1. The evidence has shown that the DWB-Konzern was definitely transformed into a Reich concern only in March, 1943, when the capital was increased. Up to that time the DWB-Konzern had been a party concern administered by SS leaders. This transformation, unnoticed in its consequences, into an enterprise of the Reich, and the elimination of the financial hopes and economic power plans of the SS are considered by me as an exclusive merit of mine. I therefore did not see to it that the DWB-Konzern produced funds for the SS, but saw to it that the SS lost power over the funds of the DWB-Konzern. This is the very opposite of what the Prosecution has asserted.
2. In its final plea, the Prosecution, lacking the knowledge of legal rules and regulations appertaining to Reich concerns, adopted the view that this transformation of an SS enterprise to one of the German Reich was entirely irrelevant; the Reich ministries were just as criminal as the SS. The IMT, it is true, passed a different finding, and the serious consequences which arise from a transfer of an SS-enterprise to the Reich have been illustrated by my defense counsel. But apart from this I must say here that I myself have never met anyone who might have pointed out to me: You must first of all, when opposing the National Socialist State, not tackle this task first but that; compared with other more important tasks the crushing of power of the SS has only a secondary significance. It is easy to talk about these things afterwards. It is still my view that my work was not only as dangerous, but even more valuable than if, for instance, I had distributed antiNational Socialist pamphlets. If I had done the latter, then, the Prosecution, no doubt, wouldn't have introduced me as a defendant into this defaming trial. In reality it was less important what was done in order to oppose National Socialism but that one fulfilled any task of that nature at all. It remains incomprehensible to me that the Prosecution expected from me the fulfillment of tasks, for instance, involving the lot of the prisoners, which, due to lack of professional possibilities, could not be fulfilled by me.
3. It is a peculiarity of this trial that the Prosecution is partly using the same arguments in order to establish close connections with the WVHA which were used by the SS at the time; but the SS used them without success trying to get power over me at the time. It will probably be a unique case that several SS leaders, amongst them two who are today still free, were interested in the negative progress of my fate, and used affidavits which proved that they made an official agreement which would implicate me in Nurnberg. They are deliberate, untrue representations of the facts. For instance, that the Reich Ministry of Economics and not the SS had in 1943 forced the end of my activities as an accountant was greated with pleasure by the Prosecution, which was in a statement of Pohl's, that the very opposite was the case, is intentionally kept out by the Prosecution. This says explicitly that my transfer to the troops corresponded to an old scheme, and that no other reasons existed for my leaving my position as an accountant. Something similar applies to testimonies given under oath during the trial which were deliberate untruths told by an SS leader to the effect that I had been a superior to the employees of the DWB. The exact contrary staled by the Chief Pohl and all other available non-SS employees of the DWB was unfortunately not recognized and appreciated by the Prosecution.
4. There is one thing that the Prosecution cannot accuse me of, and that is that at any time I had any sympathies for National Socialism or the SS, formally or factually. Every other man who had been working against the Party would no doubt have been given the benefit of a certain amount of camouflage by the Prosecution. Yet I am asked to use a form of expression in my written statements which would show my opposition to the SS in all clarity. They asked me as a natural consequence of this to subject myself to the risks of prosecution and arrest.
They asked me for more than they would ask from themselves under similar circumstances. The fact that with much luck I escaped the fate of extermination by the SS appears a sort of guilt in the eyes of the Prosecution.
5. The tragicness of my case is contained in the fact that the aim not achieved by the SS at the time has now been achieved with the assistance of the American prosecutors in any case, no matter whether I am condemned or not. Whoever has faced a military tribunal in Nurnberg is a branded man in Germany, and that applies particularly to my profession.
6. Up to now I had been convinced that I had made a more than inconsiderable contribution to the combatting of National Socialist power. That was no treason against Germany. After I had heard from Auschwitz, it was my natural duty as a responsible German. My contribution consisted in the opposing of the plans of the SS regarding an economic enterprise owned by the SS. My contribution furthermore consists in the uniformation of important anti-Fascist circles regarding the events at Auschwitz. I raised a warning voice to the threatened anti-church propaganda of the Nordland Publishing firm. I warned against the danger of further measures to be introduced by Himmler against certain anti-National Socialist sections of the population, and pointed out that the crematories in Auschwitz had certainly not been built in order to come to a standstill too soon. This type of activity was doubly dangerous to me as a non-Party member, since I was twice as suspicious and under twice as much observation as other people. The fact alone that the Prosecution considers the death sentence as the only just punishment shows that they did not succeed to enter into the train of thoughts, possibilities and dangers of those who during the war carried out deliberate activities in opposition to the SS. Otherwise such a request would have been impossible.
This high tribunal will therefore understand my attitude of resigna tion, since without feeling guilty at any time I lived through this trial.
May I merely request this high tribunal to at least put me on that level with those Germans during the pronouncement of these findings, who, during the National Socialist regime, contrary to me, showed political lethargy and inactivity.
THE PRESIDENT: The Defendant Baier.
DEFENDANT BAIER: Mr. President, Your Honors, I am quite sure this Tribunal knows that contrary to the promises given me I was torn from my profession as a teacher. Within the framework of the war measures I was transferred into the WVHA as a soldier. It has been my intent in the course of this trial to beautify nothing, to always tell nothing but the truth. I have at all times tried to fulfill my duty towards my country, and I have always dealt with all jobs assigned to me correctly.
Looking back at my life, I have no reproaches to make myself. Never did I intentionally harm a human being, regardless of nation, race or religion. I can make this statement in good conscience before God. That things of tremendous wretchedness occurred in the concentration camps is a shaking realization that arose during the course of this trial. I had no part in them, and this is my honest conviction I need not mention that I be acquitted of these crimes.
THE PRESIDENT: The defendant Volk.
DEFENDANT VOLK: Your Honors, after a hundred days of trial have passed, the guilty men responsible for soiling Germany's honor with tyranny and murder are to be brought to justice. These high tribunals are to mete out judgment to the worst war criminals. The Prosecution counts me amongst those persons since they put me in this dock.
Until the outbreak of this war I was not a member of the WVHA. A military order of the supreme command of the armed forces put me into a position against my will for which I have now to face responsibility, as a captain in the Waffen-SS and a legal man. The files of my work have been at the disposal of the Prosecution in twelve crates which have not been handed over by me, and there are no gaps.
The officials of the Prosecution have submitted from this material, covering a period of four years, about ten documents on which I had worked as a legal expert in the civil legal sphere or which I had written after having taken down the minutes. Your Honors, know this material in detail. None of the witnesses for the Prosecution knew me, nor could any of them report a crime supposedly committed by me.
Sine ira et studio, I have spent many a sleepless night during this trial, asking myself as a jurist and a man: "Are you really a war criminal?" In application of the controversial existing laws, I could neither answer this question in the affirmative, morally nor legally, but from my conscience I feel clean.
Like millions of other young Germans I followed the military order and obeyed my oath of allegiance. In spite of the greatest qualms with regard to the political system. I trusted the leaders which came into power without my will and without my assistance, and I followed them, and I have been immeasurably disappointed and deceived. When fulfilling my tasks as a legal man, I followed truthfully the teaching of my teachers and considered the fate of those concerned as important as my own. It was in keeping with those principles that I acted. Therefore my actions could have been nothing but humane. As a jurist I know no collective judgment of human beings. I valued everyone according to his actions, because in my view only individual judgment will lead to just findings with regard to a man. I have told you the truth because as a jurist an oath is particularly holy to me, nor did I have to be afraid of the truth.
Your Honors, I know that you are facing a very difficult task, that you are passing judgment in a foreign country, the language of which you do not understand and the authoritarian government administration and economy of which you have not experienced yourselves. You come from a happy country, the people of which had no worries about food, not even during war.
Your towns were not bombed night after night. Your women and children did not tremble day and night in fear of their lives. In your country, and contrary to Germany, free exchange of view has been possible even since Thomas Jefferson, and has been the basic pillar of your constitution.
I have correctly told you though my belief in political leadership has been deeply shaken, I still believe in the justice of judges, even if they belong to a country which has not yet signed a peace with my Fatherland. I do not consider the judge a servant of the law; I consider him a servant of justice. It is for that reason that I, as a German, place my fate and that of my family calmly into your hands.
THE PRESIDENT: The Defendant Mummenthey.
DEFENDANT MUMMENTHEY: Mr. President, Your Honors, I have nothing to add to the arguments of my counsel, Dr. Froeschman, as to the individual counts of the indictment in this trial.
If I, nevertheless, may use of this privilege to deliver a personal statement, I will do so in the following respects:
I am here before this High American Court as a German. I trust that what I have done will be locked upon and judged according to the conditions prevailing then in Germany and not as nowadays - ex nunc - they are expected to have been. I could neither minimize nor exaggerate my position within the German Earth and Stone Works, DEST, G.m.b.H., and the WVHA, but I could only present it the way it really was. The picture which the prosecution gives of my position does not correspond with the facts, in spite of a few features which seem to support the assertions of the prosecution.
My activities with the DEST from 1939 to 1945, took place at a time of a generally stormy development and almost exclusively during war. These facts can only be fully appreciated by those who experienced them themselves. The DEST was not an enterprise for the exploitation of defenseless human beings nor a slave labor enterprise. I must object to this with all my heart, not only for my own sake, but also for the sake of my collaborators. What we regarded our goal was the fulfillment of an economic task in the field of the stone and earth industry, connected with an attempt to solve a social problem. This social problem, the rehabilitation of criminal and anti-social elements within human society still remains unsolved.
This fact is very clearly shown in the essay by Herbert Blank with the title, "Behind the Lattice", in the Northwest German Magazine, issue 9 of 1946. If it does not contradict the rules of this high Tribunal, I should like to submit a copy of this essay.
Out of almost 11 years of custody in the Third Reich for high treason, the author spent four years in penitentiaries of the Administration of Justice. From his experiences and observations of that time, he proposes a reform of the system of infliction of punishment, according to which, instead of penitentiaries, camps should be established. He continues, and I quote, "One should not be scared by the fact that during the Hitler time the camp was corrupted.
All this speaks against Hitler, but nothing speaks against the camp, against the possibility, to reconvert in the open air psychologically sick people to useful and healthy fellow-creatures." Bland calls this problem "one of the most important for our future" and he states: "Not only the money, but first of all the security of every individual is in danger, if we do not succeed in finding a reasonable form of the infliction of punishment for the days to come."
The single proposals of Blank - is this an irony of fate?- correspond exactly to the then plan of the DEST. If a former inmate of concentration camps and a prisoner of prisons of the Administration of Justice, arrives himself at such a proposal, I conclude, that what the DEST planned and carried out within the range of possibilities could not be wrong and never could have been something damnable.
I have never had a criminal intent, let alone practiced such. My economic activity was filled with social ideas, born out of my nature.
That we could not reach our aim in the DEST is the tragedy of my own life and that of my collaborators. However, it is no proof that the ways and ends were blameworthy, or even criminal.
Since in this trial, a special problem, namely the treatment of the Jews, plays a special part, I want to add something in connection with this point. Though I don't think I have any Jewish relations, I nevertheless, never regarded them as human beings to be treated in an inhuman way or even to be killed. The loyal attitude towards the Jews in my family may be illustrated by the fact that my father, up to the end, in the banking house managed by him, employed a half-Jew in a leading position though the Kreisleiter of the NSDAP under threat had ordered his dismissal. I have an affidavit dealing with this fact. The only reason why my counsel did not submit it was that this did not have anything to do with my activity in the DEST.
A Jew, Leopold Goldschmidt, recently in public said this: "The Jewish obligation being that of a minority, should consist in reserve and adaption, while the Christian obligation should consist in patience and indulgence." May the present and future realize what the past has missed. May finally take the place of hate, what two thousand years ago from the Orient came as a light into the darkness of the world.
My fate is put into your hands, Mr. President, and Your Honors. May God help you find the just verdict.
THE PRESIDENT: The Defendant Bobermin.
THE DEFENDANT BOBERMIN: Your Honors, the trial has come to an end, the Jurist becomes silent; the accused man has the word. Man speaks, but will he be understood? Those who lovingly occupy themselves with foreign languages, know how difficult it is often to find a word, a sentence of one language for the word, the sentence of another, which must have the same meaning and the same touch.
Even greater than the difficulties of language are the difficulties of human understanding. Romain Rolland, who became one of the best Europeans, and yet remained a good Frenchman, fifty years ago wrote the following:
"Knowledge can only be obtained at the price of many errors, much suffering, and unfortunate experiences."
However, are suffering, errors, and unfortunate experiences not different for all the nations? And knowledge and understanding are not the same in the case of all the nations. Only those who knew the conditions in Germany during the war can rightly understand the actions and behavior of individual Germans. Yet beyond all understanding, even for us Germans, there remains the murder of human beings in and outside concentration camps, beyond all events of war. They fill me with the same horror and fright as any other decent human being.
My life was devoted to service on economy. I considered it fortunate that in the first years of the war I could work in this sphere in order to alleviate the destruction brought about by the hard necessities of war. I had no reason, therefore, to be dissatisfied with the tasks given me by military order.
I will stand by the principles of inviolability of private property. The sentence of Jean Jacques Proudhomme, "Possession is theft", I cannot recognize. What I myself once owned I had to work for too much and save under too much deprivation not to realize the value of protection for my property, which has become the booty of the victors.
I did not propose the confiscation of the brick works. At that time I was working elsewhere. I did not decree the confiscation. For that I did not have the power nor did I carry it out. That was a matter for other offices. At that time, however, I asked myself "Can you administer the property of others ordered by the State, but for the sake of the owner?"
I answered this question with "Yes", because with that "Yes", I did not infringe upon the limits of the principle of private ownership, which I had adopted. The limits of private ownership cannot be drawn as clearly in industry as with goods for personal use.
Those who take part in the production and earn a living through it and who need the products, have a claim to them.
Through my work, I have given work and bread to more than 10,000 people who worked as free men in their home countries and I have satisfied the needs of hundreds of thousands of people and I cannot recognize a crime in that.
Where confiscations of plants presented difficulties for the owners of the plants, I showed human understanding for the social safeguarding. It was not my fault that in one of the 400 plants which I supervised, some concentration camp inmates worked beside several hundred free workers, this was done against my suggestion, nor could I prevent it. The powers which I had to improve the living conditions and the feeding so that it was more like that of the free workers, those I used. During the last year of the war I did my duty as a soldier in service at the front. Without reason the prosecution has raised the charge against me that during that time I had participated in crimes against humanity. They failed to supply the proof, since that assertion did not concur with the truth.
I acted towards enemies and allies, against soldiers and civilians in a manner as is compatible with the laws of war and customs of war, with the moral and the Prussian tradition for soldiers and for officers.
In one of the finest books Franz Werfel holds that no cam can separate himself from the fate of his people, even if he wishes to be a world citizen.
In this book Werfel describes in a moving manner the fate of the Armenian people. The knowledge which is to be drawn from that experience is a generally human one.
I am a German and Germany's fate is my fate. During 2½ years of a prisoner's life, I have seriously examined my conscience to see if I was guilty.
I did not do this narrowly, adopting a national point of view, but I adopted the point of view of a decent human being, as I have always considered myself to be. I consider myself as innocent today as I did on the day of the arraignment.
The decision as to whether I am guilty according to the laws valid today is in the hands of this High Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: The Defendant Klain.
DEFENDANT KLAiN: May it please Your Honors, generally speaking, I have nothing to add to the arguments of my defense counsel, Dr. Bergold. I would simply like to deliver a personal statement, namely that I never did want to commit crimes and that I never did commit crimes. I had nothing to do with those horrible things uncovered before this Tribunal and I had nothing in common with them. The fate which has befallen my family under the past regime was horrible. I should like to remind you here that my sister and her husband were amongst the victims of the regime and that my father out of shame and worries suffered an early death. Furthermore, that the proceedings against my person did not come to an end, is only due to the fact that the system was already beginning to disintegrate, I knew my family's attitude very well. Please be convinced that this explains well enough why I never participated in crimes which were committed against concentration camp inmates because considering the threat of persecution by the State regarding my family, I would not have but helped to prepare the fate of my relatives.
During all these years when I had been imprisoned, namely since 12 April 1942, I have again and again examined this question. However, I could not find myself guilty, not even towards my relatives, though my conscience is still more sensitive as to my family.
This, Your Honors, please bear in mind when judging my case.
THE PRESIDENT: This concludes the statements which the law provides the defendants may make at the conclusion of the proofs. The Tribunal wishes to take this occasion to comment all defense counsel who have appeared in this case for their high professional conduct throughout the trial.
Each attorney has been zealous in protecting the interests of his client and in spite of the handicaps, of which the Tribunal is fully aware, has skillfully and adequately presented his evidence. Moreover, each attorney has shown to the Tribunal an attitude of respect and cooperation, which has been extremely helpful in our difficult task. We shall take away with us a high opinion of the lawyers in Germany.
The court will stand adjourned without day to be reconvened upon notice.
(The Tribunal adjourned until further notice).
Official Transcript of the American Military Tribunal in the matter of the United States of America, against Oswald Pohl, et al, defendants, sitting at Nurnberg, Germany, on 3 November 1947, 0900-1630, Justice Robert M. Toms, presiding.
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the Courtroom will please take their seats.
The Honorable, the Judges of Military Tribunal No. II.
Military Tribunal II is now in session.
God save the United States of America and this Honorable Tribunal.
There will be order in the court.
THE PRESIDENT: Case No. 4, the United States of America against Oswald Pohl and others, the case is before the Tribunal this morning for the reading and entry of the final judgment in the case.
Judge Musmanno is filing a concurring opinion which the SecretaryGeneral will file.
(Judge Musmanno handed his opinion to the Secretary-General.)
Judge Phillips will read the first part of the opinion.
UNITED STATES MILITARY TRIBUNALS SITTING IN THE PALACE OF JUSTICE, NURNBERG, GERMANY AT A SESSION OF MILITARY TRIBUNAL II HELD NOVEMBER 3, 1947
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA : : - vs - : : OSWALD POHL, AUGUST FRANK, GEORG LOERNER,: HEINZ KARL FANSLAU, HANS LOERNER, JOSEPH : OPINION AND JUDGMENT VOGT, ERWIN TSHENTSCHER, RUDOLF SCHEIDE, : MAX KIEFER, FRANZ EIRENSCHMALZ, KARL : Case No. 4 SOMMER, HERMANN POOK, HANS BAIER, HANS : HOHBERG, LEO VOLK, KARL MUMMENTHEY, HANS : BOBERMIN, AND HORST KLEIN, :
Defendants.
United States Military Tribunal II was established on the 14th day of December 1946 by General Order No. 85 of the United States Military Governor for Germany. It was the second of several Military Tribunals constituted in the United States Zone of Occupation pursuant to Military Government Ordinance No. 7, for the trial of offenses defined as crimes by Law No. 10 of the Control Council for Germany.
Under the Order which established the Tribunals and designated the undersigned as members thereof, Military Tribunal II was ordered to convene at the Palace of Justice, Nurnberg, Germany, and to hear and determine such cases as might be filed by the Chief of Counsel for War Crimes.
Telford Taylor, Brigadier General, U. S. Army, Chief of Counsel for War Crimes, on the 13th day of January, 1947, filed an indictment against the defendants herein named, in the Office of the Secretary General of Military Tribunals.
A copy of said indictment in the German language was served on each defendant on the 13th day of January 1947, except for the defendant Georg Loerner, who was served on the 14th day of January 1947. More than thirty days after said indictment was served on each defendant, Military Tribunal II arraigned the defendants in the Palace of Justice, Nurnberg, Germany, on the 10th day of March 1947. Upon arraignment, each defendant entered a plea of "Not Guilty" to all the charges preferred against him. Prior to the arraignment, each defendant was assigned German counsel of his own selection and each defendant was represented by his counsel during the arraignment.
On April 8, 1947, the prosecution began its presentation of evidence. At the conclusion of the prosecution's case in chief the defendants began the presentation of their evidence. The submission of evidence and the arguments of counsel were concluded on the 20th day of September, 1947. The personal statements of all of the defendants were heard on September 22, 1947.
During the trial of the case, the Tribunal sat for 101 sessions, (on 101 different dates, including date of arraignment; also, including a one-half day joint session with all Tribunals in bank.)
During the trial the prosecution offered twenty-one witnesses, the Tribunal itself called one witness, and the defendants offered forty-five witnesses, including the eighteen defendants themselves, a total of sixtyseven witnesses.
In addition, the prosecution put in evidence as exhibits, a total of 742 documents; the defendants put in evidence as exhibits a total of 614 documents, making a grand total of 1356 documents received in evidence. The entire record of the case consists of more than 9,000 pages.
Copies of all exhibits offered in evidence by the prosecution in its case in chief were furnished in the German language to the defendants before the same were offered in evidence.
During the entire proceedings each defendant was present in Court, except when a defendant was absent for a short time upon his own motion, owing to illness, or other reasons.
Counsel for the defendants made numerous applications to the Tribunal for the purpose of procuring the personal attendance of persons who had made affidavits on behalf of the prosecution. If at all possible, the Tribunal granted such applications and procured the personal attendance of such persons in order that they could be interrogated or cross-examined by defense counsel.
The trial was conducted generally along the lines usually followed by the trial courts of the various States of the United States, except as to the rules of evidence. In compliance with the provisions of Article VII of Ordinance No. 7, great latitude in presenting evidence was allowed prosecution and defense counsel, even to the extent at times of receiving in evidence certain matters of but scant probative value.
The trial was conducted in English and German with an adequate sound system for conveying either language to all participants and listeners. All proceedings on the trial were reduced to writing in English and German, and an electrical recording of all proceedings was also made.
The tribunal was most diligent in its efforts to allow each defendant to present his defense completely, in accordance with the spirit and intent of Military Government Ordinance No. 7. Counsel for each defendant was permitted to cross-examine witnesses of the prosecution and other defense witnesses and to offer in evidence all matters deemed of probative value.
THE JURISDICTION OF THE TRIBUNAL The jurisdiction of Military Tribunal II is determined by Law No. 10 of the Control Council for Germany.
The pertinent parts of this Law with which we are concerned provide as follows:
Article II "1. Each of the following acts is recognized as a crime:
"(b) War Crimes: Atrocities or offenses against persons or property constituting violation of the laws or customs of war, including but not limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor or for any other purpose, of civilian population from occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or private property, vanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity.
"(c) Crimes Against Humanity: Atrocities and offenses, including but not limited to murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape, or other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, or persecution on political, racial or religious grounds whether or not in violation of the domestic laws of the country where perpetrated.
"(d) Membership in categories of a criminal group or organization declared criminal by the International Military Tribunal.
"2. Any person without regard to nationality or capacity in which he acted, is deemed to have committed a crime as defined in .... this article, if he was (a) a principal or (b) was an accessory to the commission of any such crime or ordered or abetted the same or (c) took a consenting part therein or (d) was connected with plans or enterprises involving its commission or (e) was a member of any organization or group connected with the commission of any such crime..."
The indictment in this case contains four counts and is filed pursuant to these provisions.
Count I - The Common Design or Conspiracy The first count of the indictment charges that the defendants, between January 1933 and April 1945, acting pursuant to a common design, unlawfully, wilfully, and knowingly did conspire and agree together, and with each other, and with divers other persons, to commit war crimes and crimes against humanity as defined in Control Council Law No. 10, Article II.
During the trial each of the defendants challenged this count of the indictment, and moved that the same be quashed and stricken from the indictment. The defendants alleged in their motions that under the basic law the Tribunal did not have jurisdiction to try the charge of conspiracy as a separate substantive offense. The motion to quash was argued by counsel for the prosecution and defense and thereafter the Tribunal granted the motion. In order that this judgment may be complete, the ruling of the Tribunal is incorporated in this judgment:
"It is the ruling of this Tribunal that neither the charter of the International Military Tribunal nor Control Council Law No. 10 has defined conspiracy to commit a war crime or crime against humanity as a separate substantive crime; therefore, this Tribunal has no jurisdiction to try any defendant upon a charge of conspiracy considered as a separate substantive offense.
Court No. II, Case No. IV.
"Count I of the indictment, in addition to the separate charge of conspiracy, also alleges unlawful participation in the formulation and execution of plans to commit war crimes and crimes against humanity which actually involved the commission of such crimes. We, therefore, cannot properly strike the whole of Count I from the indictment, but, insofar as Count I charges the commission of the alleged crime of conspiracy as a separate substantive offense, distance from any war crime or crime against humanity, the Tribunal will disregard that charge.
"This ruling must not be construed as limiting the force or effect of Article 2, paragraph 2 of Control Council Law No. 10, or as denying to either prosecution or defense the right to offer in evidence any facts or circumstances occurring either before or after September, 1939, if such facts or circumstances tend to prove or to disprove the commission by any defendant of war crimes or crimes against humanity as defined in Control Council Law No. 10."
Inasmuch as the offenses charged in the unstricken part of Count I are repeated in substance in Counts II and III, the entire first count may for purposes of this judgment be disregarded without detracting from the contents of the indictment as a whole.
Counts II and III - War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity The second and third counts of the indictment charge the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity.
The counts are identical in content, except that in Count II the acts which are made the basis for the charges are alleged to have been "committed against the civilian populations of occupied territories and prisoners of war", whereas in Count III the criminal acts are alleged to have been "committed against German civilians and nationals of other countries."
With this distinction observed, both counts will be treated as one and discussed together.
Counts II and III allege, in substance, that between September 1939 and April 1945 all of the defendants herein named "were principals in, accessories to, ordered, abetted, took a consenting part in, and were connected with plans and enterprises involving the commission of atrocities and offenses, including but not limited to plunder of public property, murder, torture, illegal imprisonment and enslavement, and deportation to slave labor of, and brutalities, atrocities and other inhumane and criminal acts against thousands of persons."
The indictment further avers that all of the defendants were associated with the Main Economic and Administrative Department, commonly known as the "WVHA" which was one of the twelve main departments of the SS.
The indictment more specifically charges the defendants with war crimes and crimes against humanity, as follows:
The defendant Oswald Pohl was the head of the WVHA and the defendants August Frank and Georg Loerner were his deputies. The WVHA was divided into Amtsgruppen, which were inter-related in their operations, purposes, and functions.
Amtsgruppe A, among other things, was responsible for financial matters of the SS, including those relating to its concentration camps. This Amtsgruppe was sub-divided into five offices or Aemter, which were charged with responsibility for certain parts of the entire financial administration. The defendants Frank and Fanslau were, successively, heads of Amtsgruppe A. The defendants Hans Loerner, Frank, Vogt, and Fanslau were heads of offices or Aemter within this Amtsgruppe A.