I may draw your attention to the fact, your Honor, that at the negotiations the Allies authorized Jodl, Keitel, and Friedeburg to remain the chiefs of government in this district Flensburg. This Chief of State with his government actually remained in force until the 23rd of May 1945.
Q. But you didn't seriously believe that you could successfully hold out against the combined Allied power after May 8, did you?
A. No, I think we must have misunderstood each other, your Honor, because I had only two intentions. One was to prevent SS units from being formed into underground movements. Therefore, I tried to cause Himmler to dissolve the SS officially and to order them to submit to fate, as it were; and as far as it would be possible to work, to work with the Allies positively. I also tried to cause Himmler to go over to the Allies and put himself at the disposal of the Allies so that he could tell them what the tasks were and of what nature they were, the tasks, that is, which he had given to the SS, and so that he could take the responsibility for them.
Q. Were you in daily contact with Himmler following May 8?
A. Yes.
Q. Until when?
A. At least until the 19th of May. I believe it must have been until the 21st, by ordinances. He had camouflaged himself and was living in a disguise under which he then was delivered into a prisoner of war camp.
Q. How did you submit yourself to the Allies?
A. When Himmler told me that I was afraid of myself and afraid for my own life then, I told him that I had already made up my mind to put myself at the disposal of the Allies and to take my own responsibility for what I had made of the SD. I could not leave it to anybody else to take responsibility for the activities of the SD; and although I had not been arrested when the rest of the government had been arrested in the afternoon, after asking three times for it, I achieved the status of being arrested.
Q. When was that? What date?
A. That was on the 23rd of May.
Q. Then they favored you by arresting you?
A. Yes, on the 23rd of May.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, recess until 1:45.
(A recess was taken until 1345 hours.)
(The hearing reconvened at 1345 hours, 8 October 1947)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session. BY DR. ASCHENEUER:
May I continue now, Your Honor. Witness, did you report voluntarily for the campaign in Russia?
A.- No, on the contrary. Twice I was directed to go to Russia, and twice I refused. Then I got the third order which I could no longer evade.
Q.- Why didn't Heydrich from the beginning simply give orders, it was certainly not customary to negotiate with any of his subordinates?
A.- He was forced to insofar as I was on call for the Reich Group Commerce -- I had a note in my military passport which obligated me in case of war, to be at the disposal of the Reich Group Commerce, therefore, it was necessary that this war order be superseded by Heydrich's order. This happened for the third time by order, so that the Reich Group Trade revoked this order. Now I was conscripted for the Reichsfuehrer-SS, the Army district giving notice of a secret mission for the Reichsfuehrer-SS and that I had gone into a foreign country. After that I was made available for the Reich Security Main Office. Now I was given a note in my military passport for the Chief of the Security Police and SD.
Q.- Please explain the legal situation of your membership in the SD, when you were conscripted in 1941?
A.- In 1936, I joined the SD. When I was given the job of building up a critical military information service or office. When this job was taken away from me I asked for my dismissal. This was refused to me in 1938.
I immediately was able to leave from the main position which I held there. The situation with the Chief of Security Police and SD was as difficult as in the other SS organizations, because one did not enter into a contract. It was merely an unilateral loyalty agreement, and in addition to a simultaneous joining of the SS, a condition of military subordination existed. One was at the same time a military subordinate. My renewel application for dismissal in November 1939 was again refused. By now the position of the Chief of Security Police and SD had become even stronger. In the meantime through a decree the Security Police and SD were listed as being on a war emergency status, and in the renewed decree it was added that even an application to leave this organization would be forbidden. This application was even punishable. In this manner it was no longer possible after 1939, even to file an application to leave. This last remark applied to a general condition, since through the wish of the Reichsfuehrer-SS I had the possibility in November 1939 to make a renewed application. This is when I was conscripted for the Russian campaign in 1941, I was not a voluntary member of the SD, or of the SD. I was conscripted for the campaign.
Q.- How did the formation of the Einsatzgruppen and the Einsatzkommando come about? Were they part of the agencies of the offices of the Secret Police and the SD?
A.- The Einsatzgruppen and the Einsatzkommando were neither agencies nor parts of the organization of the Office of the Reich Main Security Office. They were mobile units set up for one single purpose which were set up ad hoe for one certain employment. The members of the Einsatzgruppen and the Einsatzkommando were either conscripted or were taken from the members of the Security Police and SD. Or they were drafted to a large extent, for example, as drivers or interpreters, whereas, a large membership of the Einsatzgruppen, by order of Himmler, was made available by companies of Security Police and the Civil Police; these Einsatzgruppen and Einsatzkommando were no agencies or authorities but they were military units.
Q.- During the detailing of leaders and the men, were the purposes and the orders of the Einsatzgruppen made known to the men and the loaders when they were drafted?
A.- No, this was not done. The leaders and men were given an order to report to Deuben or Presch in Saxony. They did not get any information where they were to be committed, or what tasks they were supposed to do. Even after the units had been activated, the commanders and men did not know about it.
Q.- When was the area of operation made public?
A.- It was made known shortly before the units left for Russia, about three days before.
Q.- When was the order given for the luquidation of certain elements of the population in the USRR, and by whom was it handed over?
A.- As far as I recollect, this order was given at the same time when the area of operations was made known. In Pretsch the Chiefs of Offices I and IV, the then Obersturmbannfuehrer Streckenbach and Mueller, gave the order which had been issued by Himmler and Heydrich.
Q.- What was the wording of this order?
A.- This special order, for such it is, read as follows: That beyond our mission the Security Police and SD, the Einsatzgruppen and the Einsatzkommando had the mission to protect the rear of the troops by killing the Jews, Gypsies, Communist functionaries, active Communists, and all persons who would endanger the security.
Q.- What were your thoughts when you received this order of killings?
A.- The immediate feeling with me and with the other men was a general protest. Obersturmbannfuehrer Streckenbach listened to this pro test, and, even gave us a few different points which we could not know, but at the same time he told us that even himself had protested most strenuously against a similar order in the Polish campaign, but that Himmler had rebuked him just as severely by stating that this is a Fuehrer order, which must be carried out, in order to achieve the war aim of destroying communism for all times, therefore, this order is to be taken without hesitation.
Q.- Did you consider this order as correct?
A.- No, I did not. I did not consider it correct, because apart from the necessity of taking such measures, these measures would have moral consequences which are very damaging.
Q.- Did you know about plans or directives which had as their goal the extermination for racial and religious grounds?
A.- I expressly assure you that I neither knew of such plans nor was I called on to cooperate in any such plans. The Obergruppenfuehrer Barzelewsky testified during the big trial that the Reichsfuehrer-SS in a conference of all Obergruppenfuehrers made known that the goal was to exterminate thirty-million Slavs. I repeat that I was neither given such an order was even the slightest hint given to me that such plans or goals existed for the Russian campaign. This is not only true for the Slavs but this is also true for the Jews. I know that in the year of 1938, '39 and '40, no extermination plans existed, but on the contrary, with the aid of Heydrich, and by cooperation with Jewish organizations, immigarations from Germany and Austria were arranged; financial funds even were formed in order to help aid the poorer Jews to make this immigration possible.
In 1941 I personally helped in individual cases, where, for example, a representative of I.G. Farben called on me in order to overcome difficulties with the State Police. It was then their intention to let so-called bearers of secrets immigrate. Up to the very and I succeeded in giving such aid. Thus at the beginning of the Russian campaign I had no cause to assume that the execution order which we were given meant any sort of the beginning of an extermination or that any such extermination was planned or was to be carried out. During my time in Russia I sent a great number of reports to Chief of Security Police and SD in which I reported about the fine cooperation with the Russian population. They were never objected to. When Himmler was in Nikolajev in 1941 he neither made any reproaches about this, nor did he give me any other directives. I am rather convinced that where such an extermination policy was later carried out, it was not carried out by the order of the Central Agencies, but it was the work of individual people.
Q Did you give any thought to the legality of such a Fuehrer Order?
A Of course I did. I knew the history of Communism. From the theory of Lenin and Stalin and from the strategy and tactics of the Bolshevism World revolution, I knew that Bolshevism was to let no other rules prevail other than those which would further and promote its its aim. The practice of Bolshevism in the Russian Civil War, in the War with Finland, in the War with Poland, in the occupation of the Baltic Countries and Bassarabia, gave us the assurance and certainty that this was not only theory, but that this was carried out in practice, and in the same manner it therefore was to be expected that in this war no other laws would have any validity. This was true for the International Conventions which Russia officially denounced to the German government, as well as the international customs and usages of war, and, it was true because according to this same Communist Ideology the customs and usages could only develop between partners who were on the same ideological basis.
Just as the other class is the opponent internally who is to be destroyed by all means, according to the same ideology the other state which does not represent a Bolshevistic system is the external opponent which is to be destroyed, just as the class is to be destroyed internally. The rules in this are adjusted according to the state of emergency of the moment. In this respect it was clear to me that in this war against Bolshevism the German Reich found itself in a state of war emergency and of self-defense. What measures are to be taken in such a war to fight such an opponent on his own ground - to determine this could be only a matter to decide for the supreme leadership which waged this war for the life or death of its people; and, which, in my opinion, they certainly believed they waged also for Europe and even more for there was no doubt for us that the Four-Year Plan, as well as the events of 1938 and 1939, were nothing else for Hitler but the securing of the point of departure for this war against Bolshevism considered by him to be inevitable.
THE PRESIDENT: Witness, when you refer to the Russian practice in the war against Poland, were you referring to the war of 1939 when Russia was your Ally?
A Yes. This has nothing to do with it, or does not change the subject, the fact that Russia was our Ally at the time.
THE PRESIDENT: No, I am just asking if that is the war you are referring to?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Well, did Germany at that time also have the same practices?
A I do not know that this happened to the same extent. That violations took place cannot be doubted.
THE PRESIDENT: You believe that it was not as widespread as it later developed in your war against Russia? Is that what I am led to believe?
BY DR. ASCHENAUER: given to him?
A This is not possible legally or actually. According to the general legal interpretation in Germany, not even a judge had the possibility of examining the legality of a law or an order. As little as an administrative official can examine the administrative edict of a supreme authority. But even actually it would have been presumptuous because in the position in which every one of the defendants found themselves, we did not have the possibility of actually judging the situation. It also corresponds to the moral concept which I have learned as an European tradition, that no subordinate can take it upon himself to examine the authority of the supreme commander and chief of state. He only faces his God and history.
Q Didn't Paragraph 47 of the Military Code give you an occasion to interpret this execution order differently? created to prevent excesses by individual officers or men leaves open the possibility to consider the supreme order of the Supreme Commander a crime. Apart from this, again according to continental concept, the Chief of State cannot commit a crime. regarded these exterminations in the East?
A This seems to have several reasons. For one thing, the deeds in the Hast were published as being isolated excesses done by the SS. One took them out of their context and made the SS alone responsible. In reality these executions in the East were a consequence of total wax which was inevitable if a philosophy of one country prevailed which had as its goal the destruction of every resistance against their conquering the world with their idea. This war was not finished. The Reparations for a possible conflict seem to tell me that whatever happened in the East is only a prelude.
Another point. It has been customary so far to judge executions during a war by various standards. The theorizing element which made the execution seem honorable was the fight of man against man. This has long been overcome. The individual war opponents try to exterminate as many enemies as possible by preserving their own strength. The fact that individual men killed civilians face to face is looked upon as terrible and is pictured as specially gruesome because the order was clearly given to kill these people. I cannot morally evaluate a deed any better, a deed which makes it possible, by pushing of a button, to kill a much larger number of cirilians, men, women and children, even to hurt them for generations than those deeds of individual people who for the same purpose, namely, to achieve the goal of the war, must shoot individual persons. I believe that the time will come to remove these moral differences in executions for the purposes of war I cannot see that political factors and political and economic conventions, which in their consequences cause the execution of and acts of violence against and misery for millions of people have done anything better morally only because the conscious consequences were not expressly made known to the population.
I believe, therefore, that when history has come to an end, that this conflict will not have started in 1941, but with the victory of Bolshevism in Russia, that then only can the judgment of history be made which will inform about various phases of this conflict. Fuehrer order which was given to you? that any other order but the goal of the war was present, namely, a momentary and permanent security of our own area, inopposition to that area, in which the belligerent conflict is taking place. execution was the part of a systematic program of genocide which had as its aim the destruction of foreign peoples and ethnic groups. Will you please comment on this?
A I did not have any occasion to assume any such plan. I assure you that I neither participated in plans nor did I see any preparation for such plans which would have let me assume that such a plan existed. What was told to us was our security and those persons who were assumed to be endangering the security were designated as such. objective prerequisite that the executions of populations according to the Fuehrer order were re necessary?
the propaganda of Goebbels was not clearly enough delineated. I was convinced that this order, in order to grin its ends internally, had torn many millions from their families, when dispossessing the Kulaks had taken the adult population away three tines from rural districts, and that the same thing was true of the other states. This state would have even less consideration for a foreign population. relation to the Bolshevist authorities, was a very, very snail number, much lower than the Jews who occupied leading positions. The Prosecution has submitted a report from my Einsatzgruppe. In this report in Enclosure No. 2 it explained the situation of Jewry in the Crimea. Unfortunately this enclosure is not available. It would have shown that in the Crimea, for example, up to ninety percent of the administrative and leading authoritative positions were occupied by Jews. The information service in the sane field, conversations with innumerable Ukrainians and Russians and Tartars, and the documents which the Prosecution submitted show that this was not a sporadic happening in the Crimea. For us it was obvious that Jewry in Bolshevist Russia actually played a disproportionately important role.
Three times I was present during executions. Every tine I found the sane facts which I considered with great respect, that the Jews who were executed went to their death singing the International and hailing Stalin, that the Communist functionaries and the active leaders of the Communists in the occupied area of Russia posed an actual continuous danger for the German occupation which the documents of the Prosecution has shown.
of Stalin for ruthless partisan warfare would be followed without any reservation. Orally and in written from the Bolshevists have attested enthusiastically to the fact that this partisan warfare was not only waged by the Communist Party and not only by the Communist functionaries, hut as Stalin requested, it was waged by the population, by peasants, by workers, men, women and children. This same literature is proud of the fact that it was waged with great treachery, which the call of Stalin evoked in order to wage this war successfully. Thus our experiences in Russia were a definite confirmation of the Bolshevist theory and of the practice as we had learned about it before.
Q. What orders did you give for the security of the rear area in regard to killing of civilians?
A. Before I testify to the various facts, I would like to say the following: The men if my group who are under indictment here were under my military command. If they had not executed the orders which they were given they would have been called to account for it by me. If they had refused to execute the orders they would have had to he called to account for it by me. There could he no doubt about it. Whoever refused anything in the front lines would have met immediate death. If the refusal would have come about in any other way a court martial would have brought about the same consequences. The jurisdiction of courts-martial was great, but the sentences if the SS were gruesome. The orders for the executions in the East given in Pretzsch, went to all Einsatzgruppen commanders or Einsatzkommando leaders who went along during the beginning of the Russian campaign. They were never revoked. Thus they were valid for the entire Russian campaign as long as there were Einsatzgruppen. Thus it was, therefore, unnecessary at any time to give another order of initiative. Therefore, I did not give any general order of initiative and did not give any individual order to kill people. I emphasize this, even though I was told in England two and a half years ago that the Russians had found a written order. My mission was to see to it that this general order for executions would, be carried out as humanly as conditions would permit, Therefore, I Merely gave orders for the manner of carrying out these executions.
Q. What were these orders?
A. These orders had as their purpose to make it as easy as possible for the unfortunate victim and to prevent that the brutality of the men would lead to inevitable excesses. Thus I directed first that only so many victims would be brought to the place of execution as the execution commandos could handle. Any individual action by any individual man was forbidden. The Einsatzkommandos shot in a military manner only upon orders. It was strictly ordered to avoid any mistreatment, undressing was not permitted. The taking of any personal possessions was not permitted. Publicity was not permitted, and at the very moment when it was noted that a man had experienced joy in carrying out these executions it was ordered that this man may never participate in any more executions. The men could not report voluntarily, they were ordered.
Q. What did you do to prevent a wide interpretation of these orders?
A. It was forbidden that the commandos undertake any executions outside of the territory occupied by the German Army. This became necessary in Czernowiz. This was especially necessary after 10,000 Roumanians had been driven into the German area of occupation, and it became acute for Odessa, when the Roumanians tried to carry out executions beyond our orders. The commandos had the order during the execution of Communists to execute only these persons who by their proved deeds and conduct do definitely represent a danger to security. A family was never seized, neither by a high functionary nor by a commissar nor by any other person. If, on the other hand, it was said that children were executed at Kertsch this was done without any connection to the Einsatzkommando there.
Q. Why did you not prevent the liquidations?
A. Even if I used the most severe standard in judging this I had as little possibility as any of the co-defendants here to prevent this order.
There was only one thing, a senseless martyrdom through suicide, senseless because this would not have changed anything in the execution A this order, for this order was not an order of the SS, it was an order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and the Chief of State. it was not only carried out by Himmler or Heydrich. The Army had to carry it out too, the Supreme Command of the Army as veil as the commanders in the East and Southeast who were the superior corianders for the Einsatzgruppen and Einsatzkommandos. If I could imagine a theoretical possibility, then there was only the refusal on the part of those persons who were in the uppermost hierarchy and could appeal to the Supreme Commander and Chief of State, because they had the only possibility of getting access to him. They were, after all, the highest bearers of responsibility in the theater of operations.
THE PRESIDENT: May I ask a question, Dr. Aschenauer 7 the East, that is of the Wehrmacht, also had orders to carry out this program of execution?
THE WITNESS: I know that the Supreme Command gave the Supreme Commanders for the Eastern Campaign who had assembled on the 30th of March, not only information about the measures planned, but also directives to support the execution of these measures. The fact that SS and Police units were used for these executions had only one reason, namely that there was no guarantee for a systematic execution of these orders in the Army troops but that one expected demoralization if Army troops would be used, AS the war progressed in the Southeast this principle was abandoned.
THE PRESIDENT: Would you say that the Army commander not only countenanced this program of executions but lent their active support to it?
THE WITNESS: Yes, that is what I want to say. If I my give you two examples for that, the executions in Simferopol by the Einsatzgruppe 11-B were executed on the order of the Army, and the Army supplied the trucks and the gasoline and the drivers in order to bring the Jews to the places of execution. The arrests of hostages were expressly carried out by order of the supreme commander of my army. He did not agree with the executions of those hostages, because the numberof executions did not seem high enough to him and afterwards he told Seibert, the defendant here, to tell me that He himself would henceforth carry out the appropriate number of executions. from this order. sense, because in agreement with the army, we had excluded a large number of Jews, the farmers, from the executions. When the Reichsfuehrer SS was in Nikolajew on the 4th or 5th of October, I was reproached for this measure and he ordered that henceforth, even against the will of the army, the executions should take place asplanned. assembled all available commanders of my Einsatzgruppe. The Reichsfuehrer addressed these men and repeated the strict ordered to kill all those groups which I had designated. He added that he alone would carry the responsibility, as far as accounting to the Fuehrer was concerned. None of the non would boar any responsibility, but He demanded the execution of this order, even though he knew how harsh these measures were. pointed out the inhuman burden which was being imposed on the men in killing all these civilians. I didn't even get an answer.
order? and the possibility of appealing to a higher authority, but I had neither of them. this order by sickness? myself as an individual person who only could think and act responsibly for himself. After I had once become Chief of the Einsatzgruppe, I felt responsible for the 500 men of this group. By simulating illness, I could have evaded the mission, but I would have betrayed my men if I had left this command. I could not leave this task and I would not have been convinced that my successor would care for his men in the same manner as I did. I considered this which I was able to do for my men - despite everything, I considered this duty and I shall consider it today as much more valuable than the cheap applause which I could have won if I had at that time betrayed my men by simulating illness.
Q Did you issue orders of execution? executions?
A It is in three points. As far as the transportation conditions permitted, I convinced myself before the large executions whether measures had been taken at the place of execution, which would make possible the conditions I set down for these executions. ordered that other distant Kommandos be detailed to support that Kommando which had to carry out an execution, and through my men to carry out unexpected inspections during these executions, I wanted to make sure in that way whether my orders were being carried out about the manner of execution.
was, in the first place to follow the German Army into the Eastern territories and to kill Jews, Gypsies, political functionaries, communists, and other elements of the civilian population which were considered racially inferior or politically unwanted. Will you please comment on this?
THE PRESIDENT: Just a moment, please. That is a rather large question and it takes up, perhaps, another phase of the indictment. Suppose we have our recessnow? Recessfor fifteen minutes.
(A recesswwas taken.)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
DR. ASCHENAUER: I may repeat the last question, if it please the Court. BY DR. ASCHENAUER: was, first, to follow the German Army into the Eastern territories, and to eliminate with Soviet functionaries, Gypsies, Jews, and other elements of the civilian population which were considered racially inferior, or politically unwanted. Would you say something about that, witness? to eliminate groups of the population because they were racially inferior, and that was not the main task. It was an additional task which, in itself, was foreign to the actual task of the Einsatzgruppen and Einsatzkommandos, because never was such a task a task of the Security Police or of the SD for that matter - and never by any means, as it is mentioned in another place in the indictment, were they trained in such exterminations and executions. Rather the general task of the Einsatzgruppen and the Einsatzkommandos was that the security of the army territory in the operational theaters should be guaranteed by then, and within the framework of this security task the execution order was, of course, one of the basic orders. But, in reality, the Einsatzgruppen's task was a positive one, if I do not consider this basic order for exterminations and executions. It must be realized, of course, that a group of about 500 people who, on the average, had charge of an area of 300 to 400 square kilometers, could not terrorize such an area, even if they had wanted to do so. Therefore, if we regard it intelligently these tasks could only be called positive ones, and as such they were developed by myself. The first experiences I collected was when the task was transferred to us by the army to harvest in the Transistria. The larger number of Kommandos only dealt for weeks with this task of harvesting in Transistria, and I had assigned various tasks which were the basis of my policy altogether which were, first, the institution of a self-administration, as it were, in the communities so-called "Kolchos", and also in the municipalities; secondly, a recognition of private property; thirdly, the payment of wages which the population received for each fifth collection.
I guaranteed this wage, even to the Rumanian authorities. Fourth, cultural places were restored - that is, the population was supported in restoring the cultural centers and they were inspired to take up a new cultural life. It is not for me now to describe or disucss the success which this had with the populations of such places. I can only state that because of these measures the population was on our side, and they themselves reported any disturbances which might happen in these territories. Therefore, by this positive winning over of the population, the security of the territory internally could be guaranteed, and actually, in our territory a partisan resistance movement did not come into existence, but it was formed by external elements and was artificially extended. to the army about the atmosphere within the population, the reaction of the population to German measures, and what disturbances and damages happened in the area on the part of the Germans. In this manner plebiscites could be arranged which were useful to the population and which saved us any police measures. The situation in the Crimea was much more difficult, although I was there a longer time than any where else at a stretch, and I had the possibility to prepare political measures. Even here the increase of my positive measures succeeded in establishing a sort of confidence relationship between the population and the SD agencies. When, in January 1942, the danger arose that we would lose the Crimea, the Tartars, also the Ukrainians, voluntarily put themselves at our disposal for military service. The army left it up to me to deal with the political situa tion in the Crimea.