defendant is guilty under Counts I and II of the Indictment. organizations SS, SD and Gestapo under the conditions defined by the Judgment of the International Military Tribunal and is, therefore, guilty under Count III of the Indictment.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will be in recess until one forty-five o'clock.
(The Tribunal recessed until 1345 hours.)
(The hearing reconvened at 1345 hours, 9 April 1948)
THE MARSHAL: All persons in the Courtroom will please take their seats. The Tribunal is again in session.
JUDGE DIXON: The defendant Adolf Ott. administrative office of the German workers Front in Lindau. He joined the NSDAP in 1922 and became a member of the SS in 1931. In 1935 he entered the Security Service. except perhaps the meaning he intended to give to the word "execution". In his pre-trial affidavit he said that his kommando carried out 80 to 100 executions. At the trial he stated that, by the word execution, he meant the death of but one person. The context of the affidavit would logically convey a contrary view because, immediately after speaking of the "80 to 100 executions", he says: "I remember one execution which took place in the vicinity of Bryansk", and he then proceeds to describe this execution which involved "corpses". The affidavit also says that the valuables collected from "theseepeople" were sent to Einsatzgruppe B. to the effect that the word "execution" is used in the sense of a multiple killing. However, for the purposes of the ascertainment of guilt or innocence it matters little whether, by "80 to 100 executions", Ott meant the killing of only 80 to 100 people or a multiple of 80 to 100, which multiple, in view of the evidence in this case, would increase the number of the slain to many hundreds at the very least.
Sonderkommando 7b on February 15, 194-2, and, according to his testimony in court, he arrived at the headquarters of the kommando in Bryansk on February 19. He asserted, however, at the trial, that he did not actually take over the leadership of the unit until about the middle of March. It is the contention of the prosecution that Ott testifyingly delayed his chief ship of the kommando until March 15, in order to avoid responsibility for the executions enumerated in Report No. 194:
"In the area of the Einsatzgruppe, during the following were specially treated:
through SK 7b: 82 persons, 19 among then for 27 Jews."
February 19 for the specific purpose of taking over control of Sonderkommando 7b it is not clear why he should have waited until March 15 to assume leadership of the unit. But even if this unexplained delay in the technical assumption of command were a fact, this would not of itself exculpate Ott from responsibility for the operation involved. Under Control council Law No. 10 one may be convicted for taking a "consenting part in the perpetration of crimes" and it would be difficult to maintain that Ott, while actually with the kommando, did not (even though technically not its commanding officer) consent to these executions, declared that the 82 persons enumerated therein were killed between March 6 and March 30.
Thus, if arguendo Ott's authority over the kommando was delayed until March 15, there is still the responsibility on his part for the executions which occured between March 15 and March 30. as to the number killed before March 15 and the number executed after March 15 is academic, because the evidence is conclusive that, during the at least ten-month period that Ott commanded sonderkommando 7b, great numbers of people were killed in violation of international Law. in the individual judgments, to enumerate and discuss all the executions charged against the defendants by the Prosecution if it is once established that the defendant is guilty under Counts I and II of the Indictment. In this respect, Ott himself removed every possible scintilla of doubt when he said:
"I told my sub-kommando-leaders that basis of the Fuehrer-Order."
After this statement in court, he was asked:
"Did I understand you, witness, to say accordance with the Fuehrer-Order?
Is that what you said?
And his answer was:
"Yes, that is correct." shot, even if he did not belong to a partisan or sabotage organization. And he replied:
"Yes. He would have been shot, even one of these organizations."
incontrovertible guilt, more questions were out to him on this subject, so that there could be no possible misunderstanding The further interrogation follows:
"Q. If he had not belonged to an organization he would have been shot anyway?
A. He would have been shot if he had not been Q. .....so that whether he belonged to an or saboteurs; or not, he was bound to be shot because, if he wasn't shot as a be shot under the Fuehrer-order?
That's correct, isn't it?
A. He was shot in accordance with the Fuehrer Order -- yes.
I would like to add..... that, in this particular case to see 'is he a member of an organization or is he not'.Q. And in each case you found out he was a organization?
A. One of these three groups.
Q. Yes, now if you had found out that he was under the Fuehrer-Order, that's right, isn't it?
A. Yes, that is correct.
Q. What was the necessity of the investigation shot?
What; was the reason for wasting all anyway?
A. Interrogations were carried out to find out and their activities.
That was the purpose of the interrogation."
refused to speak:
"Q. Some of them refused to talk?
A. That is so.
Q. They were shot just the same?
A. They had to be shot if they were Jews." of equivocation and error, the defendant was questioned further, and he answered as follows:
"Q. Well, then you did shoot some Jews because they were Jews?
A. I have already said, ..... every Jew Q. How many Jews did you shoot just because they were Jews?
A. I estimate there must have been about 20, at least."
that he shot 20 Jews just because they were Jews conclusively establishes his guilt, and it is unnecessary to consider the other items of accusation advanced by the prosecution. this subject, and that is the undeviating fidelity of the defendant to the virtue of Consistency. consistency, which has always been regarded as a jewel, did not lose any of its sparkle or glean in the hands of Adolf Ott. When asked why he did not release some of the Jews when he had the opportunity to do so, he replied:
"I believe in such matters there is capture or I have to release them all."
One more item in Ott's case is worthy of comment. In his pre-trial affidavit he said:
"In June 1942, without having received ment camp in Orel.
In my opinion people comparatively snail misdeeds.
For this were made by my kommando.
It happened too that people were released.
The in this camp was 120 persons."
in the declaration that it was his opinion that people ought not to be shot right away for comparatively small misdeeds", but his assertion that it "happened too" that is, it even happened, that people were released. the defendant guilty under counts I and II of the Indictment. member of the criminal organizations SS and SD under the conditions defined by the Judgment of the International Military Tribunal and is, therefore, guilty under count III of the Indictment.
JUDGE SPEIGHT: The defendant Woldemar Klingelhoefer. Kassel, served in the Army from June to December 1918 and after the war studied music and voice. He gave concerts throughout Germany and later received a State's Certificate as voice-teacher. In 1935 he became an opera singer. In 1937 he took over Department culture, SD III/c in Kassel. In 1941 he was assigned to Einsatzgruppe B as an interpreter, This Einsatzgruppe, already by November 1941, according to Report No. 133, had killed 45,467 persons. This score was considerably increased later.
evidence at all indicate that Klingelhoefer could be charged with all these executions simply because he belonged to Einsatzgruppe B, which, of course, consisted of several kommandos. The reference to the larger unit is made only because the defendant has told of various transfers within the Einsatzgruppe. He said that he was in Sonderkommando 7b from June 22, 1941 to July 10, 1941, and then entered Vorkommando Moscow. In October he took over an independent command of this unit and held it until he went on leave. On his return to Russia on December 20, 1941 he entered the Group Staff of Einsatzgruppe B where he remained until December 1943. There are scores of reports covering the activity of these various units and it is unnecessary to trace Klingelhoefer in and out of these individual units specifying the exact number of persons killed by the units during the time he was with that particular organization.
Report No. 92 shows that Vorkommando Moscow killed over 100 persons as of September 13, 1941 and Klingelhoefer admits he was in charge of that unit during August and September 1941.
Report No. 108 declares that by September 28, 1941 the Vorkommando Moscow and the Group Staff of Einsatzgruppe B had killed 2,029 persons. Between August 20 and September 28, 1941 the Vorkommando and the Group Staff executed 1,885 people. Klingelhoefer admitted that he was in charge of Vorkommando Moscow during that time. had executed 2,457 persons and, whereas Klingelhoefer can not be charged with the entire number of 572 persons killed between September 28 and October 26, 1941, he can not escape responsibility for some of these killings since in this period he commanded part of Vorkommando Moscow.
he witnessed showing thereby the greatest familiarity with the macabre techniques involved but in his pre-trial affidavit he related how he shot 30 Jews because they had left the Ghetto without permission. He did this, he said, under orders from the chief of the Einsatzgruppe, Nebe, who ordered him "to establish on example". At the trial he gave a different explanation of this episode which, however, establishes even a clearer case of guilt. He said that three women had contacted some partisans and, returning to the town, had talked to the thirty Jews in their homes. This, according to the defendant, made them guilty of partisan action and he had then shot. He, of course, also shot the three women. He, did, however, accord them a special consideration. He had them blindfolded for the execution and then ordered that they be given a separate grave. Einsatzgruppe operation was only that of interpreter. Even if this were true it would not exonerate him from guilt because in locating, evaluating and turning over lists of Communist party functionaries to the executive department of his organization he was aware that the people listed would be executed when found. In this function, therefore, he served as an accessory to the crime.
"Q. I asked you, witness, didn't you know that going to exterminate all these he could?
You either knew it or you didn't know it.
A. Of course, I did."
mere interpreter in the grim business of the Einsatzgruppe. He was an active leader and commander. He knew what the einsatz units were doing to the Jews, "Q. You told us you knew that if he then set free?
A. If he left the ghetto, he violated the Q. So that he was killed anyway?
A. Then he had to be executed, yes."
In his own affidavit the defendant stated:
"While I was assigned by Nebe to the part of the Jews there.
The Jews had Hauptsturnfuehrer Egon Noack.
The interrogation on the witness stand that he was morally opposed to the Fuehrer-Order, it is evident from all the testimony in the case that he went along quite willingly with it. would have been happy for Hitler to win the war even at the expense of its present condition with two million Germans killed, the nation in utter ruins and all of Europe devastated This statement has no bearing, of course, on the question of his guilt under counts I and II, but it is helpful in determining the state of mind as to whether he obeyed the so-called Superior Orders with a full heart or not. defendant accepted the Fuehrer-Order without reservation and that he executed it without truce.
The Tribunal finds the defendant guilty under Counts I and II of the Indictment. of the criminal organizations SS and SD under conditions defined by the Judgment of the International Military Tribunal and is therefore guilty under count III of the Indictment.
JUDGE DIXON: the Wehrmacht from 1934 to 1936. He then joined the SD. to October 2, 1941. During this time, the Sonderkommando was engaged, as all other kommandos of the Einsatzgruppe, in the execution of the Fuehrer Order. The reports show that, during the time that Fendler was with the unit in question, many executions occurred:
Report No. 24 - IIA/31, NO-2938 Report No. 19 - IIC/49, NO-2934 Report No. 111- IIA/44, NO-3155and asserts complete ignorance of them.
In fact, according to his story, he did not learn of the Fuehrer execution order until after he had severed all connections with the Sonderkommando. Department III and that he was concerned only with the gathering of information. Defendant after defendant has asserted that, in doing Department III work, he was utterly ignorant of the functions performed by the other departments, but one cannot help but observe that Department III did not operate within the confines of a high stone wall separating it from the rest of the kommando. An Einsatzkommando in the field usually consisted of from 80 to 100 men and 7 to 10 officers.
Sonderkommando 4b had a staff of 7 officers. Fendler lived, ate and associated with these officers. He was Department III, some other officer was Department IV, and still another officer was Department V or VI, and so on. It is absurd to assume that Fendler could not know what these other officers were doing, especially in view of the fact that Fendler was the second senior officer in the kommando. Fendler, himself, ever conducted an execution, but it is maintained that he was part of an organization committed to an extermination program.
Fendler asserts that Department IV alone conducted the executions and, therefore, within the water-tight compartment of his own Department III, he did not know what was happening in Department IV. between the SD (which is Department III) and the Gestapo (which is Department IV), said:
"One of the principal functions of the local Agency for the local Gestapo units.
In the Police and SD was slightly closer."
executions and that, generally, he did not know what was taking place. Fendler's assertion runs counter to normal every day experience because it is simply incredible that a high-ranking officer in a unit would not know of the principal occupation of that unit. after he had left the kommando and was at Kiev on his way home. He was asked:
"So that you had to travel five hundred kilometers and two days' distance from the is that right?"
And his answer was "yes". the kommando was making out morale reports on the population. He was asked whether, when he learned of the pogrom which had occurred in Tarnopol, where about 600 people were murdered, he included this fact in his report. He replied in the negative. He was asked why he would not include so momentous an event as the murdering of 600 people in the streets in a report which he was compiling on the morale of the population, and he replied he did not have a chance:
"Q. Well, how much time would it take in an SD 600 Jews were murdered, - or you didn't want to report?
How much time would it take to say that?
A. Two seconds.
Q. Well, then, why didn't you have the two seconds to write that?
A. Because I made no report.
Q. Why didn't you make a report?
A. Because I was given the order by the kommando leader to evaluate this material."
leader and stated that, when he acted as an advance kommando leader, he occupied himself only with the obtaining of intelligence files left behind by the Bolshevists. But, in evaluating these reports, it is inevitable that he would need to tell someone what he found. In fact, he did admit that this information usually was "utilized for individual reports". The Army was also informed "in a written form or orally". and thus would not know what the others were doing, the defendant stated that his unit never divided its forces. Thus, one officer would not need to do the job of others. However, since this would establish that, by sheer proximity, the officers could not help but know each other's business, the defendant later stated that the unit was not always together because of the distance it had to travel.
The defendant knew that executions were taking place. He admitted that the procedure which determined the so-called guilt of a person which resulted in his being condemned to death was "too summary". But there is no evidence that he ever did anything about it. As the second highest ranking officer in the kommando, his views could have been heard in complaint or protest against what he now says was a too summary procedure, but he chose to let the injustice go uncorrected.
He was asked:
"Do I understand you correctly that you were of sufficiently safeguarded?
Is that what you want to say, that that was your opinion; was that your opinion?"
And he replied:
"That was my theoretical opinion, Mr. Prosecutor." the Tribunal is not prepared to say that the evidence in this case rises to that degree of certainty which could conclusively establish that the defendant was guilty of planning the killing of people or ordering their death. It does, however, show that the defendant took a consenting part in the criminal activities in the sense intended in Control Council Law No. 10, although there are some mitigating circumstances. From the evidence in the case the Tribunal finds the defendant guilty under Counts I and II of the Indictment. The Tribunal finds the defendant was a member of the criminal organizations SS and SD under the conditions defined by the Judgment of the International Military Tribunal and is, therefore, guilty under Count III of the Indictment.
THE PRESIDENT: the Latvian Army in 1932. After discharge in 1933 he worked with an import firm until November 1939 and then moved to German-occupied Posen, being employed from November 1939 until January 1940 at the Advisory Office for Immigrants and from January 1940 until May 1941 at the Office of Repatriation of Ethnic Germans. In May 1941 he was assigned for emergency service with the RSHA and then transferred to Pretzsch as an interpreter to the newly formed Sonderkommando 4a. He traveled with the Sonderkommando to Hrubgoschow and from there to Ludzk where he was assigned to a Teilkommando of the same organization.
In December 1941, he took leave and reported back to Sonderkommando 4a in Charkow in March 1942. He remained with this unit until December 1942 and, at the same time, acted as liaison officer between the Einsatzkommando and German and Hungarian army units. In January 1943, the area under the jurisdiction of the 2nd Army was subordinated to the area of the Einsatzgruppe and the defendant's reports and activities were controlled by Einsatzgruppe B. In the winter of 1943, he returned to Berlin. time he served with Sonderkommando 4a, he was officially informed that the kommando participated in a number of executions in the areas assigned. that such executions did occur. A the trial the defendant claimed that executions were entirely beyond his sphere of activities, and his job was simply to make reports. One could well believe, if one were to accept as fact the statements of the various defendants who functioned in the so-called Department III that these kommandos were engaged in a scientific expedition studying the flora and fauna of the land through which they traveled, obtaining data on agriculture and economy, but in some way or other avoiding all contact with the grim enterprise to which the units were committed. It is not known what blinders these defendants wore that they could be in the very midst of the carnage caused by their own associates and yet remain entirely unaffected thereby. Again we come to the question of credibility. The witness was asked whether, in making a report on the economy of the country he would indicate that the labor supply had been affected because of the execution of Jews. He replied in the negative and the following ensued:
"Q. Making a report on the economy you would include that in your reports, would you not?
A. The situation which we found was that the entire Q. The economy wasn't helped by shooting off further labor supply, was it?
A. No.
Q. Did you report this in your reports?
A. I may say the following.
Q. Did you make this statement in your reports, that the economy was made worse?
Did you report that?
A. As far as I remember I reported about the fact Q. And did you report that Jews were being decimated?
A. No.
Q. You didn't put in any report that Jews were being killed and this affected the economy of the Ukraine?
A. No, in this shape I did not report about it. I only Q. ..... You say that you did include in your report economic potential.
Did you then add that this because of the executions?
A. No, I did not report that.
Q. And yet you want to tell the Tribunal seriously that you made a report on the economy of the Ukraine?
A. Yes." employed as an interpreter. He amplified later that he was drafted into the Einsatz-organization because of his ability in languages. His witness Kraege confirmed this. Yet, at the trial, von Radetzky denied acting in the job for which apparently he was best adapted.
It can only be assumed that he made this denial because, by admitting the translating functions, he would be admitting that he knew of executions which followed certain investigations. Asked how it was that he was able to side-step his job of interpreter he replied that his work day was filled up with his job of expert in the SD Department.
"Q. Well, how did you become and expert in De partment III?
You had not had SD training?
A. No, I did not have that, I said-
Q. Well, then, how did you become an expert so quickly?
A. I was appointed for this because of my Q. Well now, we come back to languages again.
wouldn't he naturally turn to you who was interpreter?
A. There were other interpreters in the kom Q. Then you were not used as an interpreter?
A. I was never used as an interpreter by the Commander.
I was never used in interro gations as interpreter, either."
an interpreter. Report No. 156, commenting on the activities of a teilkommando of Sonderkommando 4a at Lubny, stated that -
"On the 18 October 1941 the Teilkommando of the NKWD Files."
and thus, "......it was possible, with the aid of leading Communists.
34 agents and Communists and 73 Jews were shot."
Report No. 37 states:
"In Zhitomir itself, Gruppenstab and the NKWD."
the NKWD could only be established through the medium of the interpreter the documents would point to you Radetzky as that interpreter since he admitted being with this advance commando. Hence the possible motive for denying the interpreter's position.
Other reports also show the need for an interpreter:
Report No. 24 - IIA/81, NO-2938 Report No.187 - IIIC/34, NO-3237 Report No.111 - IIA/45, NO-3155 Report No. 111 would indicate still another reason why von Radetzky would deny his interpreter's role:
"On 26 September, the Security Police took up its activities in Kiev.
That day, Camp, and in the city itself.
Thus, interrogated in detail.
Conforming denied all political activity.
Only confessed, i.e. they admitted the position statements beyond this.
They were shot on 27 September."
(Emphasis supplied). he obtained supplies for the komnando. When asked what supplies were involved he replied: "Food and fuel". He was then asked about ammunition. He replied that he did not remember. It was then put to him:
"Witness, you either remember or you don't remember.
If you remember food ordered ammunition or not.
Did you order ammunition?"
and he now replied with a definite "No". He was then asked why it was that he at first said he could not remember if he had ever obtained ammunition for his kommando:
"Q. Do you remember now very definitely that you did not order ammunition?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you say now definitely that you did not order ammunition?
A. I an certain that I would remember if kommando."
pre-trial affidavit, that, during his absence, von Radetzky took over. Blobel repudiated this statement on the witness stand, but he also denied that von Radetzky could ever have been even a teilkommando or vorkommando leader. But the documentary evidence clearly establishes that von Radetzky was active as a sub-kommando leader. rank in his kommando could qualify as leaders and, to that extent, he also was "a leader of the kommando." Sonderkommando 4a and rear army HQ "to liquidate the Jews of Zhitomir completely and radically." not present at it but that he had been ordered to negotiate with the field command about the furnishing of vehicles. He stated that he was of the impression that the Jews were to be resettled in Rowno. It is difficult to believe that the defendant did not know what "resettlement" meant in Einsatzgruppen circles. Sonderkommando 4a during Blobel's absence. Although there is evidence that Blobel was often absent because of illness, the Tribunal cannot find beyond a reasonable doubt that, during those absences, von Radetzky took over the kommando.
Report No. 14 tells of a reprisal operation carried out at Ludzk by a sub-unit of Sonderkommando 4a. Gustav Kraege stated in an affidavit that von Radetzky was one of the officers of this sub-unit. Von Radetzky stated he was present in Ludzk during the time of this execution but denied having been commander of this unit, although he stated he was the highest ranking officer in the sub-kommando.