Q Did you receive that information from the Ic report; which we have mentioned before, dated I believe 9 October 1943?
A I am not quite certain about this, I am inclined to assume that I did not obtain the information through this report; but through a report from la; which was a bit earlier. I cannot recall the distribution list which is attached to the Ic report; which is something I would remember ordinarily.
Q You mean this list, this report or catalogue which is attached to the Ic report of 9 October 1943. Well, any way, General Lanz, you heard of the shooting of Italian officers by the 1st Mountain Division after the event?
A I assume so.
Q You assume that, do you. I see, now did you take any action or cause any action to be taken or did you do nothing and if so, why not?
A Yes, I remember it today. I asked General von Stettner to enlighten me about the fighting at the time and in connection there with I was told about the shooting of these officers. I asked why this had been done, as in my own order I had ordered a different procedure. As far as I can still remember this, the divisional commander reported to me that it had been established that about 3,000 or 4,000 Italians had for several days joined the bands and fought against us in the area between Sarando, Telvine and Kuc, that 3,500 Italian prisoners had been taken in this fighting and that some of the officers had been found to be guilty, namely to have joined the bands in order to fight us, and were to be shot by virtue of the Fuehrer order after a summary court marshal.
Q General Lanz, this action on the part of the 1st Mountain Division General von Stettner, who was its commanding officer, was really not in harmony with your own order, namely to have these officers taken prisoner and sent away into a camp, did you as the commanding general at that time do anything after the divisional commander had reported to you? I mean for instance against von Stettner the divisional commander or against the officers under him?
A In this particular case any measure I could have taken would have had to be taken against the divisional commander, providing that the facts as they were would have caused me to do anything. The order, which I had issued on the 24th, I had started on the assumption that the Italians would not fight but that they would surrender. In actual fact, however, the Italians took part together with the bands in the fighting, with the result that the facts of the case, such as outlined in the Fuehrer order of 15 September applied in this event. This is the reason why I could not take action against Stettner for not having followed my orders. The basic conditions had changed. I would have had to take action against him as matters stood, because he had carried out the Fuehrer order and that in a case were everything was quite clear and obvious.
Q Why do you think the facts of the case were so clear and obvious General? Can you tell us what the Italian units concerned were when the Commanding General of the 1st Mountain Division had the Italian officers shot?
A They were those Italian units who were stationed in Southern Albania, as I told you before, -- that is to say, doubtlessly elements of the Italian 9th Army who as early as 10 September as I recall it, had capitulated in Tirana.
Those Italians had joined the bands and together with the bands they fought us. That meant that the provisions of the Fuehrer Order 15 September applied and there could not be a doubt that under International Law they were Italians who really had been German prisoners of war and, as such joined the bands and had fought against us. Anyway, the situation was that to indict the Divisional Commander or put him before a court martial, I could not do in view of these facts.
Q If the Tribunal please, may I point out here two or three provisions of the German Penal Code which probably can be applicable for what these Italian officers did? These provisions of German military penal code have been offered in a different context before in Lanz document No. 4. There is document 127 on page 36 and document 128 on page 37-38. The one document deals with what is known as military treason and the other one deals with mutiny and military insurrection. I would appreciate it if the Court took judicial notice of these provisions in this particular context.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: If your Honor please, I would like now to object to the admissibility of these documents in evidence on the ground that they show on their face that they are completely irrelevant and inapplicable to this situation. Your Honors will note that paragraph 91B of the Reich Penal Code applies to those persons who at home or who as Germans abroad do certain things. The Italians, of course, committed these acts not within Germany but rather without Germany, and they of course were not Germans when they committed them.
This paragraph and the succeeding paragraphs which relate to insubordination and active opposition and military mutiny are internal German army provisions which apply only to German soldiers. Since the relationship between the Italian soldiers we have been talking about and the German troops is not a relationship of superior to inferior, there can be no taLk about insubordination or mutiny or as paragraph 97 points out assault on a superior. I submit, therefore, that all three documents are completely irrelevant.
THE PRESIDENT: The objection will be overruled. The matter of relevancy, it seems to me, is more a matter of argument than competency.
DR. SAUTER: If the Tribunal please, the objection which has just been raised could be anticipated. That is the reason why I also would like to draw attention to the next document which has also been given an exhibit number before which was Exhibit 28 offered in a different context before; but this will fill the gap which the prosecution have found.
In the opinion of the prosecution, it should apparently that a prisoner of war in Germany or abroad is not committed by law at all, and of course the military penal code did not oversee this and therefore, in paragraph 161 of the military penal code, it was laid down which I have offered as document 129 in Lanz Document Book IV. May I quote this paragraph verbatim, so that the Tribunal will at once see what it reads like? I quote:
"A foreigner or German who, in a foreign area occupied by German troops, commits an action punishable in accordance with the laws of the German Reich, against German troops or those belonging to them or against an authority in occupation on instructions from the Fuehrer is to be punished in the same way as if this action had been committed by him in Reich territory."
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Your Honor, I don't wish to enter into any extended legal argument at this time on the point, but I would like to point out very briefly that the term "foreigner" obviously refers to foreign civilian rather than to enemy soldiers.
If it were meant to cover the actions of enemy troops, it would be contrary to Article I of the Hague regulations relating to belligerent status. The acts of the Italians were committed in areas not occupied by German troops but only in areas on which German troops were stationed. The acts themselves were carried out in areas occupied by the Italian troops themselves. Finally, their actions were not actions punishable in accordance with the laws of the Reich. If that was so, fighting by enemy troops in the course of a war could not possibly be considered in violation of the internal laws of the German Reich.
THE PRESIDENT: The exhibit seems to have been previously admitted without objection. I don't know what there is we can do about it now. I think probably the right to road it exists in whatever relation it has to the case. We will give consideration to it. The Tribunal will adjourn at this time until two o'clock.
(A recess was taken until 1400 hours.)
AFTERNOON SESSION (The hearing reconvened at 1400 hours, 24 November 1947)
THE MARSHAL: All persons in the courtroom will please find their seats. The Tribunal is again in session.
HUBERT LANZ: Resumed DIRECT EXAMINATION:
Continued BY DR. SAUTER (Counsel for defendant Lanz):
Q. General Lanz, now I come to the last count of the indictment figure 6-H of the indictment. The indictment in this count charges you with the deportation and forced labor of the civilian population and with having erected concentration camps and I ask you: did you ever indulge in that kind of activity end did you ever ore er this kind of organization or the setting up such installations?
A. I can be very brief about this. Cases are known to me in which during tactical operations band suspects were temporarily set to work on road construction within my area. This road construction was not only on supply roads in our interests but also in the interests of the civilian population. This work was fundamentally only undertaken in those areas free from the bands, that is, outside the fighting area.
With regard to deportation of the Greek population from my area, I remember nothing at all about this. I know that in one case -- I think this was in Autumn 1943 -- it was reported that prisoners should come to work in Germany and at that time I ordered that the people should remain in the corps area, in order to participate in the road construction work mentioned and, in addition, I know that individual communist agents who during raids were captured, arrested, for instance in Joannina , were sent to Army Group E in Salonika, according to orders, for interrogation; but these were always only a few persons.
With regard to the existance of concentration camps in my area, I can state quite definitely that there were no such installations within the area of my corps.
Q. General Lanz, I can't offer you any prosecution documents in connection with this because the prosecution has not submitted any documents against you with regard to this charge but, nevertheless, I submit to the Tribunal some affidavits which comment on this matter in the area of General Lanz and in which one can see the truth of his denials of these matters.
DR. SAUTER: I will net read all the affidavits in detail. They mainly only say what the defendant Lanz has already said. They are the following affidavits , in Document Book III, Lanz No. III, No. 75 -this is a document by affiant Dr. Max Zugbaum. This is Document 75 on page 34 and this becomes Exhibit No. 90.
In the same document book, the next document No. 76, page 36, by affiant Max Prollius, Corps Adjutant and personnel officer with Lanz's staff -- and this receives exhibit number 91.
And the then the next document , No. 77 on page 37 -- this becomes Exhibit No. 92 . This is given by the Ia for the staff of Lanz, the affiant who has already been mentioned many times, Christian von Loeben.
Then in the same document book, the next document, Document No. 78 on page 38 -- this receives exhibit number 93. This is given by the Ic with the staff of Lanz, the affiant who has also been mentioned many times, Gebhard von Lenthe.
And then, in conclusion , one affidavit in Document Book V, Document No. 157, on page 4 of the document book, Document Book No. V. This receives exhibit No. 94. This affidavit is given by Ulrich Buerker who was with General Lanz as Chief of Staff of his army corps. I will not read the contents of these affidavits. I would ask that judicial notice be taken of them.
Q And now, General Lanz, I come to a few individual cases which are not set down in the written Indictment, but which are set down in the documents which were submitted subsequently. In this connection you will have an opportunity to comment on your relations to General Zervas, who was, at that time, leader of the National bands in Greece. I would refer you to the document which has already been read during the Case in chief of the Prosecution, namely. Document NOKW-478, Exhibit No. 493, in Document Book XXI, German Page No. 83, English Page No. 91. From this document it can be seen that you sent to General Zervas, through a truce bearer, the order to evacuate the coastal area, to return the prisoners, and to fix a demarcation line so that clashes with Zervas troops should be avoided. At that time Zervas turned down your request as we have already heard. And now, General Langz, what can you tell us about your attitude towards Zervas and his National troops and about your own relation to the leader of the National partisans, General Zervas?
A Soon after I arrived in Epirus, after I had found out about the situation there. I came to the decision that I should try to reach an agreement with the leader of the National partisans.
Q And how did you arrive at this idea?
A I have already mentioned that my actual task in Greece was to protect the west coast and the islands in front of this coast against an Allied landing. Of course, it was understandable that I would have liked to commit all of my available forces for this purpose, but I couldn't do that as long as numerous partisans were in my area who forced me to occupy myself with them. Therefore, it was obvious that I was trying to restrict these fights against the partisans as much as possible because I had not interest at all in these fights with the partisans. It would have been much more pleasant for me if there had been no partisans at all because then on the one hand all the losses and all the fighting would have been saved there, and I could have used all the forces for my actual military task, namely the protection of the coast. But as long as this was the care I tried in some way or another to make some agreement with the partisans in order to stop the mutual fighting.
This was quite an obvious idea.
Q Then, General Lanz, with regard to this limitation of the fighting against the partisans, did you try to do this only in the interest of your own troops, or were there other points of view which seemed important to you at the time?
A The other point of view was the one I have already mentioned, that I wanted to have my hands free for my actual military tasks, that is, to protect the coast. Another point of view was the desire which I had all through the war, i.e. to save my troops so many losses. I wanted to avoid the fighting. And thirdly, there was also the desire to spare the population the fighting. As the situation was that this fighting would affect the whole country and the people would have to suffer under it. And so all these three points of view were decisive for me and induced me to come to some kind of an agreement with the partisans to restrict the fighting.
Q And then what did you do in order to achieve this aim?
AAfter I had been for about three weeks in by Corps Area and had found out through the liaison of the leader of the International Red Cross, who was called Bickel, what was going on, I tried to get into touch with General Zervas, as leader of the National partisans.
Q And when was that?
AAs far as I remember, that was the beginning of October, 1943.
Q That is, about four weeks after you had arrived in Epirus?
A Yes. If wasn't quite four weeks.
Q And these efforts of yours to get into touch with General Zervas through the liaison of Mr. Bickel and the International Red Cross and to reach some agreement, did this have any success?
A First of all, these efforts only had a partial result or success. I must comment here that, of course, my efforts to make some agreement with Zervas were properly and regularly reported to my superior authorities and I also said that I thought it very desirable to reach an agreement with the National partisans because this would be to the interest and advantage of everybody.
And, thereupon, after I had made this request to the Army Group, I received notice from the OKW that negotiations with General Zervas would only come into the question if he delivered up all his arms. Of course it was quite clear that no negotiations could come about on such a basis.
Q That's what the OKW told you. And what was General Zervas' own attitude? What was the answer you received from him?
A General Zervas informed me that he was fundamentally in agreement with the stopping of the mutual fighting as he wanted and endeavored to play some kind of political role in Greece afterwards and as he therefore was interested in protecting the people in Greece. That was about the same line as I took, but nevertheless there was an obstruction on the part of General Zervas insofar as around General Zervas there was a British military mission who thought quite differently about these things.
Q Your Honors, in the Washington documents there is a teletype which has some reference to the negotiations between General Lanz and General Zervas, and also bears out what the Defendant has just stated. This is contained in Lanz Document Book V. It is Document No. 281, on Page 33, and it receives the Exhibit No. 95. This is and extract from a teletype, dated the 8th of October 1943, from the XXIInd Mountain Army Corps Headquarters. That is it is from Lanz, to the Chief of the General Staff of Army Group E in Saloniki. I read from Page 33, and this teletype reads as follows:
"The Swiss delegate of the International Red Cross, Herr Biekel, together with the perfect and the Bishop of Jannina, has contacted the bandit leader Zervas, and submitted to me today this man's proposal as follows:" writes Gen. Lanz:
"Servas notices the increasing sufferings of the Greek population because of his bandits' activities and our counter measures. He intends to play a leading political part in future Greece, and, for this purpose, aims at getting the people's support.
He is prepared to cease all hostilities against the German Wehrmacht, provided that we act in the same way."
So much for Zervas' suggestion. And then Lanz writes.....
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Your Honor, I object to the admission of this document, and, in fact, to the whole testimony regarding the relation between General Lanz and General Zervas, whether or not there was any agreement between Lanz and Zervas. I submit that if was nothing whatsoever to do with the counts charged in the Indictment, and no matter what the relations were they constitute no defense whatsoever with regard to the allegations the Prosecution has indicted General Lanz for.
DR. SAUTER: This point of view of the Prosecution is completely new. When the Greek witnesses, who were invited here by the Prosecution, were sitting here and testifying on the same witness stand the Prosecution was extremely interested......
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: Pardon me, Dr. Sauter. The objection will be overruled.
DR. SAUTER: Thank you, Your Honor.
BY DR. SAUTER:
Q In this document No. 181 I will now read what General Lanz had to say about General Zervas's suggestion, and I quote from Page 33:
"I request the Army Group to favor me with an early decision, whether this proposal can be accepted, which I consider desirable considering the over-all situation. In that case the corresponding agreements will be made from here. Signed 'Lanz.'" At the left, at the bottom, the signature of the Colonel in the General Staff, Dietl.
Witness, then after you had received this decision of General Zervas what did you decide to do?
A I have already mentioned that I reported the matter to my superior office and that I requested the approval for the agreement to be made because it was my desire to effort to restrict the fighting with the partisans as much as possible.
I would like to emphasize once more that if it had been up to me the partisan fighting would not have taken place at all, but, at any rate, I tried to restrict it, as far as it was in my power to do so. And then I reported on. I have already stated what answer I received. And I also knew that the Army Group was rather inclined to my opinion. As a result I decided, in spite of this answer, to continue the negotiations. Then I succeeded in reaching an agreement. I will talk about that in detail later on. On principle I would like to state in this connection that I did not want to talk about this matter at all, for I am very disappointed about General Zervas' attitude towards me after this war, i.e. while I am tried here. I do not think that this attitude is a fair one in order to express myself rather cautiously. I would like to say that I met General Zervas half way, as far as possible, and I don't think he should have treated me in the way he did. I have already written to General Zervas months ago because I hoped for a fair settlement of the matter, but so far I haven't received any answer.
Q Your Honor, with regard to these negotiations between General Lanz and his officers and General Zervas and his liaison officers, there is some reference to this in the Washington documents. These documents are included in Lanz Document Book V, documents No. 182 to 189, inclusive, from Page 34 to Page 41. All these documents show and are to prove that the assertion is untrue that these negotiations were only a sham on the part of General Zervas and were carried out in order to spy on his enemy. Document No. 182, on Page 34 receives Exhibit No. 96. It shows that Zervas, in December, 1943, again sent several officers in order to take up and to continue negotiations with General Lanz. Document No. 183, on Page 35 becomes Exhibit No. 97. This proves that Zervas himself in January, 1944, that is one month later, asked for a discussion for the conduct of common fighting against Communism, and that Lanz instructed his superior office about this request of General Zervas'. Document No. 184, on Page 36 receives Exhibit No. 98. This document is particularly interesting because here in great detail the suggestions are set down which the envoy of General Zervas submitted to General Lanz about the discontinuance of hostilities as well as about the attitude of General Zervas and General Lanz towards a common fight against the Communist bands.
Under Figure 3 the paragraph reads: "Zervas desires temporary secrecy in this matter in order not to lose the supply deliveries from the Allies upon which he depends. The emissary repeatedly emphasized that Zervas had rejected all attempts made by the English to persuade him to cooperate with the EAM and will also reject this in the future. A collaboration with the EAM and the ELAS (that is, with the Communist partisans) could only be considered by him if these organizations would completely shake off their ties with Communism."
And then Document No. 185, on Page 37 becomes Exhibit No. 99. This document also shows a quite exact specification of the suggestions which Zervas made to Lanz, especially with the purpose of the common fight against Communist partisan groups. The next document. No. 186, on Page 38, receives Exhibit No. 100. This again, are very detailed suggestions of the Zervas Plenipotentiary, as well as statements about the demands which the British liaison officers made to Zervas, but which Zervas turned down, according to the report of the Plenipotentiary.
In the next document, Document No. 187, on Page 39, which becomes Exhibit No. 101, there are, again, detailed reports from General Zervas, who complains that Communist bands have put to him too severe conditions. Under Figure 3 it states in this teletype of the 14th of February 1944, and I quote from Page 39:
"Zervas is determined to maintain the course shown towards us so far. He believes that he will be able to hold out if operations on both parts against ELAS will be coordinated."
Document No. 188, on Page 40, becomes Exhibit No. 102. Here Zervas reports that the attack by ELAS, that is the Communist groups, is to be expected daily and he talks about the interventions and disturbances on the part of the British Secret Service. And Zervas again urgently requests for strictest discretion.
Similarly important is Document No, 189, on Page 41, which becomes Exhibit No, 103. Here it states, and I quote: "Emissary of Zervas submits copy of an agreement between EDES -- EAM -- EKKA, dated 29 February, which actually had been concluded. The text of the agreement corresponds with the report of the Cairo Broadcasting Station (compare in this connection P.S. Ic/AO/, No. 609/44 top military secret). Zervas declares in this connection that he would not observe the agreement in as far as it is directed against us."
And then comes the opinion of the General Staff of General Lanz, and then on the basis of this document I would like attention to he given to the statement made by the Greek Prosecution witnesses here in this courtroom, with regard to these documents and what General Zervas himself says.
Q General Lanz, did you yourself carry on negotiations with General Zervas, or was this done through some of your officers?
A Of course it was my desire to speak personally with General Zervas because it was my honest desire into complete agreement with him as soon as possible. I was and am still convinced today that he had a similar desire, but he could not carry out this desire because he always had a little bit of anxiety, or should we rather say fear, about the British military mission which was around him. I would like to say that this provided rather an obstruction to his efforts. But with regard to the attitude of General Zervas and to his justification I would like to say one thing: I think that even today it is still my duty, as soldier, to say something in favor of my enemy. General Zervas was, himself, of course, in a very difficult position. He had a relatively small and not yet complete organization. There were about 6,000 men when I arrived in Epirus, and that is where he was. He had the understandable desire to consolidate and to built up his organization, and, of course, to spase it in order, in the first place, to put it into action against Communism. The EDES thought and, at any rate, I still think today, did not fight so much against me, that is the occupying power, at the time, as against the communists as they also did after the war and I would say they are still doing today. General Zervas was a Nationalist and conservative whose mental attitude I understood quite well. And he fought against Communism because in this Communism he saw the greatest danger for Greece, and in his judgment he was probably quite right and still is right today. And since I understood the way in which he acted it was not too difficult for me to meet him half way, all the more so because it was also my aim to prevent fighting, and that is what I expressly want to say in favor of General Zervas here. I would like to repeat again that I regret it very much that I would not have discussed the matter if I had not been forced to do so because of this energy of General Zervas.
Q Witness, then, you said that you tried to bring about a mutual ceasing of hostilities in order to protect the troops. Did this agreement actually come about or not?
A. Yes, it did. That was at the end of 1943, beginning of 1944. We had progressed so far that mutual fighting was discontinued, at least there were no more fightings with Zervas or me knowing of them. And for months there was a loyal silent which was was carried out, to the advantages of both sides i.e. these were no more losses, this non-aggression pact was kept to until the middle of summer 1944. Then it was broken off. I could say it was broken - but I would rather put it cautiously and say it was broken off - because the pressure on General Zervas by the Allies became so strong and because he had received some reinforcements, that now he went over to open fight against me. When these very violent and very difficult attacks suddenly started I, first of all, hesitated and held counter attacks back because I still hoped that perhaps it was only some local undisciplined actions on the part of subordinate officers, as whey had already previously occurred in which case General Zervas, every time, informed me that he was very sorry such a thing had happened, and that this was probably the fault of some subordinate officer. He had me told - that many times. Therefore, in July - when the attacks became more severe I hesitated to fight back. I did not want it; I had no interest. But finally there was nothing else for me to do when I saw things were really serious. Then, of course, I hit back.
Q Witness, you told us previously that during your time in Epirus, the communist bands were considerably stronger than the national units of General Zervas.
A That is correct.
Q Can you give us an explanation as to why at that time you did not prefer to work with the communist bands against General Zervas; from a purely military point of view that would probably have been more expedient. What can you say about that?
A Collaboration with the communists, even if I think about it in retrospect, did not come into the question at all from my point of view. You are certainly correct when you say that I should have combined with the stronger force military speaking, this would have been correct, but this did not enter into the question at all.
I would like to explain the following about this. As my task from the very first day I always only saw the prevention of an Allied landing in Greece. That was my actual task. The fighting against the bands which arose in addition to this and which I regarded as very unpleasant and from a military point of view highly undesirable was forced upon us. This fight was already going on when I arrived there.
We had nothing against the Greeks; in any case, I certainly had nothing against them and we did not want anything from the Greeks. I also told this to the authorities in Joannina shortly after I arrived there. I called the authorities to me and told them in a very frank manner how I looked upon my task there and that I certainly did not intend to take any action against the Greek population or against Greece if I were not forced to. I wanted to maintain peaceful relations with the population.
My actual military - and the only task I had - was to prevent an Allied landing. And this attitude was also the decisive one for the fact that I concluded this agreement with Zervas because Zervas was after all the national or the conservative element, if I may put it like that, against communism there. In addition, as a soldier, I felt myself rather more innerly obligated to Zervas as an old soldier than I did to any communist leader, but the decisive thing was that we felt no enmity towards Greece or towards the Greeks and that it was in the interest of Greece that I supported Zervas against communism.
Q Witness, you remember that here a Greek witness Tryandaphilidis was examined. This witness maintained that the two Greek Sarandis and Michalakis, as the envoys of General Zervas, were traitors and spies. Is that correct according to your experience?
A In my honest conviction, that is not correct. I can only explain this in the following way: today for political reasons, it isn't very pleasant for General Zervas to admit that at that time he worked together with me. I completely understand that, but I regret it all the more that it was set down in this form, that it came out in this form. These two people with whom we worked were properly identified, they had letters from Zervas with his seal etc.
Q Your Honor, in this connection, I offer some more documents in evidence. First of all, Document No. 54 in Document Book II, Lanz Document Book II, Document No. 54 on page 75, which has previously received Exhibit No. 40 -this document, Exhibit No. 40, has already been submitted by me in another connection and I have already read figure one.
With regard to the Zervas matter, the second part of this document in of importance - this is on page 77 in the middle and it goes on to page 79. I won't read this document in detail. I would ask that judicial notice be taken of it, and then you will see that the affiant confirms that the two negotiators named, the Greek officers Sarandis and Michalakis had handwritten letters of authorization from General Zervas with his seal on them and many of the various documents which these officers showed were personally signed by General Zerva Therefore, today General Zervas cannot possibly deny these authorizations and agreements.
Then, in a similar manner, another document concerns the Zervas matter. This is Document No. 55 in Lanz Document Book No. II on page 80, English page 80, Document No. 55, an affidavit by General August Winter, Chief of Staff with Army Group E. From this affidavit again, which I do not intend to read, these agreements and negotiations between Lanz and Zervas can be seen. In this connection belongs the next but one document this is Document No. 57, which receives Exhibit No. 105. The previous document was Exhibit No. 104.
I repeat Document No. 55 becomes Exhibit No. 104 and Document No. 57 receives Exhibit No. 105. These documents are contained in Document Book II on page 86 and following. The last-mentioned document is also from a collaborator of General Lanz on his staff, called Erdmann, and he gives exact details about these negotiations and this cooperation between Lanz and Zervas, and here I would like to offer another document from Document Book Lanz No. V, Document No. 190, on Page 42. This receives Exhibit No. 106. This is an affidavit -
