had anything directly to do with either the persecution and liquidation of the Jews, atrocities and murders in concentration camps, excesses in the Administration of occupied territories, the execution of the forced-labor program, nor with ill-treatment and murders of prisoners of war.
b) JOST's membership in the SS was forcibly dependent upon his job in the SD. He was not an SS-Fuehrer in the main office. He was on the payroll of the Police as Brigadier General (Generalmajor).
DR. GAWLIK: Dr. Gawlik for the Defendant Naumann. defendant Naumann who is represented here by me, are very severe. thoroughly the facts and their juridical implications. evidence submitted by the prosecution, it becomes already apparent that this evidence is not sufficient to establish Naumann's criminal responsibility for the actions with which he has been charged.
The incorrectness of the prosecution's assertions already arises in part out of the submitted indictment. I shall make further corrections in my submission of evidence. Naumann's character which is different from the interpretation as presented by the prosecution in the Opening Statement and throughout its submission of evidence. beginning of its activities in Russia. Until the end of November 1941 the leader of Einsatzgruppe B was the then commanding SS Gruppenfuehrer Nebe, chief of Amt V of RSHA. already were at the Einsat and Special commandos, because they already had been issued in June 1941 at the beginning of the war against Russia.
whatsoever for all executions which occurred before his taking command of Einsatzgruppe B. This concerns the following documents submitted by the Prosecution:
NO-2934, Exh. 78, Vol. II C, P. 52 NO-2844, Exh.
61, Vol. II B, P. 44 NO-3156, Exh.
60, Vol. II B, P. 15 NO-3160, Exh.
65, Vol. II B, P. 48 NO-3403, Exh.
63, Vol. II B, P. 39 reports (Ereignisberichte) which originated between July and October 1941. But the same is also true of documents NO-2825, Exh.
59, Vol. II B, P. 10 and NO-2656, Exh.
39, Vol. II A, P. 45.
The latter document contains a situation report (Lagerbericht) of 25 November 1941, in which the period of the report is specifically mentioned as 1 to 31 October 1941. In the other document we find that various executions which occurred on different days in October were mentioned in an operational situation report on events dated 14 November 1941. the executions mentioned in the operational situation reports of 19 and 22 December 1941 (Document NO-2824, Exh. 62, Vol. II B, P. 31 and Document NO-2833, Exh. 114, Vol. III B, P. 17). I shall prove that the executions mentioned in these operational situation reports have been performed by the Einsatz- and Special Commandos at a time when Naumann was not yet in command of Einsatzgruppe B. This Einsatzgruppe was then still under the command of the then SSGruppenfuehrer Nebe. The operational situation reports have been compiled by Amt IV, Al of the RSHA in Berlin and, consequently, bear the date of the day when they were drafted and compiled in Berlin. They were compiled on the basis of written reports which were transmitted to Berlin by the individual Einsatz- and Sonderkommandos through the Einsatzgruppe.
The transmission of these written reports from the locations in the heart of Russia to Berlin took several weeks, particularly in view of the great transportation difficulties. This also explains why the operational situation report of 22 December 1941 (Doc. NO-2833, Exh. 114) relates events of 18 and 21 November 1941. The executions mentioned in the operational situation report of 19 November 1941 (Doc. NO-2824, Exh. 62) must, therefore, refer to an even earlier date. can thus not be the responsibility of the defendant Naumann for the simple reason that they date from a time when he was not the Commanding Officer of Einsetzgruppe B.
By submitting Document NO-2830, Exh. 72, Vol. II C, Page 23, the Prosecution wants to prove that Naumann was Commanding Officer of Einsatzgruppe B as early as 12 November 1941. This document constitutes an operational situation report of the same day which does not contain reports of Einsatzgruppe B, which, however, names the defendant Naumann as Commanding Officer of Einsatzgruppe B in the beginning under the list of location and lines of communication. In this connection I point once more to the fact that these operational situation reports were compiled at the RSHA (Reich Main Security Office) in Berlin where also the decisions concerning the assignment of personnel were made and where also the latest reports of the assignment of personnel were known. On 12 November 1941 it was known at the RSHA (Reich Main Security Office) that Naumann was assigned as Commanding Officer of Einsatzgruppe B.
But at that time Naumann had not yet assumed duty. At that period he even was not yet in Russia. deduced for the executions carried out in November 1941 in the area of Einsatzgruppe B.During the time of Naumann's activity as Chief of Einsatzgruppe B we have, therefore, only the operational situation report of 21 April 1942, which has been submitted by the Prosecution as document NO3276, Exh.
66, and which contains data on executions in the period from 6 to 30 March 1942. for the executions mentioned there. I shall base my argument on the legal principles laid down already by Tribunal II in its judgment in the Milch Case and also by the Supreme Court in the Yamashita Case. the following questions can be answered in the affirmative beyond any reasonable doubt:
1. Did the defendant Naumann personally take part in executions?
2. Were these executions carried out under his direction or under his command?
3. Had he any knowledge of the executions before they were carried out?
4. If so, did he have the power or the opportunity to prevent them or stop them?
5. If this is the case, did he fail to act, and did he, in this way, become particeps criminis and accessory to the crime?
I shall prove: As to 1 1. The defendant Naumann personally did not take part in any executions. He himself did not kill any of the persons named in Document No-3276, Exh. 66, Vol. II B, p. 66. 2. The defendant Naumann did not give any instructions or orders for the carrying out of these executions either. Nor did he pass on any orders to the Einsatz- and Sonderkommandos under his command for the carrying out of these executions. The orders given by Hitler for these measures were already in the possession of the Einsatz- and Sonder kommandos when Neumann took over.
These orders had been transmitted to the Einsatz-and Sonderkommandos by Naumann's predecessor, the then SS-Gruppenfuehrer Nebe. As to the legal significance of these orders I shall give detailed explanations in my Closing plea. 3. It is not contested that it was known to the defendant Naumann when he assumed duty as Chief of the Einsatzgruppe B, that the Einsatz- and Sonderkommandos under his command had been given orders for the carrying out of executions. Neumann's criminal responsibility. This has already been decided by Military Tribunal II in the trial against Milch and by the Supreme Court in the Yamashita Case. opportunity to prevent the carrying out of these orders and to stop them, and have failed to do so. the opportunity to prevent the carrying out of the orders given by Hitler and passed on by Himmler and Heydrich, which were in the hands of the Einsatz- and Sonderkommandos. Naumann would not have failed to prevent the carrying out of the execution orders if he had had only a vestige of power to do so. This is proved by his conduct when he was Chief of the Security Police and of the SD in Holland. If Neumann were the type of person as described by the Prosecution, Neumann would have rendered himself guilty of some sort of war crimes or crimes against humanity also in Holland. However, the opposite is the case. The defendant Neumann endeavored in Holland to lighten the burden of occupation whenever he had a chance to do so. He took steps to have Dutch hostages released, to have a number of Dutchmen discharged from concentration camps where they had been put for suspected acts of sabotage against the German occupying power; he saw to it that the Dutchmen confined in prisons for political reasons were provided with sufficient food so that their distress was relieved.
All this Naumann did though he was not competent to do so, and though he exceeded his competence by these actions and acted contrary to existing orders. execution orders issued by his predecessor to the Einsatz- and Sonderdommandos, if he had had the power to do so. But to do so was outside Naumann's sphere of power - for these were orders of Hitler, Himmler and Heydrich - three persons - who concentrated all power in Germany in their hands and ruthlessly saw to it that the orders issued by them were carried out.
I shall prove that Naumann's activity during his service in Russia. did by no means consist of carrying into effect Himmler's and Frank's ideas in their speeches cited by the Prosecution, on the extermination of inferior races, Naumann was, first of all, a soldier - and his main activity as Chief of an Einsatzgruppe consisted in the safeguarding of the zone of communications in the East against the numerous raids by Partisans. I shall prove in my argument, that this activity claimed his entire strength, so that he was in no position to supervise the work of the Einsatz- and Sonderkommandos in the carrying out of the execution orders given by Hitler, Himmler and Heydrich. This explains also why Naumann never took part in any execution.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Gawlik, while you are here we want to call your attention to a motion made by Dr. Schwarz asking that the order in the presentation of his case he delayed because of the fact that he was not engaged as counsel until September 17th. His request does not seem to be - Oh, I did not have my key up - shall I repeat what I said: Yes, you may wonder what this has to do with you but you will see in a minute. Dr. Schwarz, who represents, Jost, the defendant who precedes your client in the order in which they are seated in the box has asked.
that he be allowed to present his case in a later order because of the fact that he was only engaged as counsel on September 17th. He would appreciate therefore, if you would present your case immediately following the case of Ohlendorf, so that Dr. Schwarz will have, let us say, approximately thirty days from the time that he was appointed for the presentation of his case, so if it is agreeable with you when Ohlendorf's case is finished, you will proceed with Neumann's?
DR. GAWLIK: Very well.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you very much.
DR. SCHWARZ: Will you pardon me, Your Honors, may I ask the Tribunal in order to have more time to prepare the defense of Jost that you excuse him from being present in the Courtroom?
THE PRESIDENT: From this moment you would like to have him excused, from this moment?
DR. SCHWARZ: Certainly.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. In order that the defendant Jost may be available to his counsel he will be excused from, attendance on this proceeding for the rest of the day and for tomorrow al so?
DR. SCHWARZ: I would like to ask that he do so.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, the request is granted. Will the Marshal escort the defendant Jost from the Courtroom?
(The defendant Jost is escorted from the Courtroom).
DR. SURHOLT: Your Honor, the prosecution -
THE PRESIDENT: Might you indicate your name and the client you represent for the purposes of the record?
DR. SURHOLT: Attorney Surholt for the Defendant Dr. Rasch. The Prosecution charges the defendant Dr. Otto Rasch with
I. Crimes against Humanity
II. War Crimes
III. Membership in Criminal Organizations (SS, SD and Gestapo). The defendant pleaded "not guilty" in the arraignment of the Tribunal. To motivate this and to contest the indictment, the Defense will submit the following:
1. The Einsatzgruppen were established in the early summer of 1941 in accordance with such principles as are generally recognized as admissible from the view point of international law in the event of war. The forces selected for this assignment received a special but purely military training. The instructions given to them in view of the tasks with which they were to be charged shortly in the course of the assignment pertained solely to a security of the "military zone in the rear". This security was to be attained by rendering harmless saboteurs, by fighting partisans, and in general by fighting all such elements as, according to general war experience, endanger the safety of the fighting troops in areas already occupied by them. Any form of training or even an indication for an assignment of such a nature as the Prosecution is now quoting under the name of Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes was not given, neither could it be surmised. Thus the defendant Dr. Rasch had no reason to reject the command over Einsatzgruppe C with which he was charged.
2. Accordingly, the assignment of the Gruppen, or at any rate that of Gruppe C headed by Rasch, was motivated by military necessity. The orders he passed on to the subordinate Kommandos were based on adequate prerequisites. Executions were only to be carried out if the actual facts of the crime were established, they had thus to be limited to cases involving persons who had participated in murders, looting acts of sabotage, etc.
3. Things changed only when new orders came out to the effect that in the area to be made safe by the Einsatzgruppe the Jews including women and children, were to be annihilated. The defendant Dr. Rasch can no longer recall the exact date of this order. It may have been in August, but also in September 1941. The order was transmitted to Rasch by SS-Obergruppenfuehrer Jeckeln. This order seemed so incredible to Rasch that he immediately left for Berlin to obtain a direct explanation. The first evening he got as far as Cracow from where he reported to SS-Gruppenfuehrer Heydrich by telephone to consult him in this matter. The latter confirmed the contents of the order as binding pointing out explicity that it came from the Fuehrer himself and was to be carried through under all circumstances. he received to the units under his command, although he personally not only disagreed with these orders, but rejected them. Although he was a high SS-leader, yet he had no possibility directly to refuse compliance with that order without exposing his own person to immediate grave danger. Like a number of other high SS-leaders before him, he would first have been sent to a KZ and then to one of the so-called "lost battalions" (Verlorener Haufen), whose members were assigned to especially dangerous tasks and thus systematically annihilated. It was moreover evident from the situation that a refusal would not have prevented or even hindered the execution of the order. Therefore, without refusing to comply with the order as such, he attempted to obtain release from his command on grounds which appeared to have no bearing on the matter. Consequently, he was relieved of his function and sent on leave in October on his own request because of his health and divergencies in opinion with Reich Commissioner, Gauleiter Koch. duties as higher SS and Police-leader in France and Northern Italy. IN view of his experiences, Rasch gave ill health as a reason, in order to be excused from further duties.
He looked around for a civilian job; at first he intended to return to the legal profession but then changed over into industry by joining the Continental Oel A.G. He remained with that firm to the end of the war.
4. The Defense is going to prove the facts stated up to the present partly from documents presented by the Prosecution, partly through witnesses, and particularly through putting the defendant into the witness stand in his own case. intends to show that the defendant Rasch obstructed hindered the aims and measures of the Party on several other occasions as well. In that way he opposed the Party in their endeavors to interfere in the normal communal administration, consciously risking and losing his position as Lord Mayor of Wittenberg. He further saved political and also racial persecutees from the concentration camp and even from death, without being prompted by any but purely humane motives. In that he even went as far as to use his rank for giving orders to subordinate agencies, to which he was not authorized in the course of duty. Evidence to that effect will be given through witnesses and the submission of defense documents.
5. With regard to the legal position, the Defense is fully aware that, according to Article II 4b of the Control Council Law No. 10, the fact that an action was committed under orders does not exempt a person from responsibility for a crime and can, at most, be taken into consideration as a mitigating circumstance. It is, however, the opinion of the Defense that the written law is always subordinate to the recognized laws of nature. No man can be denied the right to defend himself in a state of necessity. It will be the task of the Defense to elaborate on this idea in detail, at the conclusion of the hearing of the evidence.
6. Rasch was a member of the SS and the SD - not, however, of the Gestapo (Secret State Police). In that respect, however, he denies having had the intent necessary for his conviction in accordance with the rules laid down by the verdict of the IMT.
May I make some explanation? The preparation of the defense of Dr. Rasch, owing to the sickness of my client, during the decisive days of the last week -
THE PRESIDENT: Slowly.
DR. SURHOLT: On the other hand, however, in particular, during the decisive days of the last week for the reason that I was sick myself, and also my right hand was badly burned -- owing to that, I have not proceeded very far in preparing my case as yet, and, in particular, I have not yet discussed the case of the prosecution in detail with the defendant. I therefore ask, that the case of Rasch be not heard yet. I ask, therefore, that the case of Rasch be put back for the moment, as I am not quite ready yet. Quite apart from the fact that the Tribunal has not yet decided as regards my motion to separate the case of my client.
THE PRESIDENT: I don't quite understand what you mean by your request that the case of Otto Rasch not be taken up for the moment, because there is no possibility that his case will be called for the moment. We have first all the opening statements. Then we will have Ohlendorf's defense. Then there will be Naumann's defense, and then the Joost defense, and Rasch won't be reached for some few days.
DR. SURHOLT: Yes, I repeat, I cannot see how long it will take. I only say since my predecessors are not present, I will not have sufficient time.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, at the present moment, you are not threatened with any immediate presentation of your client. Let's wait and see what develops. As the situation at present presents itself, I do not see where you have any problem at all. If in the matter of three of four days you seem to feel that you are being pressed unduly for time, then your motion to the Tribunal and we will rule upon it.
DR. SURHOLT: Thank you very much.
THE PRESIDENT: In view of the lateness of the hour, perhaps we won't take up another opening statement, but will now recess until 1:45.
(A recess was taken until 1345 hours.)
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the courtroom will please take their seats.
MR. WALTON: May it please the Tribunal, the Prosecution was informed by the Tribunal that it desired to hear the testimony of Mr. Rolf Wartenberg concerning affidavits and related matters, and that it make him available for cross-examination by the Defense. If the Tribunal desires to hear him at the present time, he is available.
THE PRESIDENT: I think it might be well to call him now so that his intended trip to the States will not be retarded.
MR. WALTON: Mr. Wartenberg is just outside the door.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes; you may call him to the witness stand.
DR. GAWLIK (Counsel for defendants Naumann and Seibert): As a result of the fact that the witness Wartenberg is being called now, we are in a somewhat difficult position. We only fouud out about this today, and we had no possibility--at least I had no possibility--to discuss this with my client. Therefore, I should like to have the Tribunal grant us the possibility of having the witness called again tomorrow. If I have the opportunity to speak to my client tonight about this, we should call him tomorrow. I am of the opinion that during the examination of one or the other defendants it might be necessary to call the witness Wartenberg again. I also would like the Tribunal to grant us that.
THE PRESIDENT: Were you here this morning, Dr. Gawlik, when I made my announcement concerning this witness?
DR. GAWLIK: Yes, I heard it this morning.
THE PRESIDENT: Now, I would like to suggest to Defense counsel that when an announcement is made by the Tribunal, if any of counsel have any observations to make, that they be made then, When I said this morning that Mr. Wartenberg would be called this afternoon you did not inform the Tribunal that you were not prepared to question him this afternoon.
No defense counsel suggested in any way that they were not entirely pleased with that arrangement. Now, we have brought Mr. Wartenberg in, and now you tell me that you are not ready to proceed.
DR. GAWLIK: Your Honor, I think there must be a misunderstanding. When the announcement was made this morning I was not here. I only heard about it from my colleagues this morning.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, then, you did not answer my question correctly when I just asked you if you were here this morning.
DR. GAWLIK: I beg your pardon, I had to adjust my channels. They were not adjusted to the German language.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, then, let me repeat, for your benefit, Dr. Gawlik, what the situation is. Mr. Wartenberg is an interrogator, and you know that he took many--if not all--of the statements of the defendants. He is soon returning to the United States and must be leaving Nurnberg during the next two or three days. He may not be called, as you suggested a moment ago, intermittently, as defendants take the witness stand. He must be interrogated now--or not at all. I do not mean this very moment, but very quickly. now, whatever you want to put to him, we will see about having him appear a little bit later in the day, or possibly tomorrow morning. But you must absolutely dismiss from your mind the thought that you can call him later on, because he will not be here. He will not be in Europe.
DR. GAWLIK: I understand, Your Honor; and I do not know whether that would be required at all. I only wanted to reserve this right.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Walton, would it be convenient for Mr. Wartenberg to be here the first thing tomorrow morning, just so that Dr. Gawlik will have an opportunity to talk with his client?
MR. WALTON: Your Honor, I have not conferred with Mr. Wartenberg on that particular point, but if the Tribunal will ask him I am sure that it can be settled now.
THE PRESIDENT: I will ask you, Mr. Wartenberg: Could you appear here tomorrow morning?
MR. WARTENBERG: Yes, sir.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Very well then, Dr. Gawlik. I hope you have the right channel working. Mr. Wartenberg will be here tomorrow morning at nine-thirty, available to all Defense counsel for examination on the subject matter which I have mentioned. So we won't need you this afternoon. I am sorry to have brought you in, Mr. Wartenberg.
(Witness leaves the stand.)
DR. DURCHHOLZ (Counsel for defendant Erwin Schulz): of the Prosecution, and to the reading of documents by the Prosecution may I make the following statement. Erwin Schulz replied by pleading "not guilty" to the question of the Tribunal, whether he pleads guilty or not guilty to the grave charge preferred against him, this reply sprang from his innermost conviction. This reply was by no means a matter of course which was expected with a certain irony; especially it wasnot intended as two empty words implying a cowardly flight from any responsibility to the world, whenever such responsibility might be established. The defendant rather wanted to express to the Tribunal competent to judge his actions that he can, in his conscience, take the responsibility for what he has done in his life. He has consciously declared that he feels absolutely guiltless in face of the monstrous charges brought against him.
May I demonstrate in my argument on what this feeling is based? right and justice while pleading before this Tribunal. I shall endeavor to assist in clarifying all acts and in establishing all facts which will be of importance for the defendant's course of action.
I may assure the Tribunal that I shall represent the interests of the defendant without passion and in all frankness in order to establish the truth. Crimes Against Humanity, in which he is supposed to have participated in some form defined in Control Council Law No. 10, in actions representing murder, extermination, imprisonment, and other inhumane acts, committed on political, racial and religious grounds, actions which are said to be part of a systematic program of genocide, having as its aim the destruction of foreign nations and ethnic groups by murderous extermination. having by the same actions committed war crimes, acts which are said to have been committed in violation of the laws and customs of war, such as murder, ill-treatment of prisoners of war and of the civilian population of countries and territories under the belligerent occupation or otherwise controlled by Germany, as well as wanton destruction not justified by military necessity.
Under Count III of the Indictment the Defendant is charged: 1.) with having been, after 1 September 1939, a member of the Schutzstaffeln of the NSDAP--(SS) and 2.) with having been a member of Amt IV of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt (Gestapo); that is, of organizations declared criminal by the International Military Tribunal and by paragraph 1 d of Article II of Control Council Law No. 10, but only under definite conditions, which have, however, also been proved beyound doubt. fulfilled by asserting under paragraph 8, letters Q to W of the Indictment, that the defendant, asleader of Einsatzkommando V within the Einstazgruppe C, murdered a considerable number of human beings, in the period from 22 June 1941 to 24 January 1942.
In this I must start from the assumption that "murder" is to be understood as the concept--at all times common to all civilized peoples and always remaining the same--of killing a human being for joy in killing, avarice, or for other low motives, treacherously, cruelly, or perhaps by methods which constitute a public danger.