The conditions on the Balkans were so involved and so unique that in my opinion it is impossible down there to maintain public safety and law and order without reprisal measures.
Q. What orders did you receive from your superior agencies concerning the treatment and arrest of hostages when you were Commanding General of the LXIXth Reserve Corps in Croatia?
A. There was one order of the Second Panzer Army, dated the 15th of September 1943. This was an order which I didn't receive. It reached the Corps during a period of time when I was on leave, and my responsible deputy during my leave passed it on to the divisions. On the basis of documents which have been submitted I assume that the order of the Commander in Chief Southeast, dated the 22nd of December 1943 reached the Corps.
Q. In the case of the order of the 15th of September 1943, the one which you mentioned first--this is Prosecution Document NOKW-509, Prosecution Exhibit No. 340. It is contained in Prosecution Document Book XIV. The other order you mentioned, the one of the 22nd of December 1943, is Prosecution Exhibit No. 379, which is Prosecution Document NOKW-173, contained in Prosecution Document Book XVI, on Page 47 of the English text and Page 98 of the German text. I beg your pardon, Your Honors. I don't know whether I mentioned the English page in connection with the first document, the one dated the 15th of September. This is in Prosecution Document Book XIV, on Page 15 of the English text, which is Page 11 of the German text. I shall show you Prosecution Exhibit No. 340 witness which is Prosecution Document NOKW-509. This is the order of the Second Army, dated the 15th of September 1943.
Who was in charge of the Corps, General, when that order reached the Corps?
A That was my responsible deputy, Major General Braune.
Q What happened to that order?
AAs the documents bear out, it was passed on to the subordinate divisions of the Corps.
Q When did you get to know anything about this order?
A I cannot give you the exact date at this moment, but I am inclined to assume that, as customary, after my return from leave, the chief informed me of events which took place during my absence.
Q Did you have a possibility after your return from leave to revoke the passing on of this order?
A That was completely out of the question. The order had already been with the troops for some time. It was valid and the Corps Commander responsible at the time, Major General Braune, had carried out the passing on of the order in question which had been issued by my superior. It is quite impossible to revoke such an order as anybody knows who is familiar with military matters.
Q Did you, after you knew about that order, consider this order to be in violation of international law?
A No, that idea never entered my mind that orders which came to us from the highest level could be in contradiction to and in violation of international law.
Q Was the reprisal ration mentioned in the army order carried out at any time?
A No, to the best of my knowledge a much smaller ratio was applied.
Q What was the proportion of own losses caused by surprise attacks and sabotage acts and the number of hostages executed?
A There are a number of daily reports between the period of September and December 1943 and these daily reports are contained in Document 658. These daily reports, however, are not complete. Of 120 daily reports, only 30 approximately have been submitted. These 30 reports, however, are sufficient to prove that only every sixth or seventh surprise attack or sabotage act was retaliated. I believe I am right in assuming that in those daily reports which were not submitted, further surprise attacks and sabotage acts are reported but most likely no reprisal measures.
Otherwise, these would have been submitted. If we add to this the War Diaries which we received later on from Washington, we will arrive at the following conclusion if we take into consideration the entries in the War Diary: Only after every eighth or ninth surprise attack or sabotage act, reprisal measures were taken after, prior, to that, repeated warnings, threats of punishment had remained without success. One can, therefore, obviously assume that the number of our losses through sabotage acts and surprise attacks was larger than the number of hostage executions.
In stating this, I have not even taken into consideration the military damage which in some cases was quite considerable. I mean a damage caused by sabotage acts. Take for instance, an interruption of a railway line lasting only for one hour. A disruption of this is vital lifeline meant for the army and the civilian population that the whole schedule was out of order and such an interruption can cause a military train or a supply train, whichever one might be concerned, not to arrive in time which again can result in unexpected disruptions and losses.
The numerous locomotives which were found derailed along the railroad line between Zagreb and Belgrade - and I saw those with my own eyes on frequent occasions -- covered sometimes a stretch of kilometers -- that is, derailed locomotives and train wagons. These precious locomotives could not be replaced throughout the whole of the war, as I was told by a high-ranking railway official in Zagreb.
Q Were losses suffered during combat actions with bands retaliated?
A No, those were not retaliated.
Q General, you talked about surprise attacks. Did you yourself observe cruelties committed by the bands?
A I myself saw along the railroad line between Zagreb and Brod that the train had to stop because of a battle which had taken place a few hours ago on that particular spot.
On the telegraph poles there were a number of hanged German soldiers in uniform covered with blood; their noses and their ears were cut off, their chests were bared and swastikas were cut into the flesh. On the ground one could see traces of the battle which had taken place.
Q Could you describe some other cases or incidents, General, of which you gained knowledge in some other way?
A I remember sworn reports of German soldiers who succeeded in an unguarded moment in escaping from the partisans. During a surprise attack on a train, German soldiers were shackled with wire. Before that, their uniforms, and above all their shoes, had been taken away from them. That was during the late autumn months and after that they had for days and nights to march over the mountains with bare feet. Some collapsed, their feet bleeding, and were driven on. One or several succeeded in escaping. They swore to their statements and we reported these facts officially to higher headquarters with the request to inform the Geneva Red Cross of such occurrences.
Another incident is the following. Several German soldiers had been captured by partisans and were dragged to a camp in the woods. There they were questioned about their troop units and about the intentions of their troops. One soldier steadfastly refused to make any statements and he was hanged from he hands and feet between two trees about one meter above the ground. Pistol women started a fire under him, which they pushed to and for under him. The poor man eventually screamed with pain. One man who had to excuse himself, made use of this occasion and escaped. This incident was also reported to the army through official channels with the request to inform the Geneva Red Cross. Several German soldiers encountered some partisans in a village. Some of them succeeded in hiding in a haystack where they watched the following:
A German soldier was captured by the partisans. One of the partisans went to a locksmith shop and fetched a burning blow-torch and while the other partisans hold on tightly to the soldier, this monster went up and down the poor soldier's spine with the blowtorch until he collapsed, screaming with pain.
I happen to remember this case also, because it is so atrocious, and it was reported to higher headquarters through channels.
THE PRESIDENT: We will take our afternoon recess at this time.
THE MARSHAL: The Court will be in recess until 1515 hours.
(A recess was taken.)
(Following Recess.)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
BY DR. GAWLIK:
Q. In connection with the last answer which General Dehner gave, I would like to draw the attention of the Tribunal to Dehner document book No. 3, page 28 in the English and page 28 in the German, Dehner document No. 16, exhibit Dehner No. 10 and especially to the entry under the 23rd of August, 1943 and there it states:
"It looks as if criminal elements are beginning now without having any direct connection with the bands, to plunder and rob on their own responsibility. Among other things numerous cases of plunder and levying of warcontribution in the country, carried out by individual armed bandits were consequently reported by the Rural Police Headquarters from the Vukovar area."
General, who carried out reprisal measures in the area of the 69th Reserve Corp?
A. The army order, dated 15 September ordered that the carrying out of reprisal measures should be done through the Croatian authorities. In the order for reprisal measures, it was stated that this right was open to the divisional commander, but in practice and on principle the Croatian government or the Croatian officers had the executive power, and the right to order reprisal measures and their execution.
Q. Were reprisal measures ordered by the Croatian officers and the police and carried out in the Corps area reported to the Corps?
A. As a rule they were reported to the Corps through the divisions.
Q. Did the reprisal measures taken have the desired results?
A. At that place where the reprisals were carried out it was peaceful for a time. The reprisal measures caused the bands, who had carried out sabotage in that area, to stop for a time as can be seen from the War diary received from Washington. If no reprisal measures were taken, the rail artory would have stopped very quickly and in the whole of Athens, including the Island, this would have meant a catastrophy for the troops as well as for the civilian population.
Q. In connection with this, I would like to draw the attention of the Tribunal to Dehner document book No. 3, page 35, this is Dehner document No. 16, Dehner exhibit 10, the entry for 28 September 1943 in which it states:
"In the last 24 hours band activity was comparatively slight, since apparently the operations Kammerhofer and the operation of the 187 Res. Div. in the Dilj mountains are having the appropriate effect".
And also to the next entry for the 29th of September, 1943:
"Activity of bands in the area of the Corps continues to be slight."
The same for the entry of 1 October 1943:
"Only slight activity of the bands."
Q. The prosecution has asserted that you tried to insure the carrying out of the order for reprisals. This is on page 73 of the transcript. Did you ask for the carrying out of the reprisal measures or not?
A. No, I never demanded the carrying out of a reprisal measure and I never urged anybody not-carrying out a reprisal measure to be reprimanded.
Q. From document book 16, page 37 of the English and page 90 of the German, I would like to refer to exhibit No. 376.
This document contains two orders dated 19 of December and 20 of December, 1943, both orders are signed for the Corps Headquarters, the chief of the General Staff signed Steinbeck. What does this signature mean "for the Corps headquarters"?
A. It means that the chief of staff has issued a Corps order in the absence of the Commanding General. On 19 December I was already on leave and this lasted until 8 January 1944.
Q. Who was Steinbeck?
A. Steinbeck was the chief of staff for the 69th Reserve Corps.
Q. Did you tell Steinbeck to issue the order of the 24th of December, 1943?
A. No, I did not instigate the issuance of this order, because this order states the Commander has cause, because of an inquiry, and from this I assume that this cause arose while I was on leave.
Q. When did you hear about the order dated the 24th of December, 1943?
A. I assume after my Christmas leave which terminated on the 8th of January, 1944.
Q. And was there any reason for you to issue the order dated the 24th of December, 1943?
A. No, no. There was no reason at all to do this.
Q. Can you give us a rather more detailed reason for this?
A. The order shows the efforts to set down standard regulations for the selection of hostages and according to these regulations only the guilty people should be taken as hostages; people who were definitely innocent, however, as it states in the last paragraph, were to be released again as quickly as possible.
The decision is borne alone by the Divisional Commander, who, as I repeat again, was at the time Supreme Judicial Authority. The order, as can be seen from the figure (d), takes away from the SD all of the hostages which they have taken, and I could only declare myself to be in agreement with the one factor. The inquiry with the Army to the office which supplied labor in Germany, that is on the first page, under figure 2 (c), this inquiry could only be of a negative result because this office did not function; as far as I know, the prisoners were never sent for work in Germany. They could only have been volunteers.
The labor allocation was a purely territorial matter, which the Croatian government exercised. The order only, as I see, looking through it, mitigates the order from higher quarters, about the taking of hostages, which was already in existence. The clause about labor allocations had a negative result. There was no labor office.
Q. The Corps order dated the 24th of December, 1943, was this order an alteration in the former attitude, - in the attitude of the Corps --or did it only make this attitude clearer?
A. No, the order was no alteration in the attitude of the Corps which was still followed. Only a special case had been selected in order to show and to state again the general attitude of the Corps to the divisions and to make it clear.
Q. The Prosecution has submitted that it would be assumed that this order dated the 24th of December, 1943, went to the 173rd, the 187th and to the First Cossak Division. This can be seen from the English transcript, page 1478, and the German transcript, 1476. Can you comment on this?
A. The order cannot have gone to the First Cossak Division because the Cossak Divisions had already left the Corps area.
Q. When did the 1st Cossak Division leave?
A. On the 27th of November, 1943.
Q. Under figure 2 (c), the answer is mentioned in reply to the inquiry to the Army, with regard to the labor. Do you remember this answer?
A. No, I don't remember this answer. It is possible that the answer also came in during my leave, - probably even.
Q. And what offices were meant by SD in paragraphs 2(a) and 2(b)?
A. In any case the Security Police is meant.
Q. And what were the tasks of the SD?
A. So far as I know, the SD had police and political tasks. It was especially trained in interrogating prisoners. The Security Police was never subordinate to me.
Q. Were bands suspects handed over to the SD?
A I cannot remember, but according to a document which I have found here, it can be assumed that it happened only in cases of emergency, to check the prisoners, as stated in the order, by the Chief of Staff dated the 24th.
The SD mainly did auxiliary tasks, during the interrogation of prisoners, for a limited period, when a lot of prisoners came in. Transfer to the SD was always turned down, as can be seen from the documents.
This fundamental answer with regard to the taking of hostages, and the relation to the SD is given here on the basis of an inquiry from a division. This does not mean an alteration at all, in the views which had already been in existence, and in the customs of the corps.
Q. What was the purpose of 2-b of the order.
A. It had the one single purpose of helping in an emergency. As expressly mentioned in the order, transfer to the SD was forbidden.
Q. Who carried out reprisal measures on behalf of the Croatian troops?
A. Surprise attack raids on Croatian troops were retaliated for by the Croatian authorities.
Q. Who retaliated for surprise raids on the police?
A. The police, as far as I know and as far as I heard -- partly also Croatian police.
Q. I now come to the individual counts of the indictment, first of all to Count II of the indictment. During the period around the 15th of September 1941 were you in office?
A. No.
Q. Where were you during this period?
A. I was on leave.
Q. And where did you spend your leave?
A. In Wiesbaden.
Q. Did you hear about measures taken by the corps during this Period?
A. No.
THE PRESIDENT: Pardon me just a minute. Was there an error in interpretation or in the statement of the witness? Some reference was made in 1941. Is that the intention of the witness ?
A. No, your Honors, I didn't say that.
THE PRESIDENT: Members of the Tribunal are under the impression that the year 1941 was referred to.
DR. GAWLIK: It should be 1943. Perhaps, in order to make it clear, I should put the question again.
Q. During the period from the 15th of September 1943, were you in office?
A. No.
Q. Where were you during this period?
A. During this period I was on leave.
Q. Where did you spend your leave?
A. I spent this leave in Wiesbaden.
Q. And during this period were you informed about measures taken by the corps?
A. No.
Q. What communication had you during this period with the corps?
A. No contact at all.
Q. Who was in charge of the corps at this time?
A. At this time the eldest divisional commander was in charge of the corps. Major General Braune.
Q. Did he act independently or on the basis of orders and directives which you had given him?
A. Braune acted completely independently. I give him no directions and I had no need to do this because I had only been in the Balkans a few days while my deputy, Major General Braune had already been in the Balkans for a rather long time -- I think for more than six months -- I don't know the exact time.
Q. What were the rights and duties of the deputy of a commander while he was -
A. While he was on leave?
Q. Yes, while he was on leave.
A. He had the same rights and duties as the Commanding General.
Q. While you were on leave did you have any kind of power of command over the 69th Corps?
A. No.
Q. Did you ever give an order for the execution of 40 hostages for an attack on a railroad?
A. No, never.
Q. Did you ever hear about the fact that on the 15th of September 1943, 40 hostages were executed for an attack on a railroad of the 173rd Reserve Corps Division?
A. I cannot remember. The Chief of Staff, when I returned from leave, reported to me as usual. Whether he particularly mentioned this incident, I don't know.
Q. The prosecution charges you with the fact that troops of the 173rd Reserve Division under your jurisdiction on or about the 15th of September 1943 executed 40 hostages in Croatia. Can you give any explanation to this charge of the prosecution?
A. No, I can give no explanation about this at all.
Q. Why not?
A. Because no documents to prove this have been submitted.
Q. Does the war diary contain any entry about an execution of 40 hostages on the 15th of September 1943 for an attack on a railroad in the area of the 173rd Reserve Division?
A. There is no entry to this effect in the war diary.
Q. I submit to you Document NOKW-053. This is Exhibit No. 332 in Document Book XIII, page 117 of the English and page 84 of the German. Is this document signed by you?
A. No.
Q. Did you ever have any knowledge of this document?
A. I gained knowledge of it here for the first time in Nurnberg from these documents.
Q. On the basis of this document can it be seen that in the area of the 173rd Reserve Division 40 hostages were executed?
A. No, this is a teletype by the 2nd Panzer Army. The army has on found it out from the corps and there are no documents which show this.
Q. Can you give any more details about this?
A. We have here a teletype from the 2nd Panzer Army dated the 28th of September 1943 which talks about 40 hostages who wore executed because of attacks on the railway. In the daily report of the 2nd Panzer Army dated September or October -- the first one is the 28th of September; this is the 4th of October.
Q. General, the document dated the 28th of September is in Document Bock III, NOKW-053, Exhibit 332, and the one dated the 4th of October is Document Book XIII.
Please continue.
A. In these two reports from the Panzer -- that is the one from the 28th of September, the second from the 4th of October -- three paragraphs are contained under "III (German SS.)" That is the paragraph of the corps, the 69th Reserve Corps, the paragraph "173rd Reserve Division" which is the first paragraph of the 69th Reserve Corps and the following paragraph, "187th Reserve Division." Those three paragraphs are exactly the same in three different chronological reports.
Q. And what can be seen from it?
A. It can be seen that at least the reports are unreliable.
Q. Did you issue an order for the execution of the 40 hostages mentioned in these reports?
A. No, never.
Q. Did you know anything at all about this execution?
A. Well, this is impossible for me to say today.
Q. Can you comment on the question of whether this execution was carried out at all by the 173rd Infantry Division?
A. It is quite possible that this execution was not carried out by the 173rd Reserve Division.
Q. Can you tell us a little more about this, General?
A. The 173rd Reserve Division reported everything which happened in its area and everything which was carried out by the troop units which were not subordinate to it, also by the Croats and the police, without going into detail always as to who had ordered or carried out the executions.
Q. To whom were the police units subordinate in the area of the 173rd Reserve Division?
A. They were subordinate to the deputy of the Reichsfuehrer SS, Major General Kammerhofer.
Q Did you have jurisdiction over Major General Kammerhofer?
A No.
Q Could you have prevented any measures which were intended to be carried out by the police?
A No.
Q Did you have jurisdiction over the Croatian units?
A No, they were subordinate to the Ministry -- the Croatian Ministry of Armed Power.
Q In this connection I would like to draw the attention of the Tribunal to Dehner Document Book III, Page 17, Dehner Document No. 16, Dehner Exhibit No. 10. There -- the entry under the 15th of august 1943 (that is on the day when the Corps came to Croatia under Headquarters command). "173rd Reserve Division; 187th Reserve Division; 2nd Croat Corps General Staff." And then, three days later, on the 18th of August 1943, "Second Croat Corps eliminated from security police force--" I think it is already wrongly in the Document Book. It should be translated "The Second Croat Corps eliminated from the security area north of the Save." A security area north of the Save will be taken over completely by the LXIXth Corps. Then I would draw the attention of the Tribunal in this connection to Dehner Document Book III, Page 31, to the entry dated the 10th of September 1943, in which it states: "The Commander rejects subordination of Croatian units on the German commands on a larger scale than before." Here, again, I would like to say that the English translation is wrong in the Document Book. The word "Fuehrer" in the original is translated as "Commander But in this case it really means "The Fuehrer -- Adolf Hitler.
Could you have prevented any kind of measure taken by the Croatian units?
A No.
Q Was there a possibility of the executions mentioned in these documents not having taken place in the period of 28th of September 1943?
A Yes, there was this possibility.
Q Can you tell us a little more about this?
A Since two reports with different dates are completely the same in text in two paragraphs, one of the two reports could be wrong. It isn't exactly excluded that both reports are false, but it is also possible that the incident took place during my leave.
Q And now I submit to you, from Prosecution Document Book XVI, Page 27 in the German and Page 11 in the English, Prosecution Exhibit No. 375, Document NOKW-658. Is there any execution of this kind contained in any report of the Corps?
A It is true that there is a Daily Report of the Corps, dated the 4th of October 1943. In this is stated that for attacks on railways which took place in the last few days -
Q I would like to add here that this report is contained in Prosecution Document Book XIII, Page 121 in the English and Page 119 in the German, and in Prosecution Document Book XVI, Page 11 of the English and Page 27 of the German. Please continue.
A This Daily Report, dated the 4th of October, however, is incorrect, insofar as Figure 1, under "B", on the first page mentions the Daily Report of the 1st of October, Paragraph 2c. This cannot be correct because this Daily Report of the 1st of October is here, and this Paragraph 2c concerns a quite different troop unit, namely, the 173rd Reserve Division, not the 187th Reserve Division.
But if this questionable figure "2c" is not "2c" but "2b", then for the carrying out of the execution -- not the 173rd Reserve Division would be responsible, as it states in the Indictment, but the police. And the fact also speaks for this that in the original -- first of all the words "through police" are contained, and those words are crossed out. In any case to make the report as brief as possible. The Corps, however, had nothing to do with the police. In this Daily Report, dated the 4th of October, there is mention of another railway attack, dated the 3rd of October, and these 40 hostages are also mentioned in connection with this. This Daily Report, from the 3rd of October, was unfortunately not submitted by the Prosecution.
Q And what conclusions can be drawn from your statements?
A The results that the exhibits which have been submitted in no way give a definite, clear picture.
Q From the report can it be seen that there were no casualties during the attack on the railway?
A No, this cannot be seen.
Q Is there a possibility that if this execution took place at all the number of the people killed during the two attacks on the railway was larger than the-number of hostages executed?
Q Yes, there is this possibility. Quite apart from the fact of the military damage which was caused by the interruption in the railway service on this main line and the great material damage which could not be made up for during the war. A typical example that the casualties were not always completely given can be clearly seen from two or three documents.
Q Your Honors, these are documents, in Prosecution Document Book XIV, Page 24 in the English and Page 19 in the German, NOKW-509, Prosecution Exhibit No. 340; and Prosecution Document Book XVI, Page 19 of the English, Page 47 of the German, NOKW-658, Prosecution Exhibit No. 375.
Q Please, General, would you turn to these two documents, Book 14, Page 19 in the German and Book 16, Page 47 in the German? What can be seen from these two documents?
A Would you please tell me the page in Document Book 14?
Q Page 19 in the German; Page 24 in the English.
A I think there is a mistake. Oh, yes, I am sorry, it is Document Book 16. The only teletype dated the 21 of October, 1943, is a normal, daily report which, on the basis of reports which came in from the subordinate divisions and units to the corps headquarters, were compiled. I would like to say they were compiled by cutting and then they were sent as a teletype by Morse to the Army and in this way much was left out at the expense of clarity in the effort to make their own losses not so high and the reprisals seem more severe.
The other report in Document Book 14 concerns the same subject but here, as an exception, this is the copy of an original report. It went by courier channels from the division to the corps headquarters of the 173rd Reserve Division, that is, not through the teletype channels but through the usual post channels.
Q Which differences can be seen between the original report of the Reserve Grenadier Regiment 462 and the teletype daily report dated 20 October, 1943, although both reports have the same subject?
A In a normal teletype report of the 21 October 1943, the following can be seen; firstly, passenger train attacked near Bjelovav, plundered and burned; secondly, railway attack near Vukuslavlevica, and for these two cases, as a reprisal measure, 25 members of bands were executed after public announcement.