THE WITNESS: They were Russian soldiers. On this occasion the Priest and the above woman had hidden among the corpses, and the woman received those bayonet wounds in her throat. I don't believe I am telling an untruth if I mention that my Kommando did not carry out any executions in Dubnow, since no more guilty persons were found, or were denounced by the population.
THE PRESIDENT: Do I understand you to say that this woman told her story about what had happened?
THE PRESIDENT: She had received a bayonet thrust in the throat?
A Yes she had a bayonet wound in the neck. I saw her myself. The cut went through there (indicating side of neck) on the side of the throat.
THE PRESIDENT: It did not effect her speaking ability?
A No, Your Honor, it did not. The people who had participated in this had fled, and the Jewish inhabitants who had remained were not guilty. At Dudnow I had to detail a detachment to another place. There the army command of the 6th Army was located, about the day of the advance from Dubnow, a criminal commissar from the General Government arrived and took over an area as belonging to the General Government. On 13th of July I received the order to proceed to Shitemir. We started from Dubnew about the 14th of July. We were stopped on the way as the Kommando suffered losses during an air attack, or during air attacks. The Russian army had broken through, and a continued advance to Shitemir was not possible. Dr. Rasch, who was in Svier with his staff gave me orders to proceed to Shepetawka, which was about fifty kilome ters south of Svier. Here the forces had to be committed for their own safety exclusively, because parts of cut off Russian forces, were active in the forests around Shepetewka, and they were active continually in small scale attacks. Only on 22 July was I able to continue and my dest ination was Berditschew, which I reached around the 23 July. I was quartered in barracks near the headquarters of Rundstedt's army Group, two detachments were sheltered in barracks, as these were closer to the center of the town.
I remained in Berditschew about four weeks, since the front had become stabilized at Kiev. BY DR. DURCHHOLZ: now I consider it fitting if you now briefly describe the activity of your Einsatzkommando -- what was the mission of your Einsatzkommando altogether?
A The field of activity was very extensive. The job was made more difficult because we arrived at even a more severe iron curtain than exists even today. Everything was new to us, and had no comparison with previous standards. The area, the people, the language, already brought about great difficulties. The measures of the opponent in Lemberg and in Dubnew, the continuous actions of individual fighters, by combat groups, and by individual people armed to the teeth who had been hidden in the woods, who were often and frequently in possission of empty artillery guns and anti- tank guns, communication troops, and sabotage corps, all these made things very very difficult, but the most difficult were the innumeralbe very welltrained and unbelievably well sabotaged communication centers in the rear of our Army areas. These with incredible cleverness interfered with our Army, with the administrative agency of our army, and with the military units used by the Army. Even though I was hardly four weeks in Russia, activity by infiltration of these forces already had assumed a dangerous preparation.
COURT IIA CASE IX could not even be controlled or examined or taken care of. These infiltrated forces had their direct communications to cutoff troop units, and partisan units. Thus for them, they communicated intelligence about the Wehrmacht units, and about their strength. Sabotage acts of Army installations took place day and night continually. Within the stress of prisoners of war who clodded up the roads there were likewise important intelligence men of the other side. Hardly a night passed without people being hidden in the dense forests with communication missions, and these people amounted to a great detail of work and great patience. Added to this was the danger in which each unit found itself. The investigation of the auxiliary toops used by the Army, these Were interpreters, health officers, kitchen personnel; the investigation of these people took up a great amount of time and patience, since training had to be naturally laboriously done by interpreters, and it must be considered here that in this area the amount of denunciation was very great, but even among these people who denounced them, there were agents who had the intentions and also succeeded in their intentions to make everything unsafe and suspicious of each other. Of greatest importance for the Army leaders were the news of intelligence about Russian war efforts, and the Russian ammunition plants, and the armaments, since nothing was known about this. When the Armies first opposed each other, it was only too clearly to be seen that Russia in its war on Finland had, by sacrificing its reputation in world opinion, camouflaged its war potentiality. The first intelligence reports from the Ural Mountains made the Army agencie really, or sit-up. These intelligence activities had to be carried on by nature of the circumstances. Furthermore, the COURT II-A CASE IX Kommandos had to look for their own food, for their own maintenance, for the equipment, the vehicles had to be overhauled, and all of that went with it.
Then the daily reports came in from the population, reports about munition dumps, about agents. Here it was difficult to spot all of these reports. Furthermore, the militia kommandos had to be investigated, for we had found out that here also forces of the Russian Intelligence Service had been infiltrated. Since other organizations were looking, reports had to be received and passed on which concerned this, especially with regard to agriculture, the harvest was ready to be collected, but there were no tractors, no harvesting machines, not even sickles and tines. We stood there completely empty handed, The Security Police also had to bother their heads about this, and had to inform and to mobilize the competent authorities. In addition there were many other details which are not worth mentioning.
Q. Report now what happened after that?
A. After about two weeks' stay in Berditschew, the kommando leaders were ordered to report to Shitemir, where the staff of Dr. Rasch was quartered. Here Dr Rasch informed us that Obergruppenfuehrer Jeckeln had been there, and had reported that the Reich Fuehrer-SS had ordered to take which measures against the Jews. It had been determined without doubt that the Russian side had ordered to have the SS members and Party members shot. As soon as such measures were being taken on the Russian side, they would also have to be taken on our side. All suspected Jews were, therefore, to be shot, Consideration was to be given only where they Were indispensible as workers. Women and children were to be shot also in order not to have any avengers remain. We were horrified, and COURT II-A, CASE IX raised objection, but they were not with a remark that an order which was given had to be obeyed.
I raised the question whether the RSHA was informed of this, and whether it represented the same opinion. Dr. Rasch answered me that was, of course, the case since the Higher-SS and Police Leader Jeckelm had passed on the order of the Reichfuehrer, this order was binding on everybody, regardless. Here for the first time we saw the dictorial power of the Higher-SS and Police Leader.
THE PRESIDENT: What date was that so we may observe the chronology of events?
THE WITNESS: That must have been about the beginning of the August, the first third of August, If I had to give a date I would say between the 10th and 12th of August.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you,
THE WITNESS: It was Certainly not later than that,
THE PRESIDENT: Very well,
THE WITNESS: I myself was firmly convinced at the time that such a development was not done with the agreement of Heydrich or the RSHA, for I never had heard of anything of this kind, nor had experienced it, and, I would like to add here once more, that this opinion had certainly existed in myself, because I had Heard of this order for the first time, since I did not know about the Streckenbach order, due to my absence from Protsch at the time it was given. BY DR. DURCHHOLZ:
Q. What did you do as a result of this order. Please limit yourself to facts only?
A. Having returned to Berditschew, I discussed these incidents with my internalls among my leaders. I had great confidence in them. I could not very well tell them everything which depressed me, since a thoughtless word would have brought about more harm than good, but I thought COURT II-A CASE IX that I could tell from their conduct that they agreed with me.
After the order had been given, and since the work performed by Jews was of a decisive importance, I told them to see to it above all that the Jewish population be used for work exclusively. I gave them a way out in the interest of my own people, as well as in the interest of the victims, which was to give a misleading report. I had misgivings about this order whether such a measure was fitting or not, but I believe that a misleading report might excuse such a motive. In their reports the detachment commanders were to report about as follows: In locality "X" there were three-hundred Jews. Nov only 280 more who are indispensible as laborers. Since many Jews had fled from those villages, one could merely use these, perhaps, who had fled among these which no longer could be used for work, and, thus we were not telling the untruth, as I did not want to have any lies in my reports, and I told these officers that in my opinion, the order which had now been given, could not possibly have the approval of the RSHA, and I started to wonder how to make out these reports. The Einsatzkommando did have signaling equipment, but it could only wire via the Einsatzgruppe itself, This was therefore not possible. I intended to write a letter to Streckenbach, but I also expressed my worry that the route by APO would be too long.
who needed a furlough urgently. I have forgotten the name of therman. He was a reserve soldier in the Waffen-SS. I know that he was a farmer and that he owns a farm in Schleswig-Holstein. He was destribed to no as reliable. Despite the restriction on furloughs he did receive a furlough, and he received the mission to travel by way of Berlin on his furlough and personally deliver ft letter to Streckenbach. In this letter I asked that Streckenbach might recall me to Berlin for any reason whatsoever as I had to report to him about matters which I could only report orally. The official way was not possible. Since he knew me he would be convinced that I would express such a request only for very urgent reasons which I had never expressed before. The men was sent on his furlough with this letter on the following day. I directed my officers to conduct themselves as they had so far, to avoid any brutal measure and to use the harshest measures only if all the requirements were given. But above all the men were to be given so much police work that the variety of their reports would show that they were being urgently used. The reports told me that my officers did understand what I told them. ordering me to report to Berlin. In the meantime I heard by rumors that Obergruppenfuehrer Jeckeln, together with a major group, among whom there was one member of the Security police as far as I knew, had carried out executions of Jews in the entire area. Jeckeln himself at the time was in Stara Constantinovich.
Q. Did Jeckeln belong to your Einsatzgruppe C?
A. No, Obergruppenfuehrer Jeckeln was Higher SS and Police Leader for the area of Army Group South. His power of command had all security and police units under him in that area, insofar as the SS units were not purely Army units. As Higher SS and Police Leader he was the representative of the Reichsfuehrer-SS in his own area. As I was told he had major units of the regular police with him who were exclusively destined to carry out executions of Jews.
This fact is underlined by a report which is to be found in Document Book I, Exhibit 27, Document No. 3257-PS on page 138. That is page 3 of this report. It reads as follows:
"The Jewish population, after the combat actions, has remained unharmed for the moment," Only weeks, sometimes months later a systematic execution of the Jews was undertaken by units of the regular police. This action went from east to west. It was done publicly and by using some Ukrainian militia, often, unfortunately, with the participation of volunteers from the Army.
Q. Did Jeckeln also come into your area?
A. I just wanted to mention this When I received the radio message which ordered me to report to Berlin various detachments of Jeckeln arrived in Berditschew. BY THE PRESIDENT:
Q. Witness, would you say that generally the Jews were quite opposed to the German forces and attempted to interfere with their progress?
A. I don't understand,
Q. Would you say that generally there was a hostility on the part of the Jewish population toward German forces of all kinds?
A. Not in general, no.
Q. Well, then, do you disagree with the prevalent idea of the National Socialist idea that the Jews were enemies to the best interests of the Reich?
A. I must say, it wasnot to be wondered at, your Honor, considering the intolerance of the Germans against Jewry, one could not expect a friendly attitude from the Jews.
Q. Then you would say that generally there was an unfriendly attitude on the part of the Jews toward the Germans generally speaking?
A. I understood the question to say whether I am of the opinion that the opinion of the Jews toward the Germans was not friendly.
Q. Yes.
A. Yes, I believe that that is definitely true.
Q. Yes.
A. And I had expressed it to the effect that this attitude is not to be wondered at.
Q. Yes, and would you say generally that they were hostile to the German forces and where they could attempted to interfere with their progress?
A. I can't say that in general for the Jewish population, but it is true that among the terrorists and saboteurs and functionaries and among the intelligence men and all these forces whom I described before, doubtlessly there was a great number of Russian citizens of the Jewish faith, to express myself quite definitely.
Q. Would you say in this particular area to which this report refers, the one you read from that there was an organized resistance on the part of the Jews toward the German forces?
A. Your Honor, I cannot tell you that, and I ask you not to interpret my statements to the effect that I want to confirm, that I want to state any facts in this document which are not known to me. I only want to point out in this report that here it was not the Security Police who did this by themselves, but that Obergruppenfuehrer Jeckeln with units of the regular police, to which no member of the Security Police belonged, became effective in this area.
Q. Do I understand then that you were not familiar with the local situation in that area referred to in the report from which you just read?
A. No, not to any extent.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. BY DB. DURCHHOLZ:
Q. You were just telling us whether Jeckeln was also active in your area. I think that was also the question of his Honor.
A. When I received the radio message to report to Berlin and that advanced detachment of Jeckeln appeared in Berditschew, an officer whom I questioned told me that Jeckeln was being moved from Stara Constantinovich to Berditschew.
My whole thought was to avoid a meeting between my kommando and his and to be active in other localities in such a manner so as not to disturb his police activities and still to chose localities in which one could not expect any great Jewish actions, Therefore, when I prepared my trip to Berlin on the 23rd of August, I gave the order to move my staff to Skwira immediately where one of my detachments had already set up headquarters. Skwira is about ninety kilometers east of Berditschew. The detachments were to be used in the same manner further east. This order was carried out on the 26th of August. As I heard later from a detachment commander the three detachments were in Swenigorodka, Tarashja, and the third was near Stavishe on a collective farm.
DR. DURCHHOLZ: Your Honor, if it is your intention to have a recess. I would like to propose that it be now because the succeeding part should not be interrupted.
THE PRESIDENT: The proposal is received with welcome. The Tribunal will be in recess for fifteen minutes.
(A recess was taken) Court2-a case 9
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session. BY DR. DURCHHOLD (Attorney for the defendant Schulz):
Q. Witness, you tols us at the end of the last session that you succeeded in being called to Berlin in order to see Strenckenbach. Just tell me exactly what happened in Berlin.
A On the 24th of August I left for Berlin. As far as I can recall I arrived there on the 27th of August. I can recall this date rather clearly because the date of my arrical in Berlin was just before the birthday of my wife and so I was able to spend her birthday with her. I was unable to see Streckenbach on that same day.
It may have been on the 28th or 29th of August, I don't remember this quite clearly, but then I reported to Streckenbach in detail, and I told him what order Obergruppenfuehrer Jeckeln had issued through Dr. Rasch, in particular, that women and children were not to be saved. I described to him very much in detail just what effects this would be bound to have and I told him how monstruous the conscience of these people concerned had been. issued it, he told me that such an order would just mean plain murder. In this connection I would like to emphasize that this statement on his part referred to the form of the order, which was passed on by Rasch and which stated as a reason for this measure that women and children should be shot so that no vendetta would arise. I also expressed that at the time of my interrogations at Oberursel. I would like to comment on that again later on. Heydrich about that subject as soon as possible. On that occasion I asked him to submit my request for transfer also in case this order should be maintained.
Several days passed, because Heydrich was not theere. If I am not mistaken he was at Prague at that time. Several days later, Streckenbach asked me to come and see him and he told me on that occasion that Heydrich also had misgivings about the manner in which this order had been issued.
be changed because a Fuehrer ordere demanded that these measures should me maintained as long as the opponent was also using these measures, and as long as they were necessary. I again repeated my request for transfer because I told him that I was not able to carry out such an order, or to announce such an order to my man. He then told me that this had already been done because my transfer had already been requested by another agency, Which described me as not being enough, at the same time. Streckenbach announced me that Obersturmbannfuehrer Meyer had been appointed as my successor and that he would be notified immeduately.
Q You told me that you requested a transfer. On that occasion didn't you have the feeling that you were very selfish and that you were letting your men down?
A Yes, I did have that feeling. When I was traveling from Russia to Berlin, I realized quite clearly that if those orders should be maintained, that I would never be able to agree to it in my inner feeling.
However, I would like to emphasize that my own mental consitution was not the only thing which took me to Berlin.
When I left Russia I simply could not imagine that this order should be valid, I considered it to be a result of the doings of an over fanatical worker. At this time I would like to point out again at that period of time I did not have the least idea of the Fuehrer Order, which had already been announced.
Dr. Rasch had not discussed it with me, either on any occasion. I therefore hoped that I would be able to get a decision in Berlin which would mean liberation to all persons concerned, from the mental burden it had imposed upon all of us. After all, I did not were concerned. I assumed at the time that these happenings in Einsatsgruppe C had occured, who was a great fanatix, and that for this reason Einsatzgruppe C was occupying a social position. When I considered the idea of my transfer, the question arose within me whether my attitude was dishonorable or cowardly before my men a the men of whom I was in charge.
I can assure that my request for my transfer was very hard for me. However, I could not act differently, especially since I had realized quite clearly that it would mean a difference whether I had to carry out an order as s soldier or whether I as an officer in a leading position would issue such an order, I was unable men which I myself refuted throrough;y within myself, orders which I was simply unable to understand, I participated in one single execution of 18 people at Lemberg, and I therefore know that at that time I had to use up all my energy in order to avoid losing my outer appearance, and from this experience I knew what this order meant. However, I would like to emphasize here that my own opinion is not to be any criticism on the actions of anybody else who, from his own inner deep conviction, may have harbored a different opinion and who represents it at this time. I was frequently reproached for my alledged softness. I had to bear this repraoch and I did bear it. ing to his disposition. He just cannot alter his basic constitution. At that time, although O know that I was a man who was fully ready to do his duty, I was unable to raise a strong enough will in order to issue an order which I was unable to give. However, I would also like to point out in this respect that my request of transfer probably would not have been approved if Streckenbach had not heldped me out in a friendly manner and if my transfer had not been requested by another party. Also, the possibility that I could approach Streckenbach, as I was able to do, certainly was only possible to very few people since I, as a commander of the officer candidate school, was subordinated to the Office Chief One, I had a very close official relationship with him.
by way of Streckenbach because you had a particularly close personal relationship with him?
A Yes, only because of that reason. However, that I did not only think of myself is shwon by the fact that I was also successful in being able to have the officers candidate training course sent back of which I was in charge. Although for the Einsatzgruppem this lack of officers candidates meant a severe burden for some time, which they did not let go without objections, in spite of their objections the recall was carried out.
Q How were you able to rescind this reaching training course? circumstances he should see to it that the officer candidates should be taken off. I described to him that these valuables men, if they should remain, under such orders, they would completely deteriorate as officers. However, this was the contrary of what this traning course was trying to achieve, Under such a way of giving orders, these officers wither would have to degenerate mentally or they would become so brutal that they be completely unsuitable as leaders of human beings, Streckenbach agreed with my opinion and he assured me that he would report to Heydrich once more.
Again I had to wait for several days. Then I was notified by him that Heydrich had shown full understanding for the case and that he had also ordered that this training course be interrupted and withdranw at once.
In this way I at least had some partial success.
Q Once you had been in Berlin did you again return to Russia?
A Yes. After all, I had to turn over my detachment to my successor, who was Obersturmbannfuehrer Meyer. In the meantime, he had already been notified to that effect. Approximately on the 12th of September 1941 I left Berlin. I left for Skwira where my detachment had moved in the meantime.
In my affidavit of the 26th of May 1947 in Document Book 1, on pages 134 and 135 of the German text, Exhibit No. 26, Document No. 3644, I have stated that approximately on the 26th of September 1941 my successor arrived at that locality. This date, however, is not correct. The mistake was an by the fact that I did not know any more, Kiev. I told Mr. Wartenberg at that time that the change of my position to Obersturmbannfuehrer Meyer followed immediately in connection with the fall of Kiev. Since, however, I now know the difference from the documents, I can tell them to you with rather certainty. Accordingly, Kiev fell on the 19th of September, so that at the very latest, on the 21st of September, or probably already on the day before, Obersturmbannfuehrer Meyer arrived at my locality and took over the command. My return journey to Berlin followed on the 25th of September. I am also able to determine this date from the documents. From this it becomes evident that Dr. Rasch arrived at Kiev on the 25th of September.
At that time, however, he came from Nowoukrainke, to Skwira, where he was stationed in the school were I was also s taying. He stayed there overnight together with the Chief of Staff. Since it had become very late at that time, and he was unable to move on during the night on account of the strongly mined streets. On that occasion I immediately reported leaving his sphere. On the following morning, on the 25th of September, Dr. Rasch went to trip to Berlin.
Court No. IIA, Case No. 9.
from Russia?
A Yes. Approximately at the same time when I relinquished my command, the members of the training course were also recalled by radio message. Until 1 October 1941 they were to report to Group 1-B at Berlin, at the school there. Right on the spot I was able to convince myself that with the exception of one who was killed in battle and several cases of delay owing to special difficulties, all of them were back in time. In agreement with the Chief of Personnel, they were granted a furlough until the 1 November 1941. use this occasion in order to tell the training course something about your judgment of the war measures taken in the East?
A Yes. Since I had found out that those people partly had to fight the same strong inner conflict, I felt it to be my duty to tell them my opinion quite clearly, with the intention to give them some inner support. I thought that in their faces I saw the mirror of their feelings, that their thoughts did not differ from my own. However, probably all of them could not find the right way in their inner struggle between right, duty and their feelings; they were confronted with a horrible picture of an atrocious war; a constant propaganda began running on them with the eternal motto: "The Jews are trying to exterminate Germany." Finally they began to believe it. They just clenched their teeth and did their duty. Perhaps they did so to test that they were doing their very best in order to pacify their own souls. I assembled the members of the training course in the assembly hall of the officers candidate school, and first talked to them about general matters. With regard to measures caused by the war in the East, I finally concluded with the following words: "I know that part of you with clenched teeth had to fulfill a hard duty which was contrary to their inner feelings. This assignment brought something different to them than they had hoped for and what they had wished, namely that Court No. IIA, Case No. 9.they would be able to prove their worth in combat at the front.
However, I told them I was expecting one thing from them, even if it has been said that these measures were necessary, because the opponent provoked these things, and, even if they acted in a deepest conviction of what they ware doing was right and necessary, each one of them should clearly realize that this was a terrible experience. I told them that I prohibited them to talk about these things. That these things were too serious to serve assa subject of a conversation. However, those who were bragging about the shooting of Jaws, those people I would remove from the training course, because they had character deficiency. People who maintained such an attitude certainly were not fit to be officers. assignment in Russia, I am now coming to several individual questions. In your opinion was there a possibility of launching protest against the orders which were issued by Hitler? which I spent there during my assignment, two phases of development must be observed. First of all we have the Fuehrer Order, which was contained in the so-called Commissar Order, and which was supplemented by the Barbaressa Order, and, secondly, we have the other order which was issued by Jackelm in August. The first possibility of objecting to this order wasat the time of our assignment, and it was too late at that time in my opinion, or of what I don't know -- it would have been unsuccessful because of the fact that the first order, the so-called Commissar Order, after all, existed already actually as a Fuehrer Order as the result of mutual discussion between the OKH and other agencies. Here there would have been the first possibility of raising an objection. If inspite of this, this order had still been issued, thus we had to assume with certainty that the details in particular with regard to the legal aspects should have been conscientiously discussed; for how can the legality be doubted if higher responsible commanding agencies Court No. IIA, Case No. 9.do issue them; and this order did not result from any local situation, but from the very beginning it was considered to be applicable to all territories in the East.
The measures which ware taken, therefore, had to be considered as being necessary for the combat troops, and as being inevitable. This could not have been a political measure alone, because the order was issued by the OKH, the High Command of the Army. Therefore, in this case the objection would have had to be raised already by the Highest Command Agency of the Wehrmacht. The first observations during the campaign in Russia led to recognize very clearly that a very fierce opponent was confronting us who just like we had to fight for existence or his extermination, and accordingly he chose his methods. Also William Henry Chamberlain writes in the "New Leaders" in an article "The Permanent Crisis", that in this connection we have to quote Lenin: "It is necessary to apply every method no matter how mean, howdeceitful, how illegal it may be, in order to serve the Communist Idea." Could we reproach legally our opponent with these measures, with that repudiation of the existing International Law which was so well known to the world, his methods for the extermination and weakening of his arch-enemy? His attitude required other harsh measures considering our self-preservation. That was an opinion which I also had succeeded in obtaining, even against my own inner feelings. Within the framework of the order which was given to me, I did in our behalf, and absolutely saw to it, that the measures which resulted from self-defense, and from the urgent circumstances, which were necessary for the security of troops, and the security of areas they were entitled to, in my opinion, should not exceed the permissible limits. I want to add in this respect that my judgment may have been wrong. If from the Russian side, measures were taken with terrible severity against the civilian population, as well as against German soldiers. I can understand that when these facts became known by the local Wehrmacht agencies in this first phase, when the order was given. There were no objections that these measures were even emphasized to be urgently necessary.
Court No. IIA, Case No. 9.
However, I can not understand it that no objections were raised against the second phase of development by the Wehrmacht commanders. But the responsibility remained with the Wehrmacht Agencies; they were in charge of the executing power; only with their consent could happen what actually had happened. Even silent toleration in such serious cases must be compared with consent. Whether the Wehrmacht commanders with their objections expected to be successful or not, in my opinion, this didn't matter at all for the time being. However, as long as the Wehrmacht did not do anything at all in the way of making objections, any steps from any other side were completely impossible and useless. After all, the question could have been put to them just how can you raise objections to measures against which even the Wehrmacht does not have any objection. However, the failure to object at that time meant consent, and consent was played on equal basis with necessity. Only under these circumstances things could develop as they actually did, especially as without any doubt, for example, Jeckelm had sufficient fanatics at his disposal who instead of impeding the carrying out of these measures would always press to have them carried out; and who were able to do so because no effective obstruction was placed in their path.