But apart from this fact defendant Fanslau was not among those men who were aware of an Alleged criminal purpose of the Waffen-SS. The Waffen-SS to him was a purely military unit with military tasks and military aims. He himself regarded himself as an officer and not a political official. After he heard of atrocities of any kind he regarded them as excesses against which strong measures had to be taken, but not for the expression of a criminal system. I refer here to the testimony of witness Felix Steiner who gave us these details about discipline, and the observation of military customs within the Viking Division. Even if isolated units of the Waffen-SS were used to carry out criminal tasks it is also certain that it was not the SS as a whole or an organization which according to its aims and program was to serve criminal aims.
b. Nor can the WVHA be regarded as a criminal group in the sense of the sentence of the IMT.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Stackelberg, the only criminal group this involved is the SS isn't it? The WVHA was not determined to be a criminal group by the IMT?
DR. STACKELBERG: As I understand it, your Honor, I think a certain group was declared to be criminal within the SS.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, certainly not the WVHA.
DR. STACKELBERG: No, but I am looking for this group. I am trying to find out which group was declared criminal by the IMT because the IMT has said those members of the SS are criminal who belonged to that group, but the IMT has not said that the WVHA, or that the Waffen-SS, or the Verfuegungstruppe, was criminal, or was that group, What I am trying to point out, your Honor, is that not the whole SS has been declared to be criminal.
THE PRESIDENT: Oh.
DR. STACKELBERG: That according to the sentence of the IMT only those members of the SS were declared criminal who become, or were, members after the 1st of September 1939 and who were members voluntarily and who knew about the crimes in the SS; not all members are criminal.
THE PRESIDENT: Not all members, but does not the IMT judgment refer to the Waffen-SS only?
DR. STACKELBERG: The judgment of the IMT refers, I think verbally to"that group in the SS."
THE PRESIDENT: In the Waffen-SS.
DR. STACKELBERG: In the SS, nob the Waffen-SS, your Honor. I think in the whole SS.
THE PRESIDENT: I think the fair implication is that there was meant certain members only of the Waffen-SS.
DR. STACKELBERG: Yes, Your Honor, yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you agree with me on that?
DR. STACKELBERG: I agree with you on that, yes.
DR. VON STAKELBERG: I believe I can skip the paragraph concerning the WVHA in this connection. Number 4, to continue on Page 34: The result that the defendant Fanslau was not a member of the group within the SS which had been declared criminal is further borne out if we briefly look once again at his career and what he did during various periods of time.
In 1931 the defendant Fanslau, who was then 22, joined the NSDAP and the Allgemeine SS under the impact of the world economic crisis of the time during the course of which he had become unemployed, from the time of the autumn of 1930 on. Between 1934 and 1938 he was in the administrative service of the SS in a variety of official positions. Between 1st March 1938 and 21 June 1938 he worked on the budgets for the SS special task units, the Verfuegungstruppe. After that he became the administrative officer of the SS for Verfuegungstruppe and after that of the Viking Division.
From the time of 1st February 1942 he was a member of the WVHA, his tasks being purely military ones. As Chief of Office A/V he was only in charge of military tasks in the personnel department concerning officers and men of the Waffen SS. within the scope of field A/V/1 was the personnel data of CO's and members of Officer Group A,B,C, and D, as well as those of the female clerks. In the field of task of A/V/2 personnel data of the administrative offices were kept. The field of task cf A/V/3 consisted of the training and education of administrative officers. All that was done in A/V was a purely military activity and was roughly the same thing as was done by the personnel office of the army administrative office. The training also of the administrative officers was done on principles issued for the army.
The defendant Fanslau thought it was particularly important to describe a promotion of his officers not as increased privilege but merely as an increase in duty and recommended to the newly appointed officers honorable conduct, fairness, self-discipline, and chivalry.
As the deputy of Office Group A the defendant and Fanslau had only formal tasks to fulfill such as signing travel vouchers; permissions to use cars; but he did not have the authority to issue orders. Even after he was appointed Chief of Office Group A in May or June 1944,there was a very little change in his position.
After the curtailments and cutting down of personnel in the administration of the tasks of the troop administration had been so much reduced that the position of Office Group A was scarcely necessary from a factual point of view, the office chiefs of Office Group A continued to submit the few things which they could not decide on themselves directly to defendant Pohl. Such a practice was observed after defendant Frank had joined the police administration in 1943. Office A/1 after that was no longer in charge of budget problems. We then had an open and unlimited budget. The agencies and units did not have to report their requirements of money to WVHA. They could draw direct from the Reich Bank or the Wehrmacht Main Treasuries. The inevitable expenses could be taken care of by the agencies to an unlimited amount, and no permission of the part of WVHA was necessary.
THE PRESIDENT: When was the open budget established, Dr. Von Stakelberg?
DR. VON STAKELBERG: I am not quite sure of the date, your Honor; but I think it became clear in this trial that it happened at the time when Fanslau was chief of the office group. It was then already in practice. Unless I am very much mistaken, it must have been roughly in February of 1944. At that time the simplification measures had been
THE PRESIDENT: I think it was earlier than that, wasn't it?
DR. VON STAKELBERG: Yes, perhaps it was earlier. I'm not sure. Perhaps it was earlier. All I know as that the open budget was in force when Fanslau became Chief of Office Group A.There were only two administrative officers working in Office A/II. They had scarcely any factual task to fulfill. The Chief of Office A/II had been transferred to the field unit because he had nothing left to do.
The legal office A/III worked only on car accidents and compensation. The purchase of land had been discontinued in wartime. In the whole of Office A/ III, there was only one administrative officer apart from the office chief who was also chief of an office in another office group. Office A/IV, finally, was no longer located in Berlin at that time. Codefendant Vogt had his own post office outside Berlin, and incoming and outgoing mail was no longer dealt with by the WVHA. The current auditing had been completely discontinued and spot tests locally had been almost completely discontinued. Administrative officers and NCO's of that office on the basis of the cutting down of personnel had been reduced by eighty per cent and transferred to the field unit.
He himself regarded the most important thing in his life as being an honorable soldier without any political speculations; and in wartime he advocated decent conduct and decent treatment of the civilian population. (Affidavit Egle, Defense Exhibit Fanslau 25.) To fulfill purely military tasks in good faith without knowledge of any criminal purposes could never be regarded as criminal.
I may refer here to what the presiding judge said on 10 July 1947. "There's nothing improper in supplying guards in concentration camps with ammunition. They were SS soldiers and they needed arms and ammunition. There's nothing improper in that." Judge Musmanno added, and I quote: "I should like to add, Dr. Hoffmann, that it depends on whether the defendant knew that the ammunition had been used in an improper and inhumane manner, that the guards shot down inmates; but simply supplying ammunition is certainly a legal affair during the war." These sentences might also be applied to the military conduct of Fanslau. If, therefore, the group declared to be criminal according to the terminology quoted above of the IMT consists in cooperation for criminal purposes, I might state in summation that in the typically military attitude and activity of defendant Fanslau such contribution to criminal purposes cannot be seen.
5. Moreover, the IMT has expressly insisted that knowledge must exist that the SS had been used for criminal activities. My learned colleague Dr. Haensel in his trial brief of 3rd August 1947 analyzed analogously the principles of conspiracy and said that knowledge of that type must have been consent. A similar result is arrived at if you regard the crime of membership as an independent accessory because to assist a criminal entails knowledge of the intention and why the crime is committed. In Part B of my plea I have already discussed the point that defendant Fanslau had no knowledge of the crimes charged to the SS. On the contrary, wherever he saw excesses -- which we regard today as an expression of a criminal system but which looked to him at the time like purely individual ex ses -- he vented his indignation and interfered wherever he could. As for a number of points of the Party program, the attitude taken by Fanslau was a negative one. He particularly refuted the exaggerated racial policy of the Third Reich.
The Jewish pogrom of November 30 moved him to the acutest indignation. I am here referring to our affidavit of Rechenberg, Exhibit Fanslau Number 23. He kept up friendly relations with Jewish friends. In January 1945 he put a lorry at the disposal of some friends to evacuate them from the Kreis Landsberg. These included the Jewish family Hans Rechenberg. When his brother-in-law married a half-Jew, Fanslau was best man. When his brother-in-law was sent to a camp later on because of that marriage, Fanslau did everything he could and told his sister not to get a divorce. When Else Pleil, who was a Jehovah's Witness, was allocated to his household as an assistant, he respected her faith and did not put any obstacles in her way when she wanted to read books about Jehovah's Witnesses and continue her studies.
When he was reported to about the Russian atrocities against the civilian populations in Lemberg and Tarnopol, he voiced his indignation about such inhumanity and said that the civilian population must not be involved in military events and that he would never have stood for anything of the sort from his own troops.
This refers to the affidavit of Egle, Fanslau Exhibit Number 25.
His young administrative officers were trained by him in the traditional spirit of the army, and he expected them to be honorable, chivalrous and show self-discipline. Thus we have a complete picture of defendant Fanslau as a soldier and as a man. It is the picture of a man full of ideals and pure in heart, who kept up his moral integrity even under the difficult era of National Socialism. This becomes clear. He was not a member of the group declared to be criminal by the IMT within the SS. It, therefore, seems impossible to sentence him under Count IV.
6. May, I, for the sake of completeness, point out that the IMT had limited the extent of the sentence for the crime of membership in an organization declared to be criminal. I quote: "The Tribunal recommends that in no case should punishment imposed under Law Lumber 10 upon any members of an organization or group declared by the Tribunal to be criminal exceed the punishment fixed by the de-Nazification law." The de-Nazification law, however, regards only the committing to a labor camp as a suitable punishment, not to a penitentiary or prison, up to at the most ten years. I refer here to Defense Exhibit Fanslau Number 20.
May it please the Tribunal, I have thus reached the end of my final plea for defendant Fanslau. In your sentencing of the former Field Marshal Erhardt Milch, you described the principle of democratic jurisdiction as a most important one, that is, that a defendant is assumed to be innocent unless guilt has been proved beyond any reasonable doubt. Basing my request on that principle, I ask you to find defendant Fanslau not guilty.
THE PRESIDENT: All right, the Tribunal is ready to hear the final argument on behalf of the defendant Sommer.
DR. BELZER (for the defendant Sommer): May it please the Tribunal.
There can be no doubt that under the National Socialist regime in Germany, especially during the time after the 1st of September 1939, the gravest crimes which could be thought of by human brain were committed. There can be no excuse for these crimes. There should be no doubt that the guilty ones must be called to account and must atone for their deeds. Which courts are competent for the sentencing of these criminals is irrelevant for the following reasons. It is sufficient in this connection to refer to the rules of Control Council Law Number 10.
As grave as the crimes described in Article II, Number 1(b) and (c) of the Control Council Law and forming the object of the present indictment may be weighed individually and as terrible as their consequences may have been for the whole of civilized mankind, it is and remains supreme law for every court which is engaged in judging them to call to account only the really guilty ones and, consequently, to apply to the examination of the question of guilt the rule of the strictest impartiality. As terrible as the crimes under the indictment may have been, it would be irresponsible to punish even one innocent person for them. Wrong which has been committed is not atoned by adding to it additional wrong. The responsible task of a court can be mastered the easier the more complete is the evidence available, the exonerating in the same degree as the incriminating.
The task must appear the more insoluble the more doubtful is the evidence regarding completeness and manner. In this respect the evidence presented in this case gives cause for the severest doubt. The proof of facts and manner of the crimes committed was given mainly by the interrogation of witnesses who, with one single exception, were concentration camp inmates in whose eyes, when they made their statements, as is perhaps humanly understandable, burned hatred against the defendants in whom, as members of the SS, they saw the representatives of the system to which, as they thought, they owed their misery and past sufferings.
As much as one or the other of these witnesses may have endeavored to exercise greatest impartiality, they could not and cannot be really impartial.
Regarding the other paramount part, especially as far as the question of the participation of the individual defendants was concerned, the prosecution undertook to prove its case by presenting captured documents. One tried to fill gaps in the chain of evidence, especially regarding the connections of the individual defendants to the happenings, which could not be closed by captured documents, with affidavits of more or less questionable content. Thus one could again and again witness in this case that defendants used the occasion of the interrogation as witnesses in their own behalf to correct the affidavits made by them or that, as far as third persons were concerned and were in rea* of the defense, affidavits had to be furnished by the defense, in which these persons could correct their affidavits presented by the prosecution.
In this connection I may be allowed to refer also to the affidavit of the witness Georg Rammler, interrogated by me on 28 June 1947, who declared on remonstrance that his statements contained in the affidavit of 24 January 1947, presented by the prosecution as Document Number 1581, Exhibit Number 136, regarding the responsibility of Office D-II for prisoner transports, were based on presumptions and not on knowledge as he had told it also to the interrogator who took the affidavit but which was not considered by him. Regarding the captured documents, it should not be overlooked that these documents generally are accessible to the defense only insofar as they were presented by the prosecution itself as evidence - and often separated from their context - but, on the other hand, considerable doubt seems to be justified as to whether the prosecution has presented all documents of importance for the proof which it possesses, which is what should be done in the interest of an objective finding of the truth It is of no use to close the eyes before these things.
My short references may, however, be sufficient to throw a flash of light upon the dubiousness of the evidence presented by the prosecution with its deficiencies and dangers for a truly objective and just finding of the verdict. They show in any case that the entire evidence presented by the prosecution may be used only with extreme caution and all reservations. I cannot refrain, in fulfilling my duties as defense counsel, from referring to other sources of danger as well. But in order to exclude at once any possibility of misunderstanding, I should like at this juncture to take the opportunity of thanking the honorable Court for the procedure which in every phase of this case was objective beyond any doubt and for the understanding shown with regard to the difficulties of the defense. Just the evident efforts of this Court to get to the bottom of things encourages me to make the following statements.
As far as difficulties and misunderstandings resulted during the trial on account of the two languages, they could always easily be cleared up thanks to the loyalty of all participants. The task of the Court becomes extremely difficult regarding the examination of the question of criminal responsibility on account of the fact that prosecutor and judge lived in a wholly different world from that of the defendants and witnesses, in entirely different circumstances than the ones under which things which form the object of the indictment happened. I emphasize once again: Not a word of excuse and defense for the true crimes and the really guilty ones! In peace and war prosecutor and judge lived under entirely different living conditions and saw things from an entirely different perspective than the defendants and the defense witnesses presented by the defense. This has a tremendous importance in judging the credibility of defendants and defense witnesses.
Here once again I should like to refer to the example of the witness Rammler interrogated by me. Everybody who knew the conditions in the offices of the German military administration, such as the WVHA also was, knows that the witness in his position as Hauptscharfuehrer with Division D had no insight into the internal markings of individual offices and therefore by his own knowledge cannot be in a position to make statements, for example, regarding the responsibility of Office D-II for prisoner transports.
The declaration made by Rammler at his interrogation that he had no insight into the official tasks of the offices and that the respective statements made by him in the affidavit of January 24, 1947, Document Number 1581, Prosecution Exhibit Number 136, were based on presumptions corresponds to the real facts but was met with open doubt by the Court.
In judging the question of criminal responsibility, especially the question of how much knowledge of certain happenings the individual defendants possessed and what possibilities of influencing the course of events were available to them, the special conditions in Germany during the war, especially during the last year of the war, have to be taken into consideration. Under no circumstances can one proceed from conditions which were not directly touched by the events of war or only to a small degree. I think in this connection particularly of the destruction of the means of traffic and communication, increasing with the length of the war, and the general deterioration of living conditions in all Germany caused by this.
Finally we have to be careful not to draw from our knowledge gained in the post-war period conclusions for equal possibilities of knowledge at the time during which the crimes under indictment were committed. It cannot be omitted to emphasize in this connection very strongly the extremely severe methods of the men in power in Germany for keeping things secret. Prosecutor and Court come from a world with all possibilities of forming free opinions, and it seems to me, in spite of all the good intentions on the part of these participants in this trial, nearly impossible that they could form a really true picture of the very limited possibilities for forming a free opinion and free will in a state governed absolutely in an authoritative and totalitarian way.
I am now coming to the individual counts of the indictment.
Regarding Count I of the indictment, no further statements are necessary in view of the decision of the Court of 10 July ****. **** ******* according to Counts II and III of the indictment are said to have been committed by the defendant Karl Sommer in as far as can be recognizable from the indictment and the evidence presented by the prosecution in that he (1) as one of the most important leaders of the SS-WVHA, namely, as Sturmbannfuehrer of the Waffen-SS and Deputy Chief of the Office D-II by his work in this office participated in the committing of the said crimes;(2) himself committed two murders in the concentration camp Auschwitz.
The prosecution asserts that all defendants, and therefore also the defendant Sommer, were guilty of all crimes put under evidence. In the following arguments, however, reference is made to the crimes with which the defendants are charged individually, only in as far as the defendant Sommer is connected with them in a recognizable manner. As far as such a connection is not visible, a discussion will not be made of them. However, any connection of the defendant Sommer with them is expressly contested.
THE PRESIDENT: We are obliged to recess now, and you are just taking up a new subject. We'll reconvene at 1:15.
THE MARSHAL: Tribunal II will be in recess until 1315 hours.
(A recess was taken.)
AFTERNOON SESSION (The hearing reconvened at 1315 hours, 18 September 1947)
THE MARCHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
THE PRESIDENT: I. the attorneys for Baier and for Bobermin here? Baier and Bobermin, are they here; who represents them? Dr. Gawlik, does he represent them both?
DR. SEIDL: The defendant Baier is represented here by the defense counsel Fritsche, and the defendant Bobermin is represented by Dr. Gawlik.
THE PRESIDENT: The Translation Department has not received their closing arguments as yet. They have not even filed it with the Information Center of the Defense. I don't know when they expect to argue.
DR. BELZER: Your Honor, may it please the Tribunal. I shall continue in the presentation of my final defense speech for the defendant Sommer. The development of the position of Inspectorate of Concentration Camps and the integration of Office Group-D into the WVHA, as well as the legal foundation and general practice for execution of labor allocation of concentration camp inmates had been detailed in the discussion on the plea for the defendant Pohl. I expressly refer to these statements in order to avoid any repetition.
Since March 1942 the defendant Pohl was Plenipotentiary General for labor allocation of the concentration camp inmates. The instrument for the management and the steering of this labor allocation was Office Group-D II, labor allocation of inmates, newly created March 1942, and subsequently taken over by Obersturmbannfuehrer and later Standartenfuehrer Gerhard Maurer, within the Office Group-D. That was the Inspectorate of the concentration camp through creation of this office D-II, within the frame of the organization of Office Group-D nothing was changed regarding the competency and field of activity of the already previously existing Offices of the Group-D. The office of Group-D II could as well have been inserted somewhere else without affecting the organizational structure of the Office Group-D in any way.
Under the supervision of the Office Group-D were the concentration camps in the territory of the Greater German Reich, and the concentration camp Hertogenbosch in the Netherlands. Consequently, the working field of the Office Group-D II also extended that far. With the other concentration camps, in the General Government of Poland, and in the socalled East Countries, the Office Group-D II had only purely informatory connections regarding the labor allocation. The Office D-II was in itself divided into three branches with three tasks: Branch D-II-1, Prisoner allocation; Branch D-II-2, Education of prisoners, and, Branch D-II-3, Accounting and statistics. The written official order for the activity of the Office D-II never existed, no regulations existed, as the defendant Sommer, has in detail described the range of tasks of the Office D-II. I refer to this statement in the English transcript.
Accordingly, the Office DII had to deal exclusively with questions, which related to the labor allocation of the inmates of the so-called SS-Economic Enterprises, SS-Building Offices, and the private enterprises. The Office D II was not competent for all other uses of concentration-camp inmates, as, for example, the allocation of prisoners for the execution of medical experiments either as human guinea pigs or as nurses. The Office D II had also nothing to do with the allocation of inmates for the execution of police measures, for example, rendering harmless of bombs, removing of bombs and other air-defense measures after air-attacks on German cities.
The Office D II had absolutely nothing to do with all questions relating to the administration camps, clothing and feeding of the inmates, or in particular their arrest and dismissal. The Office D II also was not competent in any way for the allocation of guards. Insofar as the Defendant Sommer, as stated in the Document NO-3794, Exhibit No. 584, presented by the Prosecution in Document Book XXXIV, was connected with the allocation of guards for prison camps, it has been made clear without any doubt by the statement of the Witness Volk, that Sommer was only doing a favor when he transmitted Volk's wishes to the competent agency.
The decision regarding the approval of refusal of requests of persons making requirements concerning the allocation of concentration camp inmates, rested with the Chief of the Main Office Phl, who, on an average of once a week, received reports from Gluecks and Maurer, and had presented to himself the requests pre-processed by the Office D II. The Chief of Office Maurer had the authority to approve only the smallest labor commands within a limited range of time. Pohl, however, also had to be informed even in the event of such approvals.
I am coming now to the position and activity of the Defendant concerning the office D II. In March 1941 the Defendant Sommer entered the employ of DEST G.m.b.H. in Berlin as a civilian employee. There he occupied an entirely subordinate position in the department for labor allocation. In May 1942 the then Obersturmbannfuehrer Maurer got him a job with the newly-created Office D II. Also at this time, Sommer was first employed as a civilian employee. About in June 1942 Maurer told him that his employment as civilian employee was no longer possible for official reasons, and that he had therefore caused the drafting of Sommer to the Waffen-SS.
Sommer, according to his rank of a Lieutenant of the Reserve, which he had occupied with the German Army, was drafted into the Waffen-SS as Obersturmbannfuehrer of the Reserve. Effective 20 April 1944 Sommer was promoted to Hauptsturmfuehrer of the Reserve. This was remained the highest rank attained by Sommer in the Waffen-SS. Sommer never was a Sturmbannfuehrer.
In the Office D II, the Defendant Sommer was Referent of the sphere of activity D-II-1, which was inmate allocation. As witness in his own case, the defendant has given a clear and detailed description of his sphere of activity and his actions. According to this, Sommer's activity was limited to dealing with actual procedures in a purely administrative manner, according to the instructions of the Chief of Office Maurer. Sommer himself did hot have any authority to decide or direct. Sommer was only entitled to sign when documents were involved which dealt with purely administrative matters. Sommer undertook official journeys only very rarely, and always only in execution of a clearly outlined orders of the Chief of Office.
At the end of 1943, the Chief of Office Maurer appointed the Defendant Sommer, as the senior SS Officer in the Office D II, to be his deputy. This deputizing included the duty of Sommer to take care of the internal office activities of the Office D II in the absence of Maurer, and to give information upon inquiries.
Under no circumstances did this deputizing of the Chief of Office include the right and the duty to make decisions or give directions in essential matters.
After Sommers promotion in April 1944, Maurer told him that now he could call himself "Main Department Chief." Sommer's sphere of activities was, however, not changed at all by this. Also with this title, no authority whatsoever to decide or give directions was connected with it.
The Prosecution asserted in view of Sommer's appointment in 1943 as "deputy" for Maurer, that Sommer had been "Deputy Chief of Office" and therefore also responsible for the decisions made in the Office D II regarding to the labor allocation of the concentration-camp inmates. It is therefore necessary to define here in detail the position with regard to this question.
First of all, it has to be stated that the Prosecution was not able to prove the assertion that Sommer was Deputy of Office, with any documents originating during the existence of the office D II or by a statement of a witness. The table or organization of the WVHA, confirmed as being correct by Pohl, has been submitted by the Prosecution. The remark in the column "Office D II Deputy," Sturmbannfuehrer Sommer", escaped Pohl's attention when examining this chart. When being interrogated on 22 May 1947, he declared the entry to be false, and gave a detailed explanation for it. Also Pohl's affidavit of 1 April 1947 is not apt to support the assertion of the Prosecution, as results from Pohl's statement of the 27th and 28th of May, 1947. Nor can the Prosecution refer to his own statements of the Defendant Sommer. During Sommer's cross-examination by the Prosecution, Sommer's statement from the examination record was presented of 4 October 1946. According, to that, Sommer declared on that date, "In 1943 I was appointed by Maurer as his deputy with the remark that in each office a deputy for the chief of Office, who is informed about all matters concerning his sphere of activities, has to be appointed."
As a witness in his own case, Sommer has, on 30 June 1947, also mentioned the occasion which caused his appointment as deputy of Maurer. Maurer has, in Number 26 of his affidavit of 23 May 1947, referred to this question as follows: "Sommer's last service rank was Hauptsturmfuehrer. Sommer cannot be called deputy Chief of Office simply for the reason that he did not have any right to make decisions. In my opinion also the word "Deputy" goes too far. Sommer was my representative insofar as in my absence he accepted telephone calls for the Office D II, wishes and proposals regarding the allocation of inmates. After my return Sommer had to report to me about this. In case the decision could not be delayed until my return, Sommer had to get the decision of the Chief of the Office Group Gluecks. I cannot remember that Sommer once himself signed a document which originated in the Office D II. However, if it should have happened then this can only have been a very unimportant matter, but in no case questions of labor allocations were dealt with.
The table of organization of the WVHA presented to me and confirmed as correct by Pohl on 18 March 1947 is incorrect in the column Office D II, where it reads:
"Deputy, Sturmbannfuehrer Sommer." Sommer was not Sturmbannfuehrer. Regarding the right to represent, I refer to my above statement for all counts.
In January 1945, Maurer was assigned to the front troops as group administrative officer. This use of Maurer at the front was intended only for a short time. For the duration of Maurer's absence, the Standartenfuehrer Moser, who was attached to Pohl's staff, was ordered to deputize for Maurer as Chief of the Office D II. If Sommer had been Deputy Chief of the Office D II, Moser's commission would not have been necessary at all.
But this action in particular proves that Sommer really was not Deputy Chief of Office. The Standartenfuehrer Moser himself declares in connection with this in his affidavit of 13 August 1947, and I quote. This is Sommer's Exhibit No. 40. "In continuation of my former activity effective the 15th of January 1945. I substituted for the Chief of Office D II, SSStandartenfuehrer Maurer, for the duration of his assignment at the front.
"In the Office D II, SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer Sommer was employed as co-worker. I have no knowledge of a promotion of Sommer to Sturmbannfuehrer. Sommer was not Deputy Chief of Office D II. He had at most the position of an office manager and was responsible for the internal office activates. In factual matters Sommer did not have an authority to make decisions. It is quite possible that Sommer, in one or the other case, signed a paper himself. But in these cases most certainly only questions exclusively concerned with the administration and the execution of actions were involved. If Sommer would have been Deputy Chief of Office, I would not have to take over the deputizing of Maurer which, as a matter of fact, was intended only for a few weeks. Upon my repeated remonstrances with Pohl to release me from deputizing for Maurer, I was always told, that this was not possible because Maurer, at present, could not be spared at the front." End of the quotation.
Albert Mueller, a clerk of the Defendant Sommer from July 1944 to the beginning of January 1945, testifies in the affidavit of 15 May 1947, presented by me as Document Sommer No. A/2, Exhibit No. 3, that Sommer did not make any decisions regarding questions of labor allocation independently.
The former SS-Obersturmfuehrer Philipp Grimm belonged to the Office D II from 1 September 1943 to 31 May 1944. He testifies in an affidavit of 10 May 1947, and I quote:
"During my activities in the WVHA, I met Karl Sommer daily. Regarding the activity of Sommer I can testify that he himself never signed orders regarding the mobilization of new groups of inmates. If such given in the absence of the Chief of Office Maurer, he had them signed by Gluecks. He also presented transport orders to Gluecks for the allocation of inmates. I cannot say whether he otherwise made decisions while representing Maurer. I also don't know whether he was appointed Deputy Chief of Office of D II. His position correspond to the one of an office manager." In the translation of this affidavit, the word "Buerochef" has been given as "office head." It would be more correct to translate it with "head clerk."
By presenting a number of persons, outside of the case, who had to deal with the office D II, I have proved beyond any doubt, that the defendant Sommer during these negotiations always presented the fact, that he did not have any right to make decisions and that he had to present the matter to the Chief of Office Maurer. This refers to the affidavits of Ernst Schultz, Helmuth Kiener, Heinz Schwarz, Karl Hain, Heinrich Werner Courthe, Herbert Siggelkow, Walter Schieber, Walter Duerrfeld and Martin Moebius. As to the details I refer to the contents of these affidavits. As a particular significant point which proves that the service position of Sommer has been entrusted with taking the mail to his office chief Maurer to the SS Recreation Center Sudelfeld in Upeer Bavaria, where Maurer spent a fortnight's holiday. This fact is simply not compatible with the position of a "Deputy Office Chief." Likewise the defendant Sommer never took part in the periodically recurring meetings of the Commandants, nor did he attend the lectures held once a week by the Chief of the Office Group Gluecks, and the Office Maurer in Pohl's office. The affidavit Pister submitted by the Prosecution seems to contain a divergent statement.