And it is signed, for the:
"For the Corps Headquarters The Chief of Staff (signed) Jodl Colonel, General Staff Corps".Now , if you will turn to the proclamation itself, General Lanz, "The German troops have liberated you from the depotism of the JewishBolshevist elements."
Is that the way you looked at the War against Russia?
A. As far as I was concerned the war against Russia was a military affair.
Q. Then we can turn, General Lanz, to paragraph 11 of the proclamation:
"11) Political Commissars and members of the Red Army cut off from their units, are to be arrested without delay by the mayor, who is to deliver them to the nearest commander."
Then paragraph 12:
"12) Sabotage of all kinds, also to the crops, unauthorized possession of weapons, munitions, and explosives, plundering of camps and supplies, as well as the hiding of Commissars and members of the Red Army cut off from their units, or any sort of failure to carry out orders of the German commanders will be punished with the most severe means, up to death penalty."
Do you recall ever having received this proclamation?
A. I do not recall the proclamation at all.
Q. If you had received this proclamation, General Lanz, would you have distributed it to your troops and publicized it?
A. It is possible I would have passed it on, but I dont know what I would have had to add to it for my own part.
Q. You will note that in paragraph 11 a distinction seems to be drawn between political commissars and other members of the Red Army. Were you in favor of a distinction being drawn, giving different treatment to the commissars than they gave to other members of the Russian Army?
A. I was not of that opinion. That becomes clear from my attitude towards the actual commissar order which I have stressed at the beginning.
Q. If you had received this proclamation, General Lanz, do you think you would recall it?
A. Well, it is difficult to answer that. It is probable. The proclamation has been initialed by my IA, which I see from the photostat copy. It is not initialed by me. Had I received it I am sure I would have initialed it, but it is only the IA who initialed it. I see here I did not.
Q. I think you also testified that no commissars were executed except in combat by members of the 1st Mountain Division while you were in command?
A. I did not say that. It is contained in some affidavits.
Q. Do you confirm what is contained in the affidavits?
A. I can only repeat that at that time I ordered t at Commissars must be shot only in combat.
Q. Did you ever hear that commissars were shot outside of combat by units under your command?
A. Anyway, I do not remember a case where it was reported to me that commissars had been shot outside combat.
Q. If it had been reported to you would you remember it today?
THE PRESIDENT: We will take our afternoon recess at this time.
THE MARSHAL: The court will recess until 3:15.
(Thereupon a 15-minute recess was taken.)
(Following Recess.)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
DR. LATERNSER: May it please the Tribunal, I would like to make a motion. Dr. Sauter has in yesterday's session, not as a question, but during General Lanz' examination presented the following argument; General Lanz had been declared too unstable a man because he did not have all Italian officers shot. This remark becomes an argument which is not admissible at this stage of the proceedings. I therefore move that it be stricken from the record.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, please, I think the Tribunal will be able to distinguish between what might be construed as argumentative and that which is evidence and the motion will be over-ruled, which will not necessitate any comment from you, with all due respect.
You may proceed.
BY MR. FENSTERMACHER:
Q Thank you, Your Honor. General Lanz, if it had been reported to you that commissars were executed outside of combat, would you have remembered that fact?
A It is possible that I would remember it, but it is not sure. Since those days more than six years have passed and in these six years many things have happened. I could not possibly know that six years later these events were to play such an important role.
Q To your best recollection now, were any commissars ever executed by any units of the 1st Mountain Division, while you were commander of that Division, outside of combat?
A I am in no position to give a definite answer to that. It is possible, that is all I can say. I do not remember it, therefore I cannot give a positive answer to that question.
Q Would you look at this document, General Lanz? This is NOKW 2241, which is offered as prosecution exhibit 618. This is an account, written by a private first class of the 666th Propaganda Company and the account is taken from the files of your 1st Mountain Division from the Ic Activity Report and it is titled, "The Procession of the Eighteen Thousand:"
"An endlessly long procession goes by me, the procession of the eighteen thousand. They are the same eighteen thousand who in the previous nights sought to break through the iron ring which our regiments had laid around them, who stormed the heights in senseless, bloody attacks, in front of them the German weapons, which are accustomed to talk a severe language, behind them the machine pistols of the Commissars, which cracked ruthlessly in the heaps, whenever an armistice threatened.
An endlessly long procession is going by me, the procession of the eighteen thousand prisoners who had been collected from the com fields, the dug outs, and from under the bushes of the underbrush, apathetic, dumb, without any sort of feeling of excitement concerning their being taken prisoner."
I think we need not concern ourselves with a geed deal of the literary style of the author of the report, but if you will turn to page 4 of original document- this is page 3 of the mimeograph copy, Your Honors, to the paragraph - first full paragraph on that page. For you, General Lanz, it will be the last paragraph on page 4:
" And then they pull out a little man, in blue cloth trousers and with an unspeakably common face; he had concealed himself behind the broad shoulders of the good-natured farmers from the Eastern Ukraine, ducked with a sharp laugh and cringing, hustled by the searching eye of the guard, like a rat, which is lured out of its hold and does not feel right in the bright sun. His sleeves bear no insignia, but even a blind man can see the darker places on which the red-embroidered Soviet Star with golden hammer and sickle gleamed, not too long previously. Comrade Commissar? The little one turns white, but he knows how to reply, he is gifted in speech; it takes three hours, until he is wornout, until he does not know how to answer any longer, until he agrees to everything, without contradiction. The game is over, the glance for help directed to the prisoners remains unseen; no one remembers this little rat.
He is taken aside, to a place from whence only the crack of the report comes back, not however the faint cry."
Do you remember ever having seen this particular report, General Lanz?
A No, I don't. To the best of my recollection I have never read this report. If I understood it correctly, it is a report made by a war reporter who describes these events. I don't even know to what extent a war report correspondent describes things correctly and objectively. Most probably I would have remembered this report now if I had read it at the time, but I am sorry I do not remember it. From the date, I can assume that the events must have taken place around the time of the battle of Uman, that was a very hectic time when battles were raging day and night. The scene described does not strike a cord in my memory.
Q To your knowledge it is not customary to choose commissars from the ranks of prisoners and then execute them?
A I can only repeat that the incident described here is not known to me. I don't know whether it was officially reported and reached me personally that is all I can say about it.
Q Wouldn't the 1e of your Division inform you about events of this kind, General Lanz?
A I think that is possible and even probable if the incident really took place in the way the war correspondent describes it here, but war correspondents, as it is well known, have a lot of imagination. Much has been written by war correspondents which is not true literally if one comes to the bottom of the facts. From my own person, I can only say a report by a war correspondent I do not regard in the same light and I cannot give the same value as I would give to official reports.
Q This war correspondent seemed to know what the insignia of a commissar was, General Lanz, you will note he describes it as a red embroidered Soviet Star with golden banner and sickle; that is correct, isn't it?
A That can easily be explained. War correspondents always drive at everything that smells even a little of sensationalism. Not only war correspondents do that, but all reporters do that. The commissars were of particular interest to the war correspondents which is quite easily understood and they availed themselves of all the facts about the commissars, but I don't say assumptions are facts.
Q It is customary for commissars to remove their insignias if they had an opportunity, is it not, General Lanz, in order that they not be treated in accordance with the Commissar order?
A To the best of my knowledge, the commissars soon after the beginning of the Russian campaign, discarded their insignia and also to the best of my knowledge their papers, so that they could not be recognized as commissars. One thing is certainly known to me and that is that Russian troops themselves denounced commissars, who did not wear the insignia or carry papers as one could not then establish whether or not they had really been commissars. To one extent the remarks made by the war correspondent are correct, that is that the commissars always discarded their insignia.
Q They took off their insignia just because they knew what would happen to them if they were captured as commissars?
A That is what I would assume.
Q Your opinion is that the account here is inaccurately described?
A Mr. Fenstermacher, I would not regard that as an authentic report, not official enough to judge the whole problem. Because, after all, a report by a war correspondent in my opinion has not the value of authenticity, but of course you can debate that question if you like.
Q This man, General Lanz, does not appear to be a war correspondent, he appears to have a rank, that of private first class and he is attached to a particular company apparently in the German war companies; what makes you think he is a war correspondent?
A I suppose that he is a member of a field propaganda company. Those people were war correspondents and were drafted by the German press or newspapers just for that purpose. That is what knowledge I have about that subject.
Q Now, your 1c took over this account and made it a part of his Activity Report for the period from 1 September until 31 October, 1941; isn't that an indication that your 1c at least endorsed what the correspondent states?
A That might be possible that the 1c included this report in his report, I don't know who did it in the department 1c and it would be difficult to establish that now. That still does not prove that such a report is an authentic one.
Q Let us move down to Greece now. General Lanz, you described in your biographical affidavit that the Epirus area of Greece was considered an operational zone; isn't it a fact that the troop commander in an operational zone has executive power?
A No, I believe that is an error. The troop commander has jurisdiction over his troops, by this I mean over those troops subordinate to him. He has no executive power, that is something entirely different.
Q You say you did not know who had executive power in the Epirus area, but you knew that you didn't?
A In any case, it was not I who had executive powers, I was troop commander.
Q Well, who had it if you didn't have it?
A I assume the military commander for Greece, but that is an assumption which I cannot answer. I would like to stress that because I think I have to be careful in what I say here.
Q You mean you were in Greece for over a year, General Lanz, and you didn't know what the channels of authority were down there?
A I did not say that, I did not talk of channels of command, I only said I did not have executive power and I shall maintain that assertion. I knew the channels of command quite well.
Q Do you think General Speidel had the executive power in the Epirus area, while you were in command there?
A I assume that, I cannot say that with certainty. To me that question never became acute.
Q Now, General Lanz, you said you opposed the execution of hostages; would you tell us why?
A That was a matter of feeling that is where I was concerned it was an instinctive attitude, just as many things in life are matters of attitude and feeling.
Q Did you think the execution of hostages was never a military necessity?
A That is not what I intended to say, that would depend on the situation as it arose, one cannot generalize on such a subject.
Q Did you think the execution of hostages was inhumane?
A That again would depend on the circumstances. We both know that under certain prerequisites the execution of hostages is admissible even by International law, so that in a general manner one cannot reject or support such views. Such a point of view is in my opinion dependant on the local conditions, such as they prevail at certain times. I don't think that one can generalize about such things.
Q Where were General Stettner's headquarters in the Epirus area, General Lanz?
A That was different at different times. For some time he stayed in Joannina and for another period he stayed in Velas, that was about 30 kilometers north of Joannina, then again he was in the district of Korea. That changed at different times.
Q How long was he in Joannina?
A He was in Joannina when I arrived there and then he was there, if I am not mistaken, until the beginning of October.
Q And then he moved 30 kilometers away; how long did he stay there in the second place?
A I am afraid I cannot tell you that exactly, I don't remember the actual dates.
Q Where were General Stettner's headquarters when you both were in Joannina; were you both in the same building?
A No, it was not in the same building, he lived near the northern exit of the town and I lived, or rather my official quarters was in the Teacher's Academy near the western exit of the town.
Q How far away from each other were you and General Stettner during the day when you both went to work?
A When we were both present in Joannina, we were about two kilometers away from each other.
Q Now, General Lanz, would you turn to document book 19, to page 109 in the German, 83 in the English. This is General Stettner's order of 13 September 1943, which you say you knew nothing about. Now, on that date both of you were in the same town and you were only two kilometers apart from each other?
A Yes.
Q Didn't you and General Stettner discuss the execution of hostages, especially since you had such a strong feeling against executing hostages?
A Well my attitude would certainly have represented a reason for General Stettner not to discuss it with me.
Q If you had known of this order providing for the killing of hostages at a ratio of ten to one, would you have ordered General Stettner to rescind the order?
A That is possible. In any case I would have tried to influence him to the effect that hostage measures would only be taken in inevitable or particularly urgent cases.
Q Didn't you ever ask Stettner what kind of orders he was issuing to his units regarding hostages?
AAt the moment I don't recall that we discussed the subject.
Q Now, one of the first things which was done after an attack by the bandits on your troops was to seize hostages, was it not? Wouldn't the subject as hostages be a perfectly natural subject for you and General Stettner to discuss?
A Yes, but I believe that is a conception which only became so strong here in Nurnberg that this hostage problem was in the foreground of all events. At that time there were completely different things which took up our attention, there was the band fighting, tactical measures, etc., which took up the largest part of the work. Today they are shown in a different light sometimes even all topsy-turvey.
Q General Lanz, was not one of the methods which you used to decrease the number of attacks on your troops to seize hostages?
A I would like to say in this connection that it was not my method. If I may point this out here, it is well possible that the 1st Mountain Division, which had been in the area for many months before I arrived there and took it over. Until then it pursued a different practice to get results. I was thrown into the circumstances without having any connections with them prior to my arrival. I arrived from the Kuban bridgehead at that time and there no hostage measures were taken at all. The opinions between the division and myself differed.
Q General Lanz, in the course of explaining certain of the documents which Dr. Sauter put to you you made certain assumptions. Can it be assumed that the 1st Mountain Division which was subordinate to you received its orders from you and that this is simply an issuance by the 1st Mountain Division of an order which you had previously issued to it.
A I beg your pardon; could you please repeat that?
Q The ordinary channels of command were from the OKW to the Army Group F, to Army Group E, to the 22nd Corps, to the 1st Mountain Division. Isn't that so?
A Yes, that is quite right.
Q Can it be assumed that this 1st Mountain Division, prior to issuing its order, received an order of this kind from you?
A You mean in that particular case here? That is an assumption which might easily be taken and I believe that is the customary channel which you have described here too. To me, however, it is not known that this order was issued by me. If I am not mistaken, the experts of my staff of the Ic Department who worked on such matters expressed in their affidavits that this order was not known either, after all it is strange that the participants claim that they don't know the order.
On the other hand, I would like to stress that the 1st Mountain Division has been in the Epirus area two months before I got there. The 1st Mountain Division had before that been committed in Serbia and in the nature of things they must have received some sort of directives in that direction. That can only be assumed.
Q General Lanz, would you say that it is likely or unlikely that this order is based on a prior order which you had issued to the 1st Mountain Division?
A I maintain the point of view to the extent to which I can overlook things now that it is not likely that I issued this order to the 1st Mountain Division. If I knew it, I would surely tell it but I just don't know. I assume that the 1st Mountain Division, out of their own competency issued that order and it was perfectly entitled to do it.
It was in a position to do it. The divisional commander was the judicial authority and he certainly had the right to give an order without reporting to me prior to giving it or to ask my consent. He was not obliged to do that.
Q If the OKW had called you on the telephone or sent you a message and asked what was being done within your corps area regarding hostages you would have been expected to tell them precisely what was going on and what orders were issued and outstanding in your corps area? would you not?
A If the OKW had called me on the telephone in order to ask your hypothetical question, then I would certainly have reported to the OKW that I would inform myself of the orders or order and subsequently report to the OKW what I have learned. That most likely would have been my answer.
Q On such a basic matter would you be expected by the OKW to be informed immediately and generally and give a spontaneous answer rather than going about to inform yourself?
A Before in such an important matter one reports to the OKW one reflects about the facts and does not do it out of the blue on the telephone. Then one would make very bad experiences. Besides, the matter was not that urgent; I would have reserved the right to inform and then report.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Now would you turn to page 137 in the German, Book XIX, page 118 of the English, your Honors.
Q This, General Lanz, is your own order of the 3rd of October which is just about three weeks after General Stettner's order?
A Yes, that is right.
Q It is a coincidence that you here in this order adopt a 10-to-1 ration which appears in General Stettner's order?
A It is possible that it is just coincidence. I don't know. I don't know how I happened to put it just that way. I am not in a position today to answer that question.
I am afraid I can't do that.
Q Do you believe that an order which establishes a flat ratio of 10 to 1 is a lawful order, General Lanz?
A I believe in order to answer your general question that one cannot judge these things generally nor can one answer them on such a basis. One can maintain the point of view that the proportion 1 to 10 is illegal or inhumane; one can maintain the point of view such a hostage proportion is in some instances necessary any permissable. I know, for instance, that the French occupation forces have not only ordered this proportion 1 to 10 but have also applied it. Therefore, I believe one cannot reject or accept such a proposition on principle.
Q Would you say, General Lanz, that a ratio of 10 to 1 for every case, whether it be a serious case or a slight case, is lawful?
A In any case, the proportion 1 to 10 is such that it can only be applied if the dire necessity exists to do so.
Q Do you see any limitations in General Stettner's order to the effect that it should be applied in some cases but not in others? Doesn't General Stettner's order say that it should be applied in all cases?
A Just a minute. I would just like to read it over.
Q That is on page 110 of the German, page 84 of the English.
A It says here: "In order to take stringent counter measures against the continued raids on convoys and members of the Wehrmacht, it is ordered that as of 20 September 1943 for every German soldier wounded or killed by insurgents or civilians 10 Greeks from all classes of the population are to be shot to death." No exception is mentioned here but it is a basic order.
Q Would you that it meant then that in every case a 10 to 1 ratio should be applied?
A It says here; "For every German soldier wounded or killed by enemy insurgents." Therefore, from this text I would take it that it was to be applied for every case. That is how I read it.
Q Now, General Lanz, return for a minute to your own order of 3 October 1943. You state that the population is to be notified that for cable sabotage in the future 10 of the hostages which have been seized have been shot to death. Suppose the cable sabotage was the result of a commando raid by British commando units $ would you then have ordered the hostages to be shot?
A During my examination I have stated that I did not pass on the commando order. That shows my attitude to the question which you have touched upon here.
Q Your order says nothing about whether or not the hostages will be shot if the cable sabotage results from a legitimate military operation. Are we to assume that if the cable sabotage had resulted from a commando raid or from low flying aircraft that then the hostages would not have been shot?
A I believe that case is a bit far fetched, if I may put it that way. After all, one has to consider the events in the light in which they have developed. The facts are the following. In the district around Arta, as we had heard, there were quite frequently the telephone communications cut not by low flying aircraft but by the partisans. That was quite obvious. Against those continuous measures we directed our counter measure my counter measure. I would particularly stress it was just a precautionary measure. It can be proved that the people were not actually shot. They were arrested and the arrest in such case I consider my perfect right.
Q Suppose, General Lanz, that the cable sabotage had resulted from the activities of a band which wore insignia, which was commanded by superior officers, which bore arms openly and, so far as you knew, follow? the rules and customs of war; would you then have executed these hostages?
AA band which fulfills these prerequisites, Mr. Fenstermacher, as you have mentioned them here, would have been such an exception in my area that that would have, under all circumstances have been reported to me prior to the measure being taken. In that case I would have had the possibility to decide about the future steps to be taken.
Q Will you turn now, General Lanz, to page 140 of the German document book XIX, page 122 of the English. In this report to you from the 1st Mountain Division, one day after your order for the seizure of 40 hostages, it is stated that the male population of the neighboring villages along this particular road are to be employed and that in case of further attacks or acts of sabotage the hostages would be shot.
You saw nothing wrong with holding Greeks responsible for attacks which other Greeks made on a particular supply road which the Germans were using? You have in mind here danger hostages. I take it, General Lanz. At least, the 1st Mountain Division had danger hostages in mind with this report?
A. I believe, Mr. Fenstermacher, that I have stated during my examination that when I encountered those people along the highway, which I remembered very clearly and described very clearly, that the people lived in straw huts along the road. I can still see them now, the way they lived there. These huts were in stretches of about 100, 200 or 300 meters distance along the road. When I saw these people on my trip I stopped and made inquiry as to that measure. When I returned I discussed this measure "with the division and rescinded it. I considered it a senseless and unnecessary measure. I believe I stated that once before. That is connected with the measure you are discussing here.
Q. Did you mean that the tactic of danger hostages was considered by you to be unnecessary?
A. I mean to say that the measure which I saw there I considered senseless and unnecessary and, therefore, I rescinded it.
Q. Will you turn now, General Lanz, to Page 144 of that book? Page 129 of the English. This is another report from the First Mountain Division, dated the 5th of October, which is two days after your "seizure of the 40 hostages order," and the preceding report, regarding the employment of danger hostages. Here it's reported that hostages are to be taken for truck trips to a prisoner collection camp they are to be returned to the camp editor the trip is terminated. I take it we had in mind here--at least the First Division had in mind again -- the employment of danger hostages.
( TO THE COURT INTERPRETER): Do you know the translation for the word "danger hostage?"
THE COURT INTERPRETER: There's hardly a translation for this word. I could say "vorbeugungsgeiseln" -- "preventive hostages."
THE PRESIDENT: You may proceed. We have had the interpretation from the Interpreter.
BY MR. FENSTERMACHER:
Q. General Lanz, isn't it entirely possible that British air-craft would attack the trucks upon which these hostages were situated and that the hostages would be killed as a result of those attacks?
A. I think that is possible. British airplanes attacked all vehicles which they saw moving along a road. If I am talking about Greece here, they even attacked me on repeated occasions. I, therefore, think this is entirely possible, but it was not within our power to avoid it.
Q. Would you say that in using hostages in order to prevent a regimental military attack, which I take is an attack by Allied aircraft on such trucks would be, is it a permissible military measure?
A. No, I wouldn't consider that fair. But that was by no means the intention, Mr. Fenstermacher, to avoid that British planes should attack a moving column. The situation was entirely different. The bandits raided the roads or mined the roads, and the danger which threatened us from the bands was countered by this measure. This measure was not directed against an attack from the Allied air forces.
Q. It Could, however, have intended to prevent Allied attacks upon such truck columns could it not?
A. I must apologize, but here, again, I would say that it is a rather far-fetched conclusion. At least it is not known to me that any such situation became acute, although I myself, in the summer of 1944, I was attacked by British low-flying air-craft on almost every trip that I made. Still no case is known to me where such a vehicle was actually damage in such an incident. I didn't hear anything about that.
Q. Did you ever forbid the First Mountain Division to use this technique of talking hostages along on truck trips?
A. I did not recall an order forbidding this. But I have to point out that I was not quite clear how the taking of hostages by the First Mountain Division was carried out. All these things only became clear to me here when reading the documents. At the time such a practice was made from case to case, and only at some periods. I did not realize that at the time because the division did not report it to me. Apparently the division did not even deem it necessary to inform me about that.
Q. Would you turn now, General Lanz, to Page 150 in that volume? It is Page 139 of the English. This is another order of the First Mountain Division, dated the 25th of October 1943--roughly a month after the 10 to 1 order. You will note here that the ratio is changed to read 50 to 1, and I believe you said you didn't know anything about this order either.
A. That is what I said, and I pointed out that the distribution list attached to this order shows that this order was passed on by the First Mountain Division within its area and that no copy went to the Corps. Otherwise this would be mentioned here.
Q. Isn't this order based on one which you have previously issued to the First Mountain Division, General Lanz?
A. I have pondered this question, Mr. Fenstermacher, but I cannot recall that I ever issued such an order to the First Mountain Division. Otherwise I would have mentioned that during my examination. I just don't know. It is furthermore striking that a provision is contained in this order that a shooting have to be carried out through the Military Commander Greece, and one can hardly assume that I would issue an order containing such a sentence. If I had done that I would have reserved the consent to the execution for myself and not to somebody who was far removed from the scene. This is the very sentence from which I conclude that this concerns measures which were taken before my time when I was not even down there yet.
Q. General Stettner was subordinate to you when you issued it was he not, General?
A. Yes, that is quite correct.
Q. You will note in Paragraph 1-b he states that the ratio of 50 to 1 is to apply even for the losses which occurred during combat.
A. I read that. It is a measure of which I did not approve, but I can only prevent it if I know it.
Q. Are you in sympathy with that particular provision and the 50 to 1 ratio generally, which appears in this order?
A. It is not in accordance with my own opinion that a ratio is ordered here which refers to losses during combat action.
Q. You will note in Paragraph 1-e that there is a 10 to 1 ratio ordered in the case of the murder of a pro-German Greek or a Greek working for the Germans. Did you hear anything about that ratio?
A. No case is known to me where this provision was applied within my area.
Q. You will note also, General Lanz, in Paragraph 1-c, that it's stated that the band directly followed the tactics of making peaceful village suspected of being accomplices of the bands, so that they may gain recruits in the population which fears German reprisal measure. Isn't that perhaps an explanation why the Greek villages were deserted when your troops approached?
Perhaps the population left out of fear of German reprisal measures. I believe you intimated that on one occasion a priest told you that that was precisely why the population had left the village at the approach of you and your troops.
A. Well, we can hardly assume that Paragraph 1-c of this order would come to the knowledge of the population. For this reason I don't believe that this order can have any connection with what you mentioned. I'm sure the population must have had reason to leave the villages. Possibly they were afraid.
Q. Why would they be afraid, General Lanz.
A. The population wasn't only afraid of us. It was also afraid of the partisans. The partisans had frequently shown a very unfriendly attitude towards the population. I have endeavored to show in my testimony that there were in Greece two groups of partisans which fought each to the utmost. I recollect some incidents where there were fights between the National and Communist partisans without the Germans' firing a single shot. The population was under the greatest pressure from the partisans. Food and cattle were taken from them. Men were recruited by force; houses were burned down if the population didn't do what the partisans wanted them to do.