A You presuppose that the activity of the SD, which has now become known in these trials, were well-known then to everybody, which I don't think was the case at that time. Also, I believe that if somebody had a clear conscience he had nothing to be afraid of when the German troops arrived. After all, we only thrust into that area because we had information that it was there that bands hostile to us were concentrating and stationed.
Q You mean that a man who was innocent and who lived in this area, who heard that the Operation Panther, in which everybody between the ages of 15 and 55 was going to be evacuated by the Germans, was shortly to be carried out, that such a man had nothing to fear?
A There was nothing he had to be afraid of because an evacuation is not a crime. He was not killed afterwards or anything. He was merely handed over to the Croatian authorities to whom he was obligated, and then he had to do his duty towards his fatherland. That is no crime.
Q Now, do you remember, in summarizing the Operation Panther your reports and I'm sorry, but I don't have the document book on this because it's in one of the last document books, -- your reports make this remark: "The Operational intention of the Croatian main staff to make an attack reserve out of the 8th Division has been frustrated by this action." That is, referring to the Operation Panther. Do you recall that?
A I believe that is contained in one of my final reports, namely, that these 8th Division was being dispersed, but that for the time being it was no longer capable of fighting, and I think something like that is what the report said. May I perhaps have a look at the document? (THE DOCUMENT IN QUESTION IS HANDED TO THE WITNESS.)
What it says is "By this operation the operational intention of the main staff of the Croatians to establish a tactical reserve for aggressive purposes has been frustrated. A large-scale operation in the Panther area should not be practicable in the next few weeks."
Q In other words, General, here again in your summary of the Panther Operation you referred to the fact that the 8th Partisan Division exists and that it is subordinate to the Croatian main staff.
A It was well-known at the time, yes.
Q And this 8th Division is one of the three which is described in these two Intelligence Reports that we have already discussed?
A Yes.
Q General, if your troops in the course of this Operation Panther had not or had encountered more people than they did, don't you think it's likely that they would have taken more than 96 people? If more people had been there, I mean, would they not.have taken more?
A But apparently there were not more there, because it had been ordered that only band suspects must be arrested. It's quite possible that many more were present, but they were not taken along because they were not suspects.
Q But if the Communists had not made this forcible evacuation before you got there do you not think that the number of people that you would have evacuated would have been substantially higher?
A I'm unable to tell you because the order says that it was not the people fit for military service who were to be evacuated but only those that were suspect members of the bands. That was to be amended later on.
Q Yes, I realize that but you don't think that all this correspondence would have gone on between the Plenipotentiary General, the Army, and the XVth Corps over the capture of 96 men, if it had been known, in the first place, that that would be the entire haul do you?
A Well, it becomes clear from the documents, that at first we were thinking about 6,000 people. That was everybody, and then it was limited later on to the band suspects.
Q Well, what was your estimate of the number of band suspects and people who were found outside of their villages? I believe that was another classification.
A I'm afraid I can't tell you that any more. What number we estimated I can't tell you.
Q Now, let's turn to the report of the 1st Cossack Division, which was made in the course of the Operation Panther. It's in Document Book XV, Page 1 of the English and 1 of the German, NOKW-1136, Exhibit 364. It says there that 71 inhabitants fit for military service were arrested. I didn't quite understand the explanation you gave of this. First, were these 71 people--were they 71 of the total of 96 that were taken, or are these 71 additional people?
A It seems to me from the documents, and as the final report mentions a figure of 96, I think the 71 must be included in that figure.
Q Well, now it says there that 71 inhabitants fit for military service were arrested.
A Yes.
Q Where is there mention made of those nice classifications that we had in the Corps Order and in the Division Order even, for the Operation Panther, in which they said that only people found outside of their villages and band suspects were to be arrested?
A Well, this is not contained in this very brief report. After all it's a brief radio message. That was not mentioned in detail there.
Q Well, why couldn't it have been just as easy to say that 71 band suspects were arrested? That was one of the classifications that was approved.
A Yes, but that is how the division seemed to report it. That's how they reported it.
Q Now, I want to ask you about another document. You remember the report that General von Pannwitz of the 1st Cossack Division--the one that he sent to the XVth Corps, in which he said that the operations, such as Operation Brandfackel, in which whole areas of the country had to be devastated, had an unfavorable effect on his troops? Do you recall that document or shall I show it to you?
A Yes, I recall it.
Q You remember it?
A Yes.
Q Now, your explanation for that way that General von Pannwitz was given to using high-sounding phrases, and that he was using this high-sounding expression to cover up his own failure, or his failure to live up to what had been expected of him in the Operation Brandfackel. Is that correct?
A Yes, that is more or less what I said.
Q But how could the use of these expressions that you allude to be used as an excuse for the failure of the Operation Brandfackel? I don't understand that.
A What I think he means, and I think I said that, in his terminology he was very ambitious, so to speak, and because the brigade had not carried out this very difficult combing-out operation, of the training ground area in the manner they should have, and as perhaps he had gone beyond that area which was sparsely inhabited, because in that area there had been frequent battles and there had been much destruction,I know this area myself, there had been much destroyed,-he probably said all these things are so and so, and that was the excuse which he gave as to why he had taken these things easy. That is the only explanation that I can find for this expression. I cannot remember that I gave an order to destroy areas of countryside or anything like that. I cannot recall any such things.
Q Well, do you think that he was saying that the fact that the operation was not a success was due to the fact that the morals of his troops had been lowered? Was that your idea of what he meant by an excuse or what you said by an excuse?
A I don't think how it is put in this report. I don't think namely there is direct connection between the two things. The fact that it was not carried out; that it was not successful, the report doesn't say any of that as I remember. I know that, at that time he took evasive action.
Q As a general rule isn't it considered by all officers to be a sign of incompetence to admit that their troops are getting demoralized or out of hand?
A I think with the Cossack Division things were a little different, because these people, of course, had their peculiarities and as they were used to a different type of officer they were not so firm in their organization. The document also shows that those Cossacks now and again committed excesses which another unit would not commit and the excuse chosen is what he said in the document; but the documents also show that General von Pannwitz also took very strong measures against excesses committed by the Cossacks.
Q Well, why would he deliberately write into the corps in an official report that his troops were becoming demoralized unless he thought there was something to that, unless he thought that it was true? Do you think he was exaggerating when he said that his troops were becoming demoralized? Can you thin of any conceivable reason why any General would ever write in an official report to higher headquarters saying "my troops are getting out of hand" when it wasn't true.
AAt that time the Cossacks had recently joined me. I can't judge what happened before then or how much there was to it. I can really not find a very full explanation of this whole matter, and if he writes a thing like that and you say that I had given the order, then you must show me the order. I have never seen an order of that sort because I don't think it exists, and that area, used to be a troop training ground, and I don't think much could be destroyed there any longer.
Q I have been trying to find out here where the exaggeration is in the report that you alluded to before. You agree that it is not likely that he would exaggerate the demoralized condition of his troops.
That's not exaggerated?
A It is very difficult to say whether it is exaggerated. He was like that. He would use a strong expression as to these provocations, and is quite possible that within his brigade there had been insubordinations as he mentions.
Q But what you referred to the other day was not this particular exaggeration as I understand you now, but simply the phrase that "areas had been devastated pursuant to orders" that was the exaggeration you alluded to.
A That was my interpretation;that is the only way I can interpret it.
Q Will you now please look at Document NOKW 1258 which is Exhibit 361, in Book XIV, page 131 of the English and 104 of the German. I just want to call your attention to paragraph 2--b which says that in this Panther operation one of the classes of people to be evacuated are those arrested outside of villages. Now the other day you were describing these various documents which refer to the burning of villages in reprisal for various acts of sabotage and you explained that these were not villages in the European sense but that they were just scattered farms with perhaps one or two houses on them. Is that correct?
A Yes, this is not always true in this connection in which you have put it now. There are, of course, villages in Croatia which do not only consist of two houses, that is certain. But when I testified to this the other day I think we were referring to the hiding places of the bands. They preferred mountain villages and villages in the woods and they were usually extremely small settlements, huts one might call them, which you could scarcely call a village in the western European sense of the word. That is the context I mean.
Q Of course those were the same kind of settlements or villages which were found in the area where the Operation Panther was conducted because that was a mountainous area used by the bandits, wasn't it?
A Some of it, yes, but not all of it.
Q Well now if there weren't any villages up there, how was the SD or anybody else to know how to classify somebody who was found outside of a village? I just don't understand how the classification came about.
A First of all I don't think I ever said there were not villages there at all. There were certainly villages there. It is reported in the documents, for instance, that there was fighting for villages. I think it was reported that once that two villages were on fire. Villages were there.
As for the second point, people apprehended outside villages, that again is a sign of the fact that the bends, as soon as they noticed they were being endangered, hid their arms and became disguised as harmless civilians who would run about outside the villages and that we always regarded as a sign for those people being definitely suspect. That is the reason why they were arrested and this is what is being pointed out there.
Q Well, I was just puzzled by the fact that when a village is burned in reprisal, that is not a village, that is just a couple of houses, according to your explanation the other day; but when the SD is to arrest people who are found outside of villages, then villages suddenly exist. I just thought that I saw a slight inconsistency there between those two concepts.
A No, there is no inconsistency there because those people who run about outside villages were suspect, and were screened and as I mentioned the other day , if they did not have their proper identification paper which everybody had to have, they were arrested as suspects in the first instance, and then one tried to find out if there was anything against them.
Q Now earlier today I asked you whether, if in addition to the Cetniks, the German Army used any troops who were not in uniforms and you said that they didn't. I want you to look again at Document NOKW 772 which is Exhibit 570, Book XXV, page 61 of the English, and 47 of the German.
Would you please read the last sentence in the last paragraph out one.
A I don't understand here where the thing comes from, political situation, 1st Mountain Division, 10 February 1944..........
JUDGE BURKE: I believe at this time the Tribunal will discontinue until Monday morning, November 17th, at 9:30 A.M.
(A recess was taken until Monday morning 17 November 1947 at 0930 hours.)
Official Transcript of the American Military Tribunal in the matter of the United States of America, against Wilhelm List, et al, defendants, sitting at Nurnberg, Germany, on 17 November 1947- 0930-1630, Justice Wennerstrum, presiding.
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the court room will please find their seats.
The Honorable, the Judges of Military Tribunal V. Military Tribunal V is now in session. God save the United States of America and this honorable Tribunal. There will be order in the court room.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Marshal, you will ascertain as to whether or not all defendants are present in the court room.
THE MARSHAL: May it please your Honor, all defendants are present in the court room, except the defendant Speidel who has been excused, and the defendant von Weichs who is in the hospital.
THE PRESIDENT: You may proceed with the cross-examination.
ERNST VON LEYSER -- Resumed CROSS EXAMINATION (Continued.)
BY MR. FULKERSEN:
Q. Witness, when we ended Friday we were discussing this document, NOKW-1772, which is in book 25 at page 61 of the English and 47 of the German, and I drew your attention to the last sentence in the next to the last paragraph and I asked you to read that and to give us your comments on it.
A. In this letter it says, "The establishment of special units," do you mean that? The underlined.
Q. Yes.
A. "The establishment of special units in British and Italian uniforms, as well as the useful employment of civilians with the Brandenburg Regiment will probably cause unrest among the ranks of the bands. "
Q. Well, now, the other day I asked you if there was anyone working with the German army, except in addition to the Cetnicks, any other ununiformed troops and you said, no that the Cetnicks were the only ones:
now the Brandenburg Regiment was not a Cetnick unit was it?
A. It does not say here anything about the Brandenburg Regiment doing these things or wearing such uniforms. I may say first that this letter comes from the 1st mountain Division, but it does not show that I ever saw it at any time.
Q. No, but you know what the Brandenburg Regiment was, didn't you? It was under your command; wasn't it?
A. The Brandenburg Regiment was for a time subordinate to me for tactical purposes, but I don't know anything about, any special assignments of the Brandenburg Regiment. The Brandenburg Regiment was subordinate to the O. K. W. immediately and received, if and when they had special orders, the orders from there, and I was never informed about these things nor did anyone inform me about them.
Q. Well, even if you had never heard of the Regiment Brandenburg before and you read that sentence, wouldn't you draw the conclusion that some of the members of the Regiment Brandenburg were being sent out in civilian clothing to do what they could to demoralize the ranks of the partisans; isn't that the whole part of that sentence?
A. No, as I see it, it could not say that, what we are concerned with here is a certain stratagem to spy among them and there is certainly nothing wrong with that. A stratagem is certainly no crime. All that is perhaps meant here is that it is an idea or suggestion on the part of the division. It is only a suggestion, nothing, else is said there.
Q. The suggestion to establish additional units, it is true, is contained here, but there is a reference, is there not, to a Regiment Brandenburg, which was already in existence at the time this suggestion was made; is that not correct?
A. It is a suggestion and if I had seen the suggestion, I, on my part, would not have agreed to the suggestion. First of all, I would not have been entitled to give orders of that type, and secondly, I would not agree to it because strategy of that sort is of a highly technical nature and people who do such things would have to realize that if I am caught wearing a wrong uniform, I then must expect to be shot for espionage.
I would not have on my own ordered this to a subordinate unit of mine. If anybody else did it, it is none of my business.
Q. Well, what was this Regiment Brandenburg? I mean I don't understand that yet if it was not what this indicates to us, what was it?
A. I don't know. My knowledge of the Brandenburg Regiment is confined to a short period of time when it was serving under me, I think two battalions of it, and at that time it was under me as a purely tactical soldierly unit, otherwise I know nothing about the Regiment.
Q. You never heard that the personnel of the Regiment Brandenburg was especially selected for their linguistic aptitude and for their ability to impersonate the population of Croatia and to be used for espionage purposes; you never heard of that? Although this Regiment was subordinate to you for a time or at least elements of it were?
A. Those things were mentioned sometime, yes, but what was mentioned I really don't remember.
Q. And it was also mentioned that members of this unit were put in British and Italian uniforms and sent among the partisans to cooperate ostensibly with them?
A. I did not hear any such things about that, any such details are unknown to me.
Q. General, you explained to us the other day that there were I believe you said around 3,000 to 4,000 men in a German Regiment; didn't you?
A. 2,500 to 3,000 is what I said.
Q. And in this Regiment Brandenburg of over 2,500 men was down there in your corps area under your command for awhile, and you have testified to that and said you..... ......you never heard exactly what they were doing while they were down there; is that what you mean to say?
A. As far as I was concerned, the Branderburg Regiment when it was under me for a short time, was purely subordinate as a tactical and military unit, and any special operations or any special assignments given to it are unknown to me.
Q. What was that particular tactical assignment when it was under you; where was it located and what was it supposed to be doing?
A. As far as I can remember, the Brandenburg Regiment was put at my disposal for a time after the 114th Rifle Division, which as I said on direct examination, had been sent away.
Then the 264th Division had the task of moppingup the rear area. Then, as I said on direct examination, at that time for a while the army loaned troops to me so that I could comb out this rear area and eliminate the bands, and for that purpose the Brandenburg Regiment temporarily subordinate to me at the time.
Q. Well, General, where was the Regiment Brandenburg attached? Was it attached to some other corps permanently and just lent from them to you, or exactly what was the situation?
A. The Brandenburg Regiment, as I see it, belonged to a division which was under the O.K.W. direct, and the divisional commander with the O.K.W. would then issue his orders to his regiment direct. This is what I know about the Brandenburg Regiment.
Q. And that is all you can recall, all you recall about the specific task that it was given, that it was used to comb out the rear area or somewhere in the corps area, for a while. You don't remember what particular area, what particular task it had?
A. I cannot remember it now.
Q. Now, let's turn to your explanation for the destruction of a hospital. I believe in the first place you said that when these various daily reports stated that a hospital had been destroyed, that didn't really mean that a hospital had been destroyed; is that correct?
A. I don't think I put it that way. What I said was, first, the documents submitted never furnished any proof and secondly, I said that they could hardly be described as hospitals in the sense you speak of, hospitals as a rule, but that in those depots there were some old huts where there were wooden bunks, which were then used for the ill or wounded.
That is what I said. Moreover I said that they were usually in a filthy condition, full of vermin and where contagious diseases would spread, and while these operations went on, they had to be destroyed just as much as the other depots in the rear area of the partisans.
Q. Well, it would have to be a fairly large hut would it not to accommodate 500 beds?
A. I don't think the documents ever said there were 500 beds in one hut, it must have been different huts that the document meant, it does not say one hut with 500 beds. Perhaps if I could glance at the document again.
Q. I don't have the document before me General right now, but I don't recall the word hut was used in connection with any of the hospitals. I think the word hut crept into this when you started explaining what a hospital was. But, let me ask you this: in conducting a combat operation, is it not customary for the commanding general to attempt to establish a proportion between the number of wounded and the number killed on the side of the enemy? That is to say......
A. Do you mean the commanding general should establish this? I did not understand you.
Q. No, I mean is it not the custom for example, after an operation had been concluded for the General to say, "Very well, we have counted 200 enemy dead here, therefore we can assume there are 200 enemy wounded or 400 enemy wounded, or what the proportion happens to be." Do you not attempt to establish such a proportion in order to establish what the total enemy losses are?
A. I would not compile suck a list.
Q. No, I don't mean you compiled such a list. I mean that you simply attempt to establish a ratio between the number killed and wounded; isn't that customary?
A. One would assume such things are.
Q. And isn't it further true, General, that from a standpoint or weakening the enemy, I am now simply looking at this from that standpoint, leaving all other considerations aside, if your only idea is to weaken the enemy, it is better for him to have 200 wounded from your point of view than to have 200 dead; is that not true?
A. As far as I, as the technical leader, was concerned my duty was to destroy the enemy, to render him innocuous. Now here we are talking about the hospital or medical huts, I conquered that area and once they are in my hands they are not at the disposal of the enemy, he therefore cannot use them for his wounded.
Q. Well, the medical situation among the partisans was pretty bad anyway, you described that the care they must have gotten in these places must have been fairly primitive; isn't that true?
A. Well, the partisans did not have to attack us, they didn't have to do anything. If they had remained quiet all would have been well.
Q. That is right, but since they persisted in obstinate resistance of theirs, which it was your duty to crush, as you see it, from your point of view in attempting to crush the enemy, wasn't it true that one of the most efficient ways of doing it was to remove any possibility of an efficient medical treatment?
A. Those of the enemy whom we had captured wounded were treated quite normally in our hospitals as any other German soldier would have been; that was a matter of course to us.
Q. That is true, but if on the other hand one of the partisans was wounded and he was not in your hospital, but in his own hospital and received good medical treatment, he was likely to be in a position where he would have to be put in a hospital again fairly soon if he had hospitals in which to be treated?
A. I don't quite understand your question. Of course, if they were wounded they were treated by their people.
Q. Well then, with the conditions that existed in the southeast, these primitive conditions that you have described in these remote districts where the partisans lived, wasn't a very effective way of crushing resistance to see to it that these people could have no adequate medical attention?
A. It was not up to me whether they were well looked after medically, that was entirely up to the people themselves. After a combat action I picked up the wounded and sent them to be treated the same as everyone else. I am not able to tell you what happened to the wounded they took along. I am not informed about that. Anyway as I had conquered that particular area, including these medical establishments, I was the only one that could use them and not the enemy, or what was called the enemy.
Q. Well, General, if it was not considered important to destroy these hospitals, why is it that from time to time in the daily reports it is reported there to the corps, 1 bandit hospital destroyed, 100 beds or 1 hospital destroyed, 50 beds. If that was not of any interest to you, except from the point of delousing the district, why was it that this was always included in these daily reports?
A. Everything which had been conquered was reported, even every single rifle, every hut which fell into our hands was reported, every car was included in the report which the troops passed on so it could be seen what was done.
Q. Now General, you said the other day, if I understood you correctly, that you never did give any order concerning these reprisal measures either generally or specifically the whole time you were in the southeast; is that correct?
A. I, myself, did not issue an order as I said concerning a reprisal measure because they never occurred. Reprisal measures were ordered by the divisions in agreement with the representative of the Government, that is what I have said frequently.
Q. But, as far as you personally are concerned, you never had any occasion to take part in this matter at all?
A. I never had the opportunity to issue a direct order in that connection.
Q. Now, the other day, General, you talked about the activities of the SD during the "Panther" operation in determining who were band suspects; how did you go about determining who a band suspect was? What measures did you use, what criterion?
A. I don't know much about the police aspect of that, I mean the police part. I think the reason we had these experts was because through their training they would know roughly who might come under that category, also on the basis of their study of local conditions.
Q. Well, but you never took any interest in this business, you never tried to lay down any criterion as to how a person should be classified as a band suspect or not?
A. No, that was not directly my task. That was entirely up to the special experts, that is the reason why they are policemen, and in connection with the local police that is why they find these things out.
Q I want to hand you Document NOKW-963 which I want to introduce as Prosecution Exhibit 14. Will you look at paragraph "d" on page 2 of the original there and please read the first two sentences from that excerpt aloud and explain that to us -- paragraph "d" for "dog."
A What paragraph did you mean?
Q "D."
A "d) In case of repeated attacks in a certain road sector, Communist hostages are to be taken from the villages of the immediate vicinity who are to be sentenced in case of new attacks. A connection between these Communists and the bandits may be assumed to exist in every case. Sentencing of the hostages according to Corps Headquarters XXIst Mountain Corps, Ic No. 628/44 secret, re punitive measures (secret)."
This is an indication to the troops, as it says at the end, according to the order from the High Command Southeast, for the security of the roads. I should perhaps read the whole order. In that area, in other words, there had been frequent attacks and acts of sabotage, I suppose, and in order to prevent, them it is ordered here that if they do not discontinue these sabotage attacks hostages will be seized in order to safeguard the troops. That, as I see it, is purely justifiable.
Q Yes, and not only to be seized but, in case of repeated attacks, they are to be sentenced?
A. Yes. Well, that is, what has been ordered, was announced beforehand to the population and if it still does not cease, one has to do something about it.
Q General, I know you had your trouble down there. I know that goes without saying but what I asked you was not whether you had your troubles or whether such a thing would be justifiable. What I asked you was whether you had over issued an order for a directive that had to do with reprisal measures and you said, "No."
A Well, after all, I don't remember every single order which I issued years ago. That I gave an order or directive was my duty. I must tell the people what they have to do and in all probability the course here was that there were these repeated acts of sabotage, in all probability because, after all, the 10th of August -- yes, it is the 10th of August-that is, in other words, ten days after I took over my command of the 21st Corps, and this is merely an indication to the troops as to how they are to conduct themselves if these things occur.
Q Now, you say that Communist hostages are to be taken and that a connection maybe assumed to exist between them and the persons who actually committed the attacks on the roads?
A On direct examination, when I was asked about conditions in Albania I then talked about the various types of bands existing there. It was in Albania in particular that we had Nationalist bands and Communist bands, and I said they were the bands who were loyal to Tito, and in that neighborhood there were those Communists who coordinated their movements with Tito's because, after all, the whole Tito movement, as has been proved, meanwhile so clearly was being directly by Moscow.
Q But the effect of this order is to dispense with the necessity of proof of guilt so far as these hostages are concerned, you say that a connection between the hostages and the persons who commit the attacks may be assumed. Now, in other words, the only chance that a person had to prevent this sort of fate from befalling him was to keep from being classified as a Communist in the first place. Is that not true?
A No, Communists are those who were suspects from the beginning, which was the reason why, if these measures had been taken at all, these people would be seized first, but it didn't occur at all on the basis of this order.
Q In other words, though, if a man were arrested by the Germans and classified as a Communist, that was all the proof that was needed so far as he was concerned. Then, if any more attacks occurred he was automatically to be shot. There was to be no more investigation, according to this order. Is that not true?
A Well, that is not what this order says at all. It doesn't include this at all.
Q Well, what does the statement -- what does it mean "that a connection may be assumed to exist"?
A These are reprisal hostages. The other people are somehow or other suspect of having connection with the people who had committed the sabotage.
Q What do you mean by other people, General? I don't understand.
A If I seize hostages at all unless I can apprehend the actual perpetrator, I will have to take those people who somehow or other are connected with the whole event.
Q Then the purpose of this order was to establish that connection without your having to do it by actual proof.
A Well, that depended on various cases. It had to be proved, of course. It does not become clear from this order alone.
Q Well, how did you go about determining whether somebody was a Communist?
A I think the local police agencies were aware of that.
Q So that after an attack on one of your roads the German troops would go into a village and would seize those persons whom the local police pointed out to them as Communists?
A I know nothing of any such order, of any such actions. You assume that. Or does it say that in the order?
Q I am trying to find out what happened, General -- what this order meant. It must have meant something. I mean, -
A It is a preventative measure. We wanted to prevent more acts of sabotage occurring.
Q Well, how many times was this order carried out?
A I don't know.
Q That was up to the divisional commander? They would be the only ones that would know that? Is that your explanation?
A Well, I am sure they wouldn't know that today any more.
Q No, but at the time they were the ones who would have known.
A If it had become necessary in their sector they perhaps would have acted on the basis of this order.