2) Promotion of vegetable growing on a very large scale and storage of these supplies for the winter.
3) Berry- and mushroom-collection drives by especially appointed squads.
4) Procurement of additional food on the free market, independent of ration limits. This includes the purchase of Biosyn-Mycel products and of Phrix-Yeast. In order to ensure these highly nutritious products for the inmates, the defendant POHL personally undertook trips to the manufacturing plants to convince himself of the usefulness of these foods.
b) Clothing
1) In collaboration with the defendant Georg LOERNER, POHL attempted to improve the clothing status of the camp inmates. In the winter of 1943/44 a competition to improve winter clothing by the use of synthetic materials was organized for this purpose, at the instigation of Oswald POHL.
2) In 1943 and 1944, when plants throughout the Reich were being put out of action in everincreasing measure, the Weaving Section of the concentration camp Ravensbrueck was ordered to manufacture materials destined for the camp inmates.
3) Purchase of shoes from the shoe collection with the approval of the "Gemeinschaft Schuhe" (Association Shoes) in favor of camp inmates under labor allocation.
4) Commitment of armament works to provide protective garments for camp inmates.
c) Miscellaneous.
1) Issue of an order on the subject of privileges for camp inmates the so-called premium order.
2) Breaking-up of punishment squads.
3) Prohibition of work at the double
4) Abolition of roll-call or limitation of it to 10 minutes per day at the utmost.
5) Prohibition of any type of work being done by camp inmates after their return to camp.
6) Establishment of a working-day of 11 hours, which corresponded to the working-day of a German worker in armament industry during the second half of the war.
In connection herewith there is reason to investigate the basis facts of the contact which existed between Office Group C and the Administration of Concentration Camps.
1.) Up to the time when Obergruppenfuehrer EICKE left his post as Inspector of Concentration Camps in the spring of 1940, all engineering work connected with these camps was carried out be a special engineering division of the Inspectorate, under the personal and direct management of EICKE. Before that time, there had already existed departments in the Main Economic and Administrative office and in the Chief Office for Household and Engineering respectively, which had handled questions pertaining to engineering.
EICKE, however, had not made any use of them in connection with engineering work in the concentration camps. This fact has been fully proved by evidence established in this trial.
For lack of a suitable chief, the defendant Oswald POHL himself directed Office II (Engineering) in the Chief Office for Household and Engineering, by placing the three main department chiefs personally and directly under his supervision, until, in the fall of 1941, he found a suitable office chief in the person of KAMMLER, who later became SS-Obergruppenfuehrer.
2.) Only from this time on was there an organizational contact between Office Group C and agencies down to the lowest level (Engineering Management). The official engineering channels were: Office Group C (Office V. Central Engineering Inspectorate) - Engineering Inspectorate (of which there were five, namely: Reich North in Berlin, Reich West in Wiesbaden, Reich South in Munich, Reich East in Posen and Silesia in Breslau) Central Engineering Management - Engineering Management.
There was an Engineering Management in every concentration camp too; a Central Engineering Management was also located in several of these camps. In the government General the highest engineering agency was the engineering group with the SS Economic Office (SS-Wirtschaft) in Cracow. Its rank was equal to that of the inspectorates in the Reich.
3) The Office Group C had delegated its competence to a considerable degree to the Engineering Inspectorates, for reasons of decentralization. Thus, all engineering projects to the amount of maximum Reichsmark 100,000, and later up to Reichsmark 180,000, could be approved individually by the Engineering Inspectorates, within their own jurisdiction. As a result the official channels for construction managements generally ended with the Engineering Inspectorate.
However, engineering projects exceeding the value of RM 100,000 and RM 180,000 respectively, had to be submitted by the Engineering Inspectorate to the Office Group C for approval, and Kammer had reserved unto himself personally the approval of such projects. But it did also happen that engineering projects exceeding these limits did not reach the Office Group C and were not submitted to it for approval. This happened in cases in which the work involved extended over two seasons of the year and the engineering project was divided into two engineering portions, each of which did not exceed the amount of RM 100,000 and RM 180,000 respectively. This procedure was even obligatory if the yearly quota (wood, iron, concrete) was insufficient to cover entire engineering projects and had to be apportioned to two years or two seasons of the year.
4) The evidence has not furnished any concrete proof of the fact that the gas chamber facilities in Auschwitz were submitted through and approved by these official engineering channels.
In any case, the Prosecution was unable to submit evidence which might justify such an assumption. It must, much rather, be assumed that this engineering project was carried out by the local engineering management upon Himmler's order, which was given directly to the commander of the Auschwitz camp. For reasons of secrecy alone this appeared expedient, because otherwise, if this engineering project had been channeled via the Central Engineering Management and the Engineering Inspectorate, too large a circle of people would have obtained knowledge of it. This assumption is confirmed by the testimony which the Auschwitz Commander, Rudolf HOESS before the International Military Tribunal and which is submitted by me, in excerpt, as exhibit POHL No. 1. This testimony discloses, among other facts, that HIMMLER had even forbidden HOESS to discuss the contents of the order received by him with his direct superior, the Inspector of Concentration Camps Gruppenfuehrer GLUECKS. Under these circumstances it must be assumed that HOESS was also authorized directly to approve and carry out, within his own jurisdiction, all engineering projects subject to any particular obligation to secrecy and irrespective of any cost limit.
Now I shall come to number 5, dealing with labor allocation of concentration camp prisoners.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, I think we will take a short recess before you start on this subject.
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal will be in recess for fifteen minutes.
(A recess was taken)
Court No. II, Case No. 4.
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
DR. SEIDL: (5) Labor Allocation of Concentration Camp Prisoners.
I. In his capacity of Chief of the Economic and Administrative Main Office the defendant Oswald Pohl received an order from the Reichsfuehrer-SS to take up, within the scope of the competent ministry, the unified and centralized direction of the allocation of concentration camp prisoners. Defendant Pohl's function, substantially, was to decide on demands made by enterprises within the war economy for the labor allocation of prisoners. In addition, he was required to assume the unified direction of the allocation of prisoners in enterprises managed by the Office Group W of the Economic and Administrative Main Office. With regard to the details of this procedure I refer to the testimony of the defendants Pohl and Sommer and to the contents of Gerhard Maurer's affidavit, dated 3 July 1947.
The order given to Oswald Pohl for the unified direction of the labor allocation of prisoners was closely connected, in time and matter, with the development of the war and dependent on it was the nomination of a Plenipotentiary General in charge of labor supply, taking effect by an ordinance of the Fuehrer, dated 21 March 1942. I have submitted this ordinance to the Court as an exhibit and also the directives for its execution and am referring to it in detail.
Though in the Fuehrer's ordinance regarding a Plenipotentiary General for Labor Allocation, dated 21 March 1942, the latter received plenary powers to take all measures necessary "to guarantee a unified direction of allocation, adequate to the demands of war economics of all available labor-supplies, including foreign workers recruited and prisoners of war, as well as the mobilization of all labor forces previously not utilized", collaboration between the offices of the Plenipotentiary General and the Economic and Administrative Main office did not develop. The German labor-forces and foreign workers recruited by the agents of the Plenipotentiary General were immediately directed to war-economy and for the greater part quartered in camps, established Court No. II, Case No. 4.and administered by war-economy plants themselves and supervised by the German Labor Front (DAF). The freedom of the workers was not subjected to any other limitations except those originating from the labor-contract.
II.
The prisoners of concentration camps were directed to these camps by orders of the Reich Security Main Office, the administration of the Plenipotentiary General for Labor Allocation or any other labor-administration not being connected with it or in a position of influencing, to any notable degree, the decisions of the Economic and Administrative Main Office. As far as this concerned prisoners detained for political offenses, their transfer was effected by means of an order for protective custody issued by the Office IV of the Reich Main Security Office. That is the Secret State Police Office, the Gestapo Office. The transfer of criminal prisoners (professional criminals, captives in protective custody and others), of individuals detained in preventive custody by the police and similar categories was done according to a regulation of the Office V of the Reich Main Security Office (Reich Criminal Police Bureau). The agents of the Security Police were subject to police directives without being able to, or obliged to, consider questions connected with the allocation of labor and the procurement of labor-forces. The Economic and Administrative Main Office, as unequivocally proved by the evidence, had nothing to do with these police regulations and was in no connection whatever with them. It could neither transfer a person to a concentration camp nor was it authorized to order the release of a prisoner. The Economic and Administrative Main Office, in attaining the release of a prisoner, was under the obligation, uniformly with every other office of the Reich of the Party, to make an application to the Reich Main Security Office and whether this demand was granted or refused depended exclusively on the resolution of the police.
Court No. II, Case No. 4.
III.
The records of the number of prisoners employed in the different plants, furnished to the defendant Oswald POHL by the Office Group D, were arranged according to professional groups. This distinction alone was of importance for the uniform direction of labor-allocation. On the other hand, the nationality of the prisoner and the reason for his being taken into protective custody or preventive police detention did not become evident from these records and reports. These questions were of no importance for the execution of the order given to POHL and pertained exclusively to the competency of the Reich Main Security Office. Inmates of concentration camps whose allocation was to be uniformly directed by POHL within thy scope of the ministry to which he was attached were no less subject to compulsory work than the inmates of state prisons.
There is no doubt that prisoners serving sentence passed by a court were compelled to work and are still being compelled. In this way they could also be utilized in economy and war-economy. This becomes evident beyond any doubt from the Code of Penal Administration in the version of the announcement, dated 22 July 1940 (official special publication of German Justice No. 21), submitted as evidence by the Defense.
Under figure 67, referring to the fact that work is the basis of a regular and effective execution of punishment, it is expressly decreed that "every prisoner is obliged to work and to perform what can be accomplished with industry and care." Under figure 81 it is stipulated that the proceeds from the work allotted appertain to the Reich and "to the greatest possible extent should contribute to the payment of costs incurred by the Reich for the infliction of the punishment." The second part of the Code of Penal Administration contains regulations with regard to working-time, fixed at a minimum of 9 - 10 hours a day.
The Code of Penal Administration does not only deal with the compulsory work of persons sentenced to imprisonment by a court but also Court No. II, Case No. 4.tains regulations for the "execution of measures for security and the reformation of character in connection with deprivation of freedom," as provided for in paragraphs 42 and following of the Reich penal code.
Under figure 213 it is decreed that "the daily working-time of a prisoner in protective custody in general should not be less than 10 hours."
Finally there are in the Code of Penal Administration also provisions with regard to compulsory work when confined to a workhouse or institution (figure 216). Similar conclusions have to be drawn from previously existing regulations, the legal validity of which has never been doubted and can never be questioned. In this connection supplementary reference has to be made that already before the war, compulsory labor also for prisoners in custody on remand had been introduced by a provision of the Reich Ministry of Justice. With regard to details, I refer to the ordinances and regulations, submitted by the Defense, especially the general order of the Reich Minister of Justice, dated 7 June 1938 and the circular of the Reich Ministry of Justice, dated 10 May 1939.
Serious objections cannot be raised against proper application of these regulations, as far as I know existing also in the Code of Penal Administration of other countries, pertaining to inmates of concentration camps. Similar misgivings are all the less warranted, as many thousands of inmates were in concentration camps who, as criminal elements, had to be imprisoned by the police for reasons of public safety, at least for the duration of the war. The application of the regulations embodied in the Code of Penal Administration to concentration camps appears all the more obvious, as also external conditions are absolutely adequate. Compulsory labor in the concentration camps seems all the more understandable, as in opposition to penal prisoners, no compensation was claimed by the administration of the camps for the costs of accommodation, guarding, food, clothing and so on. In the German criminal code provision is made that the convicted persons Court No. II, Case No. 4.should be made to pay not only for the costs of the trial but also for the expenses of the execution of sentence.
On the other hand, special emphasis was laid on the exemption from payment of these costs in case of prisoners who were confined to a concentration camp on the basis of an order for protective custody or who were arrested by the police for preventive detention. For this reason the Reich Minister of Finance also demanded that the administration of the concentration camps pay, at least in part, for the expenses incurred by these camps from the proceeds of the prisoners' work.
IV.
As almost every law, the statute dated 8 August 1945 of the International Military Tribunal and Control Council Law No. 10 contain "normative elements of the facts of the case," these being of such a nature that the establishment of the punishable facts of the case, in each separate event, can be arrived at only by means of a decision based on the personal valuation of the judge. In Article II of Control Council Law No. 10, for instance, mention is made of "enslavement, forcible displacement and other inhuman wrongs perpetrated on the civilian population", without specifying in detail the elements of facts of the case requisite for the justified assumption of a war crime or a crime against humanity. I also refer to Paragraph 1 of my statement where I have already commented on these problems.
No special proof is necessary for answering the question under what supposition the terms "enslavement", "slave-labor" are legitimate, comprising a judicial decision based on personal valuation and that this cannot be established without due regard to actual practice not only in Germany, but also in other countries. In this connection the fact cannot be overlooked that, after Germany's military collapse, millions of German prisoners of war were not only forced to work in mines and elsewhere under different and extremely hard conditions, but that many thousands of Germans were moved to the Soviet Union and that this occurred as a result of a joint resolution by the chiefs of govern Court No. II, Case No. 4.ment of Great Britain, the United States and the USSR, taken at the conference of Yalta in February 1945 and laid down in a secret report.
Under figure 2 of this secret report provision is made for "German reparations to be exacted in triple form as follows:
"a) Within 2 years after the capitulation of Germany or following the cessation of organized resistance, total dismantling of national property within and outside Germany....
b) Annual deliveries of goods from current production for a period of time to be settled after the termination of war.
c) Allocation of German labor."
In the interpretation of Control Council Law No. 10 and in judging the defendant Oswald POHL's attitude, the Court will have to take into account this practice, actually carried out, that German labor is used as payment for reparations.
In the interpretation of the regulations pertaining to Control Council Law No. 10 and of the statute for the International Military Tribunal further consideration will have to be given to Article X of ordinance No. 7 of the Military Government for Germany (US). In it, it is laid down that admissions of the International Military Tribunal concerning case No. 1 (Goering et al.) can be taken as evidence of facts only, failing new and essential proof to the contrary. This regulation, however, will have to be valid, in its proper application, not only with regard to the establishment of facts but also when interpreting the law itself. The contents of the secret report signed in February 1945 at the conference of Yalta by the three Great Powers had not been made public when the International Military Tribunal pronounced the judgment and, consequently, could not be applied to the interpretation of the Statute by this Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: Has the Yalta agreement that you refer to been introduced in evidence here, this secret agreement?
DR. SEIDL: Your Honor, the text of this secret additional report of the Yalta conference has been published in all papers inside and Court No. II, Case No. 4.outside Germany some months ago.
This happened in connection with the accusations raised against the Soviet Union that German labor had been forcibly deported. From the point of view of the fact that this report had been published, I did not introduce it as evidence into this trial; but if the Court thinks this should be done and thinks that the text of the record should be in evidence, I should be grateful for the opportunity of making up for this omission. I have the text of this report here at my disposal.
THE PRESIDENT: Never mind introducing anything further. Just go ahead.
Page 1
5.) "The hearing of evidence has proved that the order dated 3 March 1942, issued by the Reichsfuehrer SS, charging the defendant Oswald Pohl with the unified direction of the prisoners' labor allocation was in direct connected with the development of the war events. After the collapse of the German offensive in Russia in the winter of 1941-42, which had led the German troops to the gates of Moscow, it had become evident that Germany would have to count on a long war and that in this war the entire existence of the nation was at stake. Germany was opposed by a whole world of enemies backed by an enormous war-potential, and the Government of the Reich would have seriously neglected their duty in omitting to take all measures necessary for averting this danger. One of these measures was the mobilization of all the labor available.
THE PRESIDENT: Including slaves.
DR. SEIDL: Including the mobilization of all labor of which they were available in the German territory.
THE PRESIDENT: No matter where you got it, or how you got it.
DR. SEIDL: If they were in concentration camps, then they were subject for the reasons I have quoted, for compulsory labor allocation.
THE PRESIDENT: No matter how they got there.
DR. SEIDL: If they had come to a concentration camp for reasons of the Gestapo, for instance, because they constituted a danger for the occupation forces in occupied territory, then in my opinion the administration was justified in having these inmates included in the labor process.
THE PRESIDENT: Your whole argument, Dr. Seidl, is a justification then of the enslavement of Jews and enforced labor of Jews in concentration camps. You are justifying it. You think it was right?
DR. SEIDL: If your Honor, please, I have to defend the defendant Pohl.
THE PRESIDENT: You are making an argument, and I want to know what your position is in making the argument. Do you justify it, and claim it was right?
DR. SEIDL: I claim that it has been justified if the inmates for reasons of the security Police had been committed to concentration camps. Whether in certain individual cases these requisites had been fulfilled of not, the defendant Pohl was not in a position to investigate, he had to rely on the fact that those inmates who were in concentration camps had been sent there for good reasons by the Security Police.
THE PRESIDENT: That is not the point that you were discussing. You are saying that as long as the Jews were in concentration camps it was legitimate and lawful to force them to work, no matter how they got there. Go ahead, I don't mean to distract you, or to interrupt you. Go ahead with your argument. I am sorry.
DR. SEIDL: Let us investigate the legal deductions resulting from this position of the German Wehrmacht and the German war-economy-above all in view of the supposition of a state-emergency. The question of a state of emergency and the special case of self-defense, was regulated in nearly all criminal laws, applicable only to individual circumstances. The individual, under certain conditions, may count on immunity from punishment, if he "acted forced by his own personal exigency or that of another." It has, however, been acknowledged in jurisdiction and judicial literature that a collective body, the "state" may also find itself in a state of exigency and that interventions intended to avert this exigency and actually averting it, may become exempt from punishment.
1.) First the question arose, whether the conception of the individual's self-defense could be amplified to that of a state-emergency in the sense of legal defense in favor of the state and the community of people. This question, on the whole, has been answered in the affirmative.
2.) The same that applies to self-defense also applies to a state of emergency, such as judicially expressed, for instance, in Article 54 of the German Penal Code, and also classified in nearly all modern systems of criminal procedure.
Also these regulations are, first of all, designed for individual circumstances. But, from this conception, literature and legal administration arrive at the basic acceptance of a state-emergency with adequate effect. In view of the version in which the conception of emergency is generally expressed in penal codes, the justified extension of these regulations to the State is, after all, only a transmission of fundamental ideas. If the idea of an emergency is extended to the State and if an individual is given power to intervene for the purpose of eliminating such an emergency, a valuation of objective assets and values is involved, as it also arises in a general state of emergency and in the provisions with regard to an individual state of emergency. This must necessarily lead to the result that for the individual, if conceding such actions to him, the guilt not only is removed "but that his action has become "justified". In other words; the so-called state-emergency is a reason for exculpation even if admitted only in the corresponding application to the current judicial conception of an emergency-state.
But what is mean by "transmission" of fundamental ideas to cases of state-emergency? Whether a state-emergency is due to anybody's guilt or not, whether, for instance, the last war has been a "war of aggression" is evidently of no importance here. Merely the existence of an emergency is decisive. The limitations of individual interests are, in a general way, replaced by the vital interests of the community and the state.
Summing up, we can therefore define the so-called state-emergency as an emergency not to be obviated in any other way with regard to vital interests of the state and the community. Admitting an action within its implications, not only calls for acceptance of an exculpatory cause but for the establishment of a genuine cause for justification. Which are the consequences from this legal state of affairs for the case of the defendant Oswald POHL?
1.) In March 1942 and in the following years the war situation developed in such a way that it involved a "real", i.e. an immediate pressing danger to the vital interests of the state as a power conducting the war. An increase in was production could only be achieved by an increased employment of new labor, in view of the fact that the Wehrmacht has raised its troop requirements.
2.) The conception of a State Emergency presupposes that the action which is the subject of the indictments aimed at the removal of the danger. By this is meant the objective purpose of the act and not the subjective purpose of the person acting. It remains to be discussed whether the uniform direction of the labor allocation of prisoners was a suitable means for averting the danger threatening the state. In any case, this question must be answered in the affirmative without further proof being required.
3.) In the end it may not have been possible to remove the State Emergency "by another method". According to the result of the hearing of evidence there can be no doubt that no other way existed. In view of these facts and their legal consequences the behavior of the defendant Oswald POHL appears to be justified even if the court, contrary to my conviction, should come to the conclusion that the employment of concentration came prisoners for war economy constitutes a state of facts punishable by law. This cause for preclusion of injustice would also be applicable if the court should regard the working conditions (working hours) as constituting a state of facts punishable by law. An exception would then only exist if in a single concrete case the defendant POHL were to be held responsible personally. The hearing of evidence has however offered no proof of such an exception. For the rest I refer to the limits of the criminal responsibility of the defendant POHL in his capacity as Chief of the WVHA, Economic Administrative Main Office, in my exposition at the conclusion of this evaluation of evidence.
Besides the general state of emergency already mentioned, a special state of war emergency is recognized in the literature of international law. According to this "actions are also permitted which, in self-defense and in a state of emergency, are contrary to the articles of war and which in themselves would thus also infringe on international law." According to international law, however, self-defense and emergency are different to "military was necessity" (war reason), which alone still cannot justify the violation of the articles of war. Emergency and Way Necessity are, however, different conceptions. According to general principles the emergency, in which the existence and power of development (self-preservation and self-development) of the threatened state were at stake, justified the violation of every rule of international law, consequently also the legal maxims of the articles of war, a fact recognized by the internal law of every civilized state. When applying the terms self-defense and emergency, recognized by penal law and international law, the illegality of the violations committed are precluded if the state found itself in a situation which could not be relieved by any other means and which jeopardized its existence.
The German Reich undoubtedly found itself in such a position after the collapse of the Winter offensive in Russia 1941 to 1942 and after the defeat at El Alamein. The material superiority of Germany's enemy made itself over more strongly felt as war went on and there was no longer any question, that with the acceptance of unconditional surrender demanded, the foundations of the existence of the whole nations were also threatened at the same time.
VII.
In this connection also a few remarks regarding the employment of Prisoners of War seem to be called for. The pertinent regulations are to be found in Article 61 of the Hague Convention of Land-Warfare dated 18 October 1907 (Appendix to IV Convention dealing with the laws and customs of Land warfare), and in Article 31 of the Geneva Convention dealing with the treatment of Prisoners of War dated 27 July 1929.
In Article 6 of the Hague Convention regarding Land Warfare dated 18 October 1907 regarding the question of employing prisoners of war, it states among other things: "The work done by prisoners of war must in no way .... be connected with war enterprises."
Article 31 of the Geneva Convention dated 27 July 1929 reads as follows:
"Work to be performed by prisoners of war must not be directly connected with war operations. It is especially prohibited to use prisoners for manufacturing and transporting arms or munitions of any kind or for transporting material intended for the combatant units."
1.) The Geneva Convention of the year 1929 regarding prisoners of war, which has been ratified by Germany, is to supplement and replace the regulations of the Hague Convention regarding Land Warfare of 1907 or 1899.
In relation to such states, who did not ratify the Geneva Convention the Hague Convention of Land Warfare of 1907 or 1899 is applicable if these states are bound by one of the two versions.
The Geneva Convention of 1929, which does not contain any so-called clause providing for the participation of all the powers was valid in the second World War in the relationship between Germany and her war opponents at that time, but was not valid formally as far as the Soviet Union was concerned, by whom it was not ratified. The Hague Convention regarding Land Warfare was neither formally nor even generally binding for the Soviet Union in the second World War. This warfare regulation contains a clause providing for the participation of all the powers and in the second world war the following belligerent states were not bound by it: Bulgaria, Greece, Italy and Yugo-Slavia. It is doubtful whether the Hague Convention regarding Land-Warfare of 1899 was formally valid during the second world war.
This question is however of no practical importance, because neither in the first nor in the second world war did nay of the belligerent powers refer to the lack of binding force of the Hague Convention regarding Land-Warfare.
It must therefore be granted that the regulations contained in the second Hague Convention of Land-Warfare of 1907 are valid in international law by force of custom. Therefore this appears justified too, because - a sit is commonly acknowledged - the Hague Convention regarding Land-Warfare codified mainly the prescriptive law valid under international law even before the. Similar statements may also be made with reference to the Geneva Convention of 1929 concerning Prisoners of War. In the main it gives an accurate definition of the regulations contained in the Hague Convention of Land-Warfare regarding prisoners of war. Furthermore it contains a few extensions as well as restrictions of this warfare regulation. A striking example for the restrictions is constituted by the insertion of the word "direct" infront of the word "relation". It must be assumed that here it is likewise only a case of the codification of the proscriptive international law; this law resulted from the experiences gained during the time after 1907, especially from the growth of the idea of total war and of economic war.
In this connection it appears worthy of note that already before the conclusion of the Geneva Convention of 1929 concerning Prisoners of War the demand has not infrequently been made that direct relation ship to the war should serve as a prerequisite for prohibiting the employment of Prisoners of War. Thus for example in its "Manual des Lois de la Guerre sur terre" which was composed in 1880 and which has become a classic, the "institute de Droit International" already provided the following regulations for the employment of prisoners of war, viz: "They may be employed on public utilities which have no direct relation to operations carried on in the theatre of war."
If this is so, then on the strength of the prescriptive law, article 31 of the Geneva Convention concerning Prisoners of War, also applied to Soviet Russia during the second World war.