Expressed in one word, the difference between us was that I regarded politics objectively, and I wanted to make man the subject of politics While he regarded politics merely from a point of view of his own person and his tactical position, and he subordinated the facts to this tactical position.
If we judge the matter from the German point- of view, Himmler has not so much become a parasite of our own people for what he did, but for what he did not do. He had a power which has led to the terrible judgment of him and the SS, and in reality he did not exercise this power in Germany but he and his power were an empty shell, and in this we have the important element of his crime against humanity too, that through the police, through a unit like the SS, and later through his direction of the Ministry of the Interior, he would have had the power which would have enabled him to see the damage, and he would have had the possibility to remove this damage and to create a orderly conditions.
Q. Witness, you pointed out the difference between Himmler and yourself, How did it come about that in spite of this you returned to Berlin in June 1942, and took over Office III?
A. In June 1942, Heydrich was killed as a result of an attempt on his life. Himmler himself took over the leadership of the Reich Security Main Office with the clear intention of weakening it, because Heydrich was the only SS leader who had grown above his, Himmler's head. Technically, Heydrich was officially the Reich Protector and already on the official list of Reich authorities and ranked above Himmler. When Himmler was in charge of the Reich Security Main Office he weakened it in two important points. He took the economic authority from the Reich Security Main Office and transferred it to Pohl, the manager of the Economic Main Office, and he also took away the personnel authority of the RSHA and transferred it to the SS Personnel Main Office. Everyone who knows about offices and authorities knows what this weakening means. Himmler was not present at that time in Berlin, that is, the RSHA had no management, and no leadership. Thus he was forced to have the different offices working independently as the Office III, which, while I was in Russia, had no representative. I was, therefore, the only one of the management who, during his absence in Berlin, could direct the Office III. Furthermore, it was a tactical measure which, in my opinion, was to point up his weakening measure of the RSHA by taking away the Office Chief from the office and then instituting a person who had no authority, neither internally nor externally.
Q. What was the development of your relations with Himmler after this?
A. When I returned from Russia in July I was ordered to report to Himmler. In August he received me in his headquarters in a very friendly manner.
THE PRESIDENT: May we suspend just for a moment? There seems to be something wrong with the transmission here. We don't quite get all of it. I would like to speak to the interpreter here... BY DR. ASCHENAUER:
Q. We were just dealing with the question of the development of your relations with Himmler.
A. After my return from Russia I reported at the headquarters to report to Himmler about the situation of Office III. I was received in a very friendly manner, I was promoted to a Brigadefuehrer, and he told me that he planned to make me a Brigadier General of the Police. This friendly manner, of course, had its ulterior motives, because he went on with Heydrich's intentions by asking me to leave the Reich Group Trade and to become an official in the Reich Security Main Office. I explained to him that I had to ask him not to make me an official of the Reich Security Main Office, and not to make me a Brigadier General of the police, and why the Office III had remain an independent office under all circumstances, that is, it had to remain a party organization, and its members had to be party employees. I made it quite clear to him that the Party would never stand for a state organization taking over an information service in which the work of the Party would also be dealt with. I also made it clear to him that the SD could only tackle the task which he had talked about under the conditions that he would not give it the appearance of a police organization, because a police organization collected the most able experts of all departments, but these were not prepared to even give the impression that they were in any contact what so ever with the police.
Apart from that, through this connection between the state police and the SD, the most important task of the SD would be abandoned namely to be independent of any department, not to serve in any administrative or executive function, but to work without any individual responsibility and in no connection with other departments, but working completely independently because this, in itself, would justify the SD dealing with other subjects with its objective criticism, which, otherwise, would no longer be objective criticism and would be regarded as criticism of one department against another department. This, of course, led to a completely new disagreement. Himmler reproached me with very harsh words, and asked me to not try and teach him anything. He knew exactly what the purposes of the SS were, and what meaning the state protection corps had for him. I was dismissed in disgrace, and this was the second time in my activity of nine years in the SD that I had the chance to speak to Himmler himself. When Kaltenbrunner took over the office and became Himmler's successor in January 1943, Himmler spoke of the Office III and its chief with ironical words, and said they were the guards of the grail of National Socialism and of the SS who stood whining by the broken ideas and thought that now everything had been lost. Thus, we were publicly denounced as nuisances, pessimists, and defeatists. But it was only now that the actual crisis of the SD started because after Stalingrad conditions in Germany became more and more difficult. The more difficult these conditions in Germany became, the more critical, of course, became the reports of the SD, And now, Himmler was no longer prepared to approve of this activity on the part of the SD but, on the contrary, he used the complaints of his colleagues in the Reich Offices and pushed them on to the SD.
A. I'll give you a few examples. In the spring of 1943 Goebbels had tried through a theatrical attempt to gain the internal political power in Germany. It was the famous Sports Palace Speech, the declaration of a total war. Goebbels himself asked on that morning for a report of the SD on the effects of this declaration; and he got this report. In this report it was said that among the population of all Germany, in all districts, this declaration in the Sports Palace was disapproved of and disagreed with and that it was called a Punch and Judy show. This led to Goebbels' forbidding any spreading of these reports from all the Reich or part of the Reich. The reports from the Reich were these summaries of reports of all departments of the SD which were issued by us to all Reich departments and authorities and in the administrational practice of the Reich were the only source of information of the departments about difficulties of the remaining departments. With this the most important means of information of the SD was abolished and destroyed. that even Reichsminister Rammers and Goering, who, on pressure only, received these reports, were not in a position from their own reports which they received to overcome this defeatism. Gauleiter news service in the Party Chancellory had received these reports which I had issued against his power politics in Russia, He complained to the Reichsfuehrer SS, and the Reichsfuehrer SS wrote a letter to Kaltenbrunner in which he instructed him to dissolve the Office III and its subsidiary offices; to warn its chief; and to threaten him that if these unnecessary reports were not stopped, the SD, the news service, would be dissolved completely and the chief would be arrested. Bormann and Ley were the next people to take this direction. Ley immediately forbade the confidence men and the administrators of his office any collaboration with the SD. Because of the unjustified work of the SD, Bormann threatened to speak to the Fuehrer, which was to have the of effect that the Fuehrer would take the Chief of Office III where he belonged, and his people would be put to a more productive work.
also in 1944 forbade all Party authorities, all office chiefs in the offices down to the smallest menial clerk to have any activity within the Party. I mean the SD. This fight which Bormann put up remained in force until April 1945; and it was such a heavy fight that even Kaltenbrunner, who on the whole approved of my work, asked me urgently to stop the work on the Lebensgebiet (domestic) paper, or at least to camouflage the reports as reports of the adversary or sabotage reports. The reports of this kind regarding the leadership situation within the Reich which fell into the hands of the English showed the Allies that this manner of reporting was not given up in spite of all and in spite of the threats it was still possible to edit and issue the strongest reports about the leadership of the Reich, about the complete interior dissolution of leadership within the Reich, and about the collapse of the Luftwaffe and to submit them first by way of detour to the Fuehrer.
According to my knowlege that is the tragedy of the SD. These were the only reports which in the midst of the catastrophy were submitted to Hitler. I myself did not know Hitler personally nor did I over have the possibility of submitting a report to him or even of speaking to him.
Q. How did it come about that you were appointed into the Reich Economic Ministry?
A. My professional development was conditioned by my work in the Reich Group Commerce and Trade. This work gained importance and significance as it was meant for a group in the professional organization because the neighboring groups of the industries, the handicraft and banks and insurance companies and the transport groups did not have tasks which were handled by political people. They were not prepared to work in this very difficult sphere of the economical and armament ministries; and, as I entered this policy with political arguments, my own significance in economical policy was a much bigger one than can be understood from commerce and trade.
This was fortified by the fact that even in the economic ministry there were no political personalities who were prepared to discuss the differences with the Party, and the political person Speer, who was the confidence man of the Fuehrer. Thus in the years 1939 and 1940, from the Reich Group Commerce and Trade we were in charge of the economic, political situation; and we fought against all collectivistic and socialistic tendencies which were connected with the names Speer and Bormann.
Funk was in agreement with my activity. He especially approved of my work which I did in the face of the so-called self-responsibility of economy; that is, against the consequence that state authority as a state would vanish, and instead of the state economic leaders entered who took over the authority of the state, but at the same time they were competitors in competition with each other. Therefore, the possibility of corruption set in. But also it was one of the primary reasons for an economical loss of war because the competitor was no longer prepared to talk about its actual output to the competitor, and large masses of the people did not feel themselves confronted any longer with an objective state but with individual industrial beasts and monopolies. Therefore, the contrast between economy and the state became larger and larger. Funk approved of those reports of mine and therefore asked mo for my entry into the Reich Ministry of Economy. State in the Ministry of Economy. Himmler categorically refused my transfer into the Reich Ministry of Economy and for the very reason that caused Funk to ask for my transfer into the Reich Ministry of Economy. Himmler also recognized the significance of the economical development of the capitalism of monopoly as it had not been known until that date, But in a letter to mo he refused my own transfer into the Ministry of Economy, giving the reason that He did not want an 33 leader to be exposed in this economical fight against capitalism because this economical fight could not be waged within this whole world war.
After the Ministry of Economy collapsed in the summer of 1943, Funk again tried and through a tactful game succeeded in coming to a decision before Himmler; and Himmler now agreed.
Q. What was the effect of your last discussion with Himmler?
A. The relation with Himmler deteriorated even more; it had to deteriorate even more after this because my now duty in the Reich Ministry of Economy was added to the old crisis because what our predecessors had not been able to do now became our own task. We tried to force Pohl and his old Reich Economic Main Office to uncover the cards of the SS office; to play with open cards, as it were. We told him that we would not stand for the dissolution of this SS structure in Germany any more than we would in foreign countries. During the course of this discussion, together with Heider, the UnderSecretary of State in the Ministry of Economy, Himmler asked me to come to Berchtesgaden in the summer of 1944. He explained to us why this policy was not to be pursued by us in opposition to his economical activity. We refused any agreement; but he had already created conditions in Hungary by a deal with the Weiss-Konzern, securing the Weiss enterprise for the SS. As for us, the right was on our side in this case; and as normally he had nothing on us, he used the next occasion to begin a now correspondence of a very serious and criticizing, slanderous manner. The reason was the economical reform plan which I had drafted in the autumn of 1944. He intended in the economical field to establish an orderly administration. Himmler first agreed with that when Bormann objected because he was against any consideration on the part of the state and tried to prevent this; and furthermore he did not want a curtailment of the power and authority of the districts which he regarded as a measure against the Party.
Himmler now changed his opinion and agreed with Bormann. He disavowed my reform suggestions, which he said were academical reports, statements of an unnecessary intelligence.
But the end of our relations was of a different nature. In the last fortnight before the collapse I turned over my quarters in Flensburg and Ploen to Himmler. Only now did really serious discussions begin. Now he was more open to discussing matters with me. But even to say that these discussion were actually good discussions between Us-- only the end was more or less like the beginning because. at the end I tried to cause him not only to dissolve the Werwolf activities but also to dissolve the SS, and to go over and turn himself over to the Allies. In trying to cause him to do so, I put it t** that he alone could explain to the Allies the tasks which he had given to the SS in a responsible manner, and he would have to take this responsibility. He refused and escaped without saying goodbye.
DR. ASCHENAUER: I think this would he the right moment for a recess, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: I should like to ask a question. BY THE PRESIDENT:
Q. What was the date of this discussion with Himmler when the witness recommended the dissolution of the SS and the going over to the Allies?
A. That was the 9th of May, your Honor, 1945.
Q. Well, it was all over then, wasn't it?
A. No, it was not all over in a manner of speaking because the Flensburg government was in power, and the Allies had agreed to this so-called Flensburg government. This government was actually in power until the23rd of July 1945. They were officially in charge of Germany; of course, only in the manner of a district council. In this time between the 9th and the 23rd of May there were government reshuffles, as it were. Only on that date Himmler left the government as Reich Minister and as the commander of the subsidiary army. He had been of the belief that via his officer Schellenberg the Allies might negotiate with him and he might be used as a confidence man within Europe. From these conversations with Schellenberg via Bernadotte, the chief of the Red Cross in Sweden, with Churchill and the British government, Himmler really believed in it, until the day of his escape, even until the day before his death. Even after he escaped he sent me ordinance reports every day by which manner he tried to find out whether Schellenberg had returned from Sweden or whether Field Marshal Montgomery had answered the letter which he had sent on the 9th of May.
Q. But whoa you say that on the 9th of May you were discussing whether you should go over to the Allies, it's like the mouse discussing whether he should go over to the cat. You'd already surrendered.
A. Yes, but as I just stated, this small district of the Flensburg government, as it were, with the locality Muerwik and Gluecksbuerg, had not surrendered, because at that place there were official negotiations between the Control Commission of the Allies with the government and the chief of government of the so-called German Reich.
I may draw your attention to the fact, your Honor, that at the negotiations the Allies authorized Jodl, Keitel, and Friedeburg to remain the chiefs of government in this district Flensburg. This Chief of State with his government actually remained in force until the 23rd of May 1945.
Q. But you didn't seriously believe that you could successfully hold out against the combined Allied power after May 8, did you?
A. No, I think we must have misunderstood each other, your Honor, because I had only two intentions. One was to prevent SS units from being formed into underground movements. Therefore, I tried to cause Himmler to dissolve the SS officially and to order them to submit to fate, as it were; and as far as it would be possible to work, to work with the Allies positively. I also tried to cause Himmler to go over to the Allies and put himself at the disposal of the Allies so that he could tell them what the tasks were and of what nature they were, the tasks, that is, which he had given to the SS, and so that he could take the responsibility for them.
Q. Were you in daily contact with Himmler following May 8?
A. Yes.
Q. Until when?
A. At least until the 19th of May. I believe it must have been until the 21st, by ordinances. He had camouflaged himself and was living in a disguise under which he then was delivered into a prisoner of war camp.
Q. How did you submit yourself to the Allies?
A. When Himmler told me that I was afraid of myself and afraid for my own life then, I told him that I had already made up my mind to put myself at the disposal of the Allies and to take my own responsibility for what I had made of the SD. I could not leave it to anybody else to take responsibility for the activities of the SD; and although I had not been arrested when the rest of the government had been arrested in the afternoon, after asking three times for it, I achieved the status of being arrested.
Q. When was that? What date?
A. That was on the 23rd of May.
Q. Then they favored you by arresting you?
A. Yes, on the 23rd of May.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, recess until 1:45.
(A recess was taken until 1345 hours.)
(The hearing reconvened at 1345 hours, 8 October 1947)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session. BY DR. ASCHENEUER:
May I continue now, Your Honor. Witness, did you report voluntarily for the campaign in Russia?
A.- No, on the contrary. Twice I was directed to go to Russia, and twice I refused. Then I got the third order which I could no longer evade.
Q.- Why didn't Heydrich from the beginning simply give orders, it was certainly not customary to negotiate with any of his subordinates?
A.- He was forced to insofar as I was on call for the Reich Group Commerce -- I had a note in my military passport which obligated me in case of war, to be at the disposal of the Reich Group Commerce, therefore, it was necessary that this war order be superseded by Heydrich's order. This happened for the third time by order, so that the Reich Group Trade revoked this order. Now I was conscripted for the Reichsfuehrer-SS, the Army district giving notice of a secret mission for the Reichsfuehrer-SS and that I had gone into a foreign country. After that I was made available for the Reich Security Main Office. Now I was given a note in my military passport for the Chief of the Security Police and SD.
Q.- Please explain the legal situation of your membership in the SD, when you were conscripted in 1941?
A.- In 1936, I joined the SD. When I was given the job of building up a critical military information service or office. When this job was taken away from me I asked for my dismissal. This was refused to me in 1938.
I immediately was able to leave from the main position which I held there. The situation with the Chief of Security Police and SD was as difficult as in the other SS organizations, because one did not enter into a contract. It was merely an unilateral loyalty agreement, and in addition to a simultaneous joining of the SS, a condition of military subordination existed. One was at the same time a military subordinate. My renewel application for dismissal in November 1939 was again refused. By now the position of the Chief of Security Police and SD had become even stronger. In the meantime through a decree the Security Police and SD were listed as being on a war emergency status, and in the renewed decree it was added that even an application to leave this organization would be forbidden. This application was even punishable. In this manner it was no longer possible after 1939, even to file an application to leave. This last remark applied to a general condition, since through the wish of the Reichsfuehrer-SS I had the possibility in November 1939 to make a renewed application. This is when I was conscripted for the Russian campaign in 1941, I was not a voluntary member of the SD, or of the SD. I was conscripted for the campaign.
Q.- How did the formation of the Einsatzgruppen and the Einsatzkommando come about? Were they part of the agencies of the offices of the Secret Police and the SD?
A.- The Einsatzgruppen and the Einsatzkommando were neither agencies nor parts of the organization of the Office of the Reich Main Security Office. They were mobile units set up for one single purpose which were set up ad hoe for one certain employment. The members of the Einsatzgruppen and the Einsatzkommando were either conscripted or were taken from the members of the Security Police and SD. Or they were drafted to a large extent, for example, as drivers or interpreters, whereas, a large membership of the Einsatzgruppen, by order of Himmler, was made available by companies of Security Police and the Civil Police; these Einsatzgruppen and Einsatzkommando were no agencies or authorities but they were military units.
Q.- During the detailing of leaders and the men, were the purposes and the orders of the Einsatzgruppen made known to the men and the loaders when they were drafted?
A.- No, this was not done. The leaders and men were given an order to report to Deuben or Presch in Saxony. They did not get any information where they were to be committed, or what tasks they were supposed to do. Even after the units had been activated, the commanders and men did not know about it.
Q.- When was the area of operation made public?
A.- It was made known shortly before the units left for Russia, about three days before.
Q.- When was the order given for the luquidation of certain elements of the population in the USRR, and by whom was it handed over?
A.- As far as I recollect, this order was given at the same time when the area of operations was made known. In Pretsch the Chiefs of Offices I and IV, the then Obersturmbannfuehrer Streckenbach and Mueller, gave the order which had been issued by Himmler and Heydrich.
Q.- What was the wording of this order?
A.- This special order, for such it is, read as follows: That beyond our mission the Security Police and SD, the Einsatzgruppen and the Einsatzkommando had the mission to protect the rear of the troops by killing the Jews, Gypsies, Communist functionaries, active Communists, and all persons who would endanger the security.
Q.- What were your thoughts when you received this order of killings?
A.- The immediate feeling with me and with the other men was a general protest. Obersturmbannfuehrer Streckenbach listened to this pro test, and, even gave us a few different points which we could not know, but at the same time he told us that even himself had protested most strenuously against a similar order in the Polish campaign, but that Himmler had rebuked him just as severely by stating that this is a Fuehrer order, which must be carried out, in order to achieve the war aim of destroying communism for all times, therefore, this order is to be taken without hesitation.
Q.- Did you consider this order as correct?
A.- No, I did not. I did not consider it correct, because apart from the necessity of taking such measures, these measures would have moral consequences which are very damaging.
Q.- Did you know about plans or directives which had as their goal the extermination for racial and religious grounds?
A.- I expressly assure you that I neither knew of such plans nor was I called on to cooperate in any such plans. The Obergruppenfuehrer Barzelewsky testified during the big trial that the Reichsfuehrer-SS in a conference of all Obergruppenfuehrers made known that the goal was to exterminate thirty-million Slavs. I repeat that I was neither given such an order was even the slightest hint given to me that such plans or goals existed for the Russian campaign. This is not only true for the Slavs but this is also true for the Jews. I know that in the year of 1938, '39 and '40, no extermination plans existed, but on the contrary, with the aid of Heydrich, and by cooperation with Jewish organizations, immigarations from Germany and Austria were arranged; financial funds even were formed in order to help aid the poorer Jews to make this immigration possible.
In 1941 I personally helped in individual cases, where, for example, a representative of I.G. Farben called on me in order to overcome difficulties with the State Police. It was then their intention to let so-called bearers of secrets immigrate. Up to the very and I succeeded in giving such aid. Thus at the beginning of the Russian campaign I had no cause to assume that the execution order which we were given meant any sort of the beginning of an extermination or that any such extermination was planned or was to be carried out. During my time in Russia I sent a great number of reports to Chief of Security Police and SD in which I reported about the fine cooperation with the Russian population. They were never objected to. When Himmler was in Nikolajev in 1941 he neither made any reproaches about this, nor did he give me any other directives. I am rather convinced that where such an extermination policy was later carried out, it was not carried out by the order of the Central Agencies, but it was the work of individual people.
Q Did you give any thought to the legality of such a Fuehrer Order?
A Of course I did. I knew the history of Communism. From the theory of Lenin and Stalin and from the strategy and tactics of the Bolshevism World revolution, I knew that Bolshevism was to let no other rules prevail other than those which would further and promote its its aim. The practice of Bolshevism in the Russian Civil War, in the War with Finland, in the War with Poland, in the occupation of the Baltic Countries and Bassarabia, gave us the assurance and certainty that this was not only theory, but that this was carried out in practice, and in the same manner it therefore was to be expected that in this war no other laws would have any validity. This was true for the International Conventions which Russia officially denounced to the German government, as well as the international customs and usages of war, and, it was true because according to this same Communist Ideology the customs and usages could only develop between partners who were on the same ideological basis.
Just as the other class is the opponent internally who is to be destroyed by all means, according to the same ideology the other state which does not represent a Bolshevistic system is the external opponent which is to be destroyed, just as the class is to be destroyed internally. The rules in this are adjusted according to the state of emergency of the moment. In this respect it was clear to me that in this war against Bolshevism the German Reich found itself in a state of war emergency and of self-defense. What measures are to be taken in such a war to fight such an opponent on his own ground - to determine this could be only a matter to decide for the supreme leadership which waged this war for the life or death of its people; and, which, in my opinion, they certainly believed they waged also for Europe and even more for there was no doubt for us that the Four-Year Plan, as well as the events of 1938 and 1939, were nothing else for Hitler but the securing of the point of departure for this war against Bolshevism considered by him to be inevitable.
THE PRESIDENT: Witness, when you refer to the Russian practice in the war against Poland, were you referring to the war of 1939 when Russia was your Ally?
A Yes. This has nothing to do with it, or does not change the subject, the fact that Russia was our Ally at the time.
THE PRESIDENT: No, I am just asking if that is the war you are referring to?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Well, did Germany at that time also have the same practices?
A I do not know that this happened to the same extent. That violations took place cannot be doubted.
THE PRESIDENT: You believe that it was not as widespread as it later developed in your war against Russia? Is that what I am led to believe?
BY DR. ASCHENAUER: given to him?
A This is not possible legally or actually. According to the general legal interpretation in Germany, not even a judge had the possibility of examining the legality of a law or an order. As little as an administrative official can examine the administrative edict of a supreme authority. But even actually it would have been presumptuous because in the position in which every one of the defendants found themselves, we did not have the possibility of actually judging the situation. It also corresponds to the moral concept which I have learned as an European tradition, that no subordinate can take it upon himself to examine the authority of the supreme commander and chief of state. He only faces his God and history.
Q Didn't Paragraph 47 of the Military Code give you an occasion to interpret this execution order differently? created to prevent excesses by individual officers or men leaves open the possibility to consider the supreme order of the Supreme Commander a crime. Apart from this, again according to continental concept, the Chief of State cannot commit a crime. regarded these exterminations in the East?
A This seems to have several reasons. For one thing, the deeds in the Hast were published as being isolated excesses done by the SS. One took them out of their context and made the SS alone responsible. In reality these executions in the East were a consequence of total wax which was inevitable if a philosophy of one country prevailed which had as its goal the destruction of every resistance against their conquering the world with their idea. This war was not finished. The Reparations for a possible conflict seem to tell me that whatever happened in the East is only a prelude.
Another point. It has been customary so far to judge executions during a war by various standards. The theorizing element which made the execution seem honorable was the fight of man against man. This has long been overcome. The individual war opponents try to exterminate as many enemies as possible by preserving their own strength. The fact that individual men killed civilians face to face is looked upon as terrible and is pictured as specially gruesome because the order was clearly given to kill these people. I cannot morally evaluate a deed any better, a deed which makes it possible, by pushing of a button, to kill a much larger number of cirilians, men, women and children, even to hurt them for generations than those deeds of individual people who for the same purpose, namely, to achieve the goal of the war, must shoot individual persons. I believe that the time will come to remove these moral differences in executions for the purposes of war I cannot see that political factors and political and economic conventions, which in their consequences cause the execution of and acts of violence against and misery for millions of people have done anything better morally only because the conscious consequences were not expressly made known to the population.