Q So that tho purpose of this order of yours was just in the interest of accuracy?
A It should show how the troops would actually find conditions in a certain locality.
Q This division you said you encountered near Zara actually was no bigger than the German regiment. I believe that was your testimony the other day. Is that correct?
A Yes.
Q That is about 5,000 men?
A No; a German regiment at the most consists of 2,500 to 3,000 men.
Q Well, how would you describe a groups of 3,000 men, as a large band, small band, medium sized band?
A That is a large band.
Q Well, how would you describe a group of 15,000 men?
AAgain a large band if they are so many together.
Q Well, what purpose could this order of yours have served in such a case? If you couldn't distinguish between 5,000 and 15,000 men by the terminology that you suggested, how did it contribute to the interest of accuracy?
A For instance, a company is attacked by a hundred men and the company itself consists of a hundred men. It docs not have to say that they are a large band. I would, therefore, call them a medium sized band and when one company is attacked by 5,000 men they would call it a large band. You can never count that precisely whether there are 5,000 or 2,000. The most important thing was to the troops that this was a large band.
Q Now, lot's turn to the operation Panther. I believe that the first knowledge that we got of this operation from the documents is a teletype dispatch from the 15th Corps to the Second Panzer Army on the 27 November, 1943.
Does that correspond with your recollection?
A Yes, quite correct.
Q. That was actually the first correspondence anywhere about the Panther operation, is that correct? That was the first mention that anybody made of the Panther operation, not only in these documents but anywhere; that was the first communication between the 15th Corps and the 2nd Panzer Army about the operation Panther?
AAs far as I can remember, yes. I don't know if something happened before, which is possible. I do not know that any more.
Q But that teletype contained the proposal of the Corps to undertake the operation?
A Yes, it did.
Q So that about three or four weeks after you arrived you had already formulated your plan to conduct this operation?
A On the basis of the oral reports made to me by my chief of staff and on the basis of the assignment which I had, the thing was then so formulated.
Q In other words, you took over the Corps Headquarters, I believe, on about the 20th of October and a month later -
A On the first of November.
Q On the first of November; and on the 27th you made this proposal to conduct the Panther operation. Did the idea of this operation originate with you?
A The idea, I think, was already existing because in that area up to then, that is to say, after the capitulation of the Italians no German troops had arrived yet and because at that period of time the 371st Division was transferred to that area. Whether this idea originated with me or not, or whether it existed before with the Corps, I do not know; but the mopping up in that area had to be carried out so that the right sector of the Corps could at least roach the coast.
A But as far as you remember, the first communication to the 2nd Army about the operation came from you?
A In that period of time, on the 27th. of November, probably.
Q In other words, three weeks after you arrived there you proposed to seize the entire population fit for military service in this rather extensive area?
A I suppose my chief of staff reported this to me. He described conditions to me and on the basis of the experiences which he had suggested plans to me I probably agreed because I saw no other possibility to have this area finally secured as it was intended.
Q And your original idea as contained in that proposal was to evacuate all the males between the ages of 15 and 55?
A I believe that is what was intended, yes.
Q Well, what were you going to do with these people?
A The Croatian government had said - I think I saw that in the documents which will refresh my memory - that concerning that area which had been occupied by the Italians who afterwards then evacuated it, that it had not been able to penetrate into that area infested by the bands in order to employ the population of military ages for their own military purpose. For that reason it was intended that these people should be put at the disposal of the Croatian government as a matter of course, but what happened to these people was none of my concern. That was no longer a tactical task. I was purely the tactical leader with my staff. As far as I was concerned, as a tactical leader I had to guarantee the security of my troops.
Q You don't think then that it is part of a soldier's duty when he goes into an area and arrest a number of people from their homes you don't think it is any of his concern at all what is to be done with him after that?
AAs far as that goes, it is some of his, namely, in as much as they are going to be deported; but what happened to them otherwise, as they were Croats and as they were at the disposal of the Croat agencies, that was none of my business as a tactical leader. I am purely a tactical leader in combat. What happens after that is no longer the business of the tactical leader.
Q Even though you have to be consulted and in fact since you had been the author and originator of this plan, since you had to decide yourself in the first place what was to be done with them, it was still no concern of yours?
A What was to happen to the people afterwards, you mean?
A Yes.
AAs the man in charge tactically, I was concerned with the regular army. If I made prisoners, for instance, I had nothing further to do with the prisoners once the prisoners had been sent away; to me the battle was over then. The soldiers who have been captivated are being sent away and their feeding and so forth is being taken care of by the agencies in the rear and the same applied to this case. What mattered to me was that I would gain the utmost advantages for my soldiers and that my soldiers would suffer the least losses and that was guaranteed in that area by the fact that, as the bands always disguised themselves as civilians, the civilians should be removed from that area and these were the people of military ages, which is the reason why they had to be sent away.
They were then handed over to the Croatian authorities because they were Croats. What they did with them - I could scarcely go and see if they could accommodate them. That is entirely up to the Croats authorities.
Q Well now, after the army had received this proposal of yours they answered it by approving it and making one suggested improvement, that is, that all these men be deported to Germany as impressed laborers. Isn't that correct?
A No.
DR. TIPP: May I ask the Prosecution something? They are not putting documents before General von Leyser. May I ask that I could always submit these documents to General von Leyser concerning the Prosecution's reference. I don't think, in view of the many documents which are submitted, it is impossible for the witness to remember them offhand. If a document is being discussed,I think it is usual that the document be shown to the witness first.
MR. FULKERSON: If the witness doesn't know what I am talking about I will be glad to furnish him the document any time he asks for it, but I simply was trying to expedite this proceeding as much as possible.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: Well, you may proceed and we will join very heartily in the last observation you made.
A May I now see the document, please?
Q It is in Book XIV, NOKW-830, page 128 of the English and 96 of the German. It is the entry for the third of December, 1943. It is the last entry in the document.
A This is an entry into the War Diary, but it is not the proposition of the Corps as far as I can remember from the documents. The report by the Corps was submitted by the army to some agency but the Corps did not make that remark.
Q No, no, that was the army's response to your first suggestion. In other words, you first proposed on November 27 to evaluate the whole population and then the army responded by saying, "Yes, we approve that. It is practicable to transport all these people to Germany for labor employment."
A I believe that that does not become clear from the document at all. I think all it says is that the army approves and afterwards the Corps heard that the army suggested to the Croatian Plenipotentiary General this proposition which, however, was turned down by the Plenipotentiary General in Croatia, because it was not practicable and as was found later it was entirely a Croatian matter, but the proposition by the Corps to send these people to Germany was not made at all.
Q Well, how did it get into the War Diary of the XV Corps if the army never made it?
AAs I said, the proposition was not made by the Corps.
Q No.
A But by the army, which is the reason why, afterwards, the Corps heard that the intention existed but nothing further; end therefore this is contained in the War Diary as the intention existed, but after the negotiations, which took place between the army and the Plenipotentiary General, it was found not to be practicable because it was entirely a Croatian matter.
Q All right, but as of December 3, 1943, when that entry there was made in the War Diary, the situation stood this way, that you had proposed to evacuate the male population between the ages of fifteen and fifty-five, the army had approved it and said further it would be a good idea, to ship them all off to Germany and there the matter stood at that moment.
Is that correct?
A No, no, that is not correct. This entry of 3 December - it does not mean that it was made on the third of December. A War Diary is being compiled in the course of time; there isn't an entry for every day. Therefore, if I have actually heard about this matter, to me, as the tactical leader, the most important thing was to get these people away.
Q And you didn't care whether they were shipped off to Germany or what happened to them? That was no affair of yours?
A You can't say that I didn't care but this matter is not a tactical matter any more, and therefore I was not in the position to do anything about this thing and because I had so many other things to do during the same period of time.
Q Now, you made it clear, I think, there are at least three references in the transcript now to the fact that only 96 people actually were evacuated in the course of this operation, and you said that this proved that the evacuation of the population was just an incidental aim of the whole operation because the report of the operation said it was successful, is that correct?
A Yes.
Q Well, now, who was it who said that the operation was successful?
AAccording to the document, I think it was the Corps.
Q In other words, someone on the Corps staff, in writing a summary of the operation, said that it had been successful and that report was passed on to the army?
A Yes.
Q And because of that, you draw the conclusion that the evaluation of the population was really not an important feature of this Panther operation at all?
You don't think that is a non sequetur?
A Yes, yes.
Q You do think it. is a non sequetur?
A What you asked me was whether this was a side issue, and to that I said "yes".
Q Is it very likely, General, that in summing up an operation of the XV Corps, which was conceived and directed by you and in which you employed three divisions, that a member of your staff, in summing up the results of the report to the army, was going to call it a failure?
AAs far as I know, I don't think anybody spoke about a failure. The Chief of staff was compiling these reports; the final result of the Panther operation, for instance. It says everything there, and also that the tactical aspect of the matter was a successful one.
Q That is right end the chief of staff -
A He didn't say tactically, actually; in fact it said the entire operation was successful from which it becomes clear that as we did not evacuate 6,000 people as the Prosecution alleged at the beginning but only arrested 96 band suspects, you really can't say that the success was related to the evacuation. The evacuation was not carried out in that sense at all. In actual fact, only 96 band suspects were arrested.
Q. What I am getting at is this, General. If that report had said that the operation was a failure, it would certainly have been a reflection on you, wouldn't it?
A No.
Q Although you had conceived the operation in the first plane, proposed it to the army, and had actually executed it?
A If I am unsuccessful as a soldier, I was always brave enough and not afraid to say I was wrong. That does not mean that I made mistakes intentionally. There is always the possibility that something prevents success from materializing but I never hesitated to report and admit it to higher authorities that something had gone wrong.
I am a soldier and that can happen every time. Should my superiors then say "he is not longer suitable", well they can sack me.
Q Now I believe that you testified that the reason, among others, that more people were not evacuated was that when the army reached the areas, the people were not there?
A That becomes clear from the report.
Q And I believe that the report says that the reason that people were not there was that they were forcibly evacuated by the Communists?
A That proved, in other words, that my suggestion to evacuate them in good time was the correct one but now the partisans did the very thing I wanted to prevent. I was unlucky from the point of view of sequence of time.
Q Now in this operation, General, you had in each division - or you had attached to each division either one or two groups of the SD, did you not?
A That was ordered, yes, because all these arrests were more or less a territorial matter because afterwards the people would have to be handed over to the Croatian authorities and because it was hoped that it could be checked up whether or not they were suspect and as the 371st Division had just arrived recently from the West, I believe, in this area, they had no idea and experience in these things which is the reason why General von Glaise, the German plenipotentiary General in Albania, suggested to the army to take along the SD for these things under a special cover name, which happened as was ordered.
Q Well now, if the people had all left en masse, as you testified, it must have been because there was a leak somewhere about what your intentions were. Is that not true?
The bands must have known before you got there that you were coming, in other words?
A That is entirely possible. It was only mentioned yesterday that on many occasions these operations were betrayed to the bands by the Croats beforehand and this is the reason why one of these orders says that the Croatian agencies must not be informed beforehand. The possibility that the bands heard of this beforehand most certainly existed and I think this is what happened.
Q All right, now, put yourself in the position of a native of this area which you proposed to comb. Let's just assume that he was neither sympathetic to the Germans nor to the partisans and all he wanted was to be left alone, and he was told that the German troops proposed to come in there with several groups of the SD. Do you honestly think that a man in such a position would prefer to trust himself to the tender mercies and delicate sensibilities of the SD or do you think that he would prefer to be absent from his house for a few days?
A You presuppose that the activity of the SD, which has now become known in these trials, were well-known then to everybody, which I don't think was the case at that time. Also, I believe that if somebody had a clear conscience he had nothing to be afraid of when the German troops arrived. After all, we only thrust into that area because we had information that it was there that bands hostile to us were concentrating and stationed.
Q You mean that a man who was innocent and who lived in this area, who heard that the Operation Panther, in which everybody between the ages of 15 and 55 was going to be evacuated by the Germans, was shortly to be carried out, that such a man had nothing to fear?
A There was nothing he had to be afraid of because an evacuation is not a crime. He was not killed afterwards or anything. He was merely handed over to the Croatian authorities to whom he was obligated, and then he had to do his duty towards his fatherland. That is no crime.
Q Now, do you remember, in summarizing the Operation Panther your reports and I'm sorry, but I don't have the document book on this because it's in one of the last document books, -- your reports make this remark: "The Operational intention of the Croatian main staff to make an attack reserve out of the 8th Division has been frustrated by this action." That is, referring to the Operation Panther. Do you recall that?
A I believe that is contained in one of my final reports, namely, that these 8th Division was being dispersed, but that for the time being it was no longer capable of fighting, and I think something like that is what the report said. May I perhaps have a look at the document? (THE DOCUMENT IN QUESTION IS HANDED TO THE WITNESS.)
What it says is "By this operation the operational intention of the main staff of the Croatians to establish a tactical reserve for aggressive purposes has been frustrated. A large-scale operation in the Panther area should not be practicable in the next few weeks."
Q In other words, General, here again in your summary of the Panther Operation you referred to the fact that the 8th Partisan Division exists and that it is subordinate to the Croatian main staff.
A It was well-known at the time, yes.
Q And this 8th Division is one of the three which is described in these two Intelligence Reports that we have already discussed?
A Yes.
Q General, if your troops in the course of this Operation Panther had not or had encountered more people than they did, don't you think it's likely that they would have taken more than 96 people? If more people had been there, I mean, would they not.have taken more?
A But apparently there were not more there, because it had been ordered that only band suspects must be arrested. It's quite possible that many more were present, but they were not taken along because they were not suspects.
Q But if the Communists had not made this forcible evacuation before you got there do you not think that the number of people that you would have evacuated would have been substantially higher?
A I'm unable to tell you because the order says that it was not the people fit for military service who were to be evacuated but only those that were suspect members of the bands. That was to be amended later on.
Q Yes, I realize that but you don't think that all this correspondence would have gone on between the Plenipotentiary General, the Army, and the XVth Corps over the capture of 96 men, if it had been known, in the first place, that that would be the entire haul do you?
A Well, it becomes clear from the documents, that at first we were thinking about 6,000 people. That was everybody, and then it was limited later on to the band suspects.
Q Well, what was your estimate of the number of band suspects and people who were found outside of their villages? I believe that was another classification.
A I'm afraid I can't tell you that any more. What number we estimated I can't tell you.
Q Now, let's turn to the report of the 1st Cossack Division, which was made in the course of the Operation Panther. It's in Document Book XV, Page 1 of the English and 1 of the German, NOKW-1136, Exhibit 364. It says there that 71 inhabitants fit for military service were arrested. I didn't quite understand the explanation you gave of this. First, were these 71 people--were they 71 of the total of 96 that were taken, or are these 71 additional people?
A It seems to me from the documents, and as the final report mentions a figure of 96, I think the 71 must be included in that figure.
Q Well, now it says there that 71 inhabitants fit for military service were arrested.
A Yes.
Q Where is there mention made of those nice classifications that we had in the Corps Order and in the Division Order even, for the Operation Panther, in which they said that only people found outside of their villages and band suspects were to be arrested?
A Well, this is not contained in this very brief report. After all it's a brief radio message. That was not mentioned in detail there.
Q Well, why couldn't it have been just as easy to say that 71 band suspects were arrested? That was one of the classifications that was approved.
A Yes, but that is how the division seemed to report it. That's how they reported it.
Q Now, I want to ask you about another document. You remember the report that General von Pannwitz of the 1st Cossack Division--the one that he sent to the XVth Corps, in which he said that the operations, such as Operation Brandfackel, in which whole areas of the country had to be devastated, had an unfavorable effect on his troops? Do you recall that document or shall I show it to you?
A Yes, I recall it.
Q You remember it?
A Yes.
Q Now, your explanation for that way that General von Pannwitz was given to using high-sounding phrases, and that he was using this high-sounding expression to cover up his own failure, or his failure to live up to what had been expected of him in the Operation Brandfackel. Is that correct?
A Yes, that is more or less what I said.
Q But how could the use of these expressions that you allude to be used as an excuse for the failure of the Operation Brandfackel? I don't understand that.
A What I think he means, and I think I said that, in his terminology he was very ambitious, so to speak, and because the brigade had not carried out this very difficult combing-out operation, of the training ground area in the manner they should have, and as perhaps he had gone beyond that area which was sparsely inhabited, because in that area there had been frequent battles and there had been much destruction,I know this area myself, there had been much destroyed,-he probably said all these things are so and so, and that was the excuse which he gave as to why he had taken these things easy. That is the only explanation that I can find for this expression. I cannot remember that I gave an order to destroy areas of countryside or anything like that. I cannot recall any such things.
Q Well, do you think that he was saying that the fact that the operation was not a success was due to the fact that the morals of his troops had been lowered? Was that your idea of what he meant by an excuse or what you said by an excuse?
A I don't think how it is put in this report. I don't think namely there is direct connection between the two things. The fact that it was not carried out; that it was not successful, the report doesn't say any of that as I remember. I know that, at that time he took evasive action.
Q As a general rule isn't it considered by all officers to be a sign of incompetence to admit that their troops are getting demoralized or out of hand?
A I think with the Cossack Division things were a little different, because these people, of course, had their peculiarities and as they were used to a different type of officer they were not so firm in their organization. The document also shows that those Cossacks now and again committed excesses which another unit would not commit and the excuse chosen is what he said in the document; but the documents also show that General von Pannwitz also took very strong measures against excesses committed by the Cossacks.
Q Well, why would he deliberately write into the corps in an official report that his troops were becoming demoralized unless he thought there was something to that, unless he thought that it was true? Do you think he was exaggerating when he said that his troops were becoming demoralized? Can you thin of any conceivable reason why any General would ever write in an official report to higher headquarters saying "my troops are getting out of hand" when it wasn't true.
AAt that time the Cossacks had recently joined me. I can't judge what happened before then or how much there was to it. I can really not find a very full explanation of this whole matter, and if he writes a thing like that and you say that I had given the order, then you must show me the order. I have never seen an order of that sort because I don't think it exists, and that area, used to be a troop training ground, and I don't think much could be destroyed there any longer.
Q I have been trying to find out here where the exaggeration is in the report that you alluded to before. You agree that it is not likely that he would exaggerate the demoralized condition of his troops.
That's not exaggerated?
A It is very difficult to say whether it is exaggerated. He was like that. He would use a strong expression as to these provocations, and is quite possible that within his brigade there had been insubordinations as he mentions.
Q But what you referred to the other day was not this particular exaggeration as I understand you now, but simply the phrase that "areas had been devastated pursuant to orders" that was the exaggeration you alluded to.
A That was my interpretation;that is the only way I can interpret it.
Q Will you now please look at Document NOKW 1258 which is Exhibit 361, in Book XIV, page 131 of the English and 104 of the German. I just want to call your attention to paragraph 2--b which says that in this Panther operation one of the classes of people to be evacuated are those arrested outside of villages. Now the other day you were describing these various documents which refer to the burning of villages in reprisal for various acts of sabotage and you explained that these were not villages in the European sense but that they were just scattered farms with perhaps one or two houses on them. Is that correct?
A Yes, this is not always true in this connection in which you have put it now. There are, of course, villages in Croatia which do not only consist of two houses, that is certain. But when I testified to this the other day I think we were referring to the hiding places of the bands. They preferred mountain villages and villages in the woods and they were usually extremely small settlements, huts one might call them, which you could scarcely call a village in the western European sense of the word. That is the context I mean.
Q Of course those were the same kind of settlements or villages which were found in the area where the Operation Panther was conducted because that was a mountainous area used by the bandits, wasn't it?
A Some of it, yes, but not all of it.
Q Well now if there weren't any villages up there, how was the SD or anybody else to know how to classify somebody who was found outside of a village? I just don't understand how the classification came about.
A First of all I don't think I ever said there were not villages there at all. There were certainly villages there. It is reported in the documents, for instance, that there was fighting for villages. I think it was reported that once that two villages were on fire. Villages were there.
As for the second point, people apprehended outside villages, that again is a sign of the fact that the bends, as soon as they noticed they were being endangered, hid their arms and became disguised as harmless civilians who would run about outside the villages and that we always regarded as a sign for those people being definitely suspect. That is the reason why they were arrested and this is what is being pointed out there.
Q Well, I was just puzzled by the fact that when a village is burned in reprisal, that is not a village, that is just a couple of houses, according to your explanation the other day; but when the SD is to arrest people who are found outside of villages, then villages suddenly exist. I just thought that I saw a slight inconsistency there between those two concepts.
A No, there is no inconsistency there because those people who run about outside villages were suspect, and were screened and as I mentioned the other day , if they did not have their proper identification paper which everybody had to have, they were arrested as suspects in the first instance, and then one tried to find out if there was anything against them.
Q Now earlier today I asked you whether, if in addition to the Cetniks, the German Army used any troops who were not in uniforms and you said that they didn't. I want you to look again at Document NOKW 772 which is Exhibit 570, Book XXV, page 61 of the English, and 47 of the German.
Would you please read the last sentence in the last paragraph out one.
A I don't understand here where the thing comes from, political situation, 1st Mountain Division, 10 February 1944..........
JUDGE BURKE: I believe at this time the Tribunal will discontinue until Monday morning, November 17th, at 9:30 A.M.
(A recess was taken until Monday morning 17 November 1947 at 0930 hours.)
Official Transcript of the American Military Tribunal in the matter of the United States of America, against Wilhelm List, et al, defendants, sitting at Nurnberg, Germany, on 17 November 1947- 0930-1630, Justice Wennerstrum, presiding.
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the court room will please find their seats.
The Honorable, the Judges of Military Tribunal V. Military Tribunal V is now in session. God save the United States of America and this honorable Tribunal. There will be order in the court room.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Marshal, you will ascertain as to whether or not all defendants are present in the court room.
THE MARSHAL: May it please your Honor, all defendants are present in the court room, except the defendant Speidel who has been excused, and the defendant von Weichs who is in the hospital.
THE PRESIDENT: You may proceed with the cross-examination.
ERNST VON LEYSER -- Resumed CROSS EXAMINATION (Continued.)
BY MR. FULKERSEN:
Q. Witness, when we ended Friday we were discussing this document, NOKW-1772, which is in book 25 at page 61 of the English and 47 of the German, and I drew your attention to the last sentence in the next to the last paragraph and I asked you to read that and to give us your comments on it.
A. In this letter it says, "The establishment of special units," do you mean that? The underlined.
Q. Yes.
A. "The establishment of special units in British and Italian uniforms, as well as the useful employment of civilians with the Brandenburg Regiment will probably cause unrest among the ranks of the bands. "
Q. Well, now, the other day I asked you if there was anyone working with the German army, except in addition to the Cetnicks, any other ununiformed troops and you said, no that the Cetnicks were the only ones:
now the Brandenburg Regiment was not a Cetnick unit was it?
A. It does not say here anything about the Brandenburg Regiment doing these things or wearing such uniforms. I may say first that this letter comes from the 1st mountain Division, but it does not show that I ever saw it at any time.
Q. No, but you know what the Brandenburg Regiment was, didn't you? It was under your command; wasn't it?
A. The Brandenburg Regiment was for a time subordinate to me for tactical purposes, but I don't know anything about, any special assignments of the Brandenburg Regiment. The Brandenburg Regiment was subordinate to the O. K. W. immediately and received, if and when they had special orders, the orders from there, and I was never informed about these things nor did anyone inform me about them.
Q. Well, even if you had never heard of the Regiment Brandenburg before and you read that sentence, wouldn't you draw the conclusion that some of the members of the Regiment Brandenburg were being sent out in civilian clothing to do what they could to demoralize the ranks of the partisans; isn't that the whole part of that sentence?
A. No, as I see it, it could not say that, what we are concerned with here is a certain stratagem to spy among them and there is certainly nothing wrong with that. A stratagem is certainly no crime. All that is perhaps meant here is that it is an idea or suggestion on the part of the division. It is only a suggestion, nothing, else is said there.
Q. The suggestion to establish additional units, it is true, is contained here, but there is a reference, is there not, to a Regiment Brandenburg, which was already in existence at the time this suggestion was made; is that not correct?
A. It is a suggestion and if I had seen the suggestion, I, on my part, would not have agreed to the suggestion. First of all, I would not have been entitled to give orders of that type, and secondly, I would not agree to it because strategy of that sort is of a highly technical nature and people who do such things would have to realize that if I am caught wearing a wrong uniform, I then must expect to be shot for espionage.