THE MARSHAL: Court is again in session.
DR. SAUTER: May it please the Tribunal, before the recess I stopped at Exhibit 106, which is Document 190, page 42 in the Document Book Lanz V. This is an affidavit by Robert Heumann, who served on the staff of Lanz as AC from November 1943 until the end of the War. In his affidavit he confirms the collaboration between the troops of Lanz and those of Zervas against communist attacks along the Arachtes front. I need not read the details of the affidavit as of the others. I recommend the contents of all the affidavits which I mentioned before to the notice of the Court. They are all of them duly signed, sworn to and properly certified.
Q Witness, you have told us that the arrangements made between yourself and Zervas were observed throughout many months. Why were they finally-roughly as from July 1944, as you said, no longer observed. Can you tell us anything about the reason why?
A I believe I mentioned before that the ultimate pressure applied by the allied military measures to Zervas became so strong on the one hand and also on the other, which I have indicated, and he had allied troops and what we call the Greek exile troops, he received from the ports of Parga and Amuzia, and that thereupon he began to attack me. I also mentioned before that I hesitated to answer back, because I still hoped that these were slight deviations from the official attitude on the part of some of Zervas' leaders or perhaps on the part of Zervas himself, but finally I had to realize that they meant business, and therefore I had to get my troops to hit back at Zervas in the interest of my own troops and that was done at that time until by September, General Zervas once again approached me.
Q Why did he approach you and on what occasion?
A He did so quite obviously because of the evacuation, which became apparent. The situation is that connected with events in Roumania, Bulgaria and the Russian advance, the situation became more and more severe, and the evacuation of Greece was inevitable if you didn't want to lose your troops.
Thereupon, Zervas once again contacted me.
DR. SAUTER: If the Tribunal please, this becomes clear from a document which is contained in Lanz Document Book IV. The number is 135, and it is on page 54. It is offered as Exhibit Lanz 107. This is an affidavit given by Bruno Willers, who between October 1943 and the end of 1944 was Lanz's first general staff officer. He describes the details of the propositions made by Zervas in order to facilitate the reoccupation of the evacuated area by Zervas troops before the Communist bands would do so. I need not read the very detailed descriptions of this affidavit, but I recommend it to the judicial notice of the Court.
Q Now, what went on during the evacuation itself, what were the relations between yourself and Zervas?
A It was quite understandable that General Zervas was himself interested to occupy the areas which I evacuated before the communists would take them. That was the salient point of the matter. I said before that the communists were much stronger than Zervas, and of course he wanted to occupy the evacuated areas with his own troops before the communists would pour in. That was entirely plausable to me, and I expressed my sympathy to Zervas's proposition. I emphasize once more I thought that I would do the Greeks a service thereby. I had nothing against the Greeks. They had done nothing against me.
Q What was the offer General Zervas made towards you before you left Epirus concerning your own person and your troops?
A Well, for instance he asked me that I should give him the guns and heavy weapons in these areas. I couldn't do so because I had to fight in other theatres of war, and I needed my arms. I explained this to him in a friendly way. Then he asked me to join his ranks with his troops. I still recall what proposition he made to me according to the treatment I would be accorded, and the treatment my troops would be accorded. He intended to use us against the communists because he alone would be too weak, and that is why he made this offer to me. I should join him with my troops and fight the communists with him.
A similar proposition was made by Zervas to the 104th Division, as I know this was quite in accordance with the situation of the time. It can be seen particularly clearly from the fact that when I evacuated Joannina in an entirely orderly manner Zervas immediately occupied Joannina. We have seen pictures of that here. The town was completely intact, but he didn't stay there very long when the communists attacked him, and the consequence of that was that he and a large part of his troops had to flee to the island of Korfu. He had to leave the country so to speak. At least, Korfu was Greek, but he had to leave the mainland. The communists were so strong that they forced him to do that. I believe I am not saying too much when I assert that General Zervas, at that time when I was present in Epirus, based his survival and the existence of his Edes troops on the fact that I and my troops behaved loyally towards him. Had that not been the case the communists would have probably eaten him piece-meal.
Q How, General Lanz, was the evacuation of Epirus run by you, did you have to do any fighting, were any destructions carried out, did you have things blown up, etc.?
A The fighting during the evacuation was relatively small. I and General Zervas had agreed, but of course I had to do a certain amount of fighting against the communists, because I had no contact with them, which I had no intention of having anyway. As far as the blowing up is concerned the situation was that there was a plan for the whole area for the explosions of bridges, roads, etc. and other traffic situations. I gave instructions that only the most important installations be blown up. In Joannina since nothing was blown up at all, -- I believe one single bridge across the road was blown up in the neighborhood, but these explosions were all on a very small scale, according to the original plans. I did that in order to spare the country, and in this particular moment there was no military necessity as a compelling factor in that sense.
DR. SAUTER: If the Tribunal, pleases in this connection I recommend to the notice of the Tribunal three documents, which I now offer in evidence. One is contained in document book Lanz I. This is document No. 19 on page 66, and the important and relevant matters for our case are mentioned on pages 70 and 71. I offer it as Exhibit 105. I beg your pardon, Your Honor, I mean Exhibit 108. I apologize. I shall not read this affidavit. It is a highly detailed account. The affiant is one Dr. Lindner a general practitioner, who as medical officer served on the staff of General Lanz in Joannina. The affiant on page 70 and 71 describes General Lanz's attitude towards friend and foe, particularly as to the welfare measures he took on behalf of the sick and wounded in hospitals irrespective of nationality. He then describes General Lanz's farewell from Joannina. That he did not leave the town like an enemy, but like a friend and protector. And on page 72 the witness sums up in the last paragraph all his impressions and observations to the effect that he, as a physician and friend of humanity, can only say the highest things about General Lanz, particularly from the point of view of the things General Lanz did on the retreat to help and look after the civilian population in every way he could.
This was Exhibit 108.
The next document in this quotation is contained in Document Book II, which is Document 56 on page 81, which will be offered as Exhibit 109. The affiant is called Lenthe, who in great detail describes the collaboration with Zervas, and the welfare measures taken by General Lanz on behalf of the civilian population in Epirus, as well as his cooperation with the Red Cross. It is not without significance in the present context to look at another document in Volume II, which is page 86. It is Document 57. This was offered previously as Exhibit 105. Some of it has been read previously for different reasons. Here again an official who served on General Lanz's staff describes the human conduct of General Lanz, which was above reproach, particularly during the evacuation of Epirus, and the retreat from Joannina. All these affidavits were properly sworn to and duly certified and always signed by the affiant concerned.
I recommend it to the attention of the Court, although I shall not read it in detail.
Q Witness, this it seems to me brings to an end the discussion of the cooperation of General Zervas. I would like to discuss a few documents with you now, with which you were incriminated in the course of this trial. First of all is NOKW 1010. It is contained in Document Book 14 on page 92 of the English version. I repeat Document Book 14, page 92 of the English and page 65 of the German. It is NOKW 1010, Exhibit 351. This is a basic order for the Commandos in the Southeastern area. It is dated October 30, 1943. What was the connection between yourself and this order? Why I ask you is the prosecution has asserted that you are concerned with this order somehow?
A If I received this order, which I cannot see from the distritution list, I probably read it. Whether I passed it on to the divisions I do not know. As I see it this is purely an organizational order which brought nothing new into my life. That is all I can say about this order.
Q The prosecution maintains that responsibility exists on your part concerning a document contained in Document Book 16, on page 47 of the English. This is NOKW 172, and is Exhibit 379. This is an order by the Commander in Chief Southeast of the 22 December 1943, concerning reprisal measures. Were you connected with that order?
A This is the order by General Loehr which has been mentioned before so frequently issued just before Xmas. I no longer remember whether I received it before I went on leave or not. The beginning of January I went on leave and I can no longer be quite certain. The order as compared to earlier orders issued before my time contained a few modifications. I assume that my agency massed on the order to the divisions, but I am not sure. That is all I can say about that one.
Q Then the prosecution incriminates you, witness, with a document which is contained in Document Book 17 on page 87, of the English version, page 65 of the German. It is NOKW 044, Exhibit 418, and connected therewith is another document which is contained in NOKW 20 on page 83 of the German and page 117 of the English. This is Document NOKW 1402 and Exhibit 476. Both documents refer to the destruction of villages. Were you connected with those orders?
A. It was not I who ordered these measures and when they were carried out I did not know anything about it, but I think I was informed about it afterwards through the usual channels. There are three band villages in the neighborhood of Agrinion and as far as I know, the I-A of the division gave his comments about the matter as he knew the details of the event. I don't know them myself and I would therefore be grateful if the remark made by the I-A could be read.
Q. This I-A of course is better informed about these things than the defendant and the I-A in this case is the affiant Willers and the remarks made by the affiant Willers are contained in document book Lanz No. 3. It is document No. 81 on page 43 and this is offered as exhibit 110. This affidavit, which is properly certified and duly sworn to was given by the first general staff officer Brune Willers, who in his affidavit given his comments on the destruction of these three villages north of Arginion. I shall only read paragraph 2 on page 45 and the affiant says:
"The communities north of Agrinion were situated right on the main maintenance thoroughfare Agrinion-Arta-Joannina and were occupied by our own troops, who lived there in the best of relations with the peaceful population. However, in the mountains north of Agrinion, which ascend right on the east side of the street, there were a few mountain villages, which were known as hiding places for bandits and which were not inhabited by peaceful citizens. These mountain villages were attacked and mopped out by us several times because they were the starting point for the bandit attacks. The report in question of 16 December 1943 must be concerned with one of these mopping up operations, because as far as I recall, practically no other communities north of Agrinion were destroyed."
(Signed) Brune Willers. It is duly sworn to and certified.
The defendant Lanz wishes to prove thereby that the way the report puts things mainly retaliation measures for three villages is hardly the right expression, it is a wrong formulation.
In the same document NOKW 044, contained in volume 17, there is on page 67, which is page 90 of the English, a report that there was an act of cable sabotage in Sarande and after that a few hostages had been shot. Do you know that case?
A. I don't recall it. I found it here in the documents nor have I had any evidence for it, although it is known to me that acts of cable sabotage occurred time and again in the area of my corps. I believe I have mentioned it even before that we attempted to get rid of this nuisance by establishing a special blocked off area, and similar measures, but as a matter of fact we did not succeed right until the end in completely preventing those acts of sabotage. They occurred time and again. The case mentioned here is not known to me, I do not recall it in any case, therefore I cannot give you my comments in detail.
Q. May it please the Tribunal, as far as that is concerned, there are three affidavits available, which I need not read in detail, but which I call to the Tribunals attention. One is in Lanz document book 3. This is document 98 on page 67 of the German and page 68 of the English. This will become exhibit 111. It is given by a first lieutenant and company commander in the Mountain Signal division.
The next document after that is No. 99 on page 68, which will become exhibit 112. An affidavit by a lieutenant who was with the same corps signal detachment. This is to repeat, exhibit 112.
In document book Lanz No. 4 we have on page 69 document No. 142 which will be given exhibit 113. This is given by an officer in the same corps signal battalion and he was in charge of a communications repair detachment. These documents again were properly sworn to and duly certified. They are to prove what General Lanz has told us just now, that although these were measures which he did not order, but of which perhaps he received knowledge afterwards.
Now, General Lanz, let me draw your attention to document NOKW 970, which is contained in volume 19 on page 107 of the German and page 80 of the English. This was exhibit 450. It is a report by the 1st Mountain Division concerning matters which you were not supposed to order, but of which you were informed--so it is alleged--afterwards. What can you tell us about that?
A. This occurred in the period of time before I took over command. I explained once before that on 9 September 1943 I took over the command of the area of the troops and these matters occurred in August, the last on the 4th of September.
Q. The prosecution then asserts without giving details that there was a responsibility with which you can be charged concerning document NOKW 1104, which is exhibit 461, volume 19, page 85 of the English page 111 and following pages in the German. This concerns witness a number of troop reports where the destruction of the village of Neochoraki is reported; were you connected with that or what can you tell us about it?
A. This is a measure taken by the troops without my having done anything about it. It is possible that it was reported to me afterward through channels, if it was reported to me afterwards I am in no position to state for certain now, merely that a village was destroyed in the course of a mopping up operation.
The various reasons I do not find, all I can deduce is that it must have been a combat operation and I really cannot say anything further about this.
Q. General, from the same report it can be seen that five Italians, who were apprehended wearing civilian clothes and three Greek policemen were shot to death for plundering. Were you informed about that at the time and how?
A. I believe I briefly touched on this matter once before. Why the five Italians, who were caught wearing civilian clothes were shot, I do not know. I can only express an assumption namely that they were people who were to be apprehended or captured and resisted arrest or attempted to escape, but I really don't know precisely. It is quite obviously a measure taken by the local troops on security service similar to that taken in the case of the Greek policemen who were shot for plundering. I can give no detailed explanation because I do not have the evidence and documents at my disposal and I cannot recall details of the event. I don't even know if I was informed about it at the time.
Q. The same document NOKW 1104 contained in volume 19 on page 113 and English page 87 and on page 95 of the English version, page 120 of the German there are two reports mainly that in the case of the village of Kompoti and near Arta seven bandits during a mopping up operation and eight civilians were shot to death shile digging trenches, do you remember these reports? The prosecution asserts that somehow it might be your responsibility?
A. What I recall in this case is that in the area of Arta fighting occurred with the bands.
The Kompoti incident I do not recall at all. I conclude from the files that the troops were out on a mopping up operation there because bands showed their faces in Kompoti near Arta and in the fighting at that time, where artillery was used as I see here, these ten bandits were shot. I assume in the course of the operation and when the bandits returned to the village later, about one week later, it was found that the bandits were establishing trenches somewhere in the neighborhood of Kompoti and at that location, according to the report, eight of the people who were doing the work were shot, because as a rule peaceful inhabitants don't dig out trenches. As we are concerned hero with a bandit invested area, these people must have been members of the bands who in the course of the mopping up operations, that is to say in the course of a mopping up operation, were shot. I cannot give any details about this, because I do not recall the incident.
Q. In Document NOKW-1104 on page 88 of the English and 114 of the German there is a report which is Exhibit 451. It is dated 17 September 1943 and it concerns the destruction of a village near Konica. Can you tell us what this was about -- Konica?
A. This is the village of Konica which has frequently been mentioned in the violent Greek bandits' fighting of recent times. That area at that time was badly infested by the bands which I remember. I myself frequently went to Konica. We had established a school there. These surrounding villages were probably all occupied by bandits all of the time. A number of operations were launched against the bands and in this case, as far as I can deduce from the files, we were concerned with the fact that a telephone detachment was attacked by the bands, suffered losses and that thereupon measures were taken against the village from which the bands had obviously come; an operation was launched and on that occasion such houses as contained ammunition were burned down. When the houses burned the ammunition blew up which happens frequently during these operations against bands.
Q. In the same document, witness, another report is contained which is dated 16 September 1943, according to which along the road to Joannina a supply transport was attacked by the bands. One officer and four men were killed on the German side and a number of men were missing; 7 men were wounded and 2 lorries were badly damaged. One the basis of that report a mopping up operation against these bands was launched.
Q. What can you tell us about that?
A. I recall this incident. It was a surprise attack which damaged us quite a bit. I think this was a case where the Nationalist bands attacked us on the Joannina-Arta road. Troops were used against them in order to render these bands harmless. Several units were used, in fact, which shows that the bands must have been of some size. There was fighting for some of the villages which had been occupied by the bands and it was found again that ammunition was kept in these houses. The civilian population had evacuated the villages and those houses for which there had been fighting and where ammunition had been found were gutted.
In other words, this was a mopping-up operation in reply to band attacks along this road.
Q. In this very large document, witness, we have a number of reports by the troops which are contained on page 117, reports by Regiments 98 and 99. For the report of the 18th to the 23rd of September 1943 concerning mopping-up operations, were you aware of these incidents at the time?
A. What I can see from the files is that these reports were not passed on to the corps which is the reason whey I don't think I was informed about these reports because those reports were brought to my notice which went to the corps which is not the case with these reports, as far as I can make out.
Q. Did you, witness, order these actions which we have discussed in detail and in number? Was it you who caused them or were these independent operations by the units under your command?
A. They were operations which had not been ordered by the corps. They were local engagements by units of the 1st Mountain Division which, because of the band attacks, had to be launched. Some of them were reported to the corps and some of them weren't which becomes clear from the document.
Q. Well, let us discuss another document. Now, witness, this again has been used to incriminate you. It is contained in Volume 19 on page 129 and on page 106 of the English. It is NOKW-909, Exhibit 454. This document contains a number of reports by the 1st Mountain Division which was under your command concerning operations against the bands. Some of them are reports by the units to the division and some others are reports by the division to your headquarters of the 22nd Mountain Army Corps.
For instance, on 27 September 1943 the 1st Mountain Division report that those civilians were shot to death on Korfu. Do you know that report?
A. I saw this report here in the files and I do remember that on Korfu on a number of occasions enemy radio stations were searched for which had kept contact either with Italy or with the bands. These wireless stations were intercepted by our monitoring services. We know that these black, these illegal, transmitting stations were on Korfu and I assume that, in connection with the tracking down of an illegal transmitter, these three so-called civilians were killed.
The circumstances are not known to me in detail, of course, because I was not present. I can only assume that when this illegal transmitter was confiscated this thing occurred. They either resisted or destroyed their installations or attempted to escape or something like that. As I say, I can not give you the details of this incident because I was not present and I have no further evidence in my possession.
Q. Was, under German military concept, the troop entitled to shoot at people who attempted to escape and do not stop although they are asked to?
A. Of course, without any doubt. That, of course, is a measure which is legal even in peacetime up to a point, that persons who are being stopped by a military sentry must stop and if they run away the sentry is entitled to shoot at those people. That, in any case, was the practice with us in Germany. How people abroad do it, I don't know, of course.
Q. In the same document, NOKW-909, which is Exhibit 454, contained in Document Book XIX on page 106 of the English book and 129 of the German a report is contained that in an operation against the bands two villages and, shortly afterwards, a third village and 18 nests of resistance were destroyed. Can you tell us something about that?
A. That operation I recall. This was concerned with a group of bands. I am not quite sure whether it was a Nationalist or Communist band because geographically speaking it was a borderline case. The band group was stationed in the neighborhood of Paramythia which is contained on the map I have submitted, and there they had held their position for some length of time. In the villages there as well as in the surrounding mountains they had their strong hold. The fighting lasted a certain period of time against the group and in the course of this fighting the villages mentioned and the nests of resistance mentioned, as well as a number of supply depots, as the report mentions, were destroyed. The enemy is supposed to have lost 10 killed and some wounded. In other words, it was a tactical operation lasting several days directed against bands in the neighborhood of Paramythia.
That is all I can say about this document. I was informed about it. Any action on my part was not necessary at the time because otherwise I would have done it.
Q. If I have understood you correctly, Witness, you deduce from this report that this was a tactical operation and an act of combat necessitated by the position of the bands in that area. You, therefore, had no cause to raise objections. Have I understood you correctly?
A. Yes, quite. Entirely correct.
Q. The next report in the same document is a report of 29th September 1943 given by the First Mountain Division to your staff. The date is 29th of September 1943: "Arrest of 30 male civilians who were suspected of having committed an important act of sabotage against telephone lines. The evening report of 29th September 1943 by the 98th Regiment shows that these civilians were handed over to the Kommandantura in order to be shot. Do you recall that incident?
A. I cannot remember it too well. I know that in the Arta area, which becomes clear from my order we have discussed before concerning arrest of hostages, - that sabotage on telephone lines occurred frequently. I also know the fighting flared up time and again with the bands who had participated in it. In the course of an operation of that sort these 30 or, as a later report says, 45 civilians, were arrested. As it says here, the civilians were arrested in the abandoned villages of Neovori and Kompoti, as well as in brushwood of the vicinity and turned over to the local administrative headquarters. I believe that the people were handed over to the local headquarters and were then sent on to the prisoners' camp.
Q. If the Tribunal please, I have succeeded in tracking down the officer who is informed about the fate of the 30 civilians. He is in a position to give us reliable information because it was his official duty to work on this matter. This is Affiant Oskar Hosa (H-O-S-A), who, between April, 1943 and October, 1943 -- that is to say, in that period of time with which we are concerned here, was a company chief down there. Herr Hosa has given me an affidavit, which is contained in Lanz Document Book IV. It's Document No 113, page 2.
I offer it as Exhibit No. 114. In view of the importance of this affidavit I beg to read it. It's a very brief document. The affiant states: "The 45 civilians, handed in the Arta Garrison according to evening report of Mountain Infantry Regiment 98 dated 29 September 1943, were not executed by shooting. I cannot recall whether they were removed to the prisoner collecting point or whether they were released." The affiant Hosa, the company chief at the time in the Mountain light Infantry Regiment has signed his document, has sworn to it, and the document is properly certified. This proves that these 45 civilians were arrested but not shot.
The next report on a reprisal measure near Paramythia has been discussed in an additional context. Witness Lanz has declared, on that occasion, that he had no knowledge of it. Then, Witness, we have a report of 30th of September 1943 concerning sabotage of telephone lines. You have also given us your comments about that. The next report is the Daily Report of 2 October 1943, contained in Volume XIX, Page 112 of the English, Document NOKW-909, Exhibit 454. What can you tell us about this?
A. According to the report this was a mopping-up operation in the Arta area which I mentioned before as being infested by bands. The village of Sikorachi was burned down and 3 civilians were shot to death, as it states here. I don't know the details of the case. I cannot clear them up. I can only deduce from the text that it was a tactical operation. As I was not present, I cannot say anything in detail about the matter. I'm bound to assume that it was a measure which had become necessary for military reasons.
Q. This is followed in the document by a report by the Group Haken. What can you tell us about that?
A. That report says that from among 10 pillbbxes 3 were destroyed; 40 bandits were killed, and our own losses amounted to one killed in combat, 16 wounded. It's obviously a fighting operation against bandits who occupied pillboxes and who were then dealt with by the Group Haken, which was the 41st Engineer Battalion.
And in the course of this engagement the losses mentioned in the document occurred. That is all I can tell you about that. That is all I can deduce.
Q. Then, we have a Daily Report of 3 October 1943 which is on Page 134 of the German text. This concerns an operation by the Spindler Group in the area of Tepelene. What do you know about that?
A. Tepelene is a place in Albania. I went there shortly after this fighting had occurred, so I know the neighborhood from memory. It's an area where fighting had previously occurred between the Italians an and the Greeks after 1940-41. The village of Tepelene was completely destroyed from the former fighting at the time when we arrived there. The Spindler Group fought, at that time, under somewhat difficult circumstances against a fairly strong Communist bandit group from Albania. As far as I remember there is a report by the then Captain Spindler in the files. Perhaps you could read this report because it shows what the action was like. And this gives us a relatively clear picture of the conditions at the time.
Q. This report of which we speak now is contained in Volume XIX, on Page 134 of the German text and Page 113 of the English text. It is a Daily Report of October 3, 1943. The affidavit is given by the Captain Spindler, to whom Lanz just had reference, is contained in Volume V. It is Document No. 161, on Page 9 in that volume. It will become Exhibit No. 115. It is an affidavit by the former Captain Spindler---Wilhelm Spindler of Stuttgart. He says that he served as a Captain under Lanz and also as a Battalion Commander with the 99th Mountain Jager Regiment. It concerns a report by the Ia of the First Mountain Division, dated 3 October 1943, to the Corps Headquarters of the 27th Mountain Army, sub-section two reads: "40 Bandits were shot in Tepelene." This is what the affiant says on Page 9:
I can still remember this very case especially well and can guar antee completely that during my service with my battalion and as leader of a combat group in this area merely military engagements and enemy losses and damage by fire resulting from them were concerned.
My opinion in detail is as follows: the attack by Engineer Battalion 41 for opening the mountain pass south of Tepelene with the order to capture the latter place had been bogged down for a long time before two lines of concrete gun emplacements, one behind the other, which began east of the read and were connected with villages which extended farther east. These villages had already been completely destroyed and burned down in fighting from earlier times. The ruins of their houses were partially roofed over again to meet necessary requirements and had been strongly built up by the bandits as rifle and anti-tank position and abundantly furnished with ammunition.
The affiant then describes, on Page 10, how this attack against this band strong-point was carried out. He describes that this was a definite military operation. And on Page 11, sub-section 2, he says: "The bandits mentioned in the report were killed in combat, rifle in hand, and more precisely in the fighting for the mountain pass and the capture of Tepelene. About 46 bandits were killed, and they were semi-uniforms and had weapons with them."
He then says in sub-section 3 that: "The text of one report that 'villages east of the road were burned down' is in accordance with the facts, since we had already found the villages destroyed and burned down from previous fighting. Insofar as they were burned down again during our engagement, this involved only the ruins of houses which had been built up into combat positions."
The affiant has sworn to this very important affidavit, and it has been properly certified.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: We'll recess until 9:30 o'clock tomorrow morning.
(The Tribunal adjourned at 1635 to resume session at 0930 25 November 1947.)
Official Transcript of the American Military Tribunal in the matter of the United States of America against Wilhelm List, et al, defendants, sitting at Nurnberg, Germany, on 25 November 1947, Justice Wennerstrum presiding .
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the courtroom will please find their seats.
The Honorable, the Judges of Military Tribunal V. Military Tribunal V is now in session. God save the United States of America and this honorable Tribunal. There will be order in the courtroom.
THE PRESIDENT : Mr. Marshal, you will ascertain if the defendants are all present in the court.
THE MARSHAL: May it please your Honor, all defendants are present in the courtroom with the exception of the defendant von Weichs who is in the hospital.
THE PRESIDENT: You may proceed, Dr. Sauter.
HUBERT LANZ - Resumed DIRECT EXAMINATION - Continued BY DR. SAUTER (Counsel for the defendant Lanz):
Q. Witness, at the end of yesterday's session you spoke about reports concerning the group Spindler and we stopped when we discussed troop reports which were dated October 1943 and were not submitted to Corps headquarters. This is a report which concerned 16 Italian officers. The document number is, to repeat NOKW, Exhibit 454 in Document Book XIX on page 133 of the German and 112 of the English.
Can you tell us something a bout that report and especially concerning those 16 Italian officers?
A. I discussed than case in another connection when I discussed the Solander affair. I explained the reasons why the 1st Mountain Division took these measures. I also explained that I ordered these people to be disarmed to be sent to the prisoner collection centers , and on the basis of the facts the 1st Mountain Division took measures.