If in Your Honors' view Field Marshal List surpassed the measure of that which, in retrospect with exact knowledge of the circumstances on both sides, could be designated as justified and tolerable, then you must allow that on the basis of the state of affairs and considering the vagueness of the legal position, Field Marshal List could feel himself justified in ordering the measures he did!
(The next sentence isn't translated.)
The Tribunal can not pass over these inherent facts in view of the basic principles governing the field of criminal law for all civilized nations for centuries.
Reasons of fairness and justice demand that Field Marshal List be treated in this respect exactly as were, for instance, those Allied commanders who gave the orders to attack Dresden and Hiroshima. Both attacks were operations started when the Allies had already clearly won the war, and the officers participating in both operations could have no doubt whatsoever that they would bring a terrible death to tens, nay, hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians. But in spite of this, these orders were given - and carried out!
May it please the Tribunal!
I do not believe there is one man in the world today with powers of judgment and a love of truth who would dare to think that the large scale attacks on Dresen and Hiroshima with their hundreds of thousands of dead can be objectively justified. If, in spite of this, the question has not yet been brought up about the criminal responsibility of the Allied commanders concerned, then obviously this is only because they were credited with having acted in good faith, and it is assumed they considered that such an action was militarily necessary.
But the right conceded to the Allied commanders in such cases, must certainly be granted Field Marshal List in the cases charged against him which involved far fewer losses!
May it please the Tribunal - I must deal with one further point. If the Tribunal passes sentence in cases such as that of Field Marshal List, then Your Honors will create a juridical precedent which may have incalculable consequences. Because in the future no commanders will ever dare to issue an order with any bearing on international law without first obtaining a legal opinion on it. In legally complicated and doubtful cases he will probably never struggle through to a decision. Your Honors would thereby hit the core and the striking power of Your Honors' own army. In practice this means that in the future the course of military events would be determined not by soldiers, but by lawyers!
May it please the Tribunal!
The consequence of this would be that an enemy with no scruples concerning international law would be given colossal opportunities, and he will not hesitate to make every possible use of them.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: The Tribunal is about to recess but we want to advise defense counsel that in these arguments that are to be made from now on, while each one is allowed a stipulated time, he is not obliged to use it and the one who is to follow is expected to be ready to make his argument at the conclusion of the one that precedes him. We don't want to have any delays in between the making of these arguments.
However, in view of the lateness of the hour we will recess until tomorrow morning at nine o'clock. We will start the arguments at 9:00 a.m. instead of the usual nine-thirty.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 0900 hours, 5 February 1948)
Official Transcript of the American Military Tribunal in the matter of the United States of America against Wilhelm List, et al, defendants, sitting at Nurnberg, Germany, on 5 February 1948, 0900-1630, Justice WENNERSTRUM presiding.
THE MARSHAL: All persons in the Courtroom will please find their seats.
The Honorable, the Judges of Military Tribunal V. Military Tribunal V is now in session. God save the United States of America and this Honorable Tribunal.
There will be order in the Court.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Marshal, you will ascertain if all defendants are present in the courtroom.
THE MARSHAL: May it please your Honors all defendants are present in the courtroom.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: If your Honor, please, yesterday during Dr. Laternser's closing argument he mentioned on page 20 of his final plea in discussing the Yamashita case that the whole opinion was only partial available to him. I don't know whether he asked for it at the library and was unsuccessful in getting the entire opinion, but I would like the record to show I am handing at this time to Dr. Laternser an extended full copy of the Yamashita Opinion.
DR. MENZEL: (for defendant Kuntze) If your Honor, please, I would like to begin the final plea for General Kuntze. I presume the Tribunal has an English translation of this, and I would like to state first of all, that firstly I have been as brief as possible in the treatment of the general problems which my colleague Dr. Laternser has already dealt with very much in detail, and with very much emphasis.
Mr. Fenstermacher has often stressed very much that what is correct should not be presented more than once. Further, I will not submit a number of things in order to save time, and I would like to act on the assumption that the Tribunal will regard favorable in its judgment what is set down in the final plea, even though it isn't read.
As Defense Counsel of General of the Engineers Waler KUNTZE, I beg to be permitted to give a short summary of the following facts:
I skip the first page.
Renouncing therefore the representation of the entire material of this case, I deliberately restricted myself to calling to the attention of the Court such points as have special significance in my opinion for the adjudication of the defendant KUNTZE under the charges which have been brought against him.
Then I skip the next paragraph "Competence of the Court". This paragraph only contains an observation towards the competence the Court which has already been dealt with by my colleague, Dr. Laternser. The next paragraph bears the heading, General KUNTZE's tasks in the South East "When weighing the facts on which the charge against General KUNTZE is based, we have to start from the following basic considerations:
1. According to the orders which General KUNTZE received from HITLER, KEITEL and von BRAUCHITSCH before taking over the office of deputising for the sick Wehrmacht Commander South-East and Commanderin-Chief of the 12th Army, Field Marshal LIST, his main task in the South-East was of a tactical and strategical nature. It consisted in the preparation of the defense of the South-East which was a prerequisite for the repulsion of an invasion by the Allied Forces (statement KUNTZE, transcript p. 3476-3478 German, 3533-3535 English). The solution of this task was of decisive importance in the war of the Axis powers. Not only the German operations in the USSR, in particular the protection of the deep flank of the German East-front, but also the success of the German-Italian operations in Africa and the accomplishment of the German war in the air in the Eastern Mediterranean completely depended on the successful defense of the Balkans against an invasion by the Allies.
The presupposition for the solution of this task was the restoration of quiet and order in Serbia by the German occupation forces, moreover their maintenance and the protection of the main railway lines and of the most important industrial plants in the rest of the German occupied South-Eastern territories, in particular in Eastern Croatia in cooperation with the Croatian forces and with the Italian AOK 2, which was assigned in West Croatia, mainly for coastal defense, and, in Greece, with the Italian AOK 11 which had occupied the main parts of the country.
For the purpose of carrying out his task, the following units were subordinated to the Wehrmacht Commander South-East:
a) the Acting Commanding General in Serbia with jurisdiction over Serbia and the German tasks in Eastern Croatia.
b) The Commander of Saloniki and the Aegean Sea with jurisdiction over the Greek province of Macedonia and the Islands in the Northern Aegean Sea.
c) The Commander in Southern-Greece, under whose command was also the Commander of Crete, with jurisdiction over the port-district of the Piraeus, the districts of Attica where German troops were stationed, and the Islands of Milos and Crete, in particular with respect to the operation of supply by water in cooperation with the Admiral of the Aegean Sea, who was subordinated to the Wehrmacht Commander South-East.
Executive powers in their respective districts had been conferred on these commanders for the accomplishment of their tasks. The Military Administrations were under their command.
On the other hand, the following were not under the command of the Wehrmacht Commander South-East:
The entire Air Force and the Naval Forces as far as seawarfare was concerned.
All Italian forces in the South-Eastern territory, except for the Sienna Division which was subordinated to the Commander of Crete only tactically, and the Croatian Wehrmacht were independent.
Apart from these limitations in the purely military fields, the position of the Wehrmacht Commander South-East and of the subordinated commanders was also restricted by the fact that the German Envoy to Greece in Athens had been appointed Reich Plenipotentiary for all political, economic and cultural matters of the German occupied area, and that, in Serbia, the Plenipotentiary West was responsible for the economic field, the Representative of the Foreign Office for political matters, and, from late January 1942 onwards, the Higher SS and Police Leader for matters which regarded the Police Force. Furthermore, there were direct channels of command and reports between the Reich Offices and the Military Administration in Serbia in all questions of administration and, from January 1942, between the Reich Fuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police and the Higher SS and Police Leader in all matters which related to the police. The Higher SS and Police Leader was only personally subordinated to the Acting Commanding General in Serbia, and, therefore, not to the Wehrmacht Commander South-East.
The basic tasks of the Wehrmacht Commander South-East were therefore centered in the preparation of the defense of the German occupied area, against operations of the Allies. I omit the next sentence.
2. Within the framework of the operational tasks, the tasks which accrued to the Wehrmacht Commander South-East from the occupation of the South-East were of a more secondary nature. In consideration of the widely diverging situations in Greece and Serbia, such tasks had been transferred to the territorial commanders. A limitation of such territorial powers of the commanders, in particular the total or partial assumption of such powers by the Wehrmacht Commander South-East himself, had been neither provided for nor ordered in the directives which General KUNTZE received from HITLER and KEITEL before taking over, and according to the orders of the OKW already issued.
Political tasks.
3. No political tasks were connected with the order for General KUNTZE to act as the deputy for the Wehrmacht Commander South-East. In particular, no orders had been given to General KUNTZE which aimed at the decimation of the population and at the destruction of the economy. On the contrary, on the witness stand, General KUNTZE testified to the fact that the Chief of the OKW expressly stressed the necessity for the pacification of the population and for the re-operation of the economy as being also in the German interests.
4. General KUNTZE was appointed to his office only for the duration of the illness of Field Marshal LIST, i. e. for 4 - 6 weeks. This time limitation was of course bound to have certain effects on his official activity too. First of all, this consisted, above all during the first period of his term in office, in adhering to the orders which he found in force when he took over, and secondly in the prevailing situation in whose development he had no part. His later activities were also made more difficult by the fact that his assignment of Acting Deputy for the Wehrmacht Commander South-East was never officially extended and that he, therefore, had to reckon daily with his being recalled, as General KUNTZE himself testified in the witness stand.
5. Every country in the South-East has its racial and economic characteristics which are basically different from those of the neighboring states. Moreover, when General KUNTZE took over, the internal situations in all countries where German troops were stationed, were widely diverging from each other.
General KUNTZE had never been in the Balkans, either during the First World War or prior to his assignment. Therefore, the conditions in the Balkans were completely strange to him.
I skip the rest of the paragraph to the last sentence. For these reasons, General KUNTZE, during the first period of his term in office, had to accept the conditions which he found when taking over.
Duration of the official activity of General KUNTZE According to the sworn statements of the defendants KUNTZE, and according to the Exh.
584 XXV 59, 74, General KUNTZE arrived in Athens in the afternoon of 26 October 1941. As General KUNTZE testified in the witness stand (Record p. 3494 German 3551 English) he formally took over on 27 October, which fact also emerges from the report of the Wehrmacht Commander. Then I skip the next paragraph and continue at the bottom:
According to the presentation of the Prosecution, the date of the termination of General KUNTZE's term in office was the 8 August 1942. The next paragraph:
Extent and limitation of the responsibility of General KUNTZE The following basic facts emerge from the duration of General KUNTZE's term in office:
All incidents which occurred during the time which preceded his term in office, cannot constitute any guilt on the part of the defendant KUNTZE. Among these are in the first line, such orders as had been issued, handed on and carried out during that time, and furthermore, such measures as were carried out after his taking over, but were based on orders issued prior to his taking over, as far as he had no knowledge of them. General KUNTZE can never be had responsible for incidents on which he could not exert any influence.
In addition, all incidents which happened after the 8 August 1942 must likewise be left out of the consideration of the facts. For, as a matter of course, the termination of his office was also the termination of his responsibility.
Therefore, only such incidents can constitute any guilt on the part of the defendant KUNTZE as came to pass during his term in office and were based on orders which he had issued on his own initiative, and moreover, such as had come to his knowledge.
Nor can he be charged with measures which did not reach his knowledge. But this knowledge can be assumed only in regard to those orders and reports by subordinate agencies which were reported to Military Commander South-East and were also received there. Accordingly, all those orders and reports by subordinate agencies and troops must be eliminated whose distribution rosters do not bear the name of Military Commander SouthEast as received; but this includes, about all, all activity reports and war diaries of the subordinate agencies and troops since these, according to regulations, were not to be submitted to Military Commander South-East and therefore could not be expected to reach the knowledge of Military Commander South-East.
The compilation, (Exhibit KUNTZE 65 III, 38 - 43) to which reference is being made, shows which particular documents are concerned.
But also in the case of reports and orders which, according to the distribution roster, were destined for Military Commander South-East, any knowledge on the part of the defendant KUNTZE can be considered established only if, apart from the receiving stamp of Military Commander South-East proving their actual receipt, they were initialed by the defendant KUNTZE to prove that he had taken notice of them in person. Considering the vast amount of papers that arrived at the headquarters of Military Commander South-East daily, the defendant KUNTZE could take personal note only of the most important reports. The major part of the reports, however, could be reported to him only in condensed form, confined to the essentials, giving priority always to reports on the tactical situation supplying the basis for the decisions of the Commander-inChief.
In the case of reports by Military Commander South-East to the OKW or OKH also, details of the reports by the subordinate commanders upon which the above reports were based did not roach the knowledge of the Commander-in-Chief. These reports to the OKW or OKH were only reported orally in a summarized form, mostly on the occasion of the situation conference which took place each evening.
Added to this was the fact that General KUNTZE, also because of his frequent absence on duty from Army Headquarters, could not know anything or only get a general view of a large part of the reports. Therefore, those reports which arrived at Military Commander South-East during the periods of absence as may be seen from Exhibit KUNTZE 64 III, 36/37, must be omitted from the evidence against the defendant KUNTZE to the extent as the defendant KUNTZE's initials on these reports do not show that they were brought to his knowledge alter his return to Army Headquarters. Accordingly, no responsibility whatever on the part of the defendant KUNTZE is involved in regard to the following documents put to his charge:
Situation at the Time of Taking Over Before entering into the particulars permit me to give a concise picture of the situation as found by General KUNTZE at the time of his taking office and to emphasize the legal basis ensuring from this situation for the defendant KUNTZE, as well as to set forth in the sequel the conclusions to be drawn from the development of the situation during the defendant KUNTZE's term of office.
Then I skip paragraphs 1 and 2, and would like to direct the attention of these paragraphs to the Tribunal.
Effective Occupation and Illegality of the Band Activity during General KUNTZE's Term of Office Therefore, in my further exposition I can restrict myself to prove
1) that also during the defendant KUNTZE'S term of office the occupation of the South-East was an effective one and that the band activity therefore amounted to a violation of the obligations incumbent upon the population of an occupied country toward the occupation power;
2) that also during the command of the defendant KUNTZE the rebellion did not fulfill the conditions of Article 1 of the Hague Convention concerning Land Warfare.
An effective occupation does not require the existence of so strong an occupation force as to insure the continued garrisoning of every village and every corner of an occupied country. On the contrary, it suffices that the occupation power is in a position actually to control with the forces available the country which has been taken into possession de facto. Then I skip the next paragraph.
The development of the situation during the defendant KUNTZE's term of office shows that with these forces the German occupation power was well in a position to guarantee peace and order in the territory it occupied, the self-evident presupposition being that the population paid attention to its obligations toward the occupation power. Permit me to refer to the following Defense documents.
I then refer to a number of Defense documents which are contained on page 15, and finally to the Wisshaupt Document.
From these documents follows unequivocally that during General KUNTZE's term of office
1) peace and order were being kept in Greece;
2) the situation in Serbia had calmed down considerably since the end of 1941;
3) no large-scale disturbances developed in Serbia any more; above all, the rebellion expected in the Spring of 1942 failed to materialize;
4) in the year 1942 in Eastern Croatia all centers of unrest were attacked and smashed.
And then I omit the next paragraph on page 16 and page 17 until the middle of the page.
In Croatia, on the other hand, the suppression of disturbances was an internal affair of the Croatian Government. Disturbances increased in the summer of 1942, because of the passive attitude of the Italians but were successfully fought in Eastern and Western Bosnia by the German and Croatian forces.
I do not need to mention Greece in particular, since during the whole time of office of the defendant KUNTZE no rebellion took place. Thus it is clearly proved, that the resistance movement in Serbia constituted, even during the time of office of the defendant KUNTZE, a flagrant violation of the obligations, which the population of an actually occupied country has towards the occupation power.
These resistance movements during the time of office of General KUNTZE were not a nationwide movement or a rising of the population, as understood by the rules of the HLKO (the Hague Convention concerning land warfare). The resistance movements in Yugoslav territory lacked, as in the beginning, so during the time of office of the defendant KUNTZE, the main requisite of a uniform movement namely, the centralized leadership.
Then I omit the further details about this and continue on page 19 in the middle.
But the fact, that small groups of bandits are led by some subordinate commander is not sufficient to maintain that Number 1 of article 1 of the HLKO (Hague Convention for land warfare) applies in this case.
The Prosecution has not been able to prove in its Trial brief to point II page 43, that the rebellious bands have been uniformly and firmly organized during the years 1941 and 1942.
The evidence-material Exh. 164 VII 1, 1 (Order of the Plenipotentiary General in Serbia for the fight against the resistance movements in Croatia, dated 3 January 1942), which is submitted therein, is countered by the facts, which were established after the end of the fight, that 1. the DANGIC-Chetniks, as enemies of the Communists, in general had not fought against the Germans 2. that the Communists were only 5000 men, the DANGICChetniks approximately 1000 men strong.
Then come the exhibit numbers. I omit the next sentence.
The record of the OKH dated 9 February 1943, concerning the D. MIHAILOVIC-movement -- quoted in the trial brief, page 46 -- is a mere product of fancy as testified by the witness WOLLNY. It is obvious, that the 115 Brigades of 3 companies each could not possibly number 150,000 men, but at the most 50,000 men.
The bands were neither uniformly dressed during the time of office of the defendant KUNTZE, nor did they wear any insignia, which could be recognized from afar. They wore mostly civilian clothes, i. e. peasant dress, and only partly pieces of uniforms, that is, German, Italian or Croatian, which they had stolen, as is evident from numerous documents, from killed or captured soldiers.
The assertions to the contrary contained in the trial brief of the prosecution, point II, page 46, are incorrect, as can be seen from the documents mentioned themselves.
Then skip the next three paragraphs and begin at bottom of page 21.
Uniform emblems, recognizable at a distance, as prescribed for members of a regular fighting army who do not possess a uniform, were also missing. Neither the Soviet star of the Communists nor the Yugoslav coat of arms of the Chetniks, which were worn on the cap, were badges recognizable at a distance, within the meaning of the "Laws and Customs of War on Land", Hague Convention. They were recognizable at 4 - 5 meters' distance at the most, and, in the same way as the cartridge belts of the Chetniks, which are considered "emblems" by the prosecution, could be taken off at any time, so that the rebels who were dressed in civilian clothes could quickly transform themselves into "peaceful peasants" as was customary in cases of ambushes, clashes and acts of sabotage. This lack of identification has no connection with the camouflage which was described as customary by the prosecution. Camouflage means the adaptation of uniform and equipment to the type of country-side. However, a soldier in uniform cannot quickly transform himself into a "peaceful citizen or peasant" by means of taking off his camouflage, as the rebels could do.
Furthermore, the rebels fought only from abmust and in most cases avoided an open battle.
They therefore did not carry their arms openly but hid them after use in order to then appear as "peaceful peasants". This eternal transformation from "fighters" to "peaceful citizens", and above all the nonexistance of clear front lines in this "partisan combat", while front lines are the rule in the case of combat between regular armies, contributed greatly to making the occupation army's combatting of disturbances more difficult.
This naturally had to lead to "cleaning-up operations" which the prosecution is trying to present as "reprisals". In doing so, however, the prosecution is entirely overlooking the fact that the rebels themselves as a result of their actions, bore the responsibility for the large number of searchings of villages in so far as they went into hiding in these villages as soon as they were attacked and frequently forced the population by means of arms to give them refuge and support.
I omit the next paragraph.
Above all however, the actions of the rebels did not correspond in any way to the laws and customs of war. The manner of their treatment of German soldiers captured by them almost invariably violated International Law and the laws of humanity. Captured and wounded German soldiers were murdered by them and were also frequently tortured to death by bestial methods as shown by the evidence.
Then follows the list of documents concerned. I skip the next paragraph and continue in the middle of page 24.
Nor did the rebels spare their own population. They murdered, plundered, robbed and frequently used arms in order to force the population to tolerate and support their insidious type of warfare. As the evidence has shown, acts of violence of all sorts were everyday occurrences, even deportations, forced recruiting, raids on communities, robbing of community records, money and food, destruction of the harvest, damaging the economy as well as sabotaging the industrial transportation and communication installations.
Retaliation Measures In accordance with the "Laws and Customs of War on Land", Hague Convention, the German occupation power was obliged to do away with this insecurity caused by the rebel bands.
The occupying power acted therefore not only in its own interest, when after a whole series of warnings, vigorous measures were adopted against the bands and those sections of the population which supported them, but rather in fulfillment of an obligation in accordance with International Law.
The fact that reprisal measures are permissible under International Law, especially the killing of human beings in the course of the reprisals, has already been submitted in detail in reply to the prosecution's brief on the law as well as in the opening statement and the plea of my colleague, Herr Dr. LATERNSER. With reference to these statements I can confine myself to proving that these conditions under which reprisal measures may be adopted in accordance with International Law were adhered to during the defendant KUNTZE's time of office.
Before going into details of the ordering and execution of reprisals I should like to state the following on principle:
1. The employment of reprisal measures had nothing to do with the strength of the occupying power. And I omit the paragraph and continue with "2".
2. The employment of reprisal measures depended solely upon the conduct of the population itself, as illegal actions to such an extent could not have been carried out without their cooperation, be it by tolerating or by supporting them.
3. Reprisal measures were to be inflicted only if it was not possible to seize the perpetrator or the perpetrators personally. In this case it was a military necessity to make those parts of the population responsible, which in spite of previous warnings and in spite of the publication of reprisal measures employed, participated in rebel movements or maintained relations with the perpetrators.
4. Reprisal measures have neither been initiated nor executed by the defendant KUNTZE; for the infliction of reprisal measures was a discharge of the executive power. Charged therewith were the commanders of the territories, that is: In Servia the General Plenipotentiary of Serbia, in Greece the Commanders of Southern Greece and Saloniki -- Aegaeis and on Crete the Commander of Crete, whereas in the independent state of Croatia the Croatian Government was charged with it. Consequently it was the duty of the Commanders of the territories and of the Croatian Government to order and execute reprisal measures. They had to make use of this authority on their own responsibility.
And I skip the rest of this paragraph and the next paragraph and continue with Figure 5 on page 28.
The execution of reprisal measures was not introduced by the defendant KUNTZE during the time while he was in office, but was ordered already before he entered office. Consequently, this was a fact which the defendant KUNTZE had to accept, all the more as its military necessity was proven.
While defendant KUNTZE was in office, reprisal measures were not carried out by the subordinate commanders according to an inflexible system, but were handled in each case according to the actual nature of the case. In addition, those measures were always the answer to illegal conduct of the other party, they never preceded them as claimed by the Prosecution.
The execution of reprisal measures had been ordered by the OKW. These OKW orders were orders of HITLER. There was no reason why the defendant KUNTZE should have doubts concerning the legality of these orders. For he had to assume that the Fuehrer decrees issued within the framework of international law had first been scrutinized as to their legality in the basic aspects because of their importance. Neither could the defendant KUNTZE have any doubt as to the legality of the orders which had been issued and passed on by WB South-East in the period before General KUNTZE'S assumption of office. For these orders either were passed on OKW orders or were based on instructions by OKW. General KUNTZE therefore had to assume that they were just as legal as the direct orders themselves. To this must be added that General KUNTZE only gained knowledge of these orders by and by in the course of his tenure. When General KUNTZE took over his office as Deputy Commanderin-Chief and Deputy WB (Armed Forces Commander) South-East, he was not only assigned to an area with which he was not familiar, but was also confronted by a situation which by its peculiarity was completely strange to him. Since General KUNTZE's main task was a purely military one it should be understandable that General KUNTZE, as Deputy Commander-inchief, concentrated above all on gaining a general picture of the defensive preparedness of the South-East, especially of the tasks and fitness of the subordinate troops and of the orders in the operational and tactical sphere issued before his time of command; and that he could devote his attention to the territorial matters in detail only in the course of time.
This is also the reason why General KUNTZE, as he testified in the witness stand, did not learn until December 1941 of BOEHME's basic order dated 10 October 1941 concerning reprisal measures in Serbia - Exhibit 88, which embraces most of the events which form the subject of the indictment. BOEHME himself did not mention this order during his situation report on the occasion of General KUNTZE's arrival in Belgrade, nor was General KUNTZE informed of this order and its practical effects when he took over office.
General KUNTZE clearly expressed his attitude towards the problem of reprisals in the witness stand. He convincingly stressed the fact that not the feeling of revenge, but rather the idea of a deterrent was the motive of the subordinate commanders for the order and implementation of the reprisal measures, and that their exclusive purpose was to restrain the population from committing further unlawful acts. Thus they were exclusively dependent upon the behavior of the population itself.
Then I omit the next two sentences and continue with the sixth sentence farther down:
May I especially point to his statement regarding his ignorance of the 10-day-report dated 30 October 1941 (Exhibit 124 IV 92/93,153) and of the events in Kraljevo and Kragujevac which were not reported in detail to the WB South-East and which occurred prior to his assumption of office and therefore cannot be blamed on him.
And then I begin on page 32 -- at the top.
General KUNTZE's attitude towards the problem of reprisals is clearly shown above all by his conduct after he learned of BOEHME's order of 10 October 1941 in December 1941.