In addition, these varying terms were used intentionally in order to conceal from the OKW the actual events, particularly the actual number of prisoners taken. The defendant saw himself obliged to take such action after he had tried in vain as already pointed out, to get the OKW to make basic and sweeping changes in the treatment of insurgents.
The other contention by the prosecution that during the period of office of the defendant Kuntze, relatives of the insurgents were forced to give information about them and that they were exposed to duress and committed to concentration camps has not been confirmed by the evidence submitted. Neither had the defendant Kuntze issued such orders, nor could it be proved that he knew of any such case in which relatives of insurgents had been exposed to duress.
Then I omit the next sentences and continue at the bottom of page 70:
Summarizing I conclude:
Orders, issued prior to defendant Kuntze's succesion to office, as well as orders issued during General Kuntze's tenure of office, pertaining to the treatment of captured insurgents, were issued in accordance with the rules and regulations of German and international law pertaining to the treatment of insurgents.
In addition, the defendant Kuntze did not issue these orders on his own initiative but only in compliance with binding instructions from the OKW and OKH, and because they were a military expedient.
The orders issued by subordinate offices and units were also kept as far as General Kuntze got to know of them, within the framework of the instructions issued by the OKW.
One cannot speak of an arbitrary implementation of the orders issued. This is proved by the large number of prisoners taken during the whole time General Kuntze was in office, including also the period after the order of 19 March 1942 was issued.
Now follows the section dealing with the treatment of the population:
The above explanations of the procedure of issuing orders, and of its effect in reality, during defendant Kuntze's tenure of office, show that the contention of the prosecution that there existed a plan of terrorizing and intimidation with the aim of decimating the population, is without foundation. I believe to have proved, that the character of the orders issued during the time the defendant Kuntze was in office, was determined to a large degree, by the humane attitude taken by General Kuntze towards the population of the occupied Southeast, and that moreover, the execution of reprisal measures was solely the result of military expedience.
Had the defendant Kuntze intended to terrorize or even decimate the population of the Southeast, then his whole attitude towards the question of reprisals and the treatment of insurgents, particularly his attempts to have the measures offered by the OKW toned down, would have been absolutely incomprehensible, and particularly his conflict with the OKW, which had effects, detrimental to his person would have been absurd.
Just this behavior of the defendant Kuntze should prove unequivocally that General Kuntze never had the intention to terrorize or decimate the population. More than that, I have also proved that the defendant Kuntze had the welfare of the population in mind.
May I recall defense exhibit Kuntze 28 and exhibit Kuntze 27 on the establishment of the so-called "cordon sanitaire" on the river Drina, offering the Pravoslav refuges from Croatia who were streaming across the river Drina, medical care, food and lodging.
Then I would draw judicial attention to the following statements, on page 73 which also deal with the measures taken in the interest of the Greek population and I will continue on page 74 at the top.
Also the allegation of the Prosecution that fights between the individual ethnic entities of the Balkan, had been stirred up by the German Occupation Power in pursuance of their policy of decimation and that for the carrying out of this policy, they had utilized these troubles is merely a mistaking and misrepresentation of both the facts and the situation.
Then I refer to the following statements which deal with General Kuntze's attitude towards the atrocities and also the fact that he did not do as the Italians did and sent the Cetniks against the communists.
And then I omit page 75 and continue on 76:
Destruction of homesteads That the burning of homesteads is, according to international law, admissible by way of reprisal, if it is considered a military necessity, has already been discussed in detail, in the plea and in the statement of the defense for the defendant List.
Then I continue with the next paragraph:
If, in the order issued by the defendant Kuntze, of 19 March 1942, the destroying of towns and villages as means of reprisals are mentioned, -- according to lines of policy as under section 6, -- one must, in this connection again lay emphasis on the fact that these lines of policy did not contain anything new, but were merely a repetition of the previously issued regulations of the OKH, well known to the troops.
This reference in the lines of policy as laid down, is therefore not a measure which the defendant Kuntze initiated, quite apart from the fact that these lines of policy were not binding commands but were merely meant as direct tions to the troops. For the rest, I would like to mention that this reference in the lines of policy corresponds also to the agreements as laid down in the Susak record on 3 March 1942 which through the approval of the OKW, the Commando Supreme and the Croatian Government, became binding.
I omit the rest of this paragraph.
During the period of office of the defendant Kuntze, only very few measures of destructions-in-part were carried out as means of reprisal in Serbia, which however, do not prove that the defendant Kuntze is to blame.
The documentary material of the prosecution shows only four incidents during the period of General Kuntze's command on which I am now pleading in the following, based on the text of the reports.
And then I will not read the details about these individual incidents and continue on page 79 at the bottom.
All the other incidents mentioned in the indictment happened in a period either before or after the defendant Kuntze took over command and can therefore not be charged against him.
In Greece no village, not one single house or any other building have been destroyed in the course of reprisals during the period of the defendant Kuntze's command.
I will omit the rest of this paragraph. Then follows the conclusion:
Summing up I declare with reference to this point of the indictment:
Neither the orders issued not the execution of these orders given during the period of the defendant Kuntze's command-
THE PRESIDENT: It will be necessary for us to take our morning recess at this time in order to give the sound track mechanics a chance to change the film.
We will take a short recess at this time.
(A recess was taken.)
(The Tribunal reconvened at 1045 hours, 5 February 1948)
THE MARSHAL: The Court is again in session.
THE PRESIDENT: You may proceed.
DR. MENZEL: I would like to proceed. I stopped before the recess on page 80 on the bottom where it says: "Summing up I declare with reference to this point of the indictment." Neither the orders issued nor the execution of these orders given during the period of the defendant Kuntze's command have proved a responsibility of the defendant Kuntze in the meaning of the charges made by the prosecution against the defendant.
I am turning to page 81 where it says the "Destruction of the Economy". I shall omit this paragraph. It is well known that it was not the destruction of economy that was planned but the reconstruction that was planned. Now we come to page 82, to the chapter of the treatment cf captive members of Allied Armies.
Treatment of captive members of Allied Armies The Prosecution has not been able to prove that defendant Kuntze or any of his subordinate commanders during his time of office in the Southeast issued any order stating that captive soldiers of Allied Forces were not to be treated as prisoners-of-war.
Neither did defendant Kuntze during his time of office gain knowledge of any case - nor did the Prosecution prove any such case - that captive members of the Allied Forces were not treated according to the rulings of International law by the German authorities and troops under his charge. The shooting of three Britons mentioned in the activity report of the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast of 31 August 1942 on the losses in the total area during the period of 24 July - 3 August 1942, is in the first place contradicted by the note of 4 August 1942 in the war diary of the Commanding General and Military Commander in Serbia in August 1942, according to which only two of the three captive Britons were shot. Furthermore, it has been carried out by Bulgarians as is proved by the activity report No. 2 of the 717th.
Infantry Division and the note of 4 August 1942 in Exh. von Geitner 68 IV 8. But the Bulgarian troops were only tactically subordinated to the General Plenipotentiary in Serbia, but not in a disciplinary and juridical respect. Therefore the measure carried out by the Bulgarians cannot constitute the basis for any charge against defendant Kuntze, all the more because these Britons were also gang members. Also the shooting of a British parachutist by an anti-Communist, mentioned in Doc. Exh. 227 IX 51, 36, does not incriminate defendant Kuntze. For, according to the wording of the report and according to the place of this action, which latter has been omitted by the Prosecution when reading the document, this event took place in the Italian Occupied Territory, i.e. in the area of the Italian AOK 2. Besides, it also emerges even from the documents submitted by the Prosecution that, during the time of office of General Kuntze, members of Allied Forces were always considered as prisoners-of-war.
I shall now omit the opinion in detail which is on page 84 and 85 and shall again begin on page 86 with the chapter "The 'KommissarBefehl'". I shall have to read in detail my comments on that point since the "Kommissar Befehl" was a great topic of the Prosecution.
The"Kommissar Befehl", in the form in which it was presented as Exhibit 14 I 34, 49 and of which the defendant Kuntze came to know only in Nuernberg, applied, as evident from its contents and in particular from the code-word "Barbarossa", exclusively to the Eastern theater of war and not to the South-East. Those Commissars mentioned in the documents submitted by the Prosecution and applicable only to the South-East, were rebels and were to be treated as such. Therefore the shooting of Commissars mentioned in the Documents Exhibit 590 and 591, which were submitted to the defendant Kuntze during his cross-examination do not prove the responsibility of the defendant Kuntze. Besides, the 718th Division in whose area - according to Document Exhibit 590 -- a partisan Commissar was arrested and shot, was not subordinate to the Military Commander South-East during the time in question but to the Italian AOK 2. The shooting of a Commissar mentioned in Document Exhibit 591 occurred in the course of military operations as is evident by the wording of the entry.
As far as the charge of the Prosecution is concerned blaming the defendant Kuntze, due to his assignment to the East as Commanding General of the XXXXII A.K., with responsibility for the Kommissar Order then in accordance with the evidence the following must be considered as proven conclusively:
As is evident from Exhibit Kuntze 43 General Strauch (Generaloberst) as General commanding 9th Army, to which the XXXXII A.K. was subordinate at the beginning of the Russian campaign, had given an order orally before the beginning of the offensive that captured commissars were not to be shot but were to be treated as prisoners of war. This order was passed on by General Kuntze to his subordinate divisional commanders.
When later on the XXXXII A.K. was subordinated to the 18th Army at about the middle of July 1911, the XXXXII A.K. did not receive the Kommissar Befehl from the 18th Army. Consequently the XXXXII A.K. too could not pass on this order to the divisions, which had been put under its control by the 18th Army.
Not only during the time of its subordination to the 9th Army but also during the time while it was subordinated to the 18th Army, the XXXXII A.K. never learned of any shooting of Commissars in the corps area.
The shootings of commissars in the area of the 217th Infantry Division and the 61st Infantry Division, which are mentioned in the documents Exhibit 592 and 593, and of which General Kuntze learned only after these documents had been submitted to him during his cross-examination, cannot be blamed on him. Exh. Kuntze 65.
The 61st Infantry Division, in the area of which, according to the statement of the Prosecution, with reference to Exhibit 593, Commissars are said to have been shot on 26 September and on 8 October 1941, by units 161a of the motorized military police as is evident by Exhibit Kuntze was subordinated to the XXXXII A.K. around the middle of august, this fact was not denied by the Prosecution either.
I am now turning to the next paragraph page 89 on top.
The witnesses Einbeck and von Woedtke declare in their affidavits, Exh. Kuntze 45 III 32 and Exh. Kuntze 46 III 34, that the subordination of the 61st Division under A.K. XXXXII ended around the 20 September. The Prosecution has tried to disprove those statements by submitted the rebuttal-documents Exh. 665. However, the Prosecution has not been able to do so.
According to the witness Kuntze's statement in the witness-box the A.K. XXXXII was withdrawn after the conquering of the Isles of Moon and Oesel before the action against the Isle of Dagoe had been started and after it had transferred - according to orders - the ensuing preparation for carrying through the action against Dagoe to the 61st Division. After a few days of rest in Riga and Pernau, about Oct. 6.41 A.K. XXXXII was taken by train to Rumania from around the 6 October 1941 on, for further combat-assignment against the Crimea. (Statement Kuntze, Prot. p. 3475 German, 3531 English). This statement of the defendant Kuntze in the witness box which was made earlier in the examination, i.e. before the cross-examination-documents had been submitted to him, corroborates the statements of the witnesses Einbeck and von Woedtke concerning the time of withdrawal of A.K. XXXXII from the 18th Army and also the termination of the actual subordination of the 61st Division under A.K. XXXXII.
The fact that in the war-formation schedule of the OKH on the 8 October 1941, submitted as Exh. 665 by the Prosecution, A.K. XXXXII and with it the 61st Division appears as being still subordinate to the 18th Army is no contradiction of the evidence produced by the defense. For, usually the daily war-formation schedule continued to register an exist ing subordination until transportation was on the move.
The transportation of A.K. XXXXII, however, took several days because besides the A.K. Staff the Corps Signal Battalion and the Corps Supply Units had to be shipped too. The date of the OKH war-formation schedule is therefore no proof of the actual relative subordination between one formation and another at the time specified. It is therefore quite evident from the defendant Kuntze's statement as a witness and from the defense-Exh. Kuntze 45 & 46, that in October and also around the 26 September 1941 A.K. XXXXII was no longer subordinate to the 13th Army, nor was the 61st Division subordinate to A.K. XXXXII.
Furthermore, there is nothing the war diary of the Motorized Military Police Troop 161a submitted as Exh. 593, to prove that it had been actually under the 61st Division at the periods in question. Just as many other units, the Military Police units, too, frequently changed in their position of subordination. The title page of the Military Police Troop 161a's war diary (Exh. 593) contrary to regulations does not disclose this though; and moreover the heading of that document has become illegible by deletions and handwritten notations. Only the word "Division" is legible, but not with certainty the number 61.
Further, this Military Police Troop 161a war diary covers a longer period, i.e. the time between 26 June 1941 up to 31 March 1942, as is evident from the document itself. It does not disclose, however, when during that period the Military Police Troop was subordinate to the 61st Division. The Prosecution has therefore failed to prove that Military Police Troop 161a was actually subordinate to the 61st Division at the crucial times as stated in Exh. 593.
Moreover, the Prosecution has failed to prove that the 61st Division had actually given the order to shoot the Commissars; for, only if such an order had been given by the Division, could the responsibility fall on the Division. The Military Police Troops were subordinate to the Divisions only as far as assignments were concerned, whereas they received their orders and directions in matters pertaining to the police directly from the Military Police Officer of the respective army to which the Military Police troops were subordinated in military matters.
(Exh. Kuntze 45). In view of these varying subordinations connected with the Military Police Troops the solution of the question as to which office had issued the order for the shooting of Commissars, is an essential prerequisite for fixing the responsibility for the execution of such an order. I would like to refer here to the notation in Exh. 593 to the effect that the officer of the Military Police Troop had proceeded to army headquarters as a special messenger, and further to the fact that according to the entries dated 25 and 26 September 1941 the execution of the Commissars had some connection with the sabotage-acts. It must be assumed therefore that these measures have been ordered by the Military Police Officer of the Army and that consequently the 61st Division cannot be held responsible. Besides, I would like to refer especially to paragraph 5 of affidavit Kuntze and further affidavit of this witness, Exhibit 47, in which it is said that in the visits that it became clearly evident that he demanded a decent treatment of all prisoners but particularly emphasized that captured commissars be treated as prisoners of war. The 61st Division had voiced his opinion on the question of the treatment of Prisoners of War and captured Commissars in the presence of the Commander of the 61st Division and had demanded a decent treatment of all prisoners, but had particularly emphasized that captured Commissars should be treated also as Prisoners of War.
Finally, the Prosecution has also been unable to prove that the executions (shootings) of Commissars on 26 September and on 8 and 9 October 1941 had been reported to the 61st Division. In any case, on the basis of the statement of the defendant Kuntze in the witness stand and in view of the affidavit Exh. Kuntze 44 - it is established that a shooting of Commissars, carried out by the Feldgendarmerie (Military Police) 161a had not been reported to the Corps Headquarters XXXXII.
I may refer here first of all to the explicitly stated amplification of the witnesses Einbeck and von Woedtke in their affidavits, that they would have to have knowledge of this, in view of their position at the XXXXII Army Corps if such a report had been received at the XXXXII Army Corps.
Neither can Document NOKW 1905 Exh. 647, submitted by the Prosecution in the rebuttal, prove any charge against the defendant Kuntze. General Kuntze never had anything to do with the AOK 2 during the time of his commitment in the East. The Prosecution has neither maintained nor has it been able to prove that General Kuntze at any time has been subordinated to the AOK 2. For this reason the report of the AOK 2, contained in Exh. 647 and directed to the Army Group center, cannot be laid to the charge of defendant Kuntze.
A responsibility of defendant Kuntze for the Commissar order is therefore out of the question.
Order concerning Commandos The order concerning commandos, the Kommando Befehl, which is laid to the charge of defendant Kuntze - Exh.
225 - has been issued, as is evident from the date of the order, only after defendant Kuntze's command as deputy commander-in-chief of the 12th Army and deputy Wehrmacht Commander South-East had been terminated, e.g. must have been decreed only after his term of office with the Wehrmacht Commander South-East. As the defendant has stated in the witness stand and as proved by Exh. Kuntze 47, General Kuntze was not at the front at the time when the order pertaining to the Commandos was issued, but with the reserve-army, namely as chief of training in the reserve army. In this capacity only the armament schools, schools for officers' training, and non-commissioned officers as well, as the preparatory schools for non-commissioned officers of the reserve army with their instruction units were subordinated to General Kuntze, as far as training and discipline was concerned, but not tactically. The schools and their instruction units received orders of commitment from the Chief of the reserve army through the Chief of the General Army Office.
The order concerning Commandos had therefore nothing to do with defendant Kuntze as Chief of Training.
Defendant Kuntze therefore could not have taken part either in the distribution of the order concerning the Commandos as has been stated explicitly by the witness Rittmann.
For that matter the Prosecution has not been able at all to submit the necessary proof for its generally stated accusations, as far as defendant Kuntze is concerned. This defendant Kuntze cannot be held responsible with regard to this count of the prosecution.
Collection Camps.
I omit the first paragraph.
The establishment of camps was a matter with which the territorial commanders had to deal, and in particular their military administration. In all matters which related to the administration or police, they received their respective orders directly from Reich Agencies, from the Reich Fuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police as far as the Police was concerned, and likewise submitted to him directly their informations and reports via the special channels.
The Chief of the Military Administration in Serbia frequently profited from this special position for arbitrary actions and endeavored to maintain it and to go his own ways.
I omit the first sentence of the next paragraph, continuing with the second sentence.
The Higher SS and Police Leader, appointed in Serbia from January 1942 onward, was even fully independent in all matters which related to the police.
All the defendants unanimously stated in the witness stand that concentration camps as understood today, did not exist in the SouthEast at all. They were only the so-called collection or detention camps (Anhaltslager), where captured or apprehended rebels and bandit-helpers, and unreliable elements were collected. The latter were investigated in these camps, sentenced and then either detained or discharge. Apart from such camps there were the so-called "Hostage-Camps", where reprisal hostages were housed as a warning the population.
That such camps sometimes were called "concentration camps" was a fault of the "report language" and can only be explained with the fact that the true meaning of the expression of concentration camp is nothing else than a collection camp. Moreover the meaning of the word of concentration camp was at that time neither known to the defendants nor to the greater part of the German people. This is already proved by the fact that the expressions of concentration camp, collection camps and detention camps are frequently used without discrimination and the one for the other even in reports and orders.
That these camps were not extermination camps as the prosecution has asserted, is proven, above all, by the fact which emerges from the documents of the prosecution, namely that discharges were also effected from these camps, and that courts-martial and field courts cooperated in the investigations and convictions.
I omit the reference and start with the next paragraph....
The fact that "Reprisal hostages" had not to remain in camps for indefinite periods is proven by the order of the Commanding General and Military Commander Serbia dated 21 June 1942 - Exh. 204 VIII 32, 34 -- according to which hostages were to be exchanged and to be released regularly.
The establishment of collection camps for rebels and band-helpers however was no violation of international law or crime against humanity. Incidently, collection camps are not a German invention but are of British origin and for safety reasons are even in the present time considered necessary by victorious countries.
The southeastern collection camps were not introduces by the defendant Kuntze. On the contrary, as defendant Foertsch testified in the witness stand they existed already in Serbia when the commanderin-chief of the 12th Army was appointed Military Commander Southeast.
Above all, it must be stressed again that these camps were not a military affair but purely an affair of the Police, upon which Military Commander Southeast could not exert any influence.
There existed no obligation on the part of the subordinate agencies to inform Military Commander Southeast of the incidents in the Police sector. The administrative report contained in the ten-day-report by the General Plenipotentiary in Serbia to Military Commander Southeast, was merely a formality and must be traced back to the fact that in the form used for the ten-day-report there were provided under sub-section VI reports on administrative matters. That this did not imply compulsory order is shown alone by the fact that already during General Kuntz's term of office, after July 1942, these administrative reports were omitted, the more so as reports concerning police measures were not obtainable.
It must also be categorically denied that in these collection camps with the knowledge of Military Commander Southeast and of the General Plenipotentiary in Serbia methods of treatment were applied, of a nature as designated by the Prosecution. During the time of the defendant's command not a single case came to his knowledge which would substantiate the assertions of the Prosecution. Nor does the documentary evidence supply any incident which might substantiate any charge against the defendant Kuntze in the sense of such an accusation on the part of the Prosecution.
With this any responsibility on the part of the defendant Kuntze must be dropped under this count also.
THE PRESIDENT: Pardon me. I think I should advise you that you have about 7 minutes of your time remaining, so you can decide how you want to make use of it as to the remaining pages.
DR. MENTZEL: Yes, sir.
"Allocation for Labor of Captured Rebels."
The evacuation of captured rebels for labor in German spheres of interest also was a matter of the Police.
I should like to refer to the statements on page 99 following concerning the labor allocations of captured rebels, and which I ask the Court to take into consideration. Here, in my opinion, the fact is important that the captured rebels which could have been shot according to the laws of warfare, stood trial since they were fighting as guerillas, and labor allocation saved them from capital punishment. Besides Prisoners of War in the rear Army area or in other occupied territories may be employed for labor as far as they are not officers.
Page 101 now deals in about the middle, with the statements concerning Jews and Gypsies. I have proved in these statements that the defendant Kuntze and the agency subordinate to him did in no way try to carry out a policy of exterminating Jews and Gypsies, nor did they order such a policy. That Jews and Gypsies were not persecuted and treated in a special way for reasons of their race and religion, but on the contrary that they were subordinate only to those measures that were applicable to members of bands and suspects, and that to a great extent they were allied with these bands, that they supported them and that they therefore had to count on being treated according to the same last. It is well known that the Jewish problem was entirely alien to the Military; that it was definitely a matter of the Party only.
I would like to refer to the detailed statements and comments on this and would like to recommend them to the judicial notice of the Court.
During the defendant Kuntze's period of command, only a temporary evacuation of the population of the Kosara district was carried out in agreement with the Croatian government by the Combat Group West-Bosnia at the beginning of the Kosara-Presara (Croatia) action.
This measure which had become necessary for military reasons was unknown to the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast. For this area was a haunt of the bandits, which emerges from the Exh. 207, VIII 40, 46/47, and the population there worked together with the bandits.
I would like to refer to the other statements in brief, and would like to turn to page 108, at the bottom, where it says:
In conclusion and summarizing I claim that the defendant General Kuntze, neither de facto, nor de jure, has committed any crime which violates the International Law or the Laws of Humanity.
Neither did he initiate any orders himself which could represent a crime, nor were any such orders issued by subordinate commanders upon his instruction or with his knowledge, while he was in office. Orders issued during the defendant Kuntze's term of office were merely the repetition of stringent orders of the Supreme Headquarters of the Wehrmacht, and were due by the condition on the Balkans, which is to say that they were of military necessity.
I shall omit page 109 and page 110 concerning the personality of General Kuntze, as described in detail, and I shall omit also the reference of the exhibits. Furthermore, I would like to bring the Court's attention to the concluding remarks on page 112 and through 114, and I would like to request that the Court will take into consideration in writing its opinion also those parts which have not been read today, but which are in the written version of the plea.
Thank you.
DR. TIPP: Your Honors, the High Tribunal, I believe that in the beginning of my plea I would like to preface with a short technical remark. It is not possible for me to read all the statements in my plea, but I would like to request the Court to consider the whole plea in the writing of the opinion, and to make the complete plea a part of the completed record.
THE PRESIDENT: I think it should be said for the record and for the knowledge and attention of counsel and defendants, that those parts of the plea that are not read will receive the careful attention of the Tribunal. I want to assure you of that fact.
DR. TIPP: May I also say that the concluding statements of the Prosecution lead to me supplementing my plea with various short paragraphs. They are not translated yet. I gave them to the interpreters in German, and shall notify the interpreters whenever I shall read one of these passages. These supplements were submitted for translation already, and I assume that Your Honors will receive them on time.
When the prosecution outlined, in the beginning of the proceedings, the general trend of their arguments, the chief of counsel for the prosecution made the following statement on his evaluation of the evidence to be produced:
Indeed, as this case progresses, I think it will rapidly appear that the evidentiary questions are of secondary importance. That the killings charged in the indictment occurred, that they were carried out by troops under the command of these defendants, and that they were in fact ordered by the defendants will not, I believe, be denied. The naked facts are terribly clear.
This then, Your Honors, was the opinion of the prosecution concerning the facts involved in this case. Based on this opinion, the prosecution did not trouble too much about the furnishing of evidence. Out of the ample material at their disposal, they produced certain reports and orders, in the belief that the guilt of the defendants was proved sufficiently by these exhibits.
In the opinion of the defense, on the other hand, nothing can be less clear then the result of the evidence for we believe that the facts as such do not prove anything whatsoever. They cannot be understood without full knowledge of the circumstances and conditions given at a specific period and in a specific area.
The defense has therefore, in the first instance, tried to explain to the Court the conditions -- with regard both to the period and to the locality involved, - in which the defendants were then forced to act. Your Honors, we have stressed the confusion and obscurity prevailing in the chain of command, the co-existence and overlapping of the various German and indigenous authorities both in the civil and military sectors. We have made it clear by witnesses and by documents that by far not everything that happened was done by order of the defendants, and that the defendants can by no means be burdened with the responsibility for everything that happened in the South Eastern area. Within the framework of this basic part of our argumentation, we have also tried to make it clear both by witnesses and by documents, that serious ethnical and political conflicts between the various national groups had always prevailed in the Balkans, and to point out that the resulting ethnical struggles had a great influence of the events in the Balkans. We have also endeavored to explain that the defendants are, in their capacity of commanders of German army units, in no way responsible for this ethnical struggle and for the atrocities resulting therefrom. Finally, we have submitted that all acts of the defendants were caused by binding orders and decisions of their superior command authorities.
The defense feels that by furnishing evidence of this factual background an essential and indispensable contribution has been made toward the determination of the truth and toward an appropriate evaluation of the responsibility of the defendant.
After this general statement which applies to my client as well as to the other defendants, I shall now discuss the specific charges against General v. Leyser, and I shall in the first instance supplement the consideration submitted above by adding those which are of particular importance in his own case.