THE PRESIDENT: We will take a short break at this time, about ten minutes.
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal will recess for ten minutes.
(recess)
THE MARSHAL: Take your seats, please. The Tribunal is again in session.
DR. RAUSCHENBACH: To continue on page 27 in the middle, from these replies of Frank's, which have not been refuted, it becomes quite clear that Frank never conceived the idea in his formal capacity as deputy for Pohl to work on tasks of other office groups of the WVHA. Even if he had conceived the idea, he could not have carried out in a sensible manner such activity, because he did not have the sufficient insight into and necessary familiarity with the other office groups.
But even if the Tribunal should take into consideration the possibility of Frank's responsibility in the capacity of other office groups it would apply here what the Tribunal has found in its sentence in the case against Gerhardt Milch. It says there that Milch's sphere of duties was concerned mainly with aircraft production with the Luftwaffe and that his actual acts for the criminal experiments of the doctors was far removed from Milch's immediate supervision. On the basis of that statement Milch was acquitted on the count of participation in criminal experiments. I would like it to be taken into consideration that Frank's interest and activities and his sphere of duties was mainly concerned with the administration for troops and all other matters, such as concentration camps, were far removed from his supervision. In the case of Frank, circumstances are different inasmuch as, and more favorable for Frank than they were in the case of Milch because Milch was no doubt on the highest level the superior officer of the doctors, which in the case of Frank, does not apply to the concentration camps and the Prosecution themselves have not alleged that. I believe I have proved sufficiently so far that on the basis of his former position as Pohl's deputy in the WVHA he could not be charged with criminal acts charged by the Prosecution in connection with the concentration camp system, and that he cannot be charged with criminal omissions, wherefore, he should be punished. I can, therefore, forego the discussion of the problem of his responsibility for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by his subordinates, a problem which was of importance in the verdict of the Military Tribunal I against Karl Brandt, and also was important in the Yamashita case, because the basis of a punishment for omission in the sense of influencing the subordinates, the criminals, in this sense, is that these were under the orders of the accused officer. The latter the prosecution were unable to prove in the case of Frank without any doubt.
I shall skip the next pages, to page 32. There reference is made to Frank's deputizing for Pohl before the war. As this is not so important I shall omit it.
Franks Responsibility for Certain Special Incidents.
a) Seizure of Jewish and Foreign Property and Reinhardt Action.
I shall not repeat before this Tribunal the details of this matter and I refer to the transcript of Frank's examination and the final plea by Dr. Seidl.
Then I have briefly summed up in the next paragraph the whole complex of seizure of Jewish and foreign property under the Reinhardt Action, and I emphasize Frank's personal activity.
I shall continue on page 33. I is, roughly, the tenth line from below. Here we are concerned with the beginning of the Reinhardt Action the various measures of confiscation. Here we have three orders by the Chief of the WVHA, of 26 September 1942, 9 December 1943, and 4 July 1944. Only the order under "1", which was Exhibit 472, was signed by defendant Frank on behalf of Office Chief Pohl. At the time when the orders 2 and 3 were issued Frank was no longer working with the WVHA.
The second paragraph on page 34, Exhibit 472 of the Prosecution, is the main incriminating point, it is the most essential weapon of the Prosecution against Frank. I shall, therefore, have to deal with that document in greater detail but I shall not do so now but I shall recommend this paragraph to the special attention of the Court.
To quote from page 40, bottom, the summation of this chapter concerning Exhibit 472 -- I believe that this proves sufficiently that when order Exhibit 472 was issued Frank did not know, nor could he know that the confiscated items came from killed people. It should still be examined whether that suspicion was not brought over to him when the report of 13 May 1943 was made to Himmler concerning the watches, fountain pens and other personal items was made out. But even the figures mentioned in this document Frank was in a position to understand without becoming aware that here an extermination action was concerned.
Referring to Office Group D, Frank heard that these were mainly items which were quite newly manufactured, such as razor blades and shaving apparatus, that they had not been used as personal objects by the inmates. This was described as so-called "Warehouse articles", as were stamp collections which, surely, a man who has been committed to a concentration camp would not carry on his person. Even the confiscation of watches of inmates did not seem so unusual to Frank because that happened anywhere, where a large number of people are being imprisoned.
It seems to me that the charges of the Prosecution that behind every fountain pen, every watch, and every pair of spectacles there must have been a dead man recognizable for Frank, I have refuted. But if the documents do not show sufficiently that Frank must have known, or should have known these things, then it should have been proved that before he signed the above mentioned document he must have had knowledge of the Jewish Action of the Third Reich which would have enabled him to know all about the exterminations. The Prosecution did not succeed, - not on cross examination nor through any other means - to prove that Frank knew these things before Himmler made his speech in Posen in October 1943. The suspicion which became clear by the many question put by the Tribunal, namely, that Frank as a high SS officer must have known before October 1943 that Jews were being killed must seem obvious. But suspicion alone should never be sufficient in sentencing Frank - as becomes clear from the quoted passages of the opinion in the case against Milch and against Karl Brandt and others. Frank has admitted openly that he knew about the persecution of Jews and that they were being committed to concentration camps prior to October 1943, but he disputes emphatically, and nobody could prove the contrary, that he knew anything of inhumane treatment or even killing of Jews in con centration camps prior to Himmler's Posen speech -- that is to say, before he left the WVHA.
The second paragraph on page 43 reads as follows:
Now, in order to conclude my statement on the question of seizures of foreign and Jewish property I must once again point to the statement made by my learned friend Dr. Seidl about the giving of comfort to the perpetrator after the act. It seems unthinkable to me that one could take part in a murder by having any part in the utilization of the property of the murdered person. Nor do we have any participation in offenses against property here, if, as in the case against Frank we only have the evaluation of seized - even illegally seized property - the fact of dealing in stolen property does not apply here.
Under German penal law, which must be noted here in view of the fact that these acts were committed in Germany and Frank is a German national, the fact of dealing in stolen property presupposes that the criminal in question must have acted for his own advantage. The prosecution has neither asserted nor proved that by seizing property Frank enriched himself, but even an indirect enriching of his own, by the fact that the SS by confiscating property increased its own fortunes, is completely impossible in view of the evidence submitted here. Apart from the fact that Exhibit Hans Loerner No. 8 shows clearly that the SS was not a property owner of an independent status, it has been made quite clear by Frank's unrefuted testimony and the plan about financing within the Waffen-SS, Frank's Exhibit No. 22, that all seized property went to the Reich Treasury either directly or through the WVHA.
THE PRESIDENT: May I ask a question, please? Isn't just as criminal to receive property unlawfully for the benefit of another as for the benefit of oneself? For example, if I receive stolen property, and I don't keep it, but I give it to a friend, am I none the less guilty?
DR. RAUSCHENBACH: In this case under the German laws we only know the case of receiving stolen property, and if I myself do not have any advantage therefrom, I cannot have committed that crime. It might be said, of course, that I, by receiving stolen property, would have the obligation in a sort of trusteeship sense to return the property to the person it has been stolen from, and in that case I would perhaps commit embezzlement if I passed the thing on, but that presupposes that under any circumstances it was clear to me that the property had been stolen, that even then it is highly debatable, and I do not dare to formulate as an expert my answer in so brief a moment.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, suppose that I steal an Apfelkuchen for my wife or a friend who is hungry. I don't touch it at all. I steal it and give it to him or to her. Can I say in my own defense that I got no benefit from it and therefore I am not guilty?
DR. RAUSCHENBACH: No, Your Honor, here the German law about theft states:
"Whoever takes away from anybody a movable object with the intent to appropriate it or to give it to somebody else...."
TEE PRESIDENT: I must eat my Apfelkuchen and not give it away? Well, suppose I don't steal it, but the thief brings the Apfelkuchen to me and I know that he stole it and I say, "Thank you," and I give it to my wife. I get no benefit from it.
DR. RAUSCHENBACH: That would be the same. Well, then--
THE PRESIDENT: Would you defend me?
DR. RAUSCHENBACH: Certainly, but under German law I would have to deal with the question whether I would not become guilty of abetting crime. I would commit this offense if I would prevent the legal owner of the Apfelkuchen from regaining his property. This is the question of being an accessory after the fact, in giving an object to another than its lawful owner (Sachbeguenstigung), and I shall talk about that point immediately.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, am I not guilty of receiving stolen property then, the minute that I take hold of it, knowing it is stolen, no matter what I do with it, whether I eat it or give it away? Am I not guilty immediately when it comes into my hand under German law?
DR. RAUSCHENBACH: It all depends how Mr. President has received the property. If I get it by chance--
THE PRESIDENT: If I got it from the person who stole it; I got it from the thief and I know that he stole it.
DR. RAUSCHENBACH: In that case Your Honor would probably hide the Apfelkuchen and thereby prevent the legitimate owner from regaining his property, which would be abetting the criminal, a punishable offense.
THE PRESIDENT: No, I am not going to hide it. I am either going to eat it or give it to my wife, probably eat it.
DR. RAUSCHENBACH: Then it is receiving stolen property.
THE PRESIDENT: But if I get no benefit from it and give it away, I am innocent?
DR. RAUSCHENBACH: It might be that a court from the evidence which would be relevant would conclude that you had some advantage from it because by giving it to your wife this might be possible.
But that advantage is precluded here in the case of Frank, and the case of abetting and giving comfort is precluded because Frank did not prevent the legitimate owner from regaining his property. They were owners and they could not regain their property in any case since it had been sequestrated. Therefore Frank was not the man who had caused all this.
THE PRESIDENT: I see. Well, will you send me a bill for your advice?
DR. RAUSCHENBACH: I don't know how I could do that, but I can see that different opinions are applicable here. My colleagues showed in their facial expressions you might dispute that point.
To continue, where were we? This income, as was the income from the economic enterprises which were employing inmates, did not cover the financial transactions of the SS at all because expenses by the SS were, as Frank explained on direct examination, completely independent of its income.
Then I shall briefly comment on the question of abetting or giving comfort, which has been settled by the little conversation we just had. To continue on page 45, the last sentence before the new paragraph: In a certain sense Frank's activity contributed, on the contrary, to the fact that the legitimate owners could regain their property because, inasmuch as the items were to be handed over to the Reichsbank vaults, they were still available at the capitulation and could be returned to the owners in some form or another.
I am then commenting on what is known as the thirty million credit to the DWB, which is a chapter particularly suitable for perusal; I need not read it now.
On page 51, Financing and Processing of the Budget of Concentration Camps and Moneys for the Work Done by Inmates. I shall be able to skip a lot of it, again, as the Tribunal will recall Frank's and Hans Loerner's detailed testimony on the witness stand concerning the processing of the budget, and because in the final plea for the defendant Hans Loerner this subject will be discussed in a briefer form, and I think in an impressive manner; therefore I shall talk about that in the plea on behalf of Loerner.
I shall now skip everything until page 56, the second paragraph:
To look after the clerical side of financing concentration camps is, in my opinion, not at all a crime, or a participation in the war crimes committed in the concentration camps and in crimes against humanity, as would be the supplying of arms and ammunition to the commandos and guard units. In the latter case the Tribunal has ruled on 10 July, I quote:
"The Presiding Judge: There is nothing wrong in supplying ammunition to the guards in concentration camps. They were SS soldiers and they needed arms and ammunition.
"Judge Musmanno: I would like to add the important point is whether the defendant knew that ammunition was used in an improper and inhumane manner and that the guards shot the camp inmates. The mere supplying with ammunition is certainly quite a legal affair, particularly in wartime."
In that case the only thing important in the case of the defendant Frank from the point of view of financing is whether or not he knew that the concentration camp inmates were treated inhumanely and were even killed. That, as I have shown before, has not been proven against him. That by merely handing over money to a concentration camp he made it possible for the inhumane system of concentration camps to exist at all, and so establishing a conditio sine qua non for an illegal custody of human beings, could not be asserted because concentration camps existed before he supplied them with money. To speak more accurately, the proper supplying of concentration camps with money, the more the better, could only contribute to alleviate the suffering and improve the conditions under which inmates were living.
I am then briefly commenting on the money paid out to inmates which I should like to recommend to the Court's attention, and then I am dealing with a few incriminating joints which arose during the trial.
I am doing this simply to be on the safe side.
To continue on page 61, Count 4, Membership in a Criminal Organization. May I point out to the Court an error in the translation here, which I have been informed about, when, in connection with the Reinhardt Action I made reference that it was not only concerned with property of inmates but merchandise from big depots, "depots" was wrongly translated by "camps". It is now all right.
On page 61, Count 4, Membership in a Criminal Organization. At the outset of this important paragraph of my speech I can again refer to the more detailed statements of one of my colleagues which is the trial brief concerning the theory of conspiracy, concerning Control Council Law No. 10, Article II 1 d, which has been submitted by my learned friend, Dr. Haensel. I do not wish to identify myself with the conspiracy theory which has been so profoundly expressed therein, but Chapter V, the Court I am sure recognizes, is completely correct. Many a thing contained in this trial brief is of great importance in the decision of the question whether the defendant August Frank is guilty or not under Article II 1 d of Control Council Law No. 10.
To continue on page 62, Haensel has said convincingly that guilty knowledge of criminal activities of the SS is irrelevant prior to 1 September 1939. I quote: Relevant is only knowledge of acts which had been declared criminal by Article VI of the statutes of the International Military Tribunal." Article VI only enumerates such acts as are connected with the war. The I.M.T. considered itself competent only for those. The conclusion is that only the will to form a criminal consiracy should be punished which existed on 1 September 1939 or which was formed after that period of time.
I shall skip the next paragraph and continue on page 63.
What are the conclusions to form for the defendant August Frank? It has not been proven against him, but it should be proven against him, because the assumption of guilt does not exist under penal law or even under Law No. 10, namely that before the Posen speech of Himmler in October 1943 he was familiar with conditions inside, concentration camps, and particularly the annihilation action.
At that point of time he would no longer have the possibility to leave the SS. This was, of course, the Waffen-SS, an organization of the Wehrmacht. He could not do that nor could any other soldier. Himmler's attitude, which became clear from his Posen speech and is well known to this Court, made this leaving particularly impossible for so high an SS officer unless he wanted to bring about his own destruction and that of his whole family.
When Frank knew about the crimes within the SS system, he became a military chief of the Regular Police and no longer had the opportunity to support the activity of the SS and perhaps take part with the criminal intention to take part in the crimes. The same applies to his knowledge of the seizure of property of inmates. He did not take any part in this and learned about it only after the seizure had already been effected. He thereupon availed himself of the first opportunity of leaving the WVHA.
I shall skip the next paragraph and continue at the bottom. On direct examination Frank testified that when he was a member of the SS it was his opinion that the Reich had been justified to defend itself against its enemies by locking them up. Thereupon there was an extremely interesting and valuable discussion between the Presiding Judge and the defendant August Frank. From this it becomes clear that at that time Frank thought it obvious that anybody who was in a concentration camp had the right, and was given the right, to be told why he had been locked up and for how long he had been locked up. Frank pointed out that even in other countries still today there were concentration camps, and that Germany at that time, when it was fighting a war for its survival, the State could not have survived without concentration camps. These conditions must not be measured with American terms.
Frank then admitted openly that he knew today that nevertheless this German system had its faults.
I am quite aware of the fact that it is extremely difficult to imagine that an SS Obergruppenfuehrer can be defended against Article II 1 d because if not even an Obergruppenfuehrer had any knowledge of the criminal purposes of that organization, who on earth could then fall under that category and that circle of people which was to be included by the I.M.T. in its judgment?
It was not my intention at first to attack Count IV in the case of Frank at all. However, from my knowledge of his character now and the result of the evidence, and, last but not least, the comments published meanwhile on Control Council Law No. 10, make it appear doubtful to me whether or not Frank can be declared guilty prima facie, as it were, under Article 11-ld without all prerequisites being carefull examined first. Examining these things carefully, I arrived at the result that not even of Count IV is Frank guilty. It is not the case that even knowledge of criminal acts or the will to commit criminal acts from the outset is proved, -- this could not even be assumed by reviewing the evidence, simply because the defendant was a high SS officer. The Denazification trials and the trials under Regulation No. 69 in the British zone for sentencing members of criminal organizations have repeatedly arrived at the fact that there are many officers, high ranking officers, the relations of which to the SS, and above all their activity with that organization, was such that they could not either have been provided with the will of forming a criminal group nor having had any knowledge of criminal purposes and activities of the organization. Experiences with the Control Council Law No. 10, since its issue, have resulted in the statement that there are circumstances when an SS member of a lower rank could know much more about conditions in concentration camps and have a much greater participation in them than a higher leader who was used in a position and in a manner where he could not have that knowledge or that will. That latter applies particularly to such leaders who were merely officers in the Waffen SS or experts of certain technical fields, who, therefore, as any other soldier, or any other expert were limited to a certain field.
The latter was the case with Frank. From the beginning of his activity with the Allgemeine SS and later on with the Waffen-SS, Frank specialized completely in the field of troop administration, which is usual in any army of the world. I believe he proved that sufficiently.
To continue on page 68 -- to conclude my final plea with the last chapter, I shall speak about Frank's character and veracity. Trials which last as long as this have many disadvantages, but on the other hand they have one big advantage. They give every opportunity to make a precise study of the character of the defendant. Particularly, the defense counsel can do so, but so can the court. The most important period of time here for were the days when the Defendant August Frank was on the witness stand. At that time, although I tried to think as objectively as possibly, I got the impression that on the whole Frank had made a good impression on the court. His replies to questions put by the Tribunal were swift and short. He did not delay, and he did not hesitate to admit that he regarded the confiscation of inmate property as an unclean business, of which he wanted to be rid of as quickly as possible and he succeeded in doing so. He frankly admitted and with good reasons that he thinks the system of concentration camps was wrong. If he was asked about matters in which his participation could not have been proved, for instance, his position in the clothes depot in Lublin, and with the Reich Construction Office, Office Group C, he immediately admitted that he was connected with these things, it appeared that his explanations right be absolutely credible. On cross-examination by the prosecution and when the Bench put questions to him, it would appear as though he was the most important expert in that trial for the technical questions of administration, particularly troop administration and that immediately presupposes a certain amount of confidence in his veracity.
In all cases he made the impression of a clear unambiguous man. He only seemed a little uncertain when he was dragged into discussing things which he could not have known from his own experience, such as when my colleague, Dr. Haensel questioned him and when the proceedings of the IMT Trial concerning the incident of 9 November 1938 were discussed.
To sum up the impression he made, I would say that the record concerning the examination Frank both on direct and cross examination constitutes an extremely extensive evidence of high probative value. In any case, there seems to be no cause to turn down his testimony as untrue from the outset, because, in the final analysis, he gave it in his own interest. Were this so, there would be no point in asking any defendant to take the witness stand on his own behalf.
The facts however are the following; As, far as Frank!s testimony is concerned it has not been refuted by the prosecution beyond any reasonable doubt. His statements, at least, according to the principle of in dubio pro reo have to be based on the facts and evaluated and then one must arrive at the conclusion which I have developed in the previous chapter of my speech. There are only two points in the crossexamination -- and there is one document submitted by the prosecution -- which might cause one to have serious doubts Frank's veracity; on page 2438 of the German record, it would appear as though the prosecution had convicted Frank of having kept silent about the visit to a concentration camp. The prosecution asked, "Why did you not tell me about your visit to the labot camp of Lublin, when I asked you for the first time." Reading that portion of the record with regard to that exception, it becomes quite clear that Frank was asked about concentration camps and not about labor camps. When he was asked about the labor camp of Lublin, he immediately admitted that he had been there.
The second exception can be found on page 2458 of the German record. The prosecution asked Frank whether he wished to maintain his statement that he had never seen any figures which could have informed him of the quantities which came from the Reinhardt Action. Frank answered, "I cannot remember." Thereupon he was shown Exhibit 550, a letter from Frank to Himmler of the 8th of October, 1942. This was the letter in which the 50 Kilos of gold was referred to, but that was cleared up, as I said before, in a sense which was entirely favorable to Frank. That case of the 50 kilos of gold I have dealt with in a paragraph which I have not read today.
In Document Book XXXI, the prosecution have submitted a correspondence as rebuttal on pages 3 and 4 of Exhibit 711, from which it becomes clear that SS man Frank, since 25 March 1933 had orders to look after the administration business of the Dachau concentration camp. However, that letter cannot be regarded as proof, quite apart from its factual contents, proof against Frank's veracity. In the whole record I could not find one page where he had been asked to testify about his work in the Dachau concentration camp. I believe when one expects a witness to give testimony, who at the same time is a defendant, one should not expect him to report these incidents spontaneously. If he does not do so, he must not be declared to be untruthful. When he was re-examined on the witness stand the next time, Frank explained this incident quite adequately. His activity at that time -- mind you. This was in 1933 -- was a temporary order by the Administrative Office of the SS to work in Dachau Concentration Camp so that he could look after the books and accounts of the camp expenses to the Economic office of the State of Bavaria. That did not make him a member of the staff of the Commandant or administration of Dachau Concentration Camp. Had this been the case, this would have become clear on pages 2 or 6 of Exhibit 711. I should also like to have it taken into consideration that this incident happened 14 years ago and that it was entirely possible that Frank simply could not remember this matter without being specifically asked about it.
As far as Frank's character is concerned otherwise, I cannot say any more. Everything necessary has been done in the first paragraph of my final plea.
In summation, I should only like to say that Frank was body and soul an expert of troop administration, such as is usual in any army of the world, and any other incidents on the fringes of the performance of his duties, such as supply of concentration camps with money, they were so far removed from his ken that he could not have been made a criminal responsible for the system of concentration camps.
2. Evaluation of Proof. In over 700 documents, Frank has been mentioned only very infrequently. So has his sphere of activities. No witness has ever mentioned his name. No one among the many thousand former inmates of concentration camps volunteered to become a prosecution witness against Frank, although as it is known, and has become clear from Otto's testimony, through the papers, radio and photographs exhibitions, they frequently asked for witnesses of that sort. That is most remarkable, in view of Frank's high rank and position in the SS. That, it seems to me, is most convincing for the fact that there cannot be any prima facie case against Frank. If, therefore, the prosecution could not prove Frank's case beyond any doubt -- and I believe I have given many reasons why they could not do so -- his own testimony and the evidence submitted by his defense must be given full credence.
Concerning the affidavits, it is particularly remarkable that the prosecution could have always cross-examined those persons who gave the affidavits. As far as I have referred to the record of the examination of Pohl on the witness stand, there should be no misgivings against the probative value, because Pohl contributed in no sense of the word to Frank's exoneration here and there is no reason to assume that he -- I believe there is a mistake here in the translation -- because it was clear here that Pohl did not in testifying contribute anything to his own exoneration and there is no reason to assume that Pohl wanted to protect Frank by a wrong testimony.
In weighing carefully all evidence I arrived at the result that the Defendant August Frank is not guilty and, even if one is inclined to think his guilt probable from the outset, there is still the factor that his guilt could not be proved with any certainty beyond any reasonable doubt.
3. Extenuating circumstances in the case of sentence. Only to be on the safe side, because I am quite sure that the Defendant August Frank is not guilty, I wish to draw the Court's attention to the reasons why there are extenuating circumstances in the case of Frank. In some case, that becomes clear from the affidavits submitted in connection with his decent personal attitude. In other cases they come from the indisputable facts. Even if he is criminally guilty in the conditions prevailing in concentration camps he was so far removed from the actual focal point of these crimes that he could not be punished for murder or abetting murder. The IMT did not sentence Reichswirtschafts Minister Funk as a murderer, Although they felt that Funk must have either known where the gold teeth came from or shut his eyes deliberately to these facts. In connection with the extenuating circumstances, which became clear from Speer and Ruff affidavits prevention of crimes under the National Socialistic System and the saving of a number of people and valuables material - I beg to point out the sentence of the IMT in the case of Speer where the prevention of senseless destruction of place of production has been found to be an extenuating circumstance. This must apply in the case of Frank all the more, because, according to the affidavit of Ruff, who was an inmate of a concentration camp for many years, he saved the life of many thousands of inmates by his courageous intervention.
At the end I beg a brief rebuttal to the speech made today by the prosecution. It also made on behalf of Defendant Hans Loerner. The final speech by the prosecution did not rebut any of my statements. It deals almost exclusively with what is known as prima facie proof, that is to say, it contends that all defendants on the basis of their position in the WVHA must have been familiar with murder, mistreatments, with looting, as well as slave labor in the concentration camps. Once again, the prosecution has remained the court of all the horros of concentration camps and then described what position the defendants held within the SS.
From the beginning it connected the facts to the assumption of guilt. Thus the prosecution has once again settled down on the term of independent conspiracy, according to the ruling of the Nuernberg Tribunals, need no longer be debated. What remains is the same vague accusation participation on which the indictment was based and with which I have dealt with such details, inasmuch as the prosecution has attempted by certain documents to prove guilt. I can refer back to what I have said in my final plea. I only wish to comment on a few points briefly.
The prosecution wants to prove the lack of veracity of the defendants saying they had denied in a ridiculous fashion facts which had been known all over the world, namely, that numerous crimes had been committed in concentration camps. Without dealing with the question whether that general accusation is justified I merely point out that the defendant August Frank has made frank statements in this respect and admitted openly that since Himmler's Posen speech, that is to say, after he, Frank left the WVHA, he knew very well about the policy of extermination of the Jews.
JUDGE MUSMANNO: Dr. Rauschenbach, I don't remember just where August Frank was stationed in 1943. He had left the WVHA; what was he doing at that time?
DR. RAUSCHENBACH: At that time he was the Chief of Administration of Regular Police. The prosecution have said themselves that on 16 September he left the WVHA.
JUDGE MUSMANNO: Yes, what had been the occasion of his attending the Himmler speech in Posen?
DR. RAUSCHENBACH: In the case of Himmler's speech in Posen, all SS Obergruppenfuehrer were to be present.
JUDGE MUSMANNO: I remember now. Thank you.
DR. RAUSCHENBACH: The prosecution have asserted without proving the truth of this assertion that on the witness stand, August Frank had lied, as he had testified he had left the WVHA, because he had come into conflict with his conscience in connection with the administration of troops in concentration camps; particularly, I am referring to the Reinhardt Action. The persecution have asserted that Frank had left the WVHA because of an appointment as Administration Chief of Police and later on his only aims had been a new rise in his career. I point out that this is merely an assumption on the part of the prosecution, which is irrelevant, if one regards the rules of evidence and principle of in dubio pro reo; the prosecution have also attempted to shake the affidavit given by Pister on behalf of the defendants. They have asserted that the original Pister affidavit, where he reports that several of the defendants took part in the regular concentration camp commandants conferences, was more truthful. There seem to be good and valid reasons where he gives the difference between commandants meetings and the joint dinners. In this case I am sire that I can point to the principle of in dubio pro reo. Participation in the conferences of commandants has not been proved.
Finally, the prosecution, in order to point out that they have difficulties with their evidence, in some asserted that all former SS members who had appeared as defense witnesses, or as affiants, did not tell the truth, because they were still connected with one another. It is my opinion that the prosecution are not having too easy a time in this case. They have made up for lack of evidence by substituting the assumption that the evidence submitted by the defense has not proved anything.
My final impression of the final speech of the prosecution is to the effect that insofar as August Frank and Hans Loerner are concerned, by skillfully linking facts which were not originally connected at all, supported also by assumptions and propaganda, and painting skillful pictures of atmosphere, they have bridged over the gaps in their evidence without anybody noticing it.