I know this regiment, which at that time consisted of two battalions, I simply know it as a typical German regiment, it wore uniforms and they did everything which every other German regiment did. It was tactically put at my disposal, because in the sector of the 264th division no other forces were available for the pacifying of the country, because we then began to extend the costal fortifications and we needed all forces which were available in order to make these fortifications ready before the expected landing would occur.
Q. But, it was sent here, there and everywhere to carry out special tasks; was that right?
A. Not special tasks. In my sector they had to carry out the very same tasks, which I would ordinarily allocate to the reserve, but the reserve were already used to expedite fortifications and as I had no other forces available, the Brandenburg Regiment was committed there and did the very same thing which was done by the reserves in clearing the area of bands, and as I said before, with the help of other forces the rear area of the 264th division on the coast was in actual fact quite clear of large bands.
Q. Well, I am not attempting to question your words on that, General, I am trying to find out the nature of these subordinate units. I noticed throughout the record here that the Brandenburg regiment had been pointed out as to how they carried our reprisal measures and other measures to the extreme and were pointed out as examples that others should follow; it had that reputation didn't it?
A. No, no, I think this must be a misunderstanding. It was mentioned only once today on cross-examination in this report where one division makes the proposal that special units should be established and some of them should be in Italian uniforms or civilian clothes, but otherwise that the Brandenburg Regiment had to carry out reprisal measures, I have said nothing.
Q. No, I did not mean to infer that you had, I am merely inquiring about the history of this regiment. Maybe I am mistaken, but I got the impression that this regiment was similar to the commando or sabotage regiments in the English language; is there any similarity to it?
A. I don't know. All I know is that the regiment was directly under the O.K.W. What orders it received from it, I don't know. but as long as it was under me it did not receive any assignments from me.
Q. Was it composed of German nationals?
A. Insofar as I know, yes.
Q. General, I would like to ask you a few questions about the "Panther" operation. We will wait until after the recess.
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is in recess until 3:15 o'clock.
( A recess was taken.)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
THE PRESIDENT: You may proceed, Judge Carter.
BY JUDGE CARTER:
Q. I just want to ask you one or two questions about this operation "Panther." As I remember your testimony, you said that these hands that were congregated up in the northern sector of your territory were engaged in blasting the railroads and were committing other acts of sabotage; is that right?
A. Yes, it is.
Q. That was the necessity for your dispersing them or wiping them out?
A. I said that there were two reasons. One was that the railroad line which was vital was interrupted continuously, and these disturbances originated from that particular area. Besides, at that time the right sector of my Corps, which reached the coast, had not yet been occupied. I and my division which was to be and was, in fact, added to my forces had the task to advance to the coast. That was the reason why I had to free this area the Marika-of these strong band forces, in order to fulfill my technical task.
Q. This large band that was located there had gathered together from over a large territory, undoubtedly; is that right?
A. This area was, after the capitulation of the Italians, not occupied for some time, and I suppose the bands made use of that fact and ordered to congregate there because they also received a lot of ammunition and weapons from the Italians in that area, so that they encountered a favorable situation. That was the reason why the bands had to be dispersed and eliminated.
Q. Well, General, the only thing I wanted was your thought on this proposition, that is, if it were known that these bands were committing these acts of sabotage, what justification was there for taking reprisals against the inhabitants of these villages or communities in the neighborhood of where they took place?
Do you understand my question?
A. These acts were carried out by members of the bands which remained in those areas and no reprisals were carried out against the inhabitants of the villages but, instead, against the bands who stayed in that area. That is the same in every battle where we encounter an enemy and it was the same there. The enemy was given battle wherever we met him. There is no talk of any reprisal measures during the operation Panther.
Q. Well, you agree, don't you, that reprisal measures ought to be taken, if they are taken at all, because there is some connection between the population and the doing of the unlawful act?
A. If reprisal measures were carried out at all, then they were carried out because of these sabotage acts. Otherwise, we would have no reason to carry out any reprisals. The cause for these reprisal measures was the fact that the bands committed some act of disturbance, that they disturbed people and in any other case there wouldn't have been any reprisal measures.
Q. Then they should have been taken against some persons who had some influence on preventing their reoccurrence?
A. And if reprisal measures were taken, they were carried out against those people who were in some way connected with these reprisal acts.
THE PRESIDENT: Judge Burke, do you have any questions?
JUDGE BURKE: I have no questions.
THE PRESIDENT: If there are no further questions, the witness will be excused.
DR. TIPP: May it please the tribunal, during the course of my evidence for General Leyser, I ask to be allowed to call to the witness stand, the witness Dr. Hans Joachim von Besser.
THE PRESIDENT: Major, you may call the witness.
DR. HANS JOACHIM VON BESSER, a witness, took the stand and testified as follows:
THE PRESIDENT: The witness will raise his right hand and be sworn.
I swear by God, the Almighty and Omniscient, that I will speak the pure truth and will withhold and add nothing.
(The witness repeated the oath.)
THE PRESIDENT: You may be seated.
DIRECT EXAMINATION BY DR. TIPP:
Q. Witness, will you first of all tell the Tribunal your Christian name and your surname?
A. Dr. Hans Joachim von Besser.
Q. I would like to ask you, Witness, to make a pause before you answer my question and wait until this question has been answered.
A. Yes, all right.
Q. Will you please spell your surname?
A. B-E-S-S-E-R.
Q. Please give us the date and place of your birth.
A. I was born on the 12th of July 1911 in Berlin.
Q. I believe you will have to pause a little longer yet.
A. Yes, all right.
Q. What is your profession?
A. I am a jurist.
Q. Will you please, for the record, tell us your exact address?
A. Garmisch, Alpspitzstrasse 35.
Q. Were you a member of the Party, Herr von Besser?
A, Yes, since May 1933.
Q. Did you have any office or function in the Party?
A. No, I only paid my contributions.
Q. Were you a member of any of the formations of the Party?
A. Yes, since 1933 I worked in the NSKK. This service was the prerequisite for me to continue my studies. I then became Oberscharfuehrer and after I had finished my studies in the fall of 1934, my service with the NSKK, the National Socialist Motor Corps, finished.
Q. Will you then briefly tell us your education and your career?
A. I studied law in Freiburg Breisgau, and in Koenigsberg. In 1934 I made my first State Examination and in 1938 I was made Doctor of both laws, and in 1939 I made my final law examination in Berlin.
Q. Now, will you briefly, in large outlines, give your military career in the German Armed Forces?
A. Before the war I had taken part in some short training courses to become a Reserve Officer. In the fall of 1937 I was promoted Lieutenant of the Reserve. In 1938 I articipated in the march into the Sudetenland, and in 1939 I came to Kremsgneitzendorf, to Reconnaissance Regiment IX. In this reconnaissance regiment I took part in the Polish campaign. In 1940 I was promoted First Lieutenant and on the 1st of January 1943 I was made Captain, Cavalry.
Q. In which campaigns did you participate?
A I participated in the campaigns against Poland, against Holland and France, as leader of a panzer Reconnaissance squad. In the French campaign I was wounded; that was roughly towards June, 1940. After I had recovered, I worked as an ordnance officer in various assignments. In 1943, I was a member of the staff of the XV Mountain Corps; when General von Leyser took over the command of the corps, I was made his personal ADC.
Q How long did you remain in that position?
A I remained in this position all the time. That is, all that time which General von Leyser led the XV Mountain Corps and later the XXI Corps.
Q Please now give a brief description to the Tribunal of the task of the personal ADC.
AAn ADC constantly accompanies the commanding general. Mainly, he has the task of personally taking care of the general and guarding him.
Q In order to clearly define your testimony from the very beginning, I would like to ask you, Dr. von Besser, were you, as ADC, concerned with any tactical matters?
A I, as ADC, had nothing to do with any tactical matters. I had nothing to do with any top secret matters or any super top secret matters Neither was I concerned with working on or passing on tactical orders. I never participated in any conferences about the situation which took place almost daily in the presence of the General, the Chief of Staff, the Ia and the department leaders of the staff.
Q Witness, do you mean to express by your testimony that during all that period in question here, you were not concerned at all with issuing orders or with any tactical questions whatsoever?
A Yes, that is what I want to express. I had nothing whatsoever to do with anything concerning the issuing of orders. My knowledge of tactical matters could at the best be based on the personal discussions, and quotations made by General von Leyser. Occasionally, I took part in conferences on such trips where I accompanied the General.
Q I would therefore like to restrict your testimony to purely personal matters which concern General von Leyser, to his attitude towards questions concerning the civilian population, etc.
; all this you will see from my further questions. First of all, I would like to ask you, witness, when did you get to know General von Leyser? When did you first meet him?
A I first met General von Leyser when he arrived in Croatia on the airfield of Banja-Luka. This was in 1943, in October of that year and I fetched him from the airfield. During the course of our first conversations, we found out that General von Leyser knew my family in BerlinSpandau, the family on my mother's side. He had visited the same school as had my mother's brother and he frequently visited the house of my grandparents in Berlin-Spandau. Therefore, we had, from the very first, personal contacts and mutual friends, and this fact I might designate as a basis for our future collaboration.
Q You said, witness, that from the very first, General Leyser and you had personal points of contact. Do you mean to say by this that in a subsequent time there was a personal feeling of confidence between you apart from your official dealings between you and your commanding general?
A I believe I can answer that in the affirmative, and that applied to all that long time which I spent together with the General.
Q I would then like to ask you briefly about General von Leyser's personal attitude towards several problems which have played an important part in the course of these proceedings. First of all, since you, as you said, were a member of the party yourself, I may assume that you discussed this particular problem with General von Leyser. Can you give us your comments about this?
A Yes, of course we discussed this, General von Leyser and I. I learned here for the first time that General von Leyser was a member of the party; that was a surprise to me. I didn't know anything about it, since as a general rule professional officers are not members of the party. We reserve officers did not count as members of the party while we were on active service with the Armed Forces. Furthermore, I know from frequent conversations with General von Leyser that he rejected a number of measures either because they were measures of the National Socialist leadership or they were excesses on the part of the party.
In many points, he was of the opposite opinion and he made this quite clear to the officers of his staff.
Q General von Leyser's personal attitude has now been explained by you, witness. Are you perhaps also in a position to be a little more concrete in your comments by giving us a few specific examples illustrating this attitude?
A I remember quite a number of examples which expressed General von Leyser's attitude. There was, for instance, the abolishment of the military salute or the unjustified favoritism of the Waffen SS. All these things were a cause for him to show his dissenting opinion and he did this with great emphasis.
Q One interpolation, witness. You talked about abolishment of the military salute. Could you tell the Tribunal, in order to clarify this question, what is concerned here? I don't know whether such a specific problem can be supposed to be known to everybody here.
A The military salute was in former times, before this amendment was issued, by raising one's hand to one's cap. After the change, this particular way of saluting was forbidden and from then on the so-called German salute was to be given, which I may assume is known to everyone.
Q Do you still remember, witness, for what specific reason this way of saluting was changed? Otherwise, people might think that this is an immaterial comment of yours.
A I don't remember exactly what the cause for this change was. But it was a decisive measure for every single officer concerned.
Q Are you in a position, witness, to comment on General von Leyser's attitude to some other problems where he was in opposition to the opinion as it was generally desired?
A Yes. General von Leyser was a believing Christian and for that reason he very decidedly rejected the way the youth was brought up and the way it was kept in innocence of all religious matter, which way was at that moment promoted by the party.
Particularly, he rejected everything that had anything to do with the so-called National Socialist Guidance Officers, above all the infusion of politics and fanaticism into all military life.
Q In order not to let this examination become too theoretical, can you give us a few practical examples for this last point which you mentioned?
A Yes. In Knin I received the order by General von Leyser to establish an officer's mess. After this institution was completed, the then National Socialist Guidance officer asked me to include a speaker's rostrum with a flag in this officers' mess, and also a picture of the Fuehrer. At that time, I refused this request because I knew General von Leyser's attitude towards these things exactly. The General was of the opinion that an officer in his daily surroundings which were more than primitive, as it were, should at least find relaxation in this officers' mess. He should, therefore, not be reminded in this officers' mess of the political and military situation which was not particularly pleasant at that time, by these party emblems. General von Leyser was then asked to make a decision on this question since the National Socialist Guidance officer did not accept my ruling. General von Leyser let my decision stand and it then happened, something which was quite unusual, that in this casino or rather in this officers' club or mess there was no Fuehrer picture and the speaker's rostrum which had been requested to be decorated with the flag was also not put up. Today, this fact might seem immaterial but at that time these were questions of principle, not to say vital questions.
BY DR. TIPP:
Q. Is this attitude of General von Leyser's--was that known outside of the staff at that time, Her von Besser?
A. Yes, it was known, it could not, if I may put it this way, be avoided on account of the spontaneous manner of General von Leyser. I have already said that his attitude to the questions mentioned was known well within his officers corps. Beyond that, rumors of his attitude reached even the SD. The consequence was that he was denounced and so was his staff. I gained knowledge of this in the spring of 1945. A friend of mine, who was also an officer in the Army Group -I believe his name was 1st Lt. Schurf -- phoned me at that time and asked me to see him and discuss something with him. During a visit in Zagreb I went to see 1st Lt. Schurf, and he informed me, under the pledge of secrecy, of the fact of this denunciation. He left it to me to inform General von Leyser of this fact and to warn him and caution him.
Q. Do you still remember, at least approximately, what the contents of this denunciation were?
A. Its meaning was approximately that General von Leyser's political attitude was a negative one. It was said that from a sense of duty he acted in the way it was demanded of him, but that he did not do all these things out of a full heart. He himself, as well as the whole of our staff, was termed reactionary.
Q. Did you tell General von Leyser anything about this warning which you received from 1st Lt. Schurf?
A. That was a matter of course. Immediately after my return, I informed General von Leyser of the report I had received. General von Leyser knew of this charge already from a third party, and he did not attach any particular importance to it.
Q. One more question in this respect, Witness. Was a denunciation of that kind dangerous at that time? By this, I mean could it have very serious consequences for an officer?
A. The consequences of such a denunciation I might almost say are very serious indeed, and any officer realized what it would mean to be involved in a proceeding which undoubtedly would follow such a charge.
Q. One last question in connection with this. Did General von Leyser change his attitude in any way as a consequence of this charge; I mean his attitude which he showed towards political and religious questions before that?
A. No, I am certain he did not.
Q. Then I would like to leave that particular point. You said that as of November, 1943, you were General von Leyser's personal companion. Were you during the whole time that he led the 15th Corps together with him all the time?
A. From October, 1943, until the middle of July, 1944, I was with the 15th Mountain Corps without being absent for any length of time. Subsequent to that date, I went on furlough.
Q. If I understood you correctly a while ago, you said that you and General von Leyser stayed together when he took over the 21st Corps. Were you during that period constantly his ADC?
A. As I have stated, I was ADC and personal companion of General von Leyser while he was with the 21st Corps, but not during the very first period. While during August and September, 1944, I was on leave, General von Leyser and General Fehn changed posts. It had been intended that after I returned from my furlough I was to follow him to Tirana. Through an accident which I suffered on my return trip to Knin, it was only towards the middle of October, 1944, that I joined General von Leyser. For about three months, then, I was away from him. Subsequent to October, 1944, until the time when General von Leyser became sick and left the Corps at the beginning of May, 1945, we stayed together constantly.
Q. Now, a number of specific questions. First of all, a few concerning General von Leyser's personal relation with subordinate troops. As his constant companion and ADC, I am sure you gained an impression whether or not General von Leyser through checking up and personal investigation attempted to convince himself of whatever conditions prevailed with his troops, or whether he contented himself with reports; that is, with ruling from an office desk?
A. General von Leyser has at all times convinced himself on the very spot of the events and conditions. I might almost say that General von Leyser was always away on official trips. He did that in order to gain a very clear picture of the situation and to be independent of the reports of the troops. It was known of him--and his subordinate commanders knew that -- that frequently and surprisingly he would turn up for check ups and investigations. He took ruthless measures when he found out that things had been neglected anywhere. The troop commanders always had to inform him down to the last detail, and he would not rest until he had inspected the last shelter and the last foxhole personally. As his constant companion, I observed and sometimes cursed his patience in this respect, because it was not very pleasant to go from one position to another if it was very hot and there was no shade anywhere.
Q. Did the fact that General von Leyser informed himself on the very spot of everything that went on have any particular importance in Albania and Croatia, any importance which might be of interest to us here?
A. The reason for the frequent inspections was on the one hand that the communications quite frequently did not work. Radio connections were exposed to atmospheric disturbances quite frequently on the mountainous region and therefore could not be counted with any regularity. The telephone communications and therefore also the teletype communications were almost daily disrupted by the Partisans. These were the reasons why sometimes one couldn't even dispense with informing oneself of the position on the spot. On the other hand. General von Leyser had a strong feeling of responsibility which always brought him to the focal points of any occurrence.
Q. Were these inspection tours, if I may call them thus, connected with any particular difficulties where the units were concerned?
A. Yes. I, as his ADC, can confirm that these inspections on the spot were always connected with difficulties and danger. A furlough from the Croatian area back home was through the constant attacks on highways and railway lines, through explosions on the railways and low-flying aircraft, almost a small military operation. Therefore, a trip from the Corps headquarters to the front troop always meant a commitment of human life and materiel.
Q. Can you describe a few personal experiences that you and General von Leyser made together and that show his feeling of responsibility which caused him to take these risks?
A. Yes, I remember any number of events and I would like to just quote a few of them. On the occasion of the first trip which the General made to Zara on the 18th of November, 1943 -- that will be four years ago tomorrow -- I remember this very clearly because it was the General's birthday and I accompanied him on that trip -- we overtook parts of the 264th Division. These parts had at that time been caught in a band attack and confronted a military situation, if I may call it that, in a somewhat helpless way.
The Division had just newly arrived in the area from France and was not familiar with the Band fighting. General von Leyser in spite of the firing -- machine-gun fire -- which crossed the highway, went up to the Front to the leader of the troop and had the situation reported to him. The troop leader reported that a Band Division confronted his columns, against which he with his few men could do very little. General von Leyser informed him to the effect that he, the troop leader, was apparently under the wrong impression concerning such a Band Division. Then von Leyser issued the order to put a few guns in position and open fire. The resulting success was obvious. The Partisans ceased fire quite soon and our own troops could continue on their march. We and our convoy then overtook these columns and advanced to Zara.
Then there were a few other experiences. On a trip from Zagreb to Sisak in December, 1943, we encountered a mine. Flying in a "Storch", which is a special type of aircraft which was used a lot down there, the General had frequently to make emergency landings, which were not very easy with the inadequate means of landing on this Croatian coast.
Near Dimes, near Knin, the general's car was attacked by a low flying aircraft in summer 1944, and set on fire. The car burned down to the last and General von Leyser escaped certain death only by a miracle.
In order to inspect the fortification building of the 392nd Division, General von Leyser had on repeated occasions to go along the coast in a very small boat. These boats very frequently fell victim to British vessels.
In Albania also General von Leyser's car was also repeatedly attacked by low flying aircraft or we were shot at from ambush. During a flight to Tirana our plane had to make an emergency landing northwest of Sarajewo. General von Leyser and all the crew of the plane at that time were taken prisoners by the Chetniks. I shall discuss this particular event later on.
Q. You said, Witness, that accompanied General von Leyser on all these many trips. Did you also happen to be present then when General von Leyser had discussions and conferences with subordinate troop leaders, so that you would be in a position to tell us something about these?
A. I was not always present. When we arrived at the units which we visited it was mainly my task to look after the accommodations of the general officers accompanying us and to look after the maintenance of our vehicles. This was all the more necessary because mostly we arrived unannounced. Therefore it was not possible for me to participate in all conferences and furthermore General von Leyser did not call me into all conferences.
Q. Can you tell us, Witness, whether during conferences where you did take part the ordering of reprisal measures was discussed with the subordinate commanders?
A. I cannot recollect any such a discussion or conference. I know of no case either where General von Leyser ordered such a reprisal measure. I only know General von Leyser's basic attitude toward this question, which he explained to me at one time and which is also laid down in a memo to the Army, made by him.
His basic attitude was that reprisal measures should only represent the last resort. In the foreground was the task of the military destruction of the bands in the interest of peace and order in the country.
Q. If I understood you correctly, Witness, you were saying that General von Leyser's car once struck a mine and that at some other time you were attacked from ambush. Could you now tell us whether General von Leyser took such incidents as a reason to ask the subordinate commanders to carry out reprisal measures in that particular case?
A. No. Such a measure is not known to me.
Q. Witness, before I asked you to testify here as a witness I briefly informed you of the contents of the indictment and you yourself have had an opportunity to read it.
As we know, you will have gathered from it that the Prosecution asserts that the execution of reprisal measures was, if not the most important thing, at least one very important and main part of the command of the German troop leaders in Croatia. Although you, as you said, had no connection whatsoever with the leadership and had no concern with tactical matters, I believe you would still have gathered a few personal observations at the time concerning this particular point. I would like you now to give your personal attitude toward the indictment to the Tribunal here.
MR. FULKERSON: If Your Honor please, I would like to object to that question. I don't think that the witness's personal attitude toward this indictment is of any importance here. He has in effect disqualified himself partly already by saying he was not familiar with the orders and so forth which formed the main part of the evidence which we have been discussing, and having done that, he is now asked to give his attitude toward the indictment.
DR. TIPP: I believe the Prosecutor did not get the meaning of my question. May I briefly say something? I believe the representative of the Prosecution misunderstood my question. All I wanted to know was whether Dr. von Besser who for a long time accompanied General von Leyser could from his own observations tell us something as to what part reprisal measures played in General von Leyser's activities. That is a question asking for the knowledge of the witness. If the witness says he is in no position to testify about it, that's all right; but the question as such is quite justified.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you have any further comment, Mr. Fulkerson?
MR. FULKERSON: No, Your Honor, as I understand the question as rephrased, it is quite different from the question which was asked, and I have no objection to his asking the witness what the witness knows. No sir.
THE PRESIDENT: Keeping in mind the limitation which you have now put in your question, you may proceed, Dr. Tipp.
Q. Dr. von Besser, you may answer the question as I have qualified it now.
A. If I understood you correctly, I am to make comment on the extent to which General von Leyser was occupied with reprisal measures; seen from the point of view of his work as a whole. All I can say in this connection is that I personally have never either through comments of General von Leyser or in any documents which I might have seen accidentally as A.R.C. -- as bearer of same,-- gained any knowledge that reprisal measures were ordered by General von Leyser. I believe I have said this before.
Q. It is not possible for you to say anything in a more general way, is it?
A. From the indictment which I have seen, I saw to my great surprise that the execution of reprisal measures is described as almost the main portion of the leadership in the Croatian area. I can only repeat that from the orders, or of the execution of such measures, I did not observe anything of that kind. In discussions in the officers' club which undoubtedly took place, I can only say that reprisal measures were only discussed as a complete side issue, so to speak. And they have never achieved that importance which is asserted today. The primary task which we had to carry out in the Balkans at the time was the occupation of the country, the destruction of the Bands by military means and the fortifications along the coast in the event of a possible enemy landing.
Q. Herr von Besser, you said that you accompanied General von Leyser on his many official trips throughout the Croatian and Albanian area. One question to this point, which you can perhaps answer on the basis of your knowledge of the territorial conditions: The warning to the population not to participate in sabotage acts plays a rather important part in this proceeding, and I believe the Prosecution is rather doubtful whether the population was actually warned.
Can you tell us something as to whether you knew of these warnings, such as seeing warning posters with your own eyes?
A. Yes, I can testify that I have seen such warning posters. I cannot say anything about the text -- actual text -- of these posters, because I do not understand the Croatian language. But there were sufficient picture posters which left no doubt about the meaning of these posters. They warned the population against surprise attacks.
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
Q. Can you tell us in this connection, Herr von Besser, who put up such warning posters?
A. These posters were put up by the Croatian authorities as well as by German troops.
Q. The warning posters then were to serve as a warning of civilian population with regard to participation in sabotage acts; can you from your knowledge of General von Leyser's personality tell us anything about his attitude towards the civilian population?
A. The attitude of General von Leyser towards the civilian population was based on great understanding for the difficult conditions under which our allied state found itself. Therefore, he wanted his subordinates troops and subordinate agencies to be as considerate as possible.
Q. Can you at this point also give us a few concrete examples, Herr von Besser?
A. Yes, the first one which I would like to name is General von Leyser's attitude at the time of the band attack against Banja-Luka on New Year's Eve 1943-1944. After the town had been liberated the Croatian agencies tried to carry out ruthless reprisal measures against band suspects in BanjaLuka. General von Leyser took measures against this very emphatically. I myself had to get the responsible Ustasha leader to see the General, and during this conference General von Leyser forbade expressly that any excesses should take place against the population. At that time there was a state of emergency declared. Furthermore General von Leyser complained in Zagreb and asked that this particular Ustasha leader be replaced immediately. This man took particularly stringent measures, and he was eventually replaced by somebody else. Furthermore, General von Leyser insisted that some people arrested by the Croats, who had allegedly been found with weapons, were put before a German Summary Court Martial.