RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION BY DR. TIPP:
Q General, first. I would like to clear up one of the points which are concerned with the Commissar Order in Russia, because this comes first in the time sequence.
Mr. Fulkersen has submitted to you a few documents on cross-examination. One of them he submitted when he opened his examination, and two he submitted just now. Let me ask you a few questions about these documents.
General, do you recall Exhibit No. 611, which is Document NOKW2207? It is an extract from the War Diary by your division. Mr. Fulkersen gave you that document last Friday.
A I do.
Q Let me ask you two questions about that. On cross-examination it was put to you that the entry of 28th of September 1941, and it says there under the abbreviation "NA 269," that a female Commissar had been shot. Let me ask you a question about that, General. What does the abbreviation "NA 269" stand for?
A That is the Signal Detachment 269.
Q Where was that detachment stationed, General?
A The Signal Detachment, which consists of signal soldiers, where they happened to have been stationed on that particular day, I don't know. It is not a combat unit, but a unit which is stationed in the rear area and kept in contact with the other units through telephones etc. They're not fighting at the front.
Q If the division reports, therefore, that a female Commissar had been shot, but doesn't mean that the lady had been a PW because the detachment was not at the front, as you say. How was it that this female Commissar was apprehended by the Signal Detachment?
A Of course I cannot recall that case, but how I would reconstruct it is, that in this area where the Signal Detachment was stationed -it's a female Commissar we have to do with here--and as far as I am informed I don't think the Russians had any female Commissars in their Army.
It can only be a local female Commissar, as the Signal Detachment was stationed there and as the same report mentioned partisans in that area, an act of sabotage must have been committed against signal equipment. Therefore, she was sentenced.
Q I think that is quite enough for these documents.
General, a few questions about the last two documents in this connection--Exhibit No. 616, the wireless message which was handed you just now. Did I understand you correctly when you said that this wireless message did not show at all who was responsible for its being sent?
A Quite.
Q Did you see from the photostatic copy whether you were ever shown this wireless message?
A I found that out, as my initials are not on that document. No initials at all are on the documents.
Q The text reads, as you know, "34 Politruks liquidated." That, I suppose, if one attempts to decipher the contents of this document, must have been a collective report.
A It appears to be so, yes.
Q And it does not become clear from the document what sort of "Politruks" they were?
A No.
Q Now, perhaps, may I ask you to make it quite clear, General, what sort of "Politruks" did the troops have to deal with at that time? Were they "politruks" or "Commissars" of the Red Army who could, therefore, be described as "old," or were they, in many cases, "Civilian Politruks," as you might conclude from Exhibit No. 611, who, again, according to Exhibit No. 611, took the art of the Partisans?
A That is entirely possible.
Q Would you tell us something about that?
A Well, it's entirely possible, as I said before, I can't conclude anything definite from this wireless message because I don't know it.
Q One word, General, about the other documents submitted to you just now. Exhibit No. 615, which is NOKW-2290. The Morning Report of 20th of November 1941 by the Artillery Regiment 269 was put to you, according to which two Russians prisoners were shot by orders of the Battalion Commander, and they included one Commissar and a highranking Russian officer. It's possible that I wasn't too attentive at that particular moment. May I ask you to tell us once again what your comments are about that report? Why do you believe that those two individuals were shot?
A The Battalion Commander must have had a reason for doing so, but from this brief report I cannot see his reasons at all. What I said was that there were highly extreme murdered Commissars, which was told me by third parties who attempted to resist, who attempted to incite others against us, and on those occasions they were shot by our units in self defense, as I would like to put it.
Q May I ask you a question about that, General? I suppose you still recall the Commissar Order?
A I do.
Q Does the Commissar Order say anything about high-ranking Russian officers' having to be shot?
A No, and that alone is proof that somehow or other something must have occurred. There must have been a specific reason.
Q You yourself do not recall the incident do you?
A No, I don't.
Q May I ask you perhaps, and then we shall come to another chapter, if you, as the divisional commander at that time, were informed of an incident of that sort, did you at that time have nothing else for your information that those brief statements from reports, or were you furnished with other documents and evidence at the time, from which you could see the incidents in greater clarity?
AAt that period of time, which was one of the most difficult military situations, I, as divisional commander, had so much to do with the combat as such, that if I was briefly informed about these matters I would not devote much time to them.
I didn't have the time. On the other hand, if and when these reports were submitted to me, I was certainly informed about the exact circumstances, and then certain definite reasons would be given me as to wipe the thing occurred.
Q What you want to say, General, is that at this time if the report was submitted to you, you would have been in a position to investigate whether the shooting had been properly carried out or not?
A Yes, quite.
Q Another question from the Balkan documents concerning your Russian activity.
THE PRESIDENT: Pardon me, Dr. Tipp. Before you proceed with that question we will take our morning recess.
(A recess was taken from 1100 to 1115)
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the Courtroom will please find their places.
The Tribunal is again in session.
THE PRESIDENT: You may proceed, Dr. Tipp.
BY DR TIPP:
Q. General, from the time of your commitment in Russia, there is only one document which is left to discuss. This deals, in order to inform you, with the alleged commitment of Russians PW's to clear up mine fields. The document to which I am having reference at the moment has been submitted as Exhibit 612 which is Document NOKW-2244. Do you remember the contents of this document or shall I show it to you?
A. I remember it.
Q. This document consists of two pages. The second page, as the date shows, comes first chronologically. It is a teletype of the XV Corps to your corps and reads as follows: "OKH has decided that mines except during fighting and in danger zones are only to be searched for and cleared up by Russian PW's in order to save lives," and this order, according to the first page of the document, has been passed on by your division to the 269th Division with the same text.
The covering letter reads: "The above copy," which is what I just read," is passed on for informational purposes." Perhaps you could explain briefly to us, General, whether the commitment as ordered here of Russian prisoners of war for the clearing up of mines ever occurred in actual practice for your own division, and perhaps you would also give us the reasons for your opinion.
A. I have testified yesterday concerning this document and I said that at that time, and a later date, my division was not concerned by this order at all. The conditions of battle, as they applied for my division, did not make this possible. At that time, there weren't any mines there which should have been cleared up or could have been cleared up. Furthermore, this order was only passed on for informational purposes from the OKH and it does not say anything about having to be carried out when the Ia passed it on.
Therefore, I am in no position to tell you anything about it.
Q. If I understand you correctly, General, what you mean is that you received an order from the OKH. You passed it on because it had to be passed on and distributed. And if I furthermore understood you correctly, you said that this order was passed on merely for informational purposes. It was not ordered to carry it out because the application of this order was not feasible in your divisional area for the reasons which you have just given us.
A. That is correct.
Q. With this we can leave your assignment in Russia, General, and we can now deal with the various questions which arise from your assignment in the Croatian area. On this occasion, I want to be very brief. First of all, General, I would like to ask you to clarify for us the fact when you arrived in that area?
A. On the 1st of November, 1943, I took over the leadership of the XV Mountain Corps in Banja-Luka.
Q. Perhaps you would tell the Tribunal quite briefly, in order to connect up with my following questions, whether in this area, as Commanding General of the XV Corps, you had any executive powers. By this I mean executive powers as a matter of principle.
A. No. I have never had any executive powers in this particular sector with the exception, as I have stated on direct examination, at the time while the fighting in Banja-Luka took place. Apart from that, I, as Commanding General of the XV Mountain Corps, had no executive powers invested in me. My staff was merely a tactical operational unit without any territorial authorities and without any judicial authorities.
Q. On cross-examination, General, you were shown a document which dated prior to your tenure in the Balkans. This particular document had some connection with the question to which extent the German Armed Forces and particularly yourself, could intervene in the inner workings of the Croatian Armed Forces.
I would like again to show you this order, which Mr. Fulkersen has shown to you in order to clarify a few questions which in my opinion have not been made quite clear. In this, I am having reference to Document Book X of the prosecution, page 27 of the German text. I am afraid I don't know the English page. Perhaps the prosecution would be kind enough to inform me of the English page. The English page is 34 and the Document Book is X. I would like to show you this document again, General, and I would like to ask you to give us your comments on it. As I have mentioned, this order is dated the 17th of January, 1943. Therefore, it precedes your tenure in the Balkans by ten months. The document was also not submitted as incriminating evidence against you. The document reads:
"The Commander of the German troops in Croatia"--that is the addressee and it is signed by General Lueters. The subject says "Application of executive power." You told us just now that you yourself, as Commanding General of the XV Mountain Corps, had as a matter of principle no executive power. Your predecessor General Lueters in this order talks about the execution of executive power. Maybe you would like to clarify for us why General Lueters was in a position to use executive power while you did not have this right? We will later deal with the order in detail.
A. My predecessor, General Lueters, was as can be seen from this order, the Commander of the German troops in Croatia and as such he had territorial powers and as is shown by this order he also had executive power. When this agency was changed to the XV Mountain Corps, which I as I have said previously took over as late as the month of November, these particular authorities ceased to exist for the Commanding General of the XV Mountain Corps. Therefore, I did not exercise these territorial powers and executive power any longer. What the reasons were which led to this new regulation I am in no position to state.
Q. Since this order has been subject of discussion under direct examination and since it is a basis of the count of the prosecution that the German Armed Forces were in a position to intervene with Croatian agencies, I would like you to look closely at this order, General, more closely than it was possible for you on cross-examination.
I would like to draw your attention to numeral one of this order. It says here: "The areas of the 714 and 718 Divisions are areas of operation." I skip a few sentences which deal with the boundaries of the area and I continue: "The executive powers within their area rest with Major General Fortner and Brigadier General Reichert." In this connection, I would like to ask you, General, is my assumption correct that these two Generals, Major General and Brigadier General, were commanders of the above-mentioned 714 and 718 divisions respectively?
A. Yes, that is correct.
Q. The order continues to say "All armed Croatian units in the area designated under numeral one are subordinate to the division." In this connection, I would like to ask you, General, does this subordination of the Croatian units under the divisions refer on principle to the relation between the Croatian Armed Forces, and the German divisions or is this special reference which is caused by the facts as established in this order?
A. In my opinion, this is merely so under the fact that they are particularly ordered here. I would like to say that the 714 and 718 Divisions were at no time subordinate to me during my tenure. I had other divisions under me. At that time, the Croatian units, as I have stated yesterday, were subordinate only in tactical respect. I, as Commanding General of the XV Corps, did have no possibility to have judicial or disciplinary interference with the Croatian units.
Q. What you mean to say, General, is that everything that is contained in this order in the following numerals, particularly under number three, where there is talk about replacements and re-organization of the Croatian Armed Forces and also the following numerals, deal with this specific case which is established as the areas of these divisions being operational areas and that therefore the commanders of these divisions are holders of executive power?
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
Q. We will now turn to the time when you held office in this area. You told us that at that time you no longer were holder of executive power. Therefore, did these regulations expressed in this document - by this I mean the right of the German armed forces to give directives to the Croatian armed forces and to interfere with orders of the Croatian Wehrmacht, also to take measures concerning the civilian population - was this right still valid during your time or has it been again suspended in the meantime?
A. This right no longer applied to my person. I expressed this right when I said my staff was a purely operational staff. The territorial powers were invested in the territorial commander when the 15th Mountain Corps was established, and that was General Glaise-Horstenau in Zagreb. He was the man in whom these authorities were vested, no longer the commanding general of the 15th Corps.
Q. In order then to conclude this order of the 15th of July, 1943, I believe this then was an order which only applied to a certain time period and not a basic order which was to establish the relation between the German armed forces and the Croatian armed forces.
A. That is correct.
Q. Now, one individual question which might be of importance in the further course of examination. It says under Figure 3 of this document that Ustasha units are to be inserted into the Croatian Landwehr and they are to be organized into units below battalion strength. If I remember correctly, General, under direct examination you said that the Ustasha units existed next to the Croatian home guards. Is that correct?
A. No; it is not quite correct.
Q. I might then assume that the order was not carried out to this extent?
A. That is so.
Q. General, there is another point which has not been made quite clear and that is the relation between the Croatian armed forces, the Ustasha, and also the repeatedly discussed Chetnik units with respect to the German troops. I am quite aware of the fact that it is not your fault that this has been made quite clear but it is possibly the fault of the conditions at that time which are rather difficult to clarify.
Perhaps you would be good enough, in large outlines, to explain to us the Croatian armed forces and after you have done that, to describe the relations between the German Wehrmacht - by this I mean particularly your corps - and the Croatian armed forces. I'd like to put a few questions to you in this connection. Into what parts did the armed forces of the independent State of Croatia Divide? Perhaps you could use terms here which are being used frequently and known to everybody.
A. There was the Croatian army which consisted of the so-called Domobrane battalions and then there were the socalled Ustasha battalions. At this point I'd like to draw attention to the fact that when talking about the Ustasha one has to distinguish between the Ustasha battalions which, when compared with Germany, approximate the Waffen-SS, and the other Ustasha units which would, compared with German conditions, be the general SS.
Q. One interpolation, General. You said that the Croatian armed forces was divided up into Domobrane units which could be compared with the army and the Ustasha units which could be approximately compared with the Waffen-SS; and then you talk about other Ustasha units which you are comparing with the General SS. These other Ustasha units which you have mentioned, were they also a part of the armed forces or did they have no connection with the armed forces at all?
A. No; that is why I distinguish between the various Ustasha units. The Ustasha units were never part of the armed forces. They were a Party organization and, as such, they came under the command - I would like to put it this way - of the Party authorities as the Gauleiter, et cetera. That would mean the Croatian authorities but they were never part of the Croatian armed forces.
Q. In order to anticipate this particular point let us first of all remain with the Ustasha units which we, as a comparison, shall contrast with the General SS. Was there at any time a state of command of the German armed forces units over these Ustasha units?
A. No; because the Ustasha units had never anything in common with them. They were merely a Party organization which could never have been designated as any army unit and, therefore, they could never have been under the command of any parts of the German armed forces.
Q. Therefore, they would not be committed in any tactical operations?
A. No.
Q. And any responsibility on the part of the German armed forces does not apply at all to these particular units?
A. No, it does not apply at all.
Q. In the following questions we can now, after we have clarified this, restrict ourselves to the Croatian armed forces. By this I mean the Croatian army, the Domobrane units and the Ustasha battalions. What was the subdivision in the Croatian army? By this I mean the Domobrane.
A. They were subdivided into corps and the corps again were subdivided into brigades. At the moment I am not quite sure how many corps there existed. I am afraid I can'd recollect.
Q. And the subdivision lowered down into lower echelons.
Did that continue?
A. I believe a brigade consisted of two regiments and the regiments again in battalions and the battalions consisted of companies.
Q. And to whom was this subdivided Croatian army subordinate to?
A. This army was subordinate to the Croatian War Ministry.
Q. Was the subdivision of the so-called WaffenUstasha similar?
A. Yes, it was.
Q. And who was the head man of the Waffen-Ustasha?
A. This again was the Croatian armed forces.
Q. You said, General, that Ustasha battalions and Domobrane battalions were tactically subordinate and the conception of tactical subordination you have already clarified when you said that this tactical subordination would mean that a German unit, a division or a corps, could only give such unit orders concerning combat actions and that it did not mean that the German unit had disciplinary or juridical authority at all over these Croatian units. Did I understand you correctly?
A. Yes, you did.
Q. There is something else we have to clarify, General, which in my opinion was not made quite clear on cross examination. The Croatian armed forces in its entirety or individual parts of this Croatian armed forces is subordinate tactically to the two parts of the German armed forces as a general rule or only in individual cases?
A. I am afraid that must have been misunderstood at some point. These Croatian units would be tactically subordinate only during certain operations in which they participated.
Q. I am not quite sure now, General, whether I know enough about military matters in order to be able to clarify this completely but I hope I do. I'd like to ask you what was the actual practice now. I'd like to give you an example. The 392nd Division, let us say, intended to commence some sort of land operation. Within the area of this division we would have a Croatian Brigade under its brigade commander. The German divisional commander would now desire to commit for this operational two or three Domobrane battalions which were favorably located for this purpose.
Would he, on his own initiative, be in a position to issue a direct order to these Domobrane battalions? Could he, for instance, order Battalion Ten on the first of May at a certain hour to be committed in a certain locality and the second battalion on the same date somewhere else or, if not, what was the actual channel of command and how would it be carried out in actual practice?
A. It would be carried out in the following manner: The divisional commander would contact the commander of the Croatian Brigade and would tell him that he intended to carry out a certain operation and at the same time he would ask him to have Battalion A and B put at his disposal for this operation because they were favorably located for the purpose and if the Brigade commander would agree, these two battalions would, for this operation, be tactically subordinated to the 392nd Division.
Then, when the operation was concluded, these two battalions would return to their garrisons. They would then no longer be under the command of any German unit and would again be at the disposal of the brigade commander and would receive their orders from him. That is how it happened.
Q. If I understand you correctly, General, the tactical subordination again would only apply in individual cases for certain specific operations.
General speaking, the tactical subordination of Ustasha and Domobrane units would only apply to their own brigade commander. Is that correct?
A. Yes it is.
Q. One additional question in this connection: Who, seen on a large scale, would be the agency that would issue the orders to the Croatian brigades? I mean, who would order their operations which they made independently and who would order them to disperse their troops in a certain proportion in a certain area? Did these orders come from German agencies or from whom did they come?
A. These directives came from their own superiors and when they were expected to be included in German units, General von Glaise was an additional personality and he would be the liaison and he would establish if brigade was in a certain area. In this case the brigade would be situated in the area of the 392nd Brigade. Then a certain area would be assigned to this brigade and in this area it would be completely independent and would act in accordance with these orders which they received from their own superiors.
Q. What do you mean by "from their own superiors"?
A. I mean from their War Ministry.
Q. Did these Croatian units, on their own initiative, carry out tactical operations on their own initiative?
A. For the security of their own area they could carry out such operations on their own initiative. After all, they were an independent army.
Q. If such a Croatian Brigade, on order of its own war ministry, carried out an independent operation, and if the German armed forces would gain knowledge of this, let's say for practical purposes the German Division in whose area this brigade was located gained knowledge of this operation, would the results of this operation be reported to the Corps?
A. I believe I stated that on examination everything that occurred in the corps area was reported and, of course, the results of such operations would be reported by the division to the Corps and we, the Corps, would pass it on.
Q. In order to keep this brief, General, I'd like to ask you whether all that you said about the Croatian armed forces, applies to the Domobrans as well as to the various Ustasha, the Waffen-Ustasha and the Battalion-Ustasha.
A. Yes, it does.
Q. Now we will continue and deal with the other units which also play a part here, the so-called General-Ustasha. You have told us that there was no relation between the German armed forces and this General Ustasha and that such Ustasha units were, for practical purposes, not committed and that there there was never any state of subordination under any unit of the German armed forces.
Now my question is, did these general Ustasha units occasionally carry out any operations on their own initiative?
A. Yes, they did. These party Ustasha units did carry out their own operations on order of their party authority.
Q. The next question, General: Were such operations of the General Ustasha, if they became known to the German unit, also included in the German reports?
A. Everything that occurred in the area was reported, if we heard about it.
Q. Now, the next indigenous unit which has been discussed here repeatedly is the so-called Chetnik units. This problem also doesn't seem to have been completely clarified in my opinion. Under the concept Chetniks can one think of any uniform organization or are there certain discrepancies here also?
A. The Chetniks are Croatian citizens of Pravoslav faith and these Chetniks are, I might call them, home guard organizations within their own locality and these home guard organizations call themselves Croatian combat units and the Serbian expression Chetniks - I am sure these groups has connection with Mihajlovic in Serbia who was a Chetnik leader there -these Croatian combat units which saw in themselves the defense of their own farms, of their own villages, had gathered together in order to defend themselves against Tito.
Q. Were these people, as a general rule, gathered in fixed units? In order to give you a practical example, would they be quartered in a proper accommodation and could they be called a proper troop or what was it, General?
A. There can be no talk about a proper unit. These people lived in villages and if it became necessary they would join and for selfprotecting action. These so-called Chetniks could never be denominated troop or any part of a regular belligerent. They were purely organizations for the purpose of self-protection. At least, that applied for my area. What applied in any other area I am in no position to state.
Q. General, could I perhaps explain this in hand of a concrete example and I'd like to ask you to tell us whether I am correct or not. I would imagine that such a Chetnik peasant has his gun at home in his cupboard or hidden behind his cupboard. As a general rule, he would just follow his own occupation.
MR. FULKERSEN: If your Honors please, I'd like to object to this question. I think the witness should testify and not counsel for the Defense.
DR. TIPP: I am merely trying to state, your Honor, how I imagine this to be. I am not trying to put a leading question. I have never been in the Serbian area and, therefore, I cannot give any testimony about it. All I hoped was to clarify this on hand of an example, the correctness of which General Leyser was supposed to confirm or deny and all I was trying to do is make it a little more concrete.
MR. FULKERSON: If your Honor please, it is a leading statement just to say I imagine that this and that is true.
THE PRESIDENT: I think the objection of the Prosecution is sound. What we are interested in is the information that the witness can give us from his own information. I think you can ascertain that by not asking him leading questions. If he has any information he can give it. If he doesn't he is not able to.
BY DR. TIPP:
Q. General, then I'd like to ask you to describe the facts to us as clearly and concretely as you possible can. I want to know all that you know about it.
A. The situation was approximately this: I am thinking about the area northwest of Knin. There were numerous small Serbian villages and farms. In a distance of about 20 to 30 kilometers from each other, or even further yet off the main read, so that it was not possible for every little farm and for every little village to be occupied by a German unit. For the protection of these villages and farms the Serbs, the Pravoslav Croats who lived there had organized self-protecting organization. The reason was that on repeated occasions the Tito band had attacked these villages and farms and had requisitioned and taken property away from the inhabitants. Now, these people had joined for a self-protecting organization. The procedure would be approximately this, that they had their guards who watched the district.
If such a Tito band appeared which intended to requisition and plunder this post, which had been established to watch the district, it would inform the self-protecting organization in all surrounding villages and then these home guard organizations would help each other and join together against the attacking Tito bands. If these home guard organizations succeeded in helping their own cause that was quite in order as far as we were concerned and if shootings occurred on these occasions that was unavoidable. After all, it was not the fault of the Chetniks who merely wanted peace and order in their own villages. It was merely the fault of the Tito bands who wanted to plunder and rob down there. This is one possibility. And then it was also possible that such an event would reach the knowledge of German units and this would be reported to superior agencies and that is how we gained our own knowledge about it and on these occasions also the Chetniks might advance and might make counter attacks.
If the Chetniks defended themselves against the Tito bands and if they did not themselves succeed to master the attacking bands they would report this to any German units stationed nearby and now this occurs, what the Prosecution apparently regards as a crime, that is, the working together but now it was even the task of the German Wehrmacht to establish law and order. In this instance we would know about these things and the command of the German troops would order an operation against the attacking band and during this operation of the German units, of course, and that is quite obvious to everybody who wants to defend their own home. These home guard organizations would be joined together with the German units.
It is just as much a matter, of course, that the German commander would include these communications -- I don't want to call them reports; that would be too military -- in his own reports and made use of them in order to be able to order his own attack against the attacking band. The Chetniks, of course, took part in this in order to gain possession again of their own village or farm or whatever might have been concerned; but I don't think this could be designated as a tactical subordination.
That would merely have been in the interest of the Chetniks themselves; so that they would be in a position to help themselves. That is how the cooperation between the German armed forces and these Chetniks actually took place.