"On orders by the new Plenipotentiary for the Commissariate General 'White Ruthenia' has to muster about 100,000 workers.
But will be adopted."
order of May 19, 1942. He testified that he visited Heydrich and Himmler and urged his recall and even spoke to Rosenberg against the extermination program in principle. He asserted that later he was recalled and subjected to disciplinary action, Although he retained his general officer rank in the police he was sent to the front, as a sergeant in the Waffen SS. The credibility of this story depends entirely on Jost, since all the other alleged conferees are dead, and there were apparently no surviving witnesses that he could call to confirm his conversations. to do with the reversal in his military fortunes, it can be believed that illness alone could not have brought about such a drastic change in his situation. Nonetheless the evidence is irrefutable that he was a principal in and an accessory to the extermination program in his territory. He may have, after participation in this enterprise, at last relented, and this is to his credit, but this cannot wipe out the criminality which preceded his withdrawal from the field. defendant is guilty under Counts I and II of the Indictment. criminal organizations SS and SD under the conditions defined by the Judgment of the International Military Tribunal and is, therefore, guilty under Count III of the Indictment.
JUDGE DIXON (reading):
and obtained employment in a commercial firm in his home town of Meissen, Saxony. In 1933 he joined the SA in a full-time capacity and then became official and officer of police. He joined the SD in 1935. He was Chief of Einsatzgruppe B from November 1941 until February or March 1943. The Prosecution contends that he took over the command of this organization on November 1, 1941 and points to various pieces of evidence to confirm that contention:
(1) Neumann's personnel SS record, (2) Reports listing Naumann as being in Smolensk (Headquarters of Einsatzgruppe
B) on November 12, 1941, (3) Testimony of Steimle that he met Nau (4) Naumnann's note to the co-defendant fluence Klingelhoefer's testimony that Neumann's duties began on November Neumann's purpose in establishing the latter date of induction into the chiefship of Einsatzgruppe B is to refute the Prosecution's claim that he is responsible for executions committed by Einsatzgruppe B in the month of November.
One report, dated December 19, 1941, described v arious actions which resulted in the liquidation of several thousands of people. Another report carrying the date of December 22, 1941 told of the execution of 324 Jewish prisoners of war and 680 civilian Jews. executions, since the reports were published four to five weeks following the events described therein. This would date the indicated events as having occurred about the middle of November and consequently prior to the date he claims he took over the Einsatzgruppe command. It has not established as a fact that the Operational and Situation Reports always appeared four to five weeks subsequent to the chronicled events.
It was testified during the trial that this period of delay fluctuated and that sometimes the reports were published within two weeks after the happening of the events.
However, this discussion is more interesting than practical. Even if Naumann were to prove irrefutably and conclusively that the reports were delayed and that he did not arrive in Smolensk until November 30, this would still not exonerate him from the charges under Counts I and II, for there is existent the Operational Report of April 21, 1942, covering operations from March 6 to March 30, a period during which indubitably Naumann commanded the area under consideration. This report shows, inter alia, that the Einsatzkommando 9 killed 273 persons made up of 85 Russians "belonging to partisan groups", 18 "because of Communistic, seditious acts and criminal offenses" and 170 Jews. Sonderkommando 7a executed 1,657 persons, 27 of whom were partisans and former Communists,45 were Gypsies, and 1,585 were Jews, The same report shows that unit Einsatzkommando 8 killed 1,609 persons made up of 20 Russian Communist, 5 criminals, 33 Gypsies and 1,551 Jews. was not "derived from the actual observation of the author of the document". This indeed is equivocation. The Operational Report was made up from accounts sent in by Einsatzgruppe B, accounts controlled by Naumann himself. In his affidavit of June 27, 1947 Naumann declared:
"The Einsatzgruppe B reported regularly on the Office.
Written reports were sent to Berlin every by radio.
The reports were prepared by my staff and submitted to me as a matter of routine," states:
"It is in no way intended to disclaim the assertion while Naumann was Chief of Einsatzgruppe B." executions appeared "much too high". In other words Dr. Gawlik claims that the numbers are incredible.
To say that these figures are incredible is an entirely credible and sane observation. This whole case is incredible, This is a case where the incredible has become the norm. It is not necessary to look at the reports to be shocked with incredulity. Many of the defendants themselves made statements on the incredulous things which they did. that it was in effect when he arrived. From this he seems to argue an absence of guilt. But Naumann had the power of command:
"The law of war imposes on a military officer in violations of the Law of war."
(Judgment, Milita ry Tribunal I, Case No. I, the United States of America against Karl Brandt et al, page 70.)
Naumann met from time to time with his kommando leaders. He knew that they were giving full effect to the Fuehrer Order. He knew that executions were taking place and even stated that if any of his subordinates had refused to carry out the order he would have taken disciplinary action against them.
Then it is to be noted from Naumann's own testimony that he knew of the liquidation order even before he took command of the Einsatz gruppe. He testified:
"... I was ordered to Heydrich and I received clear orders from him for Russia.
Now, first officials.
...." that Naumann was aware of the Fuehrer Order and that he carried it into effect. The only defense left him is that of the so-called Superior Orders. Did he agree with the order or not? If he did not and thus was compelled by chain of command and fear of drastic consequences to kill innocent human beings, the avenue of mitigation is open for consideration.
If, however, he agreed with the order, he may not, as already demonstrated, in the General Opinion, plead Superior Orders, The answer to this question can be found in his own testimony. anything morally wrong about the Fuehrer Order, and he replied in the negative. He was asked again the same question, and he replied specifically:
"I considered the decree to be right because it was necessary."
inquired if Naumann intended by his answer to say that he "saw nothing wrong with the order, even though it did involve the killing of defenseless human beings", and he replied "yes". dant is guilty under Counts I and II of the Indictment. nal organizations SS and SD under the conditions defined by the judgment of the International Military Tribunal and is, therefore, guilty under Count III of the Indictment.
THE PRESIDENT: The defendant, Erwin Schulz.
SS-Brigadier General Erwin Schulz entered the Army in 1918. After the first World War he successively studied law at the University of Berlin, was employed on the staff of the Dresden Bank and joined the Security Police. In 1940 he became Commissioner Inspector of the Security Police and SD. He was serving as Commandant of the Fuehrerschule of the Security Police in Berlin-Charlottenburg when he was assigned to the command of Einsatzkommando 5 which formed part of Einsatzgruppe C. He left Pretzsch with his kommando on June 23, 1941 and arrived in Lemberg in the early part of July. Here he was told that, prior to the evacuation of Lemberg by the Russians, 5,000 of the inhabitants had been murdered, and reprisals were in order. 2,500 to 3,000 people were arrested and within several days executions began. Schulz's kommando was ordered to participate in the executions and, under his direction, shot from 90 to 100 people.
kommando had been thoroughly investigated and found guilty of participation in the massacre which preceded his arrival. He stated further that after the execution he observed that Wehrmacht members were abusing the other 2,000 detainees being hold in a stadium, and that he opened the gate and allowed these detainees to escape.
These Lemberg shootings, despite the defendant's explanation, still remain unexplained. Schulz states that 5,000 Ukrainians and Poles had been massacred by the Russians and that then the invading forces, which had already executed hundreds of thousands of Poles, took reprisals against the Jews for the murder of Poles. If the operation was a "reprisal" one, as the report states, the Einsatz leaders would not have conducted investigations. If these executed were actually guilty of murder then the measure was not a reprisal but an orderly juridical procedure. Defense Counsel argues that Einsatzkommando 5 really had nothing to do with this affair:
"....it was only to fire the shot, without having of the incidents which preceded the shootings."
proceeded with the execution. Schulz testified that German soldiers had also been murdered in the Lemberg affair, but he could not state how many. Hitler had ordered a reprisal measure and that seemed to suffice. The defendant admitted that he conducted the execution of those allotted to him without any report of their guilt. He was not even furnished with a list of the executees. and was successively at Zhitomir and Berditschew. On August 10, while at Zhitomir, Schulz was instructed by the Einsatzgruppen leader that Jewish women and children, as well as men, were to be executed. Schulz states that, in moral rebellion against the order, he left for Berlin on August 24, arriving there on August 27. He spoke with Streckenbach and asked to be relieved from his post, and he was assured that this would be done, He returned to the kommando on September 15, and turned over the unit to his successor on September 25.
against the execution order cannot be conclusively known, since the other participants in that discussion, assuming that it took place, are not available. It is true that he did give up his kommando in the latter part of September 1941. Whether this excluded him from responsibility for executions, however, remains to be seen.
Report No. 88 states that "between August 24 and August 30, Einsatzkommando 5 carried through 157 executions by shooting comprising Jews, officials and saboteurs." Schulz used his trip to Berlin which embraces the six days indicated in the report, as an alibi for this shooting. But if the operation was planned before he left, his absence would not exonerate him. The man who places a bomb, lights the fuse, and rapidly takes himself to other regions is certainly absent when the explosion occurs, but his responsibility is no less because of that prudent non-presence. kommando 5 even thought he knew he intended to be absent while on the trip to Berlin is established by the fact that on the actual date of his departure, August 24, he ordered the kommando to move on from Berditschew to Skwira, 100 kilometers east of Berditschew, which removal actually took place on August 26. Schulz's explanation for this removal is a laudable one, if true. He says that he wanted to avoid that his kommando should come in contact with Higher SS and Police Leader Jeckeln who was set on execution of all Jews, including women and children. In any event, the fact remains that Schulz retained control of the kommando until the actual arrival of his successor in the latter part of September.
that before leaving for Russia he heard Heydrich's speech in which Heydrich said:
"That every one should be sure to understand that, in this fight; Jews would definitely take their the one to be overcome.
For that reason, all mea cular.
The experience in Poland had shown this."
The expression "all measures" certainly put Schulz on notice as to what was expected of the Einsatz units. for the executions described in Reports Nos. 132 and 135. The former is dated November 12 and the latter November 19, so that if one allowed even the maximum of five weeks' delay in publication of the reports, these executions would still fall subsequent to the date Schulz admittedly left Russia.
However, Report No. 47, dated August 9, 1941 which describes the shooting of 400 Jews (mostly saboteurs and political functionaries) would be within the time Schulz was on duty in Russia. This report makes the further statement: "Einsatzkommando 5 shot an additional 74 Jews up to this date."
Report No. 94 definitely chronicling a period when Schulz was in command, even though absent on the Berlin trip, says: "Einsatzkommando 5 for the period between August 31 and September 6, 1941, reports the liquidation of 90 political officials, 72 saboteurs and looters and 161 Jews." cuted by his kommando were only those who had committed offenses entitling them to be shot and in this connection Dr. Durchholz said that the "perpetrators who were Jews, were designated only as 'Jews' in the reports of the Einsatzgruppe, upon orders from superior offices, that they were not to be listed as 'saboteurs, plunderers, etc.'".
whose handling of the truth was as careless as his review of the evidence in capital cases in Esthonia. The Tribunal now declares that the record is absolutely bare of credible evidence that those listed in the column headed "Jews" fell into any category other than those who were shot merely because they were Jews. The whole documentation in the case is directly to the contrary.
Dr. Durchholz claims of his client a liberal attitude towards the Jews, but he adds:
"It goes without saying that he wanted to reduce again to normal proportions," It was just this spirit of reduction to what the Nazis called "normal proportions" which brought about the excesses in Germany leading to disfranchisement, appropriation of property, concentration camp confinement and worse.
In his final plea, Dr. Durchholz devoted some 20 pages to Schulz's activities prior to his Russian venture. He says here that Schulz was a competent police officer, that he was considerate and polite and was regarded as an "exemplary, modest, plain person who looked after his officials like a father". That the defendant is a person of innate courtesy has been evidenced in the court room, but the issue in this case is whether he lived up to International Law. did not respond to the obligations imposed upon him not only by the International law but the concept of law itself, of which, as a long police official, he could not be ignorant. In spite of this, however, it can be said in his behalf that, confronted with an intolerable situation he did attempt to do something about it.
is guilty under Counts I and II of the Indictment. minal organizations SS and Gestapo under the conditions defined by the Judgment of the International Military Tribunal and is, therefore, guilty under Count III of the Indictment.
JUDGE SPEIGHT: The defendant Franz Six. high school at Mannheim in 1930 and then matriculated at the University of Heidelberg where he specialized in sociology and political science, receiving the degree of doctor of philosophy in 1934. He then taught at the University at Koernigsberg (where he also took up the position of press Director of the German Student's Association). In 1936 he received the high academic degree of Dr. phil. habil. from the University of Heidelberg, and became Dozent in the faculty of law and political science at Koenigsberg; later, he passed examinations for the Venia Legendi at the University of Leipzig. By 1938, he was Professor at the University of Koenigsberg, and by 1939, he had obtained the chair for Foreign Political Science at the University of Berlin and was its first Dean of the faculty for foreign countries. achievements, duly enumerated by the defendant himself, the youth who came to him for guidance and instruction could expect in him a comparable degree of achievement in moral honesty. Unfortunately, this may not have been true, and therein is a tragedy of its own. A school teacher is bound in conscience to hold himself impeccable in deportment because of the example he constantly presents the future citizens of the State. The example afforded by Six left something to be desired. Reference will be made to the defendants own words on the witness stand in support of this observation.
to the Tribunal the tale of his student days at the University of Heidelberg. He said:
"I carried on my studies at Heidelberg for four years on an average of twenty marks a month.
I needed nine marks to live on.
Nine marks, that meant thir complacency with so much distress."
Then on his own words he solved the enigma: "The answer which I gave myself was joining the Nazi Party." showed, he had become a Nazi in 1930, that is, even before he matriculated at the University of Heidelberg, so that whatever advantages, benefits and comforts derived from National Socialism were already due to him at Heidelberg. Thus, by failing to tap the munificent resources which Nazism offered, while already a full-fledged Nazi, Six suffered needlessly during those four sad years at Heidelberg.
There is another illustration. Six declared he had no animosity toward Jews and advanced his respect for two certain Jewish university professors as proof of this assertion, He was then asked whether it disturbed him that these two Jews, because of their race, were persecuted. He replied that he regarded it as "highly unpleasant" that these people should have been "affected by the new laws and regulations". Whereupon the inquiry was made as to whether he was offended by the persecution of thousands and millions of the brothers and sisters of these two professors. He answered: "What do you mean by persecution? When did the persecution begin?" When this was explained to him he conceded that the burning down of the Jewish synagogues on November 9, 1938, was a "shame and a scandal". Counsel for the Prosecution now inquired if he regarded the Fuehrer-Order, which called for the physical extermination of all Jews, as a "shame and a scandal". Here he saw a difference.
The synagogues had been burned down without an order and therefore the destruction was a "Shame and a scandal". The Fuehrer-Order, however, to destroy human beings, issued from the Chief of State and consequently could not be a shame and a scandal. He later conceded that the execution of women and children was deplorable, but the killing of male Jews was proper because they were potential bearers of arms. versity of Berlin at which Six was professor and Dean, had, as far back as 1809, defined "the limits beyond which the activities of the State must not go." Obviously Six did not agree with the doctrine that there could be a limit to the activities of the State, The name of Adolf Hitler apparently throw a shade over the light of his learning, and thus, for him there was nothing wrong, even mass killings, so long as the order therefor originated with the Fuehrer. In this last named organization he attained the grade of Brigadier General. On June 20, 1941 he was appointed Chief of the Vorkommando Moscow. According to the defendant the task of this kommando was to secure the archives and files of Russian documents in Moscow when the German troops should arrive there. The defendant arrived in Smolensk on July 25, 1941 and remained there until the latter part of August when he returned to Berlin. were not as innocuous as made out by him. The prosecution submits that the Vorkommando Moscow was ussed in liquidating operations while under the command of Six. Further, that the seizing of documents in Russia was done not for economic and cultural purposes, but with the object of obtaining lists of Communist functionaries who had themselves become candidates for liquidation.
In support of its position, the Prosecution introduced Report No. 73 dated September 4, 1941, which carries on its final page the heading "Statistics of the liquidations", and then enumerates various units of Einsatzgruppe B with the executions performed by each.
"The total figures of persons liquidated by the Einsatz gruppe as per 20 August 1941 were:
1.) Stab and Vorkommando 'Moskau' 144
2.) Vorkommando 7a 996
3.) Vorkommando 7b 886
4.) Einsatzkommando 8 6,842
5.) Einsatzkommando 9 8,096 Total .....16,964" The same report carries the item:
"The Vorkommando 'Moskau' was forced to execute another tablished Ghetto of Smolensk."
kommando Moscow could not have performed the executions mentioned therein. His argument is as follows: Assuming that the executions occurred August 20th, two days must have elapsed before the report left Smolensk. Allowing then two or three days more for evaluation of the events, the report, according to Dr. Ulmer, could only have left Smolensk on August 25th or 26th. A few days were needed for the transmission to Berlin and there, on September 4, 1941, it appeared as Operation Report No. 73, Dr. Ulmer then says:
"The report can therefore -- and that is essential -
earliest, i.e. on the sixth day after the defendant had left Smolensk."
No one questioned the correctness of the date of September 4th when the report was published in Berlin.
Therefore, the longer the time required for the submission of the report to Berlin, the further back must be the happening of the events narrated therein, and thus the further back into the period when Six was incontrovertibly in Smolensk. The usual argument presented in matters of this kind has been that the delay between the event and the eventual publishing of the report was a longer one rather than a shorter one. In this case the date in the document itself indicates a delay of only 14 days. If Dr. Ulmer argues that the lapse of time was longer than 14 days, then the events in question occurred prior to August 20th when no one questions that Dr. Six was present in Smolensk. specifically states that he never made any reports to Einsatzgruppe B. Report No. 34 declares, under the heading of Einsatzgruppe B:
"Smolensk, according to the report by Standartenfuehrer Dr. Six, is a thoroughly destroyed as Minsk.
... It was follow to Smolensk."
Report No. 11, dated July 23, 1941 listed Vorkommando Moscow as one of the units of Einsatzgruppe B. Furthermore, Six admitted having supplied Einsatzgruppe B with some of his interpreters.
The defendant has described himself as a "pure" scientist. His duties were so scientific that in April 1944 he made a speech in Krumhubel at a session of consultants on the Jewish question in which he was reported as follows:
"Ambassador Six speaks then about the political structures of world jewry.
The physical elimination of Eastern Jew ry would deprive Jewry of its biological reserves.
... The so internationally."
At this same session:
"Embassy counsellor v. Thadden speaks about the Jewish the Anti-Jewish executive measures.
.. (As the details protocol.)
" Six admitted having been present and having addressed the meeting but denied making the remarks attributed to him.
had no special section devoted to the Jewish situation, but it developed that the organizational chart of the RSHA very clearly described Section VII-B-1 as dealing with Free Masonry and Jewry. so that the population could worship, and then Inter stated that he protected these churches mainly for the reason that "there were archives there and valuable treasures." of exceptional service with the Einsatzgruppe, he denied that his promotion had anything to do with special merit, but the letter from Himmler specifically stated:
"I hereby promote you, effective 9 November 1941 to Signed:
H. HIMMLER." was "quite unimaginagle" that "special merits in the past should be mentioned" in the "promotion". Whereupon the Prosecution introduced the following document:
"Memorandum: The Reich Main Security Office requests the promotion of SS-Oberfuehrer Dr. Six to Brigade fuehrer, effective 31 January 1945.
..SIPO Einsatz;
22 June 1941 -- 28 August 1941, East Einsatz... On Police Einsatz in the East."
SS prior to 1939, but it is incongruous to say the least that one who joins the Nazi Party voluntarily because he believes it to be the salvation of Germany, joins the SA voluntarily, becomes a brigadier general in the SS, and joins the SD voluntarily, should seek to leave it when Germany was riding the crest of the high wave running toward ever continuing and ever more glorious victories and triumphs.
gruppe B and despite the finding that Six was aware of the criminal purposes of Einsatzgruppe B, the Tribunal cannot conclude with scientific certitude that Six took an active part in the murder program of that organization. It is evident, however, that Six formed part of an organization engaged in atrocities, offenses and inhumane acts against civilian populations. The tribunal finds the defendant guilty under Counts I and II of the Indictment. minal organizations SS and SD under the conditions defined in the Judgment of the International Military Tribunal and is, therefore, guilty under Count III of the Indictment.
JUDGE DIXON: The defendant Paul Blobel. commanded Sonderkommando 4a from June 1941 to January 1942, and in that capacity is responsible for the killing of 60,000 people. Defense Counsel in his final plea, argued that the maximum number of persons executed by Sonderkommando 4a cannot have exceeded 10,000 to 15,000 which in itself, it must be admitted, would anywhere be regarder as a massacre of some proportions, except in the annals of the Einsatzgruppen. 60,000 killings are subject to error. He points out first that the reports are not under oath. This overlooks the fundamental fact that the reports are strictly military documents and that every soldier who collects, transmits and receives reports is under oath. He then states that the reports were compiled and issued by an office unfamiliar with the subject covered in the reports.
But this is to say that a military headquarters is stranger to its own organization. But the crowning objection to the reliability of the reports is the conjecture that possibly headquarters did not have a map with which to check the locations!" defendant was under the jurisdiction of the Army, coming directly under the orders of Field Marshal von Reichenau of AOK 6. The Tribunal has already spoken on the defense of Superior Orders. But Blobel asserts that the persons executed by his kommando were investigated and tried, and that Field Marshal von Reichenau had reviewed every case. There is nothing in Blobel's record which would suggest that his bare statement would be sufficient to authenticate a proposition which, on its face, is unbelievable. It is enough to refer to the massacre at Kiev where 33,771 Jews were executed in two days immediately after an alleged incendiary fire, to disprove Blobel's utterance in this regard. Incidentally Blobel, whose kommando took an active part in this mass killing, said that the number reported was too high. "In my opinion", he states, "not more than half of the mentioned figure were shot". accordance with International Law.
He testified:
"Executions of agents, partisans, saboteurs, suspicious Hague Convention."
It is to be need that Blobel's ideas of International Law are merely because he thinks they are suspicious.
Sixteen separate reports directly implicate Blobel's kommando in mass murder, many of them referring to him by name. Report No.,143 delcares that as of November 9, 1941, Sonderkommando 4a had executed 37,243 persons. Report No. 132, dated November 12, 1941, tells of the execution of Jews and prisoners of war by Blobel's sonderkommando. That report closes on the note: "The number of executions carried out by Sonderkommando 4a meanwhile increased to 55,432." Report No. 156 declares that as of November 30, 1941, Sonderkommando 4a had shot 59,018 persons. explanation why Blobel became involved in the business just related. He said that in 1924 Blobel began the practice of his profession, that of a free-lance architect. By untiring efforts he became successful, and at last he realized his dream of owing his own home. Then came the economic crisis of 1928-29. "The solid existence for which he had fought and worked untiringly was smashed by the general economic collapse." He could get me now orders, his savings disappeared, he could not pay the mortgage on his house, which he had previously stated he owned. Paul Blobel was, as his counsel tells us, "down to his last shirt". The defendant was seized by the force of the quarrels between major political parties, and his counsel sums it up:
"This situation alone makes the subsequent behavior of the defendant Blobel comprehensible."
depression which affected the whole world justified the defendant's going into Russia to slay tens of thousands of human beings and then blowing up their bodies with dynamite. he believed in the ideology of National Socialism, but to improve his economic condition. In 1935 he received an order as architect to furnish the office of the SS in Duesseldorf. Despite the miraculous prosperity promised by National Socialism, the defendant in 1935 still found himself in distress and so he thus decided to take up Nazi work seriously and become clothed again. He would give his entire time to National Socialism. life in ascertaining public opinion. Defense Counsel states that Blobel tried to withdraw from the SD prior to the outbreak of World War II, but later contradicts, this with the statement that "up to 1939 there was no reason for him to withdraw from his activities with the SD and to turn his back upon this organization." charge of Sonderkommando 4a and marched into Russia. In one operation his kommando killed so many people that it could collect 137 trucks full of clothes, Blobel's attitude on murder in general was well exemplified by his reaction to the question as to whether he believed that the killing of 1,160 Jews in the retaliation for the killing of 10 German soldiers was justified. His words follow:
"116 Jews for one German? I don't know.
I am not a militarist, you see. One can sentiment and from one's own human ideas.
fied ratio of retaliation." every opportunity to defend himself against the serious charges advanced by the Prosecution.