THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: You may continue, Mr. Fulkerson.
CROSS-EXAMINATION (Continued) BY MR. FULKERSEN:
Q I want to ask you, General, one more question about that document NOKW-1426, which refers to the 300 compulsory recruits. Now, your explanation was that this was -- I believe it's on Page 14 -your explanation was that this operation had as its purpose to liberate these 200 men who had been compulsorily recruited by the partisans.
A Yes, quite.
Q In other words, it was an operation which was of a friendly nature so far as the German Army's attitude towards these 200 men was concerned?
A I'm afraid I didn't quite follow just now.
(THE INTERPRETER REPEATS THE QUESTION FOR THE WITNESS)
Yes, well if you want to put it that way.
Q Well, why is it that in this document this operation is referred to as a "rabbit hunt"?
A Well, that was a term coined by somebody on the staff of the 392nd Division. They would chose the most weird expressions for their operations. For instance, one was called "Napfkuchen" -- "birthday cake." Why should it be called "birthday cake?"
Q There's lust one thing wrong with that explanation, General. This wasn't a code name. The code name is "Lagerleben." It is described as a "rabbit hunt".
A Well, I can't tell you anything about that. The code name is "Lagerleben" is taken from a camp, and they probably used that name because they were in that camp. I don't know why they chose that expression.
Q And you don't think there's any significance at all to the use of the expression "rabbit hunt" to describe what they were going to do?
DR. TIPP: I don't want to make an unnecessary objection, Your Honors, but the Witness has already stated, I believe twice, that that code name was coined by somebody on the staff of the 392nd Division and that he does not know why that particular term was chosen. If you ask him three or four more times I do not believe that he can answer any other way.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: You may proceed.
BY MR. FULKERSON:
Q You don't think that there's any significance whatever in this operation's being described as a "hare hunt" as a "rabbit hunt"?
A I can only repeat that I did not know who coined the phrase, if you find it a disagreeable expression. When one hunts a hare he shoots, but then nothing is said about it there. All we are concerned with here is the name, and how it came about I don't know.
Q No, I was just wondering how a liberation undertaking would be described as a "rabbit hunt." Of course, rabbits are also caught with mets and traps.
AAs a rule they are being shot.
Q All right. Now, we were discussing, before the recess, the Ustasha and the way in which these elements of the Ustasha were subordinated to the various divisions of the XVth Corps. And you testified, if I understood you correctly, that the divisions gave these units orders to accompany it and cooperate with it in certain tactical operations, and that, in addition to this, between operations the division directed these units as to what their tasks were to be, such as the guarding of railroads, roads, etc.
A I don't think that the division ordered such things. That would be done by the local man in charge of railroads, etc.
Q What do you mean by the "local man in charge?"
A What I mean is that these Ustasha battalions, if I may repeat, were subordinate in a tactical respect, but in other respects they were not subordinate for purely tactical operations in combat etc.
Otherwise they were not subordinate in any other respects.
Q Now, when the division was not engaged in some other undertakings, such as "Panzer," "Napfkuchen," "Brandfackel," or one of the other innumerable undertakings, you testified that the Ustasha units were used to guard roads and to watch railroad trestles and that sort of thing.
A Yes, these battalions were stationed in some village and took over, as it were, protections and security measures for the supply roads, for instance. But for that we need not use or own German troops in those villages.
Q I realize that, but who assigned them these tasks? Who told them what roads to guard? Who told them what railroads trestles to watch?
A That, of course, was ordered by the division, within the scope of the divisional sector.
Q Now, where were these troops quartered -- these Ustasha troops? Where were their barracks, or where did they live during the time that they were being used to garrison the villages and guard the supply routes?
A In the same place as the German troops, in the village itself or if there was time enough we built barracks for them or gave them certain positions within those villages.
Q Now, who assigned the village in which a particular Ustasha battalion would be billeted?
A I suppose the division ordered that. They would say the battalion would be put there or there, just as it was possible within the whole scope of the divisional area.
Q And you yourself said that as Commander of the XVth Corps you saw to it that Ustasha battalions were never billeted in Serbian villages.
A I think that should be understood just what that difference was. At the beginning we said there is a general Ustasha, and then there were the Ustasha battalions. What I meant by saying that they should not be stationed in villages has the following connection:
In order to pacify the country, as I put it, and in order.....
Q Just a minute please, General. Pardon me for interrupting you, but I think I understood what you meant. You said that you would not allow Ustasha battalions to be in Serbian villages because you wanted to prevent bloodshed; you didn't want the Ustasha murdering the Serbs. That's what you meant isn't it?
A Yes, that's what we wanted to avoid if possible, of course.
Q Well, then, summing up what you just said the Ustasha battalions were subordinate to the division in whose area they were, in tactical dense. That's right isn't it?
A In a tactical respect, yes.
Q The division gave the orders as to what assignments they were to carry out generally, such as the guarding of roads, railroads. That's correct isn't it?
A For the area in which they were stationed, yes.
Q The division decided what villages the particular Ustasha battalions were to be billeted in. That's correct isn't it?
A Yes.
Q And when the division was going to carry on a tactical operation of its own it then issued orders to these Ustasha battalions to cooperate with it and told them what their tasks would be in the course of that operation, after all they were our allies.
Q And that's what you mean when you say that the Ustasha battalions were tactically subordinate to the division?
A Yes.
Q Now, in addition to this tactical subordination that we have discussed, did the division or the corps attempt to regulate the internal organization of these Ustasha units in any way?
A No, we had no influence on that. That was entirely up to the Croats.
Q So that if it came to you attention that there was an officer, for example, in a Ustasha detachment who was unfriendly to the Germans there was just simply nothing you could do about it?
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
A. What I could do in that case, would probably have been reported by the division, to the corps. I would pass that on to the army in the official channel and the army would then turn to the competent general, the General von Glaise, the General Plenipotentiary in Zagreb, and he was the liaison officer with the Croat Ministry of War and on that channel the matter would be put in order.
Q. Now let's turn for a minute to the Domobrans, the Croatian Wehrmacht. Again, the Domobrans was tactically subordinate to the divisions, was it not?
A. Yes.
Q. It also had these various tasks of guarding the supply routes assigned to it. It was also assigned its oillets--that is to say, it was also told where to billet troops by the Germans?
A. Yes.
Q. It also-
A. May I modify this a little? One mustn't understand it so literally by saying that the division decides this, that or the other things. For instance, if in the case of the 373rd Division, one Croatian Rifle Brigade was attached, that brigade within the area of the division would be assigned a certain sector and then of course it was not the division who said this battalion is going to village "A" and the other one will go to "B" but that would be assigned of course by the Croatian brigade itself. The Croatian brigade was merely assigned a certain sector by the division.
Q. In other works all the Germans did was to issue orders to the Brigade commander and they allowed him some discretion in carrying out those orders?
A. Because he had all the tactical training for that purpose.
Q. So that really all the Germans did in a situation such as that was to tell such and such a Croatian brigade "Your task will be so and so, your sector will be so and so; but we don't care whether you put the first battalion on the right flank or the third battalion on the right flank?"
Is that what you mean to say?
A. Yes, up to a point. The tactical assignment and how they carried it out in detail was up to the brigade commander of the Croat Brigade.
Well, did the German army have any interest in interfering with the internal affairs and organization of the Domobrans?
A. They were interested in the sense that one knew if the brigade was assigned a certain tactical assignment they should carry it out as we wanted them to and there are certain internal tactical and military principles and as we were dealing with an allied state they were given German orders as their model and according to these principles they had their people trained and led their people.
Q. But the Germans took no interest whatsoever, for example, in the personnel of the Domobrans or the Ustasha. They didn't attempt to regulate who was and who was not suitable for a certain position nor did they attempt to improve or change the internal organization of any of these units?
A. No, I at least had no influence whatsoever on it nor did I ever bother about this. At the most, as I said before, if somebody failed I would then on the official channel which I have described before make a report that this particular officer perhaps may not be quite suitable for his particular post. I can remember, for instance, that on one occasion I did this in the case of one officer in BanjaLuka or somewhere like that, and then he was replaced by someone else. That was the only type of influence I could afford but any direct intervention in the personnel problems I was in no position to do nor had I any cause to do so.
Q. I want to hand you document NOKW-975 which we will introduce as -- no, I am sorry, that has already been introduced as Exhibit 253. It is in Document Book X, page 34 of the English.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: What is the exhibit number, Mr. Fulkerson?
MR. FULKERSON; 253, your Honor. That is page 34 of the English, Document Book X and 27 of the German.
BY MR. FULKERSON:
Q. I realize that this order which is dated January 9, 1943, was before your time but I want to direct your attention to paragraph 2 and 3 of it, Would you mind reading those aloud, please, Sir? And then giving us the benefit of your comments on that?
A. Paragraph 2 reads as follows: "All armed Croatian units in the area designated under 1 are subordinate to the divisions. As far as possible, the Croatian authorities are to be left with a certain responsibility of their own. It is not desirable to tear up the Croatian units which have just been put in order.
"3. It is of the utmost desirability to bring in replacements and to reorganize the Croatian Wehrmacht, if necessary to clean out; Ustasha units, in so far as this has not been done up to now, are to be inserted into the Croatian Land Wehr and they are to be organized into units, not below battalion strength."
I would like to explain about this. As you said yourself, this order dates 7 January 1943, issued by the Commander of German troops in Croatia who was my predecessor. I myself therefore do not know this order, of course. All I can conclude in this matter is that at that time the Croatian Wehrmacht in all probability was still being formed and now it was intended by the Germans to support this.
All I can say is that when I was down there, any interference with the Croatian Wehrmacht and the Ustasha could not possibly have occurred in that extent because during my time these units were more or less ready, which becomes also clear from paragraph 3. As I have always testified so far, I spoke of Ustasha battalions as little as possible, but in paragraph 3 you can see that at that time no Ustasha battalions existed at all but that they were about to be established and also in that respect by the German Wehrmacht or at least by the Commander of the German troops in Croatia, who was also the territorial commander -- a certain amount of influence was taken on this. This is the only thing I can deduce from this order.
When I was down there, any such intervention did no longer take place, as after all there was a Croatian Ministry of War in existence and if there were any personnel matters involved, as I mentioned before, General von Glaise who was the German Commander in Croatia at the time was the liaison officer with the Croatian authorities. During my period of time, this no longer had any effect.
Q. Is there any reason to suspect, General, that paragraph 3 of this order was not carried out by General Leuders before you went down there?
A. That it was not carried out you mean?
Q. Yes, is there any reason to think that it was not?
A. I can't say that at all. I don't know.
Q. Well, if it had been carried out, the result would be that by the time you arrived the Croatian Wehrmacht and the Ustasha had already been cleaned out by the Germans and reorganized?
A. Yes, that I think has been done.
Q. And you think that -
A. We had also an army inspector, a German General, who had the assignment of organizing the Croatian Wehrmacht. As you said yourself, the Croatian state was a very young state. They had to build up something first and in that they were by us Germans supported.
Q. Not only supported but screened according to this order?
A. If somebody has the order of establishing something, he must have a certain amount of authority to interfere when he notices that there are mistakes here or there and perhaps at that particular period of time it must have appeared to the German General that the organization was not a very good one and that most likely is why he made these propositions, but of course I myself cannot say very much about that order because I do not know what the conditions were at the time. I do not know the reasons behind it.
Q. But it is your impression in any case that the Croatian Wehrmacht was organized by the German army?
A. Yes, well this happens quite often all over the place that small states are being supported by bigger states in their military equipment for organizational purposes.
Q. Well at the time that -- during the period say, between the surrender of Yugoslavia and the organization of the Croatian Wehrmacht, then there were no armed forces in Croatia except the German army and these bandits that you have been describing?
A. Well, the bandits were no army.
Q. No, but I don't want to get into an argument with you about the organization of the bandits right now, but I put it this way, that during the period while the German army was helping the Croatian state to organize its own army, the country was occupied by the German army and that was the only regular army in your opinion in existence there?
A I cannot say when the Croatian army was established. I am inclined to assume that at the moment when the Croatian government was formed, they began at once to establish a Wehrmacht but I am not sure.
Q But you are positive that this army inspector was put in charge of the task of organizing the Domobrans along German lines?
A Yes, according to German meaning, according to our orders, etc. he will probably have done it that way.
Q But you don't know whether part of this assignment of his was to furnish arms and ammunitions for the Domobrans?
A No, there is nothing I can tell you about that. I really don't know.
Q What kind of arms did the Domobrans have? What was their standard infantry rifle, for example?
AAs far as I can remember, it was the German infantry rifle.
Q Which of course fired the same sort of ammunition as the German rifles?
A Yes.
Q What sort of ammunition did -- where did they get the ammunition from?
A If they were German rifles, the German ammunition must have come from Germany.
Q Well, was the same true of the other small arms? For example, the sub-machine guns, the machine pistol?
A I said before I am not quite clear about this, whether the Croatian state had ammunition factories of their own, -- it is quite possible, in which case they probably produced these things there also.
Q But there was the Domobrans was organized in such a way that its equipment was interchangeable with the German Wehrmacht equipment?
A From a point of view of arms, I think this is true up to a point but not from a point of view of uniforms. They had their own uniforms.
Q Was the same true of the Ustasha units? What sort of arms did they have? Was their equipment interchangeable with the Domobrans and with the German Wehrmacht as well?
A I believe so, yes, but I am not entirely certain about this, but I am inclined to think so.
Q They too used the German Mauser infantry rifle?
A I don't know. I assume so.
Q So that to sum up once more, both the Domobrans and the Ustasha were organized under the auspices of the German army? At least, that is what you think?
A It must have been that way because the Croatian state hadn't existed before. It was only being formed at that time. At the time of the existence of Yugoslavia there was no Croat state; therefore it can only have happened in that period of time.
Q And the German army furnished experts to organize and train the troops?
A Yes. People who trained them were supplied.
Q And they were armed with German equipment which was interchangeable with the equipment that the Wehrmacht used?
A I said yes several times to this; I am not quite certain.
Q And they were organized according to the pattern of the German army?
A No, that is not entirely correct. They had certain things which we no longer had.
Q Well, generally speaking?
A Well, all armies of the world are more or less organized in the same way. Sometimes you call one thing a brigade and in another case you call it a division but as a matter of principle there are a great many similarities, there are battalions, platoons etc.
Q And then after the Domobrans and the Ustasha had been organized and armed and trained by the Germans, then their various units were made tactically subordinate to the German units in whose area they were stationed?
A What happened was that after the capitulation of the Yugoslavs, the entire area was occupied by German troops.
Thereupon, under this occupation which existed, the Croat state, this young state, formed its own army which takes a certain amount of time. Now as this young state was an ally of Germany's, it goes without saying that Germany would support this enterprise.
Q Now then, aside from the German Wehrmacht, including the Croatian divisions, the Domobrans and the Ustasha, there was another group of people who customarily bore arms or at least who, according to you, had arms and they were the Cetnik units. Now they were also tactically subordinate to you, I believe, were they not?
A You can't put it that way; the Cetniks were not an army. The Cetniks were bands, and in the Croatian area, these Cetniks by virtue of the fact that numerically speaking they were small, they had to link up with somebody. It has been mentioned here before as the conflict between the Croats and the Serbs was a great one, the Cetniks were a Serb organization which probably existed in some form before and who now in the Serb area under Mihailovic were as certain insurgent movement. In my interrogations, I have stated that in the area of the XV Corps, the Cetniks who otherwise fought the Germans under Mihailovic would during my period of time and in my area not fight against us but that was purely a matter of expediency on the part of the leader of the Cetniks because he had to realize that first of all he was numerically superior and if he would not attach himself to the German Wehrmacht or at least not establish friendly relations, he would not only face the Wehrmacht but also the Croats and as a third opponent whom he regarded as his most important enemy he would face the Tito bands which is the reason why we in some cases helped the Cetniks--in order to make it possible that they might protect themselves, we put them into villages populated by Serbs and allowed them to form an organization known as the Cetnik bands in order to protect their own villages against Tito bands, but that does not mean that the Cetniks can be put on the same level as the German or Croat Wehrmacht. It was never an army in that senses you can't make that comparison at all.
Q Nevertheless, regardless of what you call them, there were certain Cetniks groups or units regardless of whether they had a formal organization or whether they wore uniforms, there were such units in Croatia and you were ordered to disarm them and you didn't disarm them, and you gave as your reasons, first, that to disarm them would mean that they would be annihilated either by the Tito bands or by the Ustasha; and second, as long as they had arms they would fight the Tito bands and to that extent would help you out. Is that not true?
A Of course, they helped us out up to a point because they were fighting Tito. This only proved that Tito who was not a Croat nor a Yugoslav, but if they regarded themselves to be the successors of the Yugoslav army. You can't have two Yugoslav armies. That simply proved that both those organizations were not a Yugoslav army. They were simply bands or Cetniks units.
Q And actually the only difference between them, in your opinion, is that the Tito bands, to use your own phrase, or the partisans were fighting against you, while the Cetniks were fighting with you?
A You can't really say they fought with us. On certain occasions, they opposed the Tito bands in order to protect themselves.
Q Well, in these daily reports to the XV Corps, by various divisions isn't it true that time after time you see mention of various Cetniks units and their activities? For example, do you remember, the one in which the Cetnik reconnaissance detachment took a certain number of prisoners, shot 13 of them and I believe turned two loose -- I don't want to argue about that document, but I just want to call to your attention that these things were mentioned. Well now -
A I explained at the time that we had orders then that all occurrences in my area were to be reported, no matter whether they concerned subordinate units or whether they concerned any other unit at all, so that we would be kept up to date and in order to take stops if and when necessary.
Q Well, but if these Cetnik units had not been tactically subordinate to these divisions and had not reported to the divisions what had happened, then these incidents would not appear in the division reports, would they? How would the division know about them?
A Let me correct you first. They were never tactically subordinate. Tactically the Chetnik units were never subordinate to the divisions because they were not an army. Any subordination can only apply to a regular army or troop units, not to bands. But the divisions which hoar about those things by their channels, they had their definite sector and for tho sector they were responsible and whatever occurred in tho sector tho divisions would report.
Q Well, from time to time in those division reports weren't these Chetnik units actually given a number, such as -- I don't remember one offhand, but say the 373rd Chetnik Reconnaissance Detachment?
A No.
Q They were never given such a number? They were never identified as units operating with tho Division?
A I cannot recall any such document where a Chetnik unit had a number. I really don't know. It may be that the Tito bands call themselves Tito Brigade; that the Chetniks would, on location, appear in a report as such. That is quite possible. They all had names.
Q Well, wasn't it true that these detachments would, on occasion, report back to tho division when they had made an operation?
A That was probably handled differently in the various localities. It depended how tho units were treating the German troops. There were many Chetnik units who did not like us as tho occupying power - as no country will do and such units, perhaps, did not pass on reports. Others who were loss fanatic would report to tho division because they thought that would be the correct thing to do.
Q And generally speaking, these divisions that were not so fanatical, as you say, would cooperate with the Germans and would not do anything that was inimical to their interests?
A They had no cause really. If they were not hostile to us they would not do anything against us, surely.
Q Now, you said the other day that although you had an order to disarm these Chetniks that you didn't carry it out and you gave your reasons. Did you go further than that and, from time to time, furnish arms, actually furnish arms to these Ghetnik detachments?
A That also happened. If, in certain areas, the Serb villages were frequently raided by Tito bands what we did was to furnish arms so that those people could protect themselves and fight back against the bands. That only was a contribution to the pacification of the country, After all, our main interest was to have law and order and not have shooting all over the place. But if I am the occupation power there, surely it is my business to see to it that there is law and order.
Q At any rate, you didn't furnish arms, I take it, to groups of people unless yon were fairly sure that those groups of people were not going to use the arms on you or your man?
A I would like to emphasize once again that this was entirely an action dictated by expediency on our part. I frequently said you mustn't trust these people too far. Should there be an Allied landing it was highly doubtful whether those people wouldn't fight against us. We couldn't trust them a hundred percent, of course, but, on the other hand, it was in our interest to have as much peace and order as possible. We were not interested in having unrest. It would have boon much nicer for us if everybody had been peaceful and calm.
Q But you don't , seriously contend that you, as a responsible officer, furnished arms to groups of people unless their friendliness to the Germans had already boon demonstrated?
A That I think goes without saying. I wouldn't give arms to anybody. Negotiations had been going on how it was to be handled and people said for this or that reason and then, after these people had been screened, it might well be possible, although I cannot remember it in detail, they were given arms for their own protection; but one can still maintain at the same time whether it might be a hundred percent sure that they will always be nice to us; in the case of the Ghetniks at least who were more inclined towards the Allies, it was very doubtful.
Q Well, if you gave arms to anyone who was unfriendly toward the Germans, it was a mistake of judgment on your part; it wasn't because you knew that you were doing it, was it?
A They were not hostile to the Germans. Those who collaborated with us I can hardly regard as anti-German.
Q And there were units, actual units from time to time, who did collaborate on tactical operations with the German troops, did they not?
A Well, one should really form a different picture of that. By tactical operations you speak as though we had a regular troop there. If these reports say occasionally that the Chetniks had taken part this does not moan that they took part like a regular army. It simply means that the people in that neighborhood, in the Serb villages, would perhaps, once the operation touched upon their villages, would protect their own village in that area so that no Tito band could invade it or from their villages they sent out reconnaissance troops, perhaps, and then report to us; but the whole matter, of course, is connected with their tactical assignment.
But any tactical subordination in the purely military sense you could not possibly mention here.
Q Well, when they sent out a reconnaissance detachment, for example, and they discovered the positions and strength of the partisans in a certain locality and came back and reported to you, they were certainly carrying out what you would classify as a tactical task, weren't they?
A If you want to put it that way, yes.
Q If they hadn't done it some German reconnaissance detachment would have to do it, would it not?
A Yes.
Q Well, what is your justification for using these irregular, un-uniformed Chetniks as allies of the Germans on these tactical missions if you condemn this practice so heartily when the partisans used it? You say that that was a terrible thing on their part.
A Would you please repeat your question? I am afraid I didn't quite follow in detail.
Q It is simple enough. What was the difference between the German troops using armed, un-uniformed Chetnik bands for such things as reconnaissance and the Tito bands using armed, un-uniformed bands for the same purpose?
A We did not use Tito bands for our purpose.
Q I will ask the question again. What was the difference between the Germans using Chetnik un-uniformed armed bands in connection with its tactical operations and the Tito bands using armed, un-uniformed bands for their tactical operations?