Q Did you then remain in the Army?
A I was only in charge of the regiment for a short time and on the first of December I was transferred to the Reich Air Ministry which had in the meantime, been newly formed. I became chief of staff with the command of the air school. In April 1935, I wont to Munich as Senior Air Corps Commander.
Q When did you become a General?
A On the first of January 1936, after thirty-two years of service, I became a Brigadier General. In October 1936, I took over the newly formed Seventh Air District, in Brunswick. In April 1937, I was promoted to Major General and the new Air Fleet II, which arose out of various reorganizations, was made subordinate to me after I had become General of the Air Force in February 1938.
Q What was the command area of Air Fleet II?
AAir Fleet II covered three Corps Headquarters districts. The left flank was in Bonn? the right in Luebeck. The air force had to be completely rebuilt, and not only the air training and further extended training of of the men was necessary, but the anti-aircraft detachments had to be completely reestablished and trained as well as the air signal troops, because the Ruhr Gebiet came under the command of the Air Fleet? as well as the two great ports of Hamburg and Bremen. It was the one task which I, as an officer, would have wanted -- to be active as Commander in Chief in most decisive spot and to be in charge of training the officers and men.
Q And was Air Fleet II active in tho entry into Austria and Czechoslovakia?
AAir Fleet II did not participate in the entry into Austria and Czechoslovakia and also not in the entry into the Sudotenland and Bohemia and Moravia.
Q You mean, first of all the Sudetenland and then Bohemia and Moravia?
A Yes.
Q And where were you at the outbreak of the war?
AAt the outbreak of the war, I was with my staff in the west. Alarge part of the bombing units of the Air Fleet took part in the war in Poland.
Q Did you have anything to do as regards order with these units, which were active in Poland?
A No, they were under another fleet, and were commanded by this fleet as long as they were there and not with us.
Q Did you take part in the French campaign?
A No, I did not take part in the French campaign. On the 12th of January 1940, I was dismissed.
Q Why were you dismissed?
AA liaison officer on the staff of the air fleet, a parachutist, had contrary to the well-known order, taken a top secret matter a military operational memorandum with him in the aircraft. On this occasion, the aircraft made an emergency landing in a neutral country and through this a part of this operational secret matter became known there. I was reproached with having informed the air force units concerned about this operational memorandum, even if only an excerpt from it.
Q And then, in your opinion, this affair was the real reason for your dismissal?
A No. Already since autumn 1938, there was tension between me and the Commander in Chief of the Air Force. On orders, I had worked out memorandum about the air war against England. I set down the pros and cons in this essay and came to the conclusion that an air war against England hadn't the slightest chance of success, according to technical experience and discoveries at that time.
A. This essay or this memorandum aroused the indignation of Goering or even Hitler, and it was sent back with numerous notes in the margin by Goering. And the later Chief of the General Staff of the Air Forces also stated orally something like, "This kind of work makes the Air Force impossible; this memorandum is a blow in the face for Field Marshal Goering." The memorandum, in my opinion, dissolved the tension which had been between us for so long a time, and I had given enough warnings about such kind of training and also about the speedy setting up of new units. The whole speedy set-up of the rebuilding program had cost us a great amount of losses. So, in my opinion, this incident, with the emergency landing of the officer, was a very welcome cause for my dismissal.
Q In this connection I submit from Felmy Document Book I, Document No. 31. This is on Page 49. This document contains excerpts from a book published in 1945 in Switzerland by the former Major General of the Air Force Rieckhoff. The title is "Trump or Bluff--12 Years of the German Air Force."
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Your Honor, I object to the submission of this document. Anything which is written by an author in a book is not a sworn statement, and we, of course, would have no opportunity to crossexamine him on the matter.
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW: Your Honor, I think the case is no different than if this man who wrote the book had given an affidavit. Major General Rieckhoff has given two affidavits for my client, which I will submit later on. The Prosecution is quite at liberty to call Major General Rieckhoff into the witness stand at any time.
Your Honor, could I give you this book so that you can have a look at it? (THE BOOK IS HANDED TO THE TRIBUNAL)
THE PRESIDENT: It is the thought of the Tribunal that this author is not here on the stand.
THE COURT INTERPRETER: Your Honor, the microphone is not turned on.
THE PRESIDENT: It is the thought of the Tribunal that this writer of this bock is not here on the stand and may not be particularly helpful to the Tribunal in the decision in this case. What we're interested in is the attitude of the witness who is now on the witness chair, the Defendant Felmy. If he has views similar to that which is expressed here (REFERRING TO THE BOOK), he can so state, but as to the excerpts which are now sought to be presented it seems to me that since there will not be an opportunity to question this witness the objection should be sustained. If you're going to call this man, that's another proposition, but at the present time I don't believe this exhibit should be admitted. That will be the ruling of the Tribunal.
BY DR. MUELLER-TORGOW:
Q Then, I offer from Felmy Document Book I, Document No. 22. This is an affidavit by a former General Hermann Hoth. I would like to read the first paragraph of his comments on the subject:
"In about 1927 I worked with former Major Felmy in the Reich Defense Ministry on questions of air war operations. At that time foreign literature was propagandizing the "war of nerves", that is the air war against enemy civilian populations. In contrast to that, Major Felmy was of the opinion that the task of the air force was to attack military targets. He gave not only military reasons, but rejected air attacks on large cities and on civilian populations for purely humanitarian reasons. At that time I was particularly impressed by this strict and just decision and his warmheartedness."
General, ...
THE PRESIDENT: Pardon me, ...
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW: Then, what did you do...
THE PRESIDENT: Pardon me please.
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW: This affidavit receives Felmy Exhibit No. 1.
THE PRESIDENT: That was the question I wanted to ask, as to what exhibit number you were giving it.
BY DR. MUELLER-TORGOW:
Q General, what did you do after your dismissal?
A First of all I remained in Brunswick. In order not to sit doing nothing during the war I took a position, through a friend, in Brunswick.
Q Then, did you join the Party?
A Yes. In Brunswick, of course, I was very well known. In that relatively small town my dismissal had aroused considerable notice because there was no motive for it; so it was the subject of conversation in large circles of the population there and also, of course, amongst my friends. I had sons who were growing up who tried to think about the situation and also they were drawn into debates about it. In order to bring the whole matter to a head and in order to avoid differences of opinion, in the autumn of 1940 I reported my entry into the Party. Because of the incidents I had not the slightest reason to take this step. It was, in a certain way, a victory over myself. We officers were brought up to believe that personal fate has to be subordinated to higher elements, and especially so in times of crisis. This is what I wanted to show by this step.
Q And in addition did you also have economic reasons which caused you to join the Party?
A No.
Q In your professional career perhaps it helped to promote you a little quicker?
A No. As I said, they were purely personal reasons. I received my pension, and I was economically independent.
Q Did you ever hold an office in the Party?
A No.
Q Did you take part in Party meetings and other events?
A No.
Q Did your entry into the Party have any other consequences for you? Did you, perhaps, leave the church?
A No, I remained in the church with my family as always. My boys received religious instruction at school.
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW: Your Honor, at this moment I wanted to submit another excerpt from the Rieckhoff book. On page 51, as Exhibit number 2, I would like to submit document 80 in Document Book 3. I would like to read this. It is on page 42.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Mueller-Torgow, if in presenting and when you present your documents, if you could first refer to them by name or in volume, or book number 1, 2 or 3, and then the page, then the document number, and the Exhibit number, it would be helpful to the Tribunal. If you would kindly remember to preface your offer with that statement, it would help the Tribunal in making up its record.
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW: Yes, your Honor. This is Document Book Number 3 Document Number 80, page 42. This receives Exhibit number 2. This is an affidavit by Professor Dr. Alexander Graf Schenk von Stauffenberg. I would like to read this affidavit.
"Since 1st June 1944, as a Lieutenant and Special Mission Officer of the Corps Artillery Commander (Arko 168) General Schuster-Woldan, I belonged to the Staff of the General Headquarters of the 68th Army Corps. On the morning of the ill fated attempt of my brother on Hitler's life on 20 July 1944, I submitted a declaration to the Chief of Staff (similar to one already rendered to my immediate superior, the Artillery Commander) to the effect that I was the brother of the assassin, but ignorant of the latter's plans. At the same time I asked to be excused from my mess duties and from joint meals. I was thereupon told in the name of the commander General Felmy that I had committed no dishonorable deed and that there was therefore no reason to alter any existing behavior on my part; the same applied of course to the staff officers' attitude towards me. I was actually at liberty in Athens during the days following the event, after having given my word of honor that I would not try to escape, though I would have had the opportunity to disappear any time with the help of Greek friends. Not until the 24 July instructions of the Army Personnel Office were received via Army Group E to the effect that I was to be arrested immediately and was to be taken to Berlin a life, in the quickest possible manner.
Until that time, I was to be imprisoned in the military prison in Athens. This order was not carried out by the chivalrous General Felmy who ordered me to stay in my flat and had officers of his staff guard me there in an absolutely comradely manner. I gratefully remember this trip, until my arrest in Prinz-Albrecht-Strasse. It was carried out by two officers specially detailed by him, in a high-minded and comradely way. By the tactful and high minded intervention of the General for whom I shall feel grateful esteem and respect as long as I live, I was spared the already dreaded arrest in Athens by the SS or Gestapo, with all its probable consequences."
This is in connection with the defendant's membership of the Party.
BY DR. MUELLER-TORGOW:
Q. General, did you remain in Brunswick?
A. No. In October 1940 I went to Berlin. An old friend of mine who was in charge of a lot of cartels asked me to help him in his work, and I remained with him until the end of May 1941.
Q. And when did this activity came to an end?
A. On the 21st of May 1941 I was reactivated and became chief of a military commission which was to be sent to Iraq. On the journey there I comic to Aleppo in Syria, and because in the meantime the relations between England and Iraq came to an end, and that was to be expected; and at the time I also told Fieldmarshal Keitel and General Jodel about it.
Q. And were there any German troops at all in Iraq?
A. In Mossol and Bagdad there was in each place one air force squadron. They had withdrawn to Aleppo when I arrived there. According to a directive of the Foreign Office, the OKW then ordered the Squadrons to evacuate Syria. The British had used our presence there as a pretext and had threatened an attack on Syria. Well, then, when we had evacuated Syria -- it went relatively quickly -- the British attacked in Syria and pressed French troops there under General Denz slowly back until they capitulated; and so the activity of the military commission came to an end temporarily.
Q. Then you came to your appointment in Greece?
A. Yes, that is correct. About the middle of June I was appointed commander of southern Greece with headquarters in Athens. The staff of the former Military Mission which was still in the process of being set up was transferred to Junion south of Attica and was subordinated to me as a special staff F; since southern Greece was occupied by the Italians, the German troops only had the enclaves in the southern part of the Port of Pyreus and the districts around the air fields Tatei and Eleusus, and Calamati, and the Island of Crete was also subordinated to me territorially.
Q. And which Administrative Sub Area. Headquarters were subordinated to you?
A. In Athens and Epirus, there was one each with about three rifle battalions.
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW: Your Honor, in this connection I would like to submit a document in Felmy Document Book number 5 which is on page 1, and it is Document Number 88. This becomes Exhibit number 3.
BY DR. MUELLER-TORGOW:
Q. General, would you perhaps describe to us the most important points on this map?
A. This is a town plan of Athens and in the left bottom corner of the map, there it states the Bay of Phaleron. This can also be seen on the margins of the map, the Harbor Phaleron. It is a thick, pointed line which is shown at the bottom left-hand corner of the map, and one part of it goes through the Port of Pyreus, and the other finishes at the word "bay", (Bucht) Bay of Phaleron; and then if one goes along the Bay, another line starts which runs almost parallel with the bottom edge of the map, and the district contained therein is the airfield of Calamati.
THE PRESIDENT: Pardon me, please. We will not be able to conclude the testimony concerning this map this evening, so we will adjourn at this time until 9:30 tomorrow morning. (The Tribunal recessed until 0930 hours, 2 December 1947.)
Official Transcript of Military Tribunal V, Case VII, in the matter of the United States of America against Wilhelm List, et al, defendants, sitting at Nurnberg, Germany, on 2 December 1947, 0930, Judge Carter presiding.
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the Courtroom will please take their seats.
The Honorable, the Judges of Military Tribunal V.
Military Tribunal V is now in session. God save the United States of America and this Honorable Tribunal.
There will be order in the Court.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Marshal, will you ascertain if all the defendants are present in the Courtroom?
THE MARSHAL: May it please Your Honor, all the defendants are present in the Courtroom with the exception of defendant von Weichs who is in the hospital.
THE PRESIDENT: Judge Carter will preside at this day's session.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Your Honor, if I might interrupt very briefly the examination of General Felmy. The Prosecution on the 6th of November distributed to Your Honors, and filed with the Secretary General a memorandum of law concerning the unlawfulness of the German occupation of Greece and Yugoslavia, and the lawful belligerency of the Greek partisans and partisan units. The German translation of that memorandum was served to the Secretary General and distributed to defense counsel I believe on November 13, and on the 21st of November the Prosecution filed a supplementary memorandum of law concerning the law of hostages and reprisals and the plees of superior orders. The translation of that memorandum was distributed to defense counsel and filed with the Secretary General yesterday, that is December 1st. We have prepared one further memorandum of law on the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the inapplicability to these defendants of certain of the provisions of the Geneva Convention regarding the treatment due prisoners of war. That memorandum is being stenciled and mimeographed, and it will be ready for distribution to Your Honors and for service upon the Secretary General today, and I believe a German translation will be ready for distribution within the next two or three days.
Because the Prosecution was somewhat tardy in filing its memoranda law I hesitate to ask that the Tribunal place a date line on defense counsel for filing of replies. However, I would like to have any written argumentation of the defense filed in time for us to write replies thereto, or at least in time for us to include any replies we might wish to make toward our closing address.
THE PRESIDENT: I think it should be kept in mind in making that request, Mr. Fenstermacher, that by agreement of counsel for the prosecution and the defense, the original date for the filing of prosecution's brief was October 24.
DR. LUCK: (representing for Dr. Laternser) If it please the Tribunal, the last part of the memorandum of law the German text reached the defense as late as yesterday. Dr. Laternser had already discussed with His Honor repeatedly the reply to the memorandum of law. The defense endeavors to work as fast as possible on the memorandum of law, but just as the Prosecution, the Defense also needs a certain amount of time to work on the memorandum. As regards the memorandum of law mentioned by Mr. Fenstermacher, I would like to ask the Court to give defense counsel an opportunity to get in touch with each other.
JUDGE CARTER: The Tribunal will not fix any time for the filing of briefs on the part of defense at this time. We will wait until we have consulted with defense counsel and until they have had an opportunity to consult among themselves.
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW: If it please the Tribunal, I had fixed to the wall two maps. The right one is a map of Greece and the left one covers the area of the 68th Corps. In due course I shall refer back to these maps. Before I continue with my examination I would like to supplement the statements made by the witness yesterday. I would like to comment on his discharge from the Wehrmacht and about his party membership, and I would like to submit two affidavits in this connection, both from Rieckhoff.
The first one is contained in Document Bonk Felmy I on page 46. It is document 29. I would like to read this affidavit.
"I am acquainted with the General of the Air Corps Felmy--"
JUDGE CARTER: What exhibit number are you attaching to it?
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW: The exhibit number is going to be "4."
Exhibit Number Felmy "4", Your Honor.
I am acquainted with the General of the Air Corps Felmy since 1934. He was my superior in 1934, 135 and 1938 until January 1939. From April 1938 until January 1940 I was next to his chief of staff, his first adviser in command matters. During these periods I came to know Felmy as a man of sincere character and high morality. Harshness and inconsiderateness were foreign to his character.
When he was ordered in 1938 to make preparations in the case of war in Western Europe, Felmy pointed to the dangers of a conflict with Great Britain, as regards air warfare, in a detailed memorandum addressed to Goering. This memo was submitted for the purpose of stopping the German leaders in their policy by a calm judging of the air situation.
Felmy fell into disfavor because of this unvarnished memorandum. After having put up with an embarrassing affront by Goering at the outbreak of war because of his sense of duty and responsibility, he was discharged in a defamatory manner for an inconsequential reason -- he was held responsible for the personal failure, contrary to existing orders, of a subordinate over whose actions he could not exert any influence.
In 1939 Felmy favored my repeated endeavors to call the attention of influential business circles in Hamburg (Rieder Sloman) and in Duesseldorf (Industrial Club) to the dangers of air warfare by way of lectures. He exposed himself to certain reproaches by this attitude too.
After the beginning of the war. Felmy exhorted the subordinate troops to strictest observation of the neutrality of Holland and Belgium, although the risk of own losses was increased by this.
Likewise Felmy ordered the dropping of bombs on British soil to be strictly avoided during attacks against British naval targets although the chances of success were considerably decreased by this. (Attack aiming at the destruction of the dreadnaught "Repulse" in the Firth of Forth, ordered by the C-in-C of the Air Force in 1939).
The second affidavit, it it please the Tribunal, is the following document in the same document Book, Felmy I. It is Document 30 on page 48, and I am offering it as Exhibit Felmy 5. The affidavit reads:
In May or June 1934 a conflict occurred between 3 officers of the Air Corps, among them the later Ltn. Col. Schalke of Air Fleet 2, and two SA officers, among them the then Obergruppenfuehrer Ernst, in Warnemuende.
Hereupon Felmy visited general agencies of the German Transport Pilot School in Brunswick, Hildesheim, Fassborg, and Lechfeld, the later Air Force Military Schools. In my presence he called upon the officers there to defend themselves, in uniform as well as in civilian clothes, with arms in hand against any attack on the part of the SA, he ordered in this connection that every officer had always to carry a fire-arm, and threatened every officer with severe measures who exposed himself to an insult by the SA, or who did not defend himself sufficiently.
signed: Herbert Rieckhoff HELMUTH FELMY DIRECT EXAMINATION (Continued) BY DR. MUELLER-TORGOW:
Q General, yesterday afternoon we had stopped when we discussed the map of Athens; I would like to ask you to briefly repeat now what you said yesterday, and then we can continue.
A This map excerpt, -- I am afraid this was the best one we could find in the archives of Washington, -- shows to the left at the bottom of the margin of the map a thick line, which forms a pointed angle. This line is the dividing line between the German and Italian areas of supremacy, as far as regards the Southern part of the Port of Pyrasus. If we follow near the lower margin of the map along to the place where it says "Bay of Phaliron" and follow the thick line which runs almost parallel to the margin of the map, we find that this encircles the enclave of the Airport Calamaki. On this map excerpt we can see quite clearly that the town of Athens and the adjacent area were Italian occupation territory. That's all I have to say about this map excerpt.
Q What was your main task as commander for Southern Greece?
A. My main task was to regulate the supply to Crete.
Q How long did you remain in Greece?
A My first assignment in Greece lasted until the end of August 1942. In the meantime my special staff had been added a German Arabic Instruction Detachment, which later on was to form the skeleton of an Iraq Army. Towards the end of August the special staff F underthe new name "Corps Headquarters LXVIII," under my leadership, was transferred to the Calmueck Desert. The Calmueck Desert is in Southeast Russia near the Caspic Sea, and this area was put under the jurisdiction of the First Panzer Army. At the proper time it was to advance via the Caucasus, then the commitment in the desert was to follow this action.
Q Will you tell us something now, briefly, about your assignment in the East, General, please?
A In the course of the summer of 1942 special units had been established in Germany for commitment in the desert, and these were gathered towards September and October around Stalino. From there they marched via Rostov and Vatigersk into the area around Julinorsk, where they were to protect the wing of the flank of the 1st Panzer Army. The subsequent period was full of offensive and defensive actions against the strengthened 4th Russian Guard Cavalry Corps. When in January 1943 the withdrawal movements started, the Corps Headquarters also evacuated the area, and finally west of Rostov in the so-called Vius position this unit established a new position.
Q Did the corps remain in the Vius position?
A The German-Arabic Instruction Detachment had remained behind in Stalino, and in the meantime this unit had been committed in Tunis Headquarters was to follow there. Towards the end of March it was withdrawn and gathered in Southern Italy near Rellhio in Calabia. I personally flew to Tunis in order to gain a picture of the situation, there. However, due to the course which the war took, the Corps Headquarters was not committed in Tunis. Instead, in the course of the month of May it was transferred to Southern Greece.
Q General, now comes your second assignment in Greece. Would you please tell us something, in large outlines, about this period?
AAfter the German troops had withdrawn from Africa it seemed very likely that the Allies would attack the Balkan area. In order to defend against such an attack the 1st Panzer Division was also transferred on to the Peleponnes amongst others, and subordinated to me, in the same way as was the 117th Rifle Division, two Italian Divisions, and a number of fortress battalions. The capitulation of the Italian Army on 8 September changed the picture completely, particularly since the 1st Panzer Division had been withdraw and transferred to the East. The Corps Headquarters was transferred to Athens, and, here in this area, the 11th Airforce Field Division was subordinated to this Corps Headquarters.
When in August 1944 Roumania, and seen after that, Bulgaria left the alliance with Germany, it was a natural consequence that Greece was also evacuated. On 12 October the evacuation of Athens, and the withdrawal movements started.
Q And what became of the Corps Headquarters?
A The Corps headquarters was in charge of the withdrawal movements until approximately the 20th or 22d of October when we had reached Larissa in Thesselouia. Then the Operational Department was by air route transferred to Syrmia. Syrmia is the most Eastern tip of Croatia, and almost stretches to the gates of Belgrade. Here, the Corps Headquarters took over a sector between the rivers Save and Danube, but, when on November 11, 1944, the Russians had crossed the Danube in Southern Hungary near Batina, the Corps Headquarters was also committed in that area. The defensive actions against the four Russian Corps attacking there stopped towards the end of December southwest of the Drave and near Lake Plaffen.
Q Did you remain in charge of the LXVIII Corps?
AAt that time I left my post as commander of the LXVIII Corps and took over instead the XXXIL Corps and that again gave me the leadership on the Syrnia front.
Q If it please the Tribunal, the reasons for this transfer were at the time given by the witness von Warmbuehler while dealing with questions concerning General Rendulic, but at this point I would like to present an affidavit, which is contained in document book Felmy III, page 44 of that document book. It is document Felmy No. 81 and it will be submitted under exhibit Felmy 6. This is an affidavit executed by one Friedrich W. Esche, which I would like to read in part. On page 44 in the second paragraph it says:
As a major and operational staff officer I worked from about early October until the middle of December 1944 in the army corps headquarters of General (Air Force) FELMY until his transfer to another staff. I was present at most of the tactical conferences and oral reports and took part in their preparation, As far as my position as Ia required or allowed this. During this activity I came to know and esteem General FELMY as a very objective, clear-minded, and personally modest soldier of an exact military - scientific mind.
Without remembering at the moment any dates and figures of the war days from October-November-December 1944, permit me to render the impression unequivocally won at that time, namely that General FELMY with the troops then at his command aimed at a very careful conduct of battle free of any risks in East Croatia (Syrnia), on the Danube River on both sides of Vukovar, in Southern Hungaria (on the Danube east of Fuenfkirchen), which he performed with full success to the benefit of the human material under his command and of the civilian population living in the fighting zone, regardless of his personal fame or reputation which, on many occasions, would certainly have been embellished by harder and bolder decisions.
I clearly remember that General FELMY approved of the retreat, ordered by me independently, of a mixed "Brigade Hildebrand" from the Danube River towards the West, and that he successfully upheld my decision against the Fuehrer-order ("hold positions") as well as against the repeated admonitions by the superior army headquarters, because this retreat was strategically justified and a tactical holding of the position according to the order -- would have exacted too heavy losses from the German, Croat and Hungarian troops under his command.
I know that the orders repeatedly issued by the Fuehrer-Headquarters in connection with a further retreat to the line of the Southern border of Lake Platten - Drau River, to occupy so-called "Fortresses", that is to say local strong - points which were to be held at all events, were not carried out. General Felmy justified this with the following clear argument: "What matters is a tactical - wise conduct of battle, not a "glorious" one."
These very independent decision made by General Felmy were governed by the respect for the life of every man-natural to every soldier - , by his refined sense of responsibility toward every human being, and by his respect for the rules of the Geneva Convention.
From stories told by members of the Staff-First Lieutenant von Koschembahr (the General's personal orderly officer) and others - I know that Felmy's corps headquarters in the Russian campaign - Eastern Ukraine or Donez Basin in 1942 - did not forward and carry out the order for the creation of a "desert zone", that is to say the burning down of all communities in the course of the retreat operations on all fronts.
The industrial plants at Fees (Fuenfkirchen) - Hungaria - namely as far as I remember - iron or coal mines which lay in the immediate vicinity of the city and of the swelling houses, were by order of General Felmy not blown up in October 1944, out of consideration for the civilian population. - I was present when the then engineer major on the Corps Staff reported to General Felmy on the "peaceful" discussions held, as ordered, with the Pecs plant managers, which aimed at a shut-down of the plants "for a limited time" and which did not entail any subsequent destruction nor even any serious injury of the whole plants.
I saw with my own eyes how much sympathy General Felmy showed to the old Hungarian staff officers and commanding officers of the Military District Pecs, when the problem arose to give warning to the civilian population, within limits of place and time but at any rate in due course, about the approaching battle and to protect it against any danger, in conformity with the Hungarians' desire.
General Felmy did not carry out the order for the evacuation of the "fortress lines" to the West of the Danube River, for the formation of which new orders had been issued, since he clearly realized that in view of the expected conduct of battle by his army corps and out of consideration for the peaceful population such a "whirl of glory" (Ruhmeswirbel) was untimely and, moreover, of secondary importance from a military point of view.
I would then like to read one more paragraph, which is the last paragraph on page 46.
In the middle of December 1944 General Felmy was relieved of the command of the LXVIII Army Corps and, after having had to pocket the most severe reproaches for his allegedly "easy" conduct of battle, he was given the command of another army corps. On the part of the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht one would probably have liked to take stronger measures against him if the Army Headquarters (Second Panzer Army) had not at that time "pleaded" on behalf of General Felmy and if the strained situation had allowed more time for the investigation of the events."
General, how long after that did you remain on the Syrnia front?
A. Defensive and offensive actions alternated on the Syrnia front. On 11 April, 1945 here, too, large withdrawal movement started. Approximately around 23 April, when the front became increasingly narrow, 100 kilometers of Zagreb, the XXXIL Corps headquarters was relieved from that area and transferred to the area of Leibach, from there it was to be committed either on the Essence river of in the so-called Alpine fortress. However, this future commitment did not take place and toward the beginning of May we transferred to Carynthia and when the capitulation was announced, we surrendered to the British.
Q. Did you remain with the British?
A. No, toward the middle of June we were taken to a place south of Salzburg and there we were delivered to the Americans. I, myself, have been in various American camps and toward the middle of October, 1945, I was brought to Ulm.
Q. And how long did you remain in Ulm?
A. I remained in Ulm until 20 March, 1946. The time during which the Generals were accommodated in the stables, I did no longer experience there. We were quartered in barracks. The way in which this camp was equipped and fed was not in accordance with the previsions of International Law. I only want to mention one example.
In February, 1946 the Generals were collected in the riding ring and in the meantime under the supervision of an American officer our rooms were being searched. When we were allowed to go back, we found the following: Admiral Marshal had been robbed of his razor, General Reinhardt's gold watch had disappeared, General Reinecke's silver cigarette case had been taken, which had been a present made to him by Trukish officers during the first World war, and had sentimental value. In the other rooms similar things had happened, for instance, General Schmidt had lost a traveling alarm clock, which happened to belong to me and I loaned it to him as he did not have a watch.
We complained about this and compiled lists of the things which had been stolen, which we submitted, but nothing happened.
Q. and where did you go on 20 March 1946?
A. On that day, I and six other Generals were brought to Dachau.
Q. How was the situation there?
A. If there were a few things which were objectionable in Ulm, the situation in Dachau was in flagrant violation of the previsions of the Geneva convention. Three of us, General Judge Beckelberg, General Vegel and myself were detained in the cell, the measurements of this cell were 2 meters and 96 cents long and 2 meters and 26 cents wide and 3.05 meters high. These measurements were written on the wall of the cell and we had made a note of them.
For 26 days without any examination of any kind, without any statements of any reason whatsoever, we were detained. I asked in a telegram to General Truscott, the commander of the 3rd American Army, for an explanation of this. I wanted to know why we were not treated as prisoners of war, but I did not receive any reply. Only toward the last ten days of April the situation changed somewhat and we were transferred into a barracks camp, which had been an annex of the SS hospital in Dachau. The accommodations, food, etc., here was not bad. In the same SS barracks, where we were quarters, there were also detained, for some time, Field Marshal Kesselring, Field Marshal Sperle and Field Marshal List. Frequently around noon there were visits and inspections by some visitors to whom we were shown like wild animals in a zoo.