Court No. V, Case No. VII.
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
DR. WEISGERBER (Counsel for defendant Speidel): Your Honor, I would like to continue in the presentation of evidence for General Speidel and I would like to read a number of documents which are contained in Speidel Document Book No. V. The first document in this document book is the affidavit by Frau Irene Keilig. This document is No. 74 and has already been admitted by the Tribunal as Speidel Exhibit No. 37; but since this document was not included in a document book at the time I have included it here.
The next document, Speidel Document No. 75, is an affidavit by Otto Kuenzel, Deputy Mayor of Reutlingen. I offer this document as Speidel Exhibit No. 59. The document contains the following:
"I am aware of the consequences that would arise for me if I give a false affidavit; I also know that I am liable to punishment if I give a false affidavit. Furthermore, I know that the following statement will be submitted to Military Tribunal No. 5 at Nurnberg.
"I, Otto Kuenzel, born 40 September 1903, Verwaltungsreferent and deputy to the 1st mayor at Reutlingen, declare the following:
"On 24 April 1945 French combat troops executed by shooting the following persons as hostages:
"Oberfeldarzt Dr. Wilhelm Egloff, at that time surgeon at the Wehrmacht hospital in Reutlingen."
And here I would like to add that the rank of an Oberfeldarzt corresponds to that of a Lieutenant Colonel and Oberfeldarzt Dr. Egloff was therefore a medical officer of the German Wehrmacht and, in addition, I would like to point out that Oberfeldarzt Dr. Egloff at that time was a prisoner of war -- and then I continue:
"Friedrich Wilhelm Schmid, Construction technical engineer, resident at Reutlingen, "Ludwig Ostertag, Chief Editor, resident at Reutlingen, "Jacob Schmid, Master Carpenter, resident at Reutlingen, "The temporary acting city administration did not receive any Court No. V, Case No. VII.
any official information from the French troops concerning the shooting of hostages. The temporary acting city administration received during the night the following proclamation to be posted in the city boundaries of Reutlingen:
"Iere Armee Francaise Commandant Militaire "In the night from 22 to 23 April a French soldier was murdered in Reutlingen.
"Those responsible have been executed by shooting. A fine of 200 000 Marks has been imposed in the community.
"From now on civilians will have to stay in their houses in the period from 18.00 to 09.00 hours.
"If another attack is made against our troops, martial actions against the town will be resumed."
"Signed: "The Commanding Officer."
Then comes this proclamation in French and I continue:
"If the proclamation reads: 'Those responsible have been executed by shooting,' I can state in this connection that the temporary acting German city administration had no knowledge at any time that those persons shot as hostages had anything to do with the alleged slaying of a French soldier in the night from 22 to 23 April 1945."
MR. RAPP: Your Honors, I object to the introduction of this part of the affidavit. If Dr. Weisgerber wishes to introduce that part of the affidavit which contains the proclamation of the French, we have no objection, if it states in there that those responsible have been executed by shooting. When it comes to the part that he has commenced to read now, it is at its best negative hearsay, not even hearsay but negative hearsay. It is highly argumentative. He is going to state what it means that those who are responsible have been executed by shooting. He admits nobody in the town knew anything about it and he goes on to make these argumentations, not even based on hearsay but a negative hearsay.
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
We object to that part of the affidavit.
DR. WEISGERBER: Your Honors, I would like to state in this connection the following:
This proclamation of the first French Army was, as this witness has stated, given to the city administration as a threat and as pressure. The witness, Otto Kuenzel, was Deputy First Mayor of Reutlingen and now this is a statement by an official but whether the contents of this proclamation is the truth or not one must take into account the conditions of war at that time and then one will understand that this statement as made by the affiant was based on the conditions at that time and, above all, I would like to point out that if the statement as contained in paragraph 1 of the proclamation, the fact that a French soldier was murdered -- if this statement is correct, then certainly the city administration at Reutlingen again at that time would have known about it and it was known throughout the whole of Reutlingen. As I was able to find out by going there, nothing at all was known about this murder in Reutlingen and it is certainly the task of a witness to state an opinion on this kind of incident and that is what the affiant is doing in the second paragraph of this.
MR. RAPP: Parenthetically I may add that the statement has not been made under oath. It states merely in German that the affiant has been told of all consequences if he would make a false statement and then it says:
"I declare:"
And if the Tribunal desires we can have it put to the interpreter for his translation. I can't glean the word "under oath" from any part of the German.
DR. WEISGERBER: Your Honor, I think that this is really a play on words, a quibble here because if in the beginning of the affidavit the affiant states -
THE PRESIDENT: This last objection will not be sustained. It will be overruled and in that connection I want to call attention to Court No. V, Case No. VII.
the fact that there were two affidavits which were admitted yesterday without objection with were not even sworn to and it seems to me there should be some consistency in the objections which were made yesterday. As to the objection which has been previously made, it will be sustained. It being the conclusion of the affiant he can state as to what he knows but he is not in a position to state what other parties know.
You may proceed.
DR. WEISGERBER: Then I continue reading this affidavit, the passage where I was interrupted by the prosecution:
"Inquiries which were made from the Colonel Cambiez and the Captain Rouch', who were in Reutlingen at that time did not shed any light on this as far as the temporary acting city administration was concerned. Furthermore, the temporary acting city administration has no knowledge -
MR. RAPP: Your Honors, I understood that the Tribunal ruled that part was not to be read into evidence.
THE PRESIDENT: The objection will be sustained.
DR. WEISGERBER: Then the ruling of the Tribunal refers to that part of the affidavit which starts: "If the proclamation reads:" -is that correct?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, or beginning with: "I can state in this connection." It might as well start with that paragraph and, continuing the entire paragraph will be stricken.
DR. WEISGERBER: Then I read the concluding sentence:
"The temporary acting city administration had to collect and pay off the fine of 200,000 Marks within a few hours."
"Reutlingen dated 3 January 1948"; signed and certified by me.
The next document which I would like to submit is Speidel Document No. 76. This becomes Exhibit No. Speidel 60. This is an affidavit by Hermann Keicher. It is on page 6 and page 7 of Document Book V.
"Affidavit":
"I, Keicher, Hermann, born 13 August 1883, Catholic priest in Reutlingen an aware that I expose myself to punishment if I make a false statement in lieu of oath. I am also aware that the following statement is intended as evidence at the American Military Tribunal Court 7, Nuernberg. I declare in lieu of oath:
A few days after the occupation of the city of Reutlingen by the French army, a French army chaplain came to me and explained that several Germans were to be shot as hostages, to whom I should give spiritual comfort. Upon my suggestion that some of these persons might be of the Protestant faith we attempted to reach the Evangelical minister of Reutlingen, but we were not successful. Then I went to Urbanstrasse 22 in Reutlingen, where I had been told the hostages were. There I met Lt. Col. Dr. Egloff, the chief doctor of the German army hospital in Reutlingen, editor-in-chief Ostertag, construction engineer Wilhelm Schmid and master carpenter Jakob Schmid. These men explained to me that they were to be shot as hostages. I got permission for them to write letters to their families. After some time on the same day the four men were driven to a prepared place on the so-called "Schoenen Weg" near Reutlingen, and I accompanied them. At the prepared spot an execution squad of about 40 to 50 French soldiers under the command of a French officer was ready and carried out the execution by shooting, without any further formality such as reading an order or the like.
"Then the officer shot each of the four hostages in the back of the head as a coup de grace.
"To the question of whether I had heard anything about the presumed murder of a French soldier in the night from 22/23 April 1945, I can only say that I learned nothing positive of this event."
Signed and sworn to and properly certified.
The next document is Speidel No. 77 on page 8 in Document Book V, and this becomes Exhibit No. 61. This is the death certificate issued by a registry officer in the town of Reutlingen for Lieutenant Colonel Wilhelm Egloff, M.D. In this official death certificate it says, "Cause of death: Shot as a hostage." The registry clerk who issued this death certificate has stated in an affidavit, which I have included, that this certificate was made according to the death register in the city of Reutlingen, and this affidavit is certified by me and was given before me.
The next document is Speidel document No. 78, which is Speidel Exhibit No. 62. It is on page 10 of Speidel Document Book No. V. This is the death certificate for the editor-in-chief, Ludwig Ostertag, one of the four hostages, and it states cause of death the same, "Shot as a hostage." The registry clerk has given the same statement with regard to this certificate as he had regarding the death certificate of Dr. Egloff.
The next document is Speidel No. 79. This becomes Exhibit No. 63. It is on page 12 of Speidel Document Book No. 5. This is the death certificate for Friedrich Wilhelm Schmid who was killed by French soldiers in the city of Reutlingen in the vicinity of Schoenen Weg in April, 1945, and the cause of death is given as "Shot as a hostage", and the same affidavit covers this death certificate as covered the other two, and it was given before me and was certified by me.
The next document is document Speidel No. 80, and this becomes Speidel Exhibit No. 64. This is the death certificate for the fourth of these hostages, the master carpenter, Jacob Schmid, also shot on the 24th of April 1945, at 1600 hours at Reutlingen in the vicinity of Schoenen Weg by French soldiers as a hostage. The confirmation by the registry clerk, as in the previous cases, was also given before me and certified by me.
The next document, Speidel No. 81, becomes Exhibit No. 65.
MR. RAPP: Your Honor, I object to the introduction of this document because the exact contents of this document is already contained in that part of Document No. 75, Exhibit 59, which the Tribunal admitted into evidence. On page 3 at the bottom under the same date, the same will be found as in Document 81. It is merely cumulative and repetitious.
DR. WEISGERBER: Your Honor, this really isn't quite true. This is a photostatic copy of the official proclamation which was mentioned in the affidavit of Otto Kuenzel. The contents of this proclamation were put by me into Otto Kuenzel's affidavit intentionally, because if I hadn't done it then the prosecution would then have said, "We don't know where this proclamation comes from.
It could come from anywhere. First of all it must be identified."
THE PRESIDENT: The objection is overruled. You may proceed.
DR. WEISGERBER: Well, then this is the photostatic copy of the proclamation which was posted at that time on the 24th of April, 1945, in Reutlingen. I have given an affidavit with regard to this that I might convince myself that this photostat complies with the original which is in the possession of the city of Reutlingen.
The next document is Speidel No. 82 and becomes Exhibit No. 66. This is the affidavit by Heins Scheurlen and the contents are as follows:
"I am conscious of the consequences of a false affidavit. I am also aware of the fact that the following deposition is destined for submission to the Military Tribunal V.
"I declare under oath:
"I, Heinz Scheurlen, born 24 April 1895, residing at Schwaebisch-Hall, Ackeranlagen 1, came to Athens in May 1944, in order to relieve the then Military Commander Greece, General of the Air Force Speidel. The handing over of the official affairs was done all in all. I do not remember that details as, for instance, orders concerning reprisals and the like, were discussed. Nor do I remember that General Speidel especially handed over to me any orders connected with reprisals, or that the contents of these orders were discussed in any way.
"The Higher SS and Police Leader Greece, SS-Gruppenfuehrer Schimana, declared to me in writing, right at the beginning of my activity, that he did not consider himself bound to orders which I perhaps might give him, since he was subordinate to the Reichsfuehrer-SS."
MR. RAPP: Your Honor, I object to the introduction of that paragraph of the affidavit because it deals within a time limit we are not concerned with. We have no objection to the first paragraph when the affiant talks about this relationship with the defendant Speidel. What he did with the Higher Police Leader Schimana after Speidel left is entirely outside the scope of this Tribunal.
For that reason I object to this paragraph.
THE PRESIDENT: The objection will be sustained.
DR. WEISGERBER: Then I have one other affidavit which I received yesterday noon, and it comes from President Sandstroem who in 1943 and 1944 was director of the Greek Relief of the International Red Cross. This affidavit I gave yesterday for translation. If the Tribunal agrees I can present it now, but otherwise if the Tribunal thinks it would be better if I waited until the translation was here, then, of course, I can present it at some later date.
THE PRESIDENT: I think we will have to wait until it is translated because that way that will be the only way in which the Tribunal would know as to its contents and could rule on any possible objection, and that would also be applicable to the prosecution too as they are not familiar with the German language and would not know as to its contents. We will wait until it is translated and presented in its proper form. Is it in the German language or the Greek language?
DR. WEISGERBER: It is in German. It is in German, your Honor.
Then for the moment I have finished, your Honor.
DR. GAWLIK: Dr. Gawlik for the defendant General Dehner.
Your Honor, now I would like to present those documents from my document book, Dehner No. 6. First of all I would like to submit document Dehner No. 35, Document Book 6, Pages 92 to 98 in the English and the German, and this becomes Exhibit Dehner No. 30.
This is an affidavit by Kurt Engelschall dated the 22nd of September, 1947. The fact that Engelschall has the necessary knowledge in order to make the statements which are contained in the affidavit can be seen from Figure 1. There Engelschall has stated the following: "From the middle of September 1943 until March 1944 I was Ia with the Corps Headquarters of the 69th Reserve Corps." With regard to Engelschall's personal details, he continues:
"Later I was Ia with the Plenipotentiary of the Armed Forces in Prague. On 22 July 1944 I was arrested by the Secret State Police for participation in the 20 July 1944 affair. In November 1944 I was dismissed from the Wehrmacht 'because I had uncritically accepted orders from the conspirators of 20 July 1944 and had prepared the execution thereof.'" I omit the next sentence and then continue.
"I never belonged to the NSDAP or any of its organization."
Under Figure IV Engelschall, during the whole time when General Dehner was in charge of the 69th Reserve Corps, Engelschall, who was la, makes the following statements about the attitude of the Croatian state.
"The Croatian government was entirely independent. Its relations to Germany were according to International Law. This is indicated by the fact, of which I know, that a German ambassador was accredited in Zagreb.
The independence of the Croatian government was further impressed upon me by the relationship between Corps Headquarters and the Grossgespan Vukovar, whose position corresponded roughly to that of a Prussian district president and to whom the Corps could never have given orders.
"Further I know that Prince Lobkowitz was at the Vatican in Rome as ambassador from Croatia." Then I continue with the next paragraph.
"For instance, the Corps was not empowered to make requisitions or collections independently. Furthermore, the Corps could not requisition billets without the consent of the Croatian authorities. Corps Headquarters also did not have the right, for example, to interfere with the sovereignty of the Croatian state, that is, the financial or judiciary sovereignty.
"Even in military operations it was necessary to get the consent of the Croatian government if the interests of the Croatian people might in any any way be injured. (For instance, in flooding operations.)
"The Croatian police, assisted by the Higher SS and Police Officer, was responsible for the maintenance of the public order and security in the area of the 69th Corps. The agencies of the Croatian government were not subordinate to the command of the 69th Reserve Corps."
Under Figure V then Engelschall made statements about the relation of the German police to the corps headquarters and especially he stated that the German police was not subordinate to General Dehner. Under Figure V it states:
"The Higher SS and Police Officer in Zagreb and the Police District Commander in Esseg were not subordinate to the 69th Reserve Corps. Both of these offices refused to accept any kind of orders from the Corps. When from time to time collaboration was necessary, agreements had to made with the Higher SS and Police Leader and the Police District Commander in Esseg.
"There were repeated controversies between the 69th Reserve Corps on the one hand, and the Higher SS and Police Leader and the Police District Commander in Esseg on the other hand, during which those agencies insisted on their independence and pointed out that the area of the 69th Reserve Corps was 'pacified' territory and that, in addition to the Croatian agencies, only the German police authorities were responsible for the maintenance of the public order and security.
"The operations carried out by the police were not ordered by the 69th Reserve Corps. Furthermore, the Corps had no command power of any kind in these operations. This pertains particularly to the operation that was known as operation 'Ferdinand' and is referred to in the war diary of the Corps as well as the daily reports as operation Kammerhofer. This operation too, was neither ordered nor executed by the Corps. As usual, Kammerhofer considered himself so independent in this operation too, that he did not consider it necessary to send reports to the Corps. For this reason the Corps could only get reports from the police on the execution of this operation with the greatest difficulty."
These statements refer to the operation Kammerhofer mentioned in various daily reports.
"During the time that I was on the Corps staff, the 7th SS Mountain Division 'Prince Eugen' was never under the command of the 69th Reserve Corps."
These statements refer to the representation contained in the legal brief of the prosecution in which it was stated that the commander of the 7th SS Mountain Division 'Prince Eugen' was subordinate to the command of the 69th Reserve Corps, although the prosecution during its presentation of evidence never presented any kind of assertion in this respect.
From Figure VI it can be seen that the 69th Reserve Corps in Croatia had a certain definite task and never exercised executive power. The task of the 69th Reserve Corps was, in addition to the training of troops, especially to protect the main railway line from Belgrade to Zagreb. "This railway was the main supply route for all the German troops in the Balkans. Therefore it was the pulse which had to be protected by all means. The assignment of the troops to protect the railway was done with the consent of the Croatian authorities, which was greatly interested in preserving railway traffic."
Figure VII then concerns the bands which appeared in the area of the 69th Reserve Corps. "The bands against which the troops of the 69th Reserve Corps had to fight in Croatia were composed of Communists, German and Italian deserters and Domobrane deserters as far as I can remember.
Later on some deserters from the Cossack divisions joined them. In addition there were adventurers from various nations. So far as the Communists were concerned, they were Croatian citizens, as well as other Yugoslavs and non-Yugoslavs.
"The commander-in-chief of the bands was Tito. Tito's bands were not the remnants of the regular Yugoslav armies which had fought against Germany in 1941. The insurrection of the Communists under Tito was directed against King Peter as well as against the newly formed Croatian state, and in this connection against the German Armed Forces who were allied with the Croatian state.
"In my opinion the activities of the bands under Tito can in no way be considered an uprising of the people. It was a pure movement towards the left, so far as it was not directed by outside sources."
The next paragraph then state: "I am convinced that the religious differences between the strongly Catholic Croatians and the Communistic bands under Tito precluded any collaboration. I know from various conversations with Croatians that they had rejected Tito's movement.
"I am convinced that during the time I was with the 69th Reserve Corps Tito's bands were not yet recognized by the Allied Nations. In this connection I remember reading a report that was directed to the Corps. This report contained directions which Tito had given to his officers in which the officers were directed to detain Allied officer commissions - I no longer remember whether it was American or English commissions - and not to allow them to travel further."
"So far as I know, the bands did not wear any insignia that could be discerned from a distance. My knowledge is based on the reports that were sent to the Corps. These reports referred mostly to bandits in civilian clothes. I remember that a large group was once seen in Italian uniforms.
"I know from reports from the troops that the bands often did not adhere to the rules of the laws of war. For instance, I know from troop reports that the bands repeatedly took German soldiers from trains and murdered them. I remember to this day that in the territory of the 173rd Reserve Division an officer was taken from a train, murdered, undressed and mutilated. As I recall today, this officer's testicles were cut off.
"In the fighting near Brcko the bands approached the German troops with raised arms and called out: "Do not shoot -- deserters". When the bands had approached as closely as possible, they suddenly opened fire.
"I further remember that the reports after the capture of Tuzin indicated that, according to statements of residents, the officers and men of an artillery replacement battalion were ambushed by bands, put against a wall without trial and shot. As a result of these reports an investigation was ordered by Major General Brauner which confirmed these reports, so far as I remember.
Figure VIII relates to reprisal measures within the area of the 69th Reserve Corps, and from this it can be seen particularly that these measures in the area of the 69th Reserve Corps were also tried out in agreement with the Croatian authorities and the police authorities.
Under Figure VIII it states: "The Croatian authorities and the Police Commanders were authorized to arrest hostages and carry out reprisal measures against hostages. As a result of an Army order the German divisional commanders and independent regimental commanders were also given the authority to take hostages and carry out reprisals against hostages.
"In my opinion the Corps did not have this authority. The Corps could not interfere with the powers of the division and independent regimental commanders without the consent of the Army.
"While I was the I-a on the Corps staff, no orders to take or to lay claim to hostages in any particular case were issued by the 69th Reserve Corps to its subordinate units.
"Not every attack on German troops, by far, was answered with reprisals in the territory of the 69th Reserve Corps."
I skip the next paragraphs and continue on the next page. I would like to draw the attention of the Tribunal to Page 96 in Document Book 6, and I would like to continue reading from Paragraph 4:
As far as I remember, the ratio of 1: 1 was by far not reached in the corps area. I am convinced that a much greater number of German soldiers was killed by the band raids than band members were called to account. In this connection I have particularly in mind the band raid near Ilok, when about 70 German soldiers were murdered. As far as I have been informed, no reprisal measures were carried out for this crime. Moreover, no reprisal measures were carried out for the murder of several German officers and soldiers at Tuzla.
The divisions under the command of the LXIXth Reserve-Corps reported to the Corps all the reprisal measures which were carried out in the area of the divisions, and, to be precise, also the reprisal measures carried out by the Croatian authorities, by the German police, and, in case the division commanders had carried out reprisal measures, these reprisal measures as well.
In the area of the 173rd Reserve Division no reprisal measures were, as far as I am informed, ordered or carried out by the commander. In the area of the 173rd Reserve Division all the reprisal measures were carried out by the police, sometimes even without notification of the divisional commander.
This I know for certain, particularly from a special case, where 11 partisans were hanged. In answer to my personal inquiry, because the reason was not clear to me, the report came that the SS or the Security Service had carried out the execution because of a raid against the railway line without the agreement of the division.
"I presume that all the executions for assaults in the course of which no German soldiers lost their lives were carried out only by the police or by the Croats.
"I still remember the case of the woman teacher of Kapella. I know that this teacher was set free by the Croats, when the reasons for suspecting her were, as I heard, not confirmed. My knowledge of this case comes from the report of the division."
And then Figure IX deals with the treatment of captured band members and from this it can be seen that although these band members, as I will show in my final plea, were not belligerents under international law; nevertheless, they were treated according to the laws of war. In Figure IX it states:
"With regard to the captured band members orders were issued by the Corps that these persons were to be treated as prisoners of war.
"The divisions had no prisoner-of-war camps. There were prisoner-of-war camps under Croatian command. Therefore, I must assume that the troops of the 69th Reserve Corps handed the captured band members over to the Croatian authorities."
The next figure deals with the Commando Order and the Commissar Order.
"During the time when I belonged to the 69th Reserve Corps, the Commando Order and the Commissar Order were never carried out.
"No Italian soldiers were shot in the area of the 69th Reserve Corps, during my membership with the Corps staff.
The next figure deals with concentration camps and forced labor.
"There were no concentration camps under the command of the 69th Reserve Corps.
"The conscription of Croatian nationals for compulsory labor at the construction of the Heinrichsburg, as mentioned in the document NOKW 509, Exhibit XIV, page 47, which is shown to me, was not ordered by the 69th Reserve Corps. As far as I remember today, it was the Reich Main Security Office which ordered the conscription for labor. Neither did the Corps take any part in the conscription for labor, but was rather accidentally informed of that conscription for labor."
The next Figure, XII, deals with the measures taken by the Corps against the Cossacks, as far as the Corps heard about any excesses committed by the Cossacks.
"In each individual case in which the Corps received information about excesses committed by the Cossacks, and this information proved to be correct, steps were taken against it. I know that in serious cases Court-Martial proceedings were instituted. I remember that in the course of these proceedings at least 8 Cossacks were executed."
The next document which I would like to submit is Document Dehner No. 32, on pages 86 to 87 of Document Book 6, and this becomes Dehner Exhibit No. 31. This is a letter from the Swiss Consulate-General in Munich, dated the 17th of November 1947. With this letter I want to prove that Croatia was an independent state within the meaning of international law, and in particular that Croatia had the possibility of making connection with allied nations in the international community, and that Croatia also made use of this possibility, and, as can be seen from this letter, was also in connection with Switzerland according to international customs.
Figure 1: "It was within the general rules of the Federal Government not to recognize de jure any territorial changes which came about during the war, and this was the reason why the Croat State was never recognized. Nevertheless, during this interval a de facto representation through the Swiss Consulate in Zagreb did exist."
In my final plea I will refer in detail to this paragraph and show that de jure recognition is not essential to the genesis of a state in the meaning of international law. The legal sources for this I have already set down in the local brief which I referred to this morning. Under Figure 2 it states:
"During this period several trade agreements were concluded with Croatia. They are the agreements of 10 September 1941 on the commodity and currency exchange between Switzerland and Croatia, which expired on 31 December 1942, and which was given a short extension afterwards to which the Croat co-signee agreed. Another agreement on the commodity and currency exchange with that particular state was concluded on 19 March 1943, which was continued automatically for another three months each, because none of the parties concerned gave notice to that effect."
My next document on the same subject will be Dehner Document No. 37, page 102, Document Book 6, and this becomes Dehner Exhibit No. 32. This is an excerpt copy from the Journal, the American Journal if International Law, Volume 35, July, 1941. From this Journal --.
MR. FULKERSON: (Interrupting:) It seems to me, if Your Honor please, that if extracts from a newspaper itself are not admissible in evidence, then certainly references to extracts from newspapers are not admissible in evidence, and apparently that is what this document consists of; and, further, if this has any place at all, its proper place is in a brief and not in evidence. For that reason, I object.
DR. GAWLIK: The case is rather different, Your Honor. I want to prove with this that the dates which are set down for the genesis of the Croatian state are decisive, and it is not an excerpt from a newspaper but from a scientific journal, and I know that the prosecution also submitted scientific statements as exhibits.
THE PRESIDENT: The objection will be sustained. The Tribunal will be in recess until 1:30 this afternoon.
(A recess was taken until 1330 hours.)
AFTERNOON SESSION (The hearing reconvened at 1330 hours, 9 January 1948)
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal is again in session.
DR. GAWLIK: I shall now continue with the presentation of my documents. Dehner Exhibit No. 32 will be assigned to Dehner Document No. 33, contained in Dehner Document Book 6, on pages 88 to 89 of both the English and the German text. This is an affidavit given by Willy Zorn, dated 28 November 1947. With this affidavit I want to show that the bands in the Croatian area did not adhere to the rules of warfare and that even this condition did not exist with regard to them for the recognition as a belligerent unit. From paragraph 1 and 2 it becomes apparent that Willy Zorn had the necessary knowledge to make the statements contained in the affidavit. It is stated in paragraph 1:
"During the war I was finally master sergeant in the German Armed Forces.
During the entire period in which General Dehner was in command of the 69th Reserve Corps I was attached to Corps Headquarters of this Corps as a driver. I had an opportunity through my trips to become acquainted with the conditions in Croatia, moreover I very often had a chance to look at reports and messages from subordinate units."
The next paragraph, 3, makes statements about the subject matter of the affidavit. In Paragraph 3 he says:
The German army in Croatia was in an exceptionally difficult position because it had to deal with an enemy there whose mode of warfare was in no way in keeping with that customary in modern armies. The partisans waged war in a wily and cruel manner.
I have the following to say about this in detail:
a) They wore no common insignia which could be recognized at a distance. I never heard that the partisans ever wore a common insignia at all; on the contrary it frequently happened that the partisans wore uniforms of the German Armed Forces or their Allies.
I myself saw a large group of partisans who had been captured north of Zagreb and who were brought back to the prisoners' camp. They all wore German uniform without any insignia whatsoever which might have distinguished them from German troops. General Dehner also pointed out to me at the time that the uniforms of the partisans were in better condition than those of the German guards who were escorting them.
b) A favorite means used by the partisans to deceive the German army was to disguise themselves as peaceful farmers. This was done both for the purpose of setting a trap for German troops or individual soldiers and in order to escape from the German army if they were confronted by superior German forces. This conduct resulted in great insecurity for the German soldier, for he was never able to know whether he had a peaceful inhabitant or a partisan before him.
The German soldier who fell into the hands of the partisans could not expect to keep his life. I know of cases in which German soldiers were not only killed but were also cruelly mutilated and tortured. One example of this is the massacre of an entire engineer company, of which I learned from a report to the Corps Headquarters.
The engineer company had marched out on maneuvres and was resting when it was attacked by partisans from ambush. Of the entire company only 6 men escaped. The rest were cruelly mutilated and murdered. I did not learn that any reprisal measures whatsoever were ordered in return for this by the Germans, On the whole, the German troops never retaliated for the atrocities of the partisans with similar measures.
The Zagreb-Brod railroad was a main target for partisan attacks, the partisans carried out raids against it almost continuously. The frequency of the raids varied; however, there was an average of one raid every hour.
The next document to be offered will be Dehner Document No. 31, and this will become Dehner Exhibit No. 33.