Whoever has his statements refuted, in so far as they can be checked, cannot expect that those parts that cannot be checked shall be believed.
I come now to the testimony of the Witness Bielski. The former concentration camp inmate Bielski, who was heard as a witness by this court, stated under oath during his examination on 14 April of this year that he recognized the defendant Sommer as the man who in the first part of 1944 killed two prisoners at concentration camp Auschwitz with a brick. In identifying Sommer, Bielski stated that the defendant Sommer was at concentration camp Auschwitz from 1942 until 1944 as labor allocation officer, and that he was a Hauptsturmfuehrer, had often ridden in a heavy motorcycle with a side car, usually carried a dog whipp, was known for his brutality and famous for his method of cracking skulls. During cross examination, Bielski declared that he had seen the Defendant Karl Sommer very often in different seasons about 20 to 30 times, perhaps more often.
The question of whether he had actually seen any peculiarities in the uniform and the manner in which Sommer had walked Bielski denied. These statements are contradicted by the following facts:
1. The defendant Karl Sommer was never labor allocation officer and at no time did he belong to the personnel of Auschwitz camp.
Sommer was only twice altogether in Auschwitz and, moreover, only once in the concentration camp. These two visits of Sommer to Auschwitz took place before and after the time given by the witness Witness Bielski at which time the murders described by him were alleged to have taken place. The 1st visit took place in the summer of 1943 on the occasion of a labor allocation meeting in Auschwitz. At the same time the concentration camp was inspected by all of the people taking part in the meeting and the second visit to Auschwitz was in October 1944. That time Sommer did not set foot in the concentration camp at all and besides, Bielski, according to his own statement was no longer in the concentration camp Auschwitz at this time.
It was only on 20 April 1944 that Sommer was promoted to Hauptsturmfuehrer. Therefore, at the time when he was supposed to have committed the murders in Auschwitz he was not yet Hauptsturmfuehrer.
4. Sommer never wore the official uniform prescribed for SS officers. On account of a war injury he could not wear high hoots and without exception wore long trousers. For that reason, Sommer is very distinct from other officers.
5. The defendant Sommer did not use a motorcycle either in his duty in Oranienhurg or during his visit in Auschwitz. None of the camp personnel in Auschwitz used a heavy cycle with side car during their duty.
6. The defendant Sommer is not a man who uses force. He is generally characterized as friendly, decent and correct, kindly disposed towards, and possessed of, far-reaching human consideration for the concentration camp inmates.
There is no doubt whatsoever that the witness Biolski saw the defendant Sommer here in the courtroom in Nurnberg for the first time in his life. The witness who asserts that he saw Sommer 20 to 30 times, perhaps more often, who says he remembers details like the dog-whip alleged to have been carried frequently by the defendant Sommer, cannot remember seeing the defendant Sommer one with long trousers instead of high boots. That would be quite understandable of Sommer had he only worn the long trousers by way of exception instead of the boots prescribed as uniform for SS officers. Sommer, however, never wore high boots as an SS officer because of his injury he could not wear them. This fact has struck, everyone who had anything whatsoever to do with Sommer, except the witness Bielski! No reasonable man would demand that Bielski should have noticed this state of affairs if, according to his story, he only saw the defendant Sommer occasionally at the murders alleged to have been committed by him. While Bielski asserts that he saw the defendant Sommer at least 20 to 30 times, he maintains that he was always seeing him at different seasons of the year and according to different statements Bielski saw only non-commissioned officers in long trousers in the concentration camp Auschwitz! In other words, what struck everyone because it must strike them - did not strike Bielski. It could not strike him because he never saw the defendant Sommer in the concentration camp Auschwitz.
The Prosecution, too, could obviously not avoid the impression that Bielski's statement is incorrect because defendant Sommer did not belong to the personnel of the Auschwitz concentration camp as labor allocation officer or in any capacity whatsoever. They tried to save Bielski's statement by construing the possibility of frequent official journeys on the part of Sommer to Auschwitz.
This possibility is eliminated by the unequivocable manifestations of the witness Rammler and further by affidavits of Maurer, Mueller and Schultz.
All attest that Sommer went on official journeys only on rare occasions. Sommer and Maurer declare that Sommer was only twice in Auschwitz. From the statements of the witness Caesar it becomes evident that on a possible visit to Auschwitz, Sommer could not have obtained a motorcycle for himself in order to travel around in the camp. And even if Sommer, as the Prosecution thought, had a reason, as Maurer's deputy, to undertake frequent official journeys to Auschwitz to solve problems of labor allocation, then in the logical course of events Sommer would only have had to deal with the camp headquarters. This, however, was situated outside who actual concentration camp. It is not possible to see what could have caused Sommer to walk around in the protective custody camp, or ride around in a motorcycle. On, - what advantage could it have been to Sommer to enter a room suddenly and strike down an inmate who was secretly cooking potatoes for himself, or to slay an inmate with a brick who just did not happen to be working when he noticed him in passing by? Whether an inmate secretly cooked potatoes for himself, or another inmate, while working, looked up from his work and did not work - certainly is a thing which could not have interested Sommer as an outsider - quite apart from the fact that Sommer could not enter any concentration camp without being accompanied by someone sent with him by the camp commandant office. Therefore, he could not possibly move about freely in a concentration camp. In the description of the two murders, however, not a word is mentioned of Sommer's escort. Only on other occasions does Bielski maintain that he saw the defendant Sommer escorted by other persons. The murders asserted by Bielski can only have been committed, if at all, by a member of the camp personnel. And there is no doubt that Sommer did not belong to the camp personnel.
From all these arguments the impossibility of connecting the defendant Karl Sommer with murders in the Auschwitz concentration camp, as done by Bielski, is evident; but then, the question arisesHow did Bielski come to make this statement, and how was it possible for him to identify the defendant Sommer here in the courtroom?
Bielski neither saw nor ever heard of the defendant Sommer in the Auschwitz concentration camp. Therefore, it is not possible but that Bielski learned something about the defendant Sommer while he was here in Nurnberg as a witness. Originally I suspected that Bielski, in describing the murders alleged to have been committed by the defendant Sommer, was quoting more or less faithfully the book by Kogon, "Der SS-Staat". Both descriptions of the brute Sommer have so much in common! Not once is the dog-whip missing.
By the witnesses Rammler and Pook, as well as by the confirmation of the English camp management of the internment camp Neuengamme it has become evident that in the Auschwitz concentration camp at the time in question there was a block leader by the name of Sommerer. According to the statement of Rammler this Sommerer was pointed out by former members of Auschwitz concentration camp as having been extremely brutal. It can be safely assumed that Bielski knew this block leader Sommerer and, when he heard the name of the defendant Sommer here in Nurnberg now, connected the two with each other. Bielski further asserted that the had a very good memory. And the prosecution expressly had Bielski confirm that he trained his memory, particularly for names. Nevertheless, it happened that Bielski gave the labor allocation officer Sell the name "Held". Because the two names of Sommer and Sommerer sound alike, the confusion is possible, and this has become evident from the affidavits of Rammler and Pook. To establish which of the defendants is Sommer, then, required no magic on the part of an interested party.
I refer only to the brochures which are published for Allied visitors to the Nurnberg trials. In these brochures the names of the defendants and the order in which they are seated in the defendants' dock are given. Also everything of interest in the indictment and concerning the personality of the defendants can be seen from this brochure. It is an obvious assumption that Bielski saw this brochure. From it Bielski learned that Karl Sommer, who was a defendant, had something to do with labor allocation and was an SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer. However, these two facts did not fit the description of block leader Sommerer, who was obviously known to Bielski. Bielski was not beaten. He described the defendant Sommer simply as labor allocation officer of the Auschwitz concentration camp and it looks as if for this purpose Bielski's block leader had to change the name Sommer for the name "Winter".
I refer here to page 361 of the German transcript. That Bielski could identify the defendant Sommer only on the grounds of information received here in Nurnberg and pictures which he saw before is evident from the fact that Bielski, in the light of repeated questions of the defense, as well as the prosecution, as to whether before the interrogation he had seen pictures of the defendants, in particular of the defendant Sommer. Yielding to the pressure of the Prosecution, later on, however, Bielski admitted that in fact pictures were submitted to him and that, for the last time, hardly an hour before he disputed that fact here under oath. This statement made about an alleged misunderstanding to explain his previous opposition is not true. It is impossible that in the question of the defense he made a mistake about, or misinterpreted the words "submitted" and "shown". According to the agreement in the wording in the German and English records of this session, my first question to the witness Bielski with reference to the pictures was:
"When have you seen the last photograph of the defendant Sommer?"
This question contains neither the word "submitted" nor the word "shown." The question itself, because of its clear meaning, could not be misunderstood at all. The witness Bielski did not misunderstand it either, as it becomes evident from his answer which, in accordance with the precise corresponding wording of the two records reads:
"I have not seen photographs at all. " The witness Bielski, with this answer intentionally and deliberately lied.
Bielski did intentionally and deliberately answer the question of the defense whether during the time between the interrogation on the previous Friday and the beginning of the Monday session he had talked with any member of the prosecution. There is no doubt about that from the answer of the witness. What is more, Bielski, could not have misunderstood the question on this matter addressed to him. He had the incredible audacity to deny these two facts flatly as being incorrect to the prosecutor who himself had submitted pictures of the defendants, among them of the defendant Sommer, too, to him, and with whom he had talked immediately before the Monday session. He just denied these two facts as being incorrect.
The witness Bielski was clearly conscious of the fact that he had never seen the defendant Sommer at Auschwitz, and that he quite wrongly accused the defendant Sommer of the murders at Auschwitz. He naturally know best the source of his knowledge about the personal appearance of the defendant Sommer. With the questions of the defense and of the prosecutor Mr. Robbins, when he asked Bielski, he saw his edifice of lies crashing to the ground if he replied truthfully. Therefore, the incredibly bold denial of facts which he had to admit later at the instigation of the prosecution.
Court No. II, Case No. 4.
If Bielski knew the block leader Sommerer and saw the latter commit murders which he then attributed here to the defendant Sommerer it may well be that originally the similarity in the names caused Bielski to confuse the two persons. That, however, in fact, the two persons are not identical, Bielski knew, at the latest, the amount he saw the defendant Sommer here. Considering the photographs furnished by the camp management of the internment camp Neuengamme of the former block leader Sommerer, which are attached to the Document Sommer No. 37 Exhibit No, handed over by me -- there is no confusion possible between the two persons. If Bielski did not know block leader Sommerer, then the whole story about the murders in Auschwitz with which Bielski tried to incriminate the defendant Sommer are to be regarded as pure invention. Be that as it may - insofar as the witness Bielski connected the defendant Sommer with murders in Auschwitz he committed sheer perjury. And, to prevent this perjury from coming to light, Bielski committed additional perjury by denying that he ever saw photographs of the defendant Sommer.
The statement of Bielski as a witness can never be the basis of proof of built against the defendant Sommer. The evidence has shown quite clearly that the defendant Sommer did not commit the murders with which he is charged and that he could not have committed them at all.
I am now coming to the question of guilt.
THE PRESIDENT: You have taken much more than the allotted time. You have had an hour and a quarter this afternoon, and you had at least a half hour before lunch. Is there anything that you can omit?
DR. BELZER: I would only like to read statements on the questions of guilt, which will take approximately ten minutes. Then I shall refer to the contents of my final plea.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, how much more time all together will you need?
DR. BELZER: Approximately ten more minutes.
THE PRESIDENT: All right. Go ahead.
DR. BELZER: The defendant Sommer, when accused by the prosecutor that he only remembered events he wanted to remember, stated here on the witness stand that he entered the stand in order to speak the truth. And no one able to see and hear the defendant in the three days when he was being examined and cross-examined was able to resist the impression that Sommer actually spoke the truth. Sommer was also not averse to speak of matters he did not have to mention, as the prosecution would never have been aware of them without the defendant's willingness to speak the truth. The statements made by defendant Sommer could not only not be refuted but they have been proved from all points from evidence presented by the defense. Sommer's statements in their entirety must, therefore, be the basis for the evaluation of the evidence and especially for the examination of the question of guilt.
Sommer considered concentration camps as a special form of imprisonment and an instrument used by the state in its preventive battle against crime. Neither during his civilian employment with the German Earth and Stoneworks Ltd. lasting for about a year, nor during his later employment in the Office D II, did the defendant find cause to change his opinion.
Sommer never became aware of the fact that people were taken to the concentration Camps simply to supply working power. He affirms most distinctly that he never saw an order or directive from which he could have gained the knowledge that it was the aim and purpose of the concentration camps to torture people or to work people to death. It would never have entered the defendant Sommer's mind that the labor allocation of the concentration camp inmates could in any way be brought into incompatibility with the moral law. He only became acquainted with the accomplishment of labor allocation within the framework of the regulations also applicable to prisoners of justice. To him, having no insight into the methods of sending people into the concentration camps, it was impossible to imagine a difference between prisoners of Court No. II, Case No. 4.justice and concentration camp inmates.
Sommer was never able to observe in any way that the labor of concentration camp inmates by Office D II, acceding to orders by Pohl, was carried out under inhumane conditions, either in their work with SS agencies or in industrial plants. On the contrary, anything Sommer heard and saw at the Office D II in regard to the accomplishment of labor allocation was adjusted to the aim of maintaining the efficiency and increasing the interest of the concentration camp inmates in their work. While in the witness stand the defendant made detailed statements in regard to measures taken in this respect. These measures had not been put down on paper but influenced the life at the camp and the treatment of the inmates favorably in a very large measure as none of the former inmates testifying here as witness was able to deny seriously, and as it has all been comprehensively thankfully acknowledged by the former inmates Gross and WeissRuthel in their books. The defendant Sommer could not become aware that work under slave-like conditions was involved herein.
It has never come to the defendant Sommer's attention that prisoners of war were taken into the concentration camps, and that they were then allocated to work from there by the Office D II. However, it was well known to him that civilians from abroad were sent to the concentration camps. Sommer heard just as little of the reason for their imprisonment as of that of the inmates of German nationality. All premises were lacking for the defendant Sommer to decide whether, and in how far, labor allocation of foreign concentration camp inmates was contrary to the international law, and especially the Hague Convention. These questions can only be answered from one case to the next. Prime requisite is knowledge of legal regulations and the manner of work for which they are allocated. This knowledge could not be expected from Sommer according to his education and rank in office. In the fight for life and death in which the German nation had been involved since 1941 against Russia, in the fight which, according to official German propaganda was not supposed to be a fight of Germany but a fight of Europe to guard Court No. II, Case No. 4.itself against Bolshevism, a man like Sommer, who believed in this propaganda and who, according to all he had seen and heard in his youth had to believe, could never realize that the drafting of foreign laborers and even of concentration camp inmates to work in this fight against Bolshevism which threatened German and European culture could be something immoral, objectionable or criminal.
The defendant Sommer cooperated as a co-worker of the Office D II which managed labor allocation as executive agency, according to orders issued by General Plenipotentiary Pohl in the accomplishment of labor allocation of the concentration camp inmates. Sommer had, as already stated above, no authority whatsoever to make decisions. Everything he did was carried out according to orders given to him by his Chief of Office Maurer. Responsible for all that happened at the Office D II can be, aside from Pohl and Gluecks, only the Chiefs of Office Maurer and Moser. In the accomplishment of the concentration camp inmates labor allocation nothing happened at the directive or order of Sommer. Sommer could not, and he did not, give a directive or order of this kind. Due to his absolute subordinate position Sommer had neither the power, nor did he have the opportunity, to direct the labor allocation of the concentration camp inmates into different channels if he had recognized same as unjust, not to mention preventing same from taking place or preventing them all together. What he knew about the labor allocation could not, for moral reasons, cause him to try to get away from the Office D-II.
With reference to the remainder of my statements with regard to the questions of guilt, and in particular with regard to the statement to count 4 of the indictment, Membership in a Criminal Organization, I would like to refer to my defense speech and I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of that.
I am now coming to the conclusion of my final plea.
In the judgment against the former Field Marshal Milch this Tribunal has expressed the principle in its Findings in the following words, and Court No. II, Case No. 4.I quote:
"We must band every effort toward suggesting to the people of every nation that laws must be used for the protection of people and that every citizen shall forever have the right to a fair hearing before an impartial Tribunal, before which all men stand equal. We must never falter in maintaining, by practice as well as by preachment, the sanctity of what we have come to know as due process of law, civil and criminal, municipal and international. If the level of civilization is to be raised throughout the world, this must be the first step. Any other road leads but to tyranny and chaos. This Tribunal, before all others, must act in recognition of these self-evident principles. If it fails, its whole purpose is frustrated and this trial becomes a mockery. At the very foundation of these juridical concepts lie two important postulates: (1) Every person accused of crime is presumed to be innocent, and (2) that presumption abides with him until guilt has been established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
"Unless the court which hears the proof is convinced of guilt to the point of moral certainty, the presumption of innocence must continue to protect the accused. If the facts as drawn from the evidence are equally consistent with guilt and innocence, they must be resolved on the side of innocence. Under American law neither life nor liberty is to be lightly taken away and, unless at the conclusion of the proof there is an abiding conviction of guilt in the mind of the court which sits in judgment, the accused may not be condemned."
I trust that the Honorable Court will also apply these guiding principles in the case of Sommer. The Finding can only be Not Guilty followed by the acquittal of the defendant Karl Sommer, and so I beg the Honorable Court to find.
THE PRESIDENT: We are going to take a ten-minute intermission and then we will hear the plea on behalf if Hohberg from Dr. Heim. We wish to serve notice on you now that we will start keeping clock keeping a time - and when you have actually used an hour and thirty Court No. II, Case No. 4.minutes the hammer will fall and the argument will be over.
Now, you can time it any way you like within one hour and thirty minutes.
We will take a short intermission.
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal will recess for ten minutes.
(A recess was taken.)
THE PRESIDENT: Now we have arranged a schedule here, and I am glad that so many of you are hear at the present time. This afternoon we will hear the final plea of Dr. Heim for the defendant Hohberg, and asmuch of the argument for Pook as we have time to hear up to five-thirty and then finish in the morning. The following are ready, or will be ready tomorrow; Pook, Tschentscher, Scheide and Eirenschmalz tomorrow. Now I have talked to Dr. Gawlik and suggested to them if they see fit that they submit their arguments in written form; neither of them are as yet translated, and I have assured than I want their clients to know that if the argument is submitted in writing instead of being delivered over the sound system, that it will be carefully and thoroughly read by the court, and can be done more deliberately, and we probably will get more out of it than from merely listening to the argument here. I think their clients are fully protected in every respect if that is done, and they have agreed to do it. I told them that I would explain to their clients that they lose nothing by the arrangement, and perhaps even gain something. Now this naturally leads to the suggestion to any of the other counsel that if they wish to follow the same procedure, with their closing arguments translated in English, and do not deliver them here, they will get careful and deliberate consideration and study. I am not urging you to do that, and please do as you think best, but if there are other counsel who wish to follow the same plan as Dr. Gawlik and Dr. Fritsche, the court will have no objection. Now, you can think it over. You don't have to decide now, because we are filled up for tomorrow, but if on Saturday morning any other counsel washes to follow that plan, there will be no objection by the Court. Now don't think that you are being forced to do it, because you may do whichever way you like.
DR. HAENSEL: May I venture to make one proposition. I am convinced that things which I have put down in my final speech are more easily read than heard, and I shall be entirely satisfied if the Court merely reads it, but I have another request to make.
It is only natural that in the course of the speech by the prosecution, as well as of my learned colleagues, one or the other problem has arisen which has not as yet, or perhaps could not be dealt with entirely exhaustively, and I would, therefore, ask that instead of a written speech, the perusal of which I leave to the Court, I could be given for discussion of these intricate problems about half or three-quarters of an hour; in that case I could do without the reading of my speech; and then all I think should be said in that period of time. I would speak freely and the interpreters would follow. If that were agreeable to the Court, I should be grateful if I could do it tomorrow sometime. Perhaps in the afternoon. If you could give me thirty minutes at any time, or perhaps tomorrow morning, if you prefer.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Haensel, the schedule for tomorrow has already been announced. Would you like to do that on a Saturday morning?
DR. HAENSEL: May I venture to remark this. As my colleagues have one hour and a half each, and four times an hour and a half make six hours, and coinciding with the day with recess, before that, we have the speeches tomorrow for an hour and a half each, the last would be unfortunately cut into two parts, because the time is not quite sufficient. Therefore, if three colleagues are speaking tomorrow one hour and a half each, that would make four and one-half hours, and as quarter of an hour recess in the morning, and quarter of an hour in the afternoon, we would have enough time for me if it would be agreeable both to the court and my colleagues.
THE PRESIDENT: I think we will slip you in tomorrow, Counsel for Pook will be finished tomorrow, and he won't finish unless I stop talking, and when he finishes then you can speak for thirty minutes.
DR. HAENSEL: Yes:
THE PRESIDENT: And then we will take three others, which will finish the day.
DR. HAENSEL: If I understand you correctly, after Pook's counsel has finished, Pook will last an hour and a half.
THE PRESIDENT: No, no, because he has some this afternoon. You see, he has sometime this afternoon. Let's leave it this way. Hohberg finishes this afternoon.
DR. HAENSEL: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Pook partly finishes this afternoon and then completes tomorrow morning.
DR. HAENSEL: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, and then comes Dr. Haensel.
DR. MAYER: Dr. Mayer for the defendant Kiefer. May it please the court, I shall try tomorrow or Saturday morning to get my translation ready for my final plea, and to have the official translation, so I can put it at the disposal of the interpreter, and he can then follow me without difficulty. I should be grateful if the court would agree to this manner of delivering my final plea as soon us there will be time.
THE PRESIDENT: That will be on Saturday then.
DR. MAYER: Yes, quite.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Then after Haensel, it will be Pook, Haensel and Hoffman. All right, Dr. Heim.
DR. HEIM: Dr. Heim for the defendant Hohberg. May it please the Tribunal, before I shall deliver my final plea, I would like to draw the court's attention to the fact that because my request was turned down, namely, to be given more time than an hour and a half, it will be possible for me to read all of my plea. In the case of single paragraphs, which I shall, therefore, not read, I shall give a brief explanation of the contents, and I should ask the Tribunal to read the paragraphs and take notice of them.
The case of the defendant Dr. Hohberg is entirely different from the cases of the other defendants; different not only because he was never a member of the Party, or of the SS, but also and in the first place never belonged to the Economic and Administrative Main Office, and, as auditor of the DWB, resolutely opposed the aims of the SS, and did what he could do to break the economic power of the SS, and to contribute with all his strength to the overthrow of the national socialist system.
Since Count I of the indictment, the conspiracy has been dropped by decision of the Court, the indictment against the defendant Hohberg now rests only on Counts II and III - war crimes and crimes against humanity.
The forms of participation according to Control Council Law No. 10, the next paragraph, I shall not read for reasons mentioned. In fact , I have analyzed the form of participation under control Council Law No. 10, having been given in comments, inasmuch as it applies to this trial.
I shall continue on page 4 of the German Text. Before I shall evaluate these lines, will you please allow me to give you a fair summary of Hohberg's professional career, and give his attitude, his character, and ideology.
Born in Alsace as the son of a clergyman, the defendant received from childhood a strictly protestant and liberal education. His youth was influenced by the intensive work of his father for an understanding between the German and French peoples. His mother is of French nationality. The defendant was member of a Christian school-association and a Christian students union. His personal way of thinking was influenced in a way by his working during his vacation as a worker in factories and mines and by acquiring social and socialistic ideas in the course of his university studies.
On account of his education and professional attitude Hohberg was "from the beginning a pronounced adversary of National Socialism and always preserved these ideas of his". His political and economic ideas as well as his religious attitude made it impossible for him to join, inform or in fact, the NSDAP or one of its affiliated organizations, All the time he gladly put up with all the professional disadvantages resulting from the fact that he was not a Party member. It may be pointed out that among the Germans holding, during the Nazi period, any position of some importance there was only quite a small percentage of people who were not member of the NSDAP.
After passing his university examinations Hohberg worked as an auditor with various firms and auditing companies and finally as a tax expert with the Reich Finance Administration in Berlin. When his name was put forward there for admission into the Party so that he might be taken over as a Regierungsrat, he resolutely declined the invitation. This setback suffered in his professional career caused Hohberg to leave the service of the Reich Finance Administration, after having passed the examination as an auditor. Then the defendant was an official examiner of accounts and leader of the Koenigsberg branch of the Wirtschaftsberatung A.G. Berlin; this was an accounting firm that was generally known for its antinational socialistic attitude and as a refuse for Jewish members of that profession. In Koenigsberg Hohberg was repeatedly called up by an old friend named Weiffenbach. This man asked him, as well as his colleague on the Vorstand, the SS Fuehrer Moeckel, to establish himself in Berlin as an independent auditor with the aid of a large auditing job.
Next, Hohberg undertook to audit the Reichverein fuer Volkspflege und Siedelerhilfe e.V. as a trial case. During the final discussions in connection with the audit he met Oswald Pohl who was a Gruppenfuehrer at that time. Pohl proposed to Hohberg, through Moeckel, that he should take over, as the official examiner of accounts, all the auditing that the law required for the enterprises that Herr Pohl controlled.
Hohberg accepted the offer after a long period of hesitation, when Herr Pohl assured him that he did not require Hohberg to join the Party, leave the Church or limit his professional independence.
A contract was made between Pohl and Hohberg on 10 May 1940; this was an auditing and counselling contract. This contract provided that (1) Hohberg should carry out the audits that were required by law, for Pohls enterprises, (2) Hohberg was to counsel the management on business questions dealing with commercial law, taxes, and laws concerning prices and foreign exchange, and to see to it that these affairs were handled according to law. Besides this, the contract provided for salary, accounting assistants to be provided by Pohl, the office space and also the limit for the property bond of Hohberg.
Hohberg also made the usual public accountants agreement with Pohl, that is, a contract agreement and not and employee agreement. According to German law Hohberg was not obligated by his contract agreement to perform certain services, but solely to make the audits required by law and give business advice to the companies. Hohberg's agreement did not place him in the position of an employee of the WVHA in any way. As a certified public accountant he would have been prohibited by law from having such a position, because he would have automatically lost his qualifications for being a certified public accountant.
Hohberg did not remain an independent C.P.A. The auditing job he got from Pohl was not the only work he did between 1940 and 1943. Pohl's account was one among several; to be sure it was the largest. This is why he had two offices; one, his own accounting office at Darmstatterstr. 2, Berlin W 15, and another in the rooms of the DWB for the audits of Pohls' enterprises.
The fact that Hohberg took private auditing jobs during this time, besides auditing Pohl's enterprises, is also evidence that he was not an employee of Pohl's, but rather remained an independent C.P.A.
It may seem peculiar that the defendant, who was and remained an outspoken opponent of national socialism, accepted a far reaching auditing job for SS enterprises. However, the conclusion can in no way be made, from this fact, that Hohberg concurred with the business goals of the SS or that he adopted SS ethics as the basis for his own thinking. Hohberg was motivated by very different reasons to accept this auditing job. It enabled him to become an independent accountant and to return from the country to Berlin, where he later tried to be accepted as an unsalaried lecturer at the Technical Institute in Berlin, by writing a paper on international fiscal law. Furthermore, he had become very excited over auditing the Reichverein, because it was mere than interesting to him to find out what was done and planned in these radical national socialist circles of the SS, At that time there was no reason for moral or political objections, because Pohl had described the economic goals of the SS as purely social to Hohberg.
After the agreement had been signed, Hohberg began to make the audits as required by law. As agreed, civilian clerks from the WVHA were put at his disposal for these audits; later soldiers from the Waffen SS were also assigned as accountants. These persons, however, were not subordinate to him as far as discipline was concerned, but only in technical matters.
The mentality of the SS was already known at that time to be so selfish and unreliable that Hohberg would not have dared to hire the accountants at his own financial risk. A contract with the SS did not carry the same weight as the usual contract in civilian life.
But the defendant soon saw that the pre-requisities to carry out the legal audits were lacking, because the enterprises in part had made no tax returns for years, had an incomplete bookeeping system and were many months behind in their postings.