You know that to be a fact, don't you?
A Yes, Your Honor. And I believe I can say with a clear conscience that I consider myself one of them.
Q Yes. Very well. If you considered yourself a hypersensitive individual, you could visualize that there would be others not so hypersensitive, couldn't you?
Q So that you could have said to Ohlendorf, "Now, I am a very hypersensitive person, perhaps you can find someone who doesn't feel such a revulsion in performing this very disagreeable task", there would have been nothing wrong about that, would there? I did not think it would be any good if I asked; I was fully convinced that the answer would be in the negative, and that was the very reason why I never made this request. My personal attitude towards these matters, I believe Herr Ohlendorf knew at the time and knows now, and if there had been a possibility for him, I am convinced that I would not even have had to ask, and he would have acted in that manner on his own, but since he never opened that chain of thought, I did not make this special request to him.
PRESIDENT: You may proceed, Dr. Mayer. BY DR. MAYER:
Q Dr. Braune, why, in your opinion, did Hitler give this order?
A I can only repeat what we were told at the time; it was that it was a fight for our existence in the East, that these measures were necessary in order to secure the rear of the army in the occupied territory, and that communist functionaries and Eastern Jews were the decisive bearers of this fight which the Bolshevists fought, which was outside all rules.
BY THE PRESIDENT: decisive bearers of Bolshevism? the assignment, the comrades who had been out there for months, confirmed this to me. This was also confirmed to me in the reports which I read, also from the spheres from other Einsatzgruppen, and I must say quite frankly I made my own experience in the assignment, and in the Crimea there were particularly those. Detailed investigations were made during the months while we were in one place and we made them conscientiously and very carefully. In the Crimea about five or five and a half percent of the entire population were Jews. Our investigations showed that the leadership of the communist party and also the state administration of the authonomic republic on the average was held by Eastern Jews, from 50 to 80 or 90 percent. And according to this they shared in the fight which was being carried out in the rear of the German troops, destruction battalions and elimination battalions, sabotage troops, agents and information service, partisan warfare, and many other things. We realized again and again that apart from communist functionaries who purposefully had been left behind and were assigned to a decisive degree, these Jews in the Crimea took a decisive part in this. and played the active part which you have indicated, then they were definitely enemies and dangerous enemies of the Reich, weren't they?
A Yes, Your Honor. I could not say anything different. dispose of them, didn't you? enemies of the Reich, but they were decisive bearers of a fight which I believe no army can take.
Q Yes. Well then, it was entirely in order to fight this enemy in every way possible, wasn't it? personally saw there in practice, made me realize a little more why Hitler had given this order, but my inner rejection and my conviction that it was not quite right was not changed in a decisive manner because of this. I agree that to a certain degree I could understand this because of the situation, but my basic opinion was not changed on account of this. were defending your country, and you were in the field, and you were fighting the enemy, and you say that you knew that the Jews were your most implacable foe, that they carried the banner of Bolshevism, that they assisted in partisan activity, that they were saboteurs, that they formed private destruction battalions, well, with all that you should certainly have no hesitancy in fighting them, should you?
A Your Honor, the order went further. The order was not only given for the individual leader of a battalion or some individual saboteur, but Adolf Hitler drew the conclusion that it was necessary that all the Jew be exterminated. the Jews should be eliminated? humane point of view entirely and also that I considered it wrong.
felt that you had to obey the order?
A Yes, Your Honor. In that situation in which I was during these events in the East I believed that I had to carry out the order of the supreme commander, and I saw no possibility of evading it.
PRESIDENT: Proceed, Dr. Mayer, please.
Q (By Dr. Mayer) Did you know that Hitler had given these orders already before the Eastern campaign? already announced in Pretzsch but I can imagine that it was issued already at the time, because Adolf Hitler, as supreme commander, realized fully in what form this fighting in the East would be taking place.
Q In your opinion, how could Hitler know this beforehand? example, ever since the Bolshevist revolution, was conducted by the Bolshevists as a considerable part of its warfare. Already in peace time the Bolshevist Army and the people had been prepared to conduct such a manner of fighting. I would like to say it was the highest maxim that one held the opinion that in a war, men and women, children and old men have to help to fight behind the front and at the front and to fight the enemy wherever they can. I believe that documents have been submitted or will be submitted which will confirm this opinion, as said by Lenin or at least by Stalin and I believe we also have documents which show that after the end of the war Bolshevist leader announced with great pride that they had conducted the fighting in that manner. I have read documents where they emphasized proudly that it was like this in the rear territory of the enemy that no soldier knew whether the farmer's wife or the farmer, who was working in the field, did not carry a weapon under their clothes. BY THE PRESIDENT: children were aiding in this partisan warfare and were assisting the cause of the enemy? this. as war is fought?
who opposed us with weapons or with poison or with intelligence service or by any other means, by dynamite in the most horrible manner, I would lie if I would say here that I felt any great hesitancy about this, but I have pointed out before that the order went further. It wasn't said kill the Jews or the Jewesses when you catch him or her in the act, but this was not mentioned in the order, but the order said to kill all of them without proving any actual individual guilt, and that is the tremendousness and the great difficulty in this task. cause? Did you believe that all Jews helped that cause? the possibility that there were people who were not interested in politics. Bolshevist cause? majority of the Jews? Communist actually meant in the rear of the Army. In fact, he wasn't a human being who simply kept his own opinion to himself, but according to the Communist education and upbringing, the natural result of his conviction was to take part actively in this fight wherever he could.
Q Well, that's what I said. You believe that the vast majority of the Jews supported Bolshevism and therefore you believed it was proper to fight the vast majority of the Jews? agree with the order which said, without examination, from the very start, every Jew should be killed.
before you executed the individual?
A I don't know whether I should actually formulate it like that, Your Honor, whether one could have solved the question to a certain degree by interning them, but here again, I can only repeat what I said yesterday, what the real motives were to cause this man to give the order and why he considered it necessary, that is beyond me. ing Bolshevism and therefore were opposing your forces could you have conducted an investigation before you executed particular group to find out if these individuals had actually supported the Bolshevist cause.
A Your Honor, I don't know whether this would have been possible practically and technically, but the difficulty of our situation arises from the fact that we did not have that right but our order was that they were to be shot and that they were considered to be a danger from the start and therefore we could not have used our own judgment to make any such examination or investigation. summary investigation before you executed any particular group? excellent interrogating officials and criminal officials, and if these had examined the cases for weeks, for months, down to the last detail, if I had called witnesses and all that, certainly the impression one would have gotten was that not a small percentage of these Jews were active in some form or other in resisting in the rear territory of the German Army, but that was the very reason why we were told right from the start this order is to be carried out without examinations. any way, so therefore an investigation would not have added anything to your conclusion? results of examinations. Only actual practice could have shown this because the question always remains open for one, how many people could one prove to be guilty and how many people could one not prove to be guilty.
One cannot make a general statement here, Your Honor.
Q Well, you conducted some investigations didn't you when you executed a saboteur; you had someone who would indicate that the saboteur had actually committed sabotage, assuming that he was not a Jew? Jews were active as saboteurs, there also investigations were carried out. active in the Communist cause?
A Your Honor, I cannot talk of percentages here. I tried to express it as clearly as possible. knew it; when I asked you that question, you said there was no doubt about your belief, but you know it as a fact that the vast majority of Jews were active with the Communist Party. Is that true or not true?
A Your Honor, I don't think I said that the vast majority was active, but that the vast majority was in favor of Bolshevism and I also said that our experience was there that the convinced Communists who remained in the rear territory of the enemy-- most of the people always escaped-they remained and were active in some way, but we never definitely insisted that the great majority actually was active.
Q Very well. If you conclude that the vast majority were in favor of Bolshevism, it necessarily follows that only a small minority did not approve of Bolshevism, is that right? 30%.
Q Well, all right. Let's say 30%. 30% did not approve of Bolshevism. It would not be unreasonable to come to that conclusion?
A Not approved, Your Honor? I would doubt that, but, as I said before, surely there were a number of people who never cared one way or another.
approve of Bolshevism among the Jews and those who did not. You say the vast majority did, would you say that is 70%?
Q Well, let it remain the majority. The majority then did approve of Bolshevism?
A There is something between pro and anti. Somebody can be convinced and fanatical and prepared to fight to the bitter end and somebody can approve, but say, "I don't want to have anything to do with fighting," and somebody can be indifferent. Somebody can doubt and not be sure and somebody can conscientiously oppose it.
Q Well, let's group them together just for the purposes of discussion . The vast majority approved. Let us say that is 60%., That is not quite as strong as vast majority, but it is a majority; 60% that leaves 40% who either did not approve or were indifferent. That would be a just way of dividing it, wouldn't it? to follow an example.
Q Yes,well, you say the vast majority. Let's say that is 60%, to be on the safe side, did actually approve of Bolshevism, then 40%, we are speaking of Jews all the time, either did not approve or either were absolutely indifferent either one way or the other. Now, when it came to executing a group, if you had excluded 40% from the execution order, would that have caused any great difficulty?
A Your Honor, there was not choice for me. I was in a war under martial law. I had an order from the supreme commander to shoot all Jews for the reasons given to us and it was not possible for me except to obey this order in war under martial law.
Q Well, let's suppose that you had a way of determining that these 40% were not active Communists, couldn't you have found a way not to execute them?
A. No, your Honor, I must say that this possibility did not exist. Take four or five thousand people......if two or three thousand of these were not Communists and the others constituted a danger........this is an estimate, I cannot look into the people's minds; and with a handful of the Crimea the Army Commander-in-Chief told me before Christmas already this must be carried out, I do not see a possibility of doing such a thing.
Q. Did you ever excuse one Jew just because there may have been some doubt as to whether he was a participant in Communism or not?
A. No, your Honor, because the order excluded such a thing. I could not decide on this any more since the Supreme Commander had given this order. This was beyond my rights.
Q. Don't you think that it would have helped your inner feelings if you had said, "Now, I am going to excuse one Jew just so I will know in my heart that I did not carry out this inhumane order to its utmost. Did that ever occur to you? I am going to excuse one Jew, one miserable Jew, so that then I can have on my conscience that I at least, in some way, I tried not to carry out this inhumane order to its merciless extent." Did that ever occur to you?
A. Your Honor, I do not know whether this would have changed my situation and my distress; but I agree I had been given this task, and I carried it out as I considered it to be my duty and as I thought I could not evade it in a military manner.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Mayer, I am sorry I interrupted your examination.
Will you please continue? BY DR. MAYER:
Q. Witness, even now.......are you still convinced that Hitler's order was only given in order to secure the territory, and not to exterminate people?
A. To the best of my knowledge and belief I can answer, even now, only yes. In my Einsatz it was never mentioned that the Jews were to be exterminated, that a plan existed to exterminate all the Jews; but I remember very well that during that time in particular it was discussed very often that the aim existed that the Jews be given a national home......the name, Madagascar, even came down to the Crimea, and here in Nuernberg in the prison I learned the confirmation that a plan for a national home was seriously considered at the time. Added to it is the fact for me that I heard here that the order by Adolf Hitler should be a final solution, that is, to kill all Jews, according to what has been determined in the IMT, was given in April and May 1942; in any case, the affidavit by Wisliszeny, a co-worker of Eichmann, I read here.......according to which the order which he thinks he has seen in writing bears the date of April or May 1942. That is what I remember, your Honor, and therefore I am convinced, even now, that this order given in May or June 1941 was not connected with this so-called final solution which was found one year later.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Mayer, I am a little bit confused about these dates. Once he said May 1942, then he says June 1941. Would you try to get a more......
THE WITNESS: May I explain this, your Honor, May and June the order by Adolf Hitler must have been made out.
THE PRESIDENT: Please give us the year, now, that is what we are talking about.
There is a confusion about the years. Now, May and June 1941. Is that right?
THE WITNESS: I beg your pardon, your Honor, I forgot to mention the year. In May or June 1941 the order by Adolf Hitler came out that the Jews be shot at the Eastern front. The reason given was that they constituted a great danger to the security of the Rear Army, that this measure was necessary in order to secure the Rear Army territory. What I heard and read here is the statement by Wisliszeny, during the IMT..........as far as I remember he stated under oath that the order for the final solution was given one year later, April-May 1942.
THE PRESIDENT: That is very clear. Thank you very much. BY DR. MAYER:
Q. DR. Braune, when did you go to Kommando 11-b in Odessa?
A. On 2 or 3 November, I think, I am sure of this..... I travelled to Odessa from Nikolajew where the Einsatzgruppe was stationed and where I stayed the first ten or fourteen days in order to gather information and to look after Minister Lie.
Q. After arriving in Odessa, were you put in a charge of the Kommando immediately?
A. No. I remained there for one week first, where my predecessor was in charge of the Kommando. I think I took over the Kommando on 10 November 1941.
DR. KOESSL: The defendant Schulz, your Honor.....
THE PRESIDENT: The defendant Schulz will be excused for a few minutes. BY DR. MAYER:
Q. Witness, in your statement of 8 July 1947.....it is in Document Book III-D, Document 4234, page 54 of the English, page 94 of the German.
.....please explain.......that you were given your assignment in October 1941. The Prosecution draws the conclusion from this you were Kommando Chief of 11-b already in October 1941. Is that correct?
A. That I received the order in October 1941 is right. The conclusion from this that I had taken over already in October, is wrong. If I had Known that this statement would be used against me in a trial I would have attached importance to its clarification; and at the place where it says, I quote:
"I travelled to Odessa"........I would have added the date there, but Mr. Wartenberg told me at the time that I would be examined as a witness, and not as a defendant, and therefore I did not attach very much importance to this minor matter.
Q. When did you move to the Crimea?
A. That must have been after 20 November.
Q. In Odessa, did you carry out the execution of the Jews living there?
A. No. In Odessa I did not carry out the execution of Jews. The Rumanian Army, an officer of the Commander of Odessa, approached me and asked that this be carried out. But already before I took the Kommando.........I meant to say it already before I came to Odessa.......the Rumanians had the sovereign right in that territory, and also in Odessa, and the Einsatzgruppe had given directions that the transactions be concluded and that they should prepare to move on. I pointed out to this Rumanian officer that they had Rumanian sovereign rights, and therefore rejected his request that the execution of Jews should be carried out in Odessa by me.
Q. Were the Rumanians satisfied with that attitude?
A. No; the following day, or the day after the next, another officer approached me......I believe it was a major or a lieutenant colonel. He repeated this request, and also pointed out, or at least maintained, that it was the task of the Einsatzkommando, and they knew that, and threatened to make a complaint through diplomatic channels or through his war commander to Berlin. I still rejected, in spite of this, but in order to calm him down I told him that I shall turn to my superior officer in Nikolajew although there was no doubt in my mind that the decision would be. I did that. Herr Ohlendorf gave me the instructions which I had expected.........to continue to refuse; and I informed the Rumanians of this, as the decision of my superior office, and then nothing further happened.
Q. How many Jews were concerned in this case?
A. Odessa was a very large city. I believe in peacetime there were between five hundred or six hundred thousand inhabitants there. I think I can remember that about one hundred thousand Jews lived in Odessa in peacetime. Of course, a great number had escaped from there, but tens of thousands must still have been there.
Q. When did you arrive in the Crimea?
A. That must have been in the lest days of November. I arrived with only a few vehicles, as the first one there. I remember exactly. It was terrible weather. And the greater number of my vehicles had actually gotten stuck in the mud.
Q. When did the last vehicles of your detachment arrive?
A. I think that took two weeks.
Q After your arrival in the Grimea, where were you stationed? Einsatzgruppe Chief, Oberfuehrer Ohlendorf. Simferopol? the first days of November, that is, for weeks, a sub-kommando of the Kommando 10-a was in Simferopol. by Herr Ohlendorf until after a few weeks -- I don't know the exact date any longer -- they were sent back to Kommando 10-a. arrival? first of all saw to it that the vehicles which had gotten stuck were partly repaired; some of them were pulled away; and thus the kommando was gathered together again. Oberfuehrer Ohlendorf? There it was fixed where the sub-kommandos were to be assigned and and which territory was to fall within my competency. such sub-kommandos? Karasubasar, Aluschta and Eupatoria. Apart from the sub-kommando which already existed in Simferopol. when did you make them move? before the first few days of December.
other kommandos or sub-kommandos there, or had they already been active there? explain it -- on the basis of documents I am convinced that Kommando 10-b during their advance to Feodosia were active in Karasubasar as well, but I am not sure of this. since when other kommandos or sub-kommandos had been active before yours in your later Einsatz territory. Please look at Document Book I, page 34 of the German, page 30 of the English text. It is Document No. No-4134, Exhibit 7. Apart from that, Document Book II_D, page 11 of the German and page 12 of the English, Document No. NO_3159, Exhibit 85. Also Document Book II_C, page 59-60 of the German, and page 54 of the English. It is Document No. NO_2832, Exhibit No. 79. And finally, Document Book II_A, page 108 of the German, page 101 of the English. It is Document No. 2822, Exhibit 50. Please explain to me, on the basis of these documents, from when onwards your kommando was assigned in the Crimea, and was active there, and in how far other kommands had previously been active - namely, the kommandos 10-a, 10-b and 11-a, in your area of your later competency. NO-4134, Exhibit 7.
DR. MAYER: Your Honor, this is page 30 of the English text.
A (by the witness, continuing) This is page 4 of the original, your Honor. There it says, under Einsatzkommando 11-a, on 28 October, Majhtschka, with Advance Kommando, south of Perekop.... your Honor, may I show on the map where Perekop is?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, please do.
WITNESS: (continuing) Perekop is here. Therefore sub-kommando was to the south, while advancing south.
Q (By Dr. Mayer) On that occasion I would like to ask you to show the Tribunal the situation of Karasubasar, Aluschtka and Eupatoria, which will clarify the entire situation.
A (by the witness) It is not simply on this small scale, but Simferopol, it would be about here, at the lower end or the letter "M". Karasubasar was to the east Of it. Half way to Feodosia, which was about here. Karasubasar was about here, on letter "A". Eupatoria was west of Simferopol, on the coast about here; and Aluschta was on the other side of the Jala Mountains, on the south coast, about here, southeast of Simferopol.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
WITNESS (continuing): If I may repeat, it is shown here that on the 28th October a sub-kommando of 11-a was already south of Perekop.
I now refer to the next Volume, that is, II_D, page 11 of the German text -
DR. MAYER: Page 12 of the English, y ur Honor.
WITNESS: NO_3159. Exhibit 85. It is a Situation Report of the report of events, No. 129, Of 5 November, with the locations as can be shown on page 1. There on the top it says: "Location and Communications. As of 5 November." And here on page 4 of the original it can be seen that. "Sonderkommando 10-a, Taganrog, Advance Kommando to the north of Simferopol. "That is this sub-kommandoo your Honor, which in my opinion from the beginning of November had already been active in Simferopol. It can also be shown, 11-a, also an Advanced Kommandoo already in Simferopol... Therefore one sub-kommando of 11-a must have been active in Simferopol before a sub-kommand of 10-a. It can also be seen that 11-b, on 5 November, was still in Odessa, a time when I was not yet in charge of the kommado.
DR. MAKER: Page 54 of the English, your Honor) A (witness continuing) Document 2832, Exhibit 79.
Here on page 3 of the original it can he seen, "Sonderkommando 10-b, Feodosia, Advance Kommando in Kertsch," sub-kommando in Alushta, at the place where later on my sub-kommando went to.
On the next page, Einsatzkommando 11_a, Jalta, sub_kommando before Sevastaopol and Bachtschisaraj and Eupatoria. That is a location where later on one of my sub_kommandos also went to. Here under 11_b, my kommando is listed enroute for the first time as of 19 November. This cannot be quite correct, however, but I explain it to myself like this, your Honor, that I believe that the day when the departure should have taken place originally, I had already reported to the Gruppe that we were going to move; but during the night there was a severe frost, as a surprise, and a great number or cars froze, and cylinders burst etc., so that we had to remain another two or three days, if not more, until we finally were able to depart. That is how I explain to myself that this report came about. It cannot be right because I explain that my kommando, on the 28th of November, for the first time were reported in Simferopol. On 26 November they were reported to be en route.
And the last one, II_a, page 108 of the German-
DR. MAYER: Page 101 of the English text, your Honor, WITNESS (continuing) It is NO_2822, Exhibit 50.
There it says on Page 1 of the original in the Situation Report No. 135, that is the one I just mentioned before, there it is mentioned that on 19 November, 1941 the stations were not changed. Here too in Eupatoria and Alutschka subkommandos of 10b and 11a, my commando, still en route. And finally I have certified excerpts by my defense counsel from the reports of events 138 to 144. Unfortunately, we were not able, your Honor, to get them because these things were only found a few days ago.
DR. MAYER: Your Honor, may I interpolate here? These excerpts from the reports of events of the prosecution, I shall introduce them in my Document Book I. My Document Book I may have been received by the Tribunal already. Document Book II will follow within the next few days.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Mayer, shall we take our recess now? The Tribunal will be in recess fifteen minutes.
(A recess was taken).