Q. Were they uniformed by that time?
A. You mean the bands, your Honor.
Q. Yes.
A. Of the bands I'm sure some individual people must have been uniformed as always happened but of course one cannot talk about a regular uniform of the bands because they never had any such uniform.
Q. That's all.
BY DR. TIPP:
Q. General, one additional question. His Honor told you that a large number of bands were concerned there and you were also asked about the organization of these bands and about their uniforms. You said in reply that in spite of everything these were bands and not a belligerent unit in the sense of International Law. Maybe you can quite briefly tell us why these bands, if I may call them that, despite their strength and despite their organization, particularly in Croatia, always remained bands and can you please tell us the reasons for your opinion?
A. That such large hands existed there was a consequence of the fact that after the capitulation of the Italian Army in these areas, as I have explained before when I talked about Sketch 1, - the Italians were to begin with not disarmed and therefore gave a great number of arms to the hands. This was possibly an additional reason that in this particular district there were such numerous hands and that all these hands had joined together because they believed that they could equip themselves through the arms that they had at their disposal there. That was the danger which threaten us and that was the danger which had to be eliminated.
Q. General, I don't believe you quite realized what my question was driving at. You were talking about the organization and the number of bands but I would like you in answer to this one question which your Honor has also put to you, to state why you are of the opinion that this mass of armed men were not belligerent within the meaning of International law hut in spite of it all remained a band.
Maybe you would like to take the conditions of Croatia in consideration when you answer this.
A. Of course there can be no talk whatsoever about a regular troop because they did not fulfill in any way the pre-requisites in any way for one. They were not all uniformed but only some of them and besides even if some of the bands had leaders there still was no unified responsible leadership so that there can be no discussion of a regular belligerent. Furthermore, there was no such thing as a regular army in Croatia which could be designated as bands because the regular army which existed in Croatia was allied to us and fought with us against the bands. Therefore, there can be no talk of a regular army when referring to the bands of Croatia.
Q What you mean, General, if I understand you correctly, is that Croatia was an Allied and independent state.
A Yes.
Q And in an Allied and independent state, from the point of view of International Law, there is no possibility that any organized troops bodies can be formed against the government which can become belligerent in the International meaning of the word.
A That is correct.
Q Then, there is no possibility in International Law that such bands, even if they fulfilled all the pre-requisites, could become regular belligerents?
A Yes, that is my opinion, and it is based on the fact that there was a regular Croatian Army.
Q I shall then continue with the discussion of my Exhibit 25. I stopped at Arabic numeral No. 6, while discussing the booty. May I point out that the booty, for the most part, consisted of purely military instruments. There are mentioned here "47 machine guns, 189 rifles, 2 medium sized mortars, 3 gunsof 7.5 cm, 1 anti-tank rifle, smaller implement, several small ammunition depots, 2 field kitchens, etc." Under Arabic numeral 7 it reads, and I quote: "Although considerable parts of the enemy succeeded in escaping from complete encirclement, the principal aims of the action were attained. The winter quarters of the bands in Petrova Gora and Samarica were destroyed. A rich booty of cattle was brought back, depots were destroyed and therewith considerable damage was inflicted on the power of the enemy to wage war." May I skip a few sentences, and now I come to deal with the handwritten part of the document It says there, and I quote: "The success of the action consisted in heavy casualties inflicted on the enemy and in considerable booty. Even though the enemy could not be destroyed or scattered, he nevertheless sustained a considerable set-back, in particular as regards organization and prestige.
If I may add one remark to this document -- if it is said here. General, that the aim of the operation was achieved and, if on the other hand, we can see from the document that instead of the originally provided 6,000 evacuees, no more than 76 persons actually were evacuated, what does this conclusion show where you are concerned with the purpose of this operation?
A In my opinion it shows clearly that the aim of the operation was not to evacuate the people, but the purpose was a purely military and tactical one, which had to serve the fulfillment of my main task. This evacuation was militarily necessary in order to fulfill the tasks which had been put to me.
Q I would then like to turn to the next document which we have to deal with in this connection. It is contained in Leyser Document Book II, and it is Leyser Document No. 33, found on Page 200 of this Document Book. I am offering this as Leyser Exhibit No. 26. This is the final report concerning the "Panther" operation. It is contained in a teletype of the XVth Corps, dated the 24th of December 1943. May I, for reasons of simplicity, just quote a few paragraphs of this document and point out other parts contained in it? Under number 1 it gives the number of evacuees and there again we find the number 96, and there again we find the fact that the villages had been evacuated before by the Communists by compulsory measures. The then following figures, which deal with the booty and losses, are identical with the figures mentioned in the document which I have just now mentioned. The next paragraph is a new one, and this one is entitled "Success." And then it says here, "Results," and I quote: "The operational intention of the Croatian Main Staff to make an attack reserve out of the 8th Division has been frustrated by the action. Enterprises on a larger scale should be impossible in the "Panther" district during the next weeks. Apart from material losses, the enemy sustained a considerable set-back in the following fields:" 1) Organization of the rear areas; in 2) communications are mentioned here in this paragraph, and that "the smoothly working courier-service of the newly established postal organization has been destroyed."
; 3) "Organizations of the Communist Party" it says here, then, "the development has been reduced to its initial stages."; 4) Propaganda: "The most important idea: the population was convinced that the Communists will never be able to keep the so-called liberated districts, if matters come to a head."
Is there anything you would like to say in conclusion where these documents are concerned, General?
A I believe that these documents show clearly that the purpose of the operation "Panther" was a purely military and tactical one, and that at the time we were not concerned, as has been asserted by the Prosecution, with evacuating the population for compulsory work, but since the operation has been called a success, this report of the success cannot apply to the evacuation because there is no doubt that the evacuation failed, which can be seen by comparing the figures of 6,000 evacuees provided and only 96 actually carried out.
Q We have no dealt with the outlines of the operation "Panther," General. Now, can you briefly indicate to us how the operation "Panther" was carried out in detail, and mainly what reports you or the Corps received?
AAs every larger operation of this type, the operation "Panther" was carried out in separate sectors. The individual units were assigned certain daily tasks, and they were to report about these daily targets.
Q General, the Prosecution has submitted a number of individual documents which are concerned with this operation "Panther." They are usually individual incidents which can be found in the Daily Reports of the Corps, I think we'll now take these individual reports one by one and deal with the assertions of the Prosecution. I shall again proceed in a chronological order so that we can see the course of the operation clearly. The first report of this type we can again find in Document Book XV, on Page 11 of the English version and Page 11 of the German version also. This is Exhibit 366 of the Prosecution, and it is Document No. 728.
I shall have this document submitted to you and I would like to ask you a brief question as to that. It is a report of the 373rd Infantry Division, to its Corps. The Prosecution will probably see incriminating in this report that three bandits were shot and throe villages were described as burning. I shall later on deal with another point of this document. Would you please give us your comments about this report, if you can, to the extent to which I have indicated it here?
A This report shows quite clearly that the report concerns the combat actions carried out on that particular day. In accordance with orders the unit reports 1 man captured. And it furthermore reports that three bandits were shot during the combat action. And as far as can be observed three were wounded. Two villages were set on fire, while these actions were taking place, and that is quite possible because the houses have straw roofs in this district. That has nothing to do with reprisal measures of any kind.
Q What you are saying then, General, is that this report is merely a report of a combat action?
A Yes, that is all it is.
Q Then, the 373rd Infantry Division further reports in this report that one bandit, who made a false report, was shot to death. I don't believe this incident would have taken place during combat action. And may I ask you, therefore, General, whether you can clarify for us this rather striking incident?
A It so happens that I can remember this particular incident. At that time, on the basis of information which was gained, a man had offered himself to help the troops since he know the villages well. He wanted to be a guide for the unit, but he did not do this, and in the end he was shot because he deceived the unit.
Q I think that will conclude our discussion about this particular document. Let us turn to the next one. We have it in the same Document Book, on Page 3 of the English text and on Page 2 of the German text.
This is Exhibit 364, which is Document NOKW-1136. The report to which I refer here is a report of the 1st Cossack Division, dated the 16th of December 1943. You have that report in front of you, General, and I would like you to give us brief comments about it. May I emphasize that in this document there is some talk about the destruction of villages?
A Here again we have a document which resulted from the operation "Panther." The Division states here that the area has been mopped up and it further reports that the villages have been evacuated and that there was no furniture of any kind and no installations left in these villages. However, 45 shelters had been built up. This quite clearly and obviously refers to band strongholds. The houses there had been prepared as defense posts. The destruction was, therefore, an absolute military necessity.
Q Well, we will now turn to the report which comes next in chronological order. This report again is contained in Document Book XV, on Page 1 of the English and Page 1 of the German texts.
This again is a report by the 1st Cossack Division, this time dated the 2 of December 1943. The report mentions that one bandit was shot. Maybe, on the basis of the report which you have in front of you, you can explain these facts to us.
A Here again we have a report of a combat action because the sentence before that reads: "1 Commando Unit was attacked by partisans in the Bijenic district; 22 horses and 12 vehicles were lost." That is the sentence that precedes the sentence, "1 bandit was shot." When this attack was repelled the enemy lost one dead.
Q In this same report it is further stated that 71 male inhabitants fit for military service were apprehended. Maybe you can give us an explanation of this, General.
A The explanation for this report can be seen from the general purpose of the operation "Panther." As I have previously stated, this is a band district which was to be mopped up. And from the final report, which was just mentioned, we see that the Communists had evacuated these districts under duress.
Every adult able to carry arms, who had remained in this district had, therefore, to be either a bandit or at least a bandit helper. Otherwise, he would have been included in the evacuation measures of the bands and would have been taken away. And if we were to secure our supply lines we had to avoid that this area, after we were leaving it, would again become a band area. That was the reason why these people were, first of all, apprehended, because they seemed to be band suspects. After a proper examination they were later on again dismissed if nothing could be found against them.
Q General, there is one other report which belongs to this complex of the operation "Panther." This time it is a report of the 371st Division. We find this report in Document Book XV, on Page 24 of the English text and also Page 24 of the German text. This is Exhibit No. 367 of the Prosecution, which is Document NOKW-1331. The report, as I have already said, is one of the 373rd Division's reports, dated the 21st of December 1943. I assume that the Prosecution submitted this report because it is mentioned here that in mopping up Samarica two bandits were shot to death. Maybe you can explain to us this sentence with in the frame of the whole report.
A This again is a report of a combat action. In mopping up Samarica the Division had advanced far enough to reach a large supply depot of the bands. That is what the report shows us. These depots were, for the most part, well guarded, and they were also camouflaged. And it was unlikely that such a depot would fall into our hands without any fighting. I, therefore, assume that there must have been combat action there, and on the occasion of this combat action the enemy lost two.
Q That then concludes the detailed and individual reports resulting from the operation "Panther." I would now like to ask you, was this "Panther" area kept occupied subsequently or was it at a later time given up?
A The "Panther" area was not immediately given up in all its parts, but I think the 1st Cossack Division remained in the area of Glina until the middle of January. After that the Cossacks were withdrawn because they were employed in the guarding of the railroad lines.
Q I would like to point out that the occupation of this area through the 1st Cossack Division and the later withdrawal from this area can also be seen from a document of the Prosecution. These facts are mentioned in the Document NOKW-1425 of the Prosecution, which is Exhibit 369. We find this in the same Document Book XV, on Page 15 of the German text and on Page 47 of the English text. This document is a report of the 1st Cossack Division, dated the 24th of January 1944. General, would you give us your comments on this document, as far as it is of interest here?
A. This document says amongst other things, and I think that is quite important, that when Clina was evacuated twothirds of the population followed the Cossacks. This, to me, seems to be an indication that the population would rather go along with the Cossacks then remain with the bands. That seems to be a good sign for the Cossacks and a bad one for the bands.
Q. We shall now leave the problem of the operation "Panther," with which we have dealt for such a long time now, and we shall now turn to another operation, which is also mentioned in the Prosecution documents. By this I mean the operation "Ristow" which was carried out by the 373rd Division. This operation is also mentioned in the last exhibit mentioned, No. 369, which is on Page 44 of the English document Book and on Page 45 of the German Document Book. Do you have that document in front of you, General? On Page 1 of this document we have a Divisional order of the 373rd Infantry Division, dated the 22rd of December 1943, which gives a mission for the 383rd Infantry Regiment. In order to expedite matters here, I would just briefly like to indicate what we can see from this document. According to its contents the Regiment had to mop up and comb through the area south of the Sana, and to destroy the enemy wherever he might be found. The document further says that the population capable of bearing arms is to be arrested and, supplies and cattle are to be taken away. First of all, can you tell us something about the aims and purposes of this operation?
A. To begin with, I would like to mention that this order of the Division I saw for the first time here in Nurnberg. Such orders, as I have mentioned before when I was talking about orders, did not generally reach the Corps. But in as far as actual facts are concerned I would like to say the following:
This operation "Ristow" was a small operation. On the whole it had the same purpose as had the previously discussed operation "Panther." Here again the tasks were to pacify the area which was infested with bands, and to take away from the bands their material, strongholds, and their personnel support. Besides from this area too surprise attacks occurred constantly on the railway line Novi Pridor. The safeguarding of the repair work along the railway line was a further purpose of this operation, as I can see from the order.
Q. I would like to point out that this purpose of the operation is mentioned also in a report of the 383rd Regiment, which was submitted under the same number. This report is dated the 5th of January 1944, and the reference to the safe-guarding oi the railway line can be found on Page 51 of the English text and Rage 62 of the German text. Will you please continue, General?
A. These were the reasons why it was necessary to evacuate the male population from these areas. These were obliged to serve the Croat State, but in areas threatened by the bands they, partly voluntarily and partly forced by the bands, joined the bands. The planned evacuation of the supplies and of the cattle is also mentioned in the document, and the reasons are given. It says here, and I quote: "In order to deprive the bands of the supply bases." It was, as a rule, not necessary to carry out and evacuation because these band strongholds were usually in such difficult terrain that it was not possible to transport anything away from these areas.
Q. General, according to the documents was it possible for you to ascertain whether this purpose of the operation "Ristow" was actually achieved?
A. The purpose wasn't quite achieved, as we can see again from this document.
The operation had to be interrupted. As a consequence, unfortunately it could not be carried out in full and, therefore, the purpose was not achieved to the extent which had been intended.
Q. General, I would like to put an additional question with regard to this question. You know that in this Courtroom there have repeatedly been discussions about the terns "occupation" and "occupation de facto?" What I mean is, was it possible for you to reach ever locality in the area if you wanted to do so? Were you in a position to clear up the mopped-up-area? Can you give us your comments about this question?
A: If I said here that the purpose was not completely achieved, the reason for this was that the operation had to be interrupted. However, by this I don't mean to say that we, had we wanted to, could not have been in a position to reach those localities which we wanted to reach. Thank God, our troops were strong enough so that as a matter of principle we could get anywhere and reach any place we wanted to reach so that one can say that the whole area was of course occupied and dominated by us. For this it isn't necessary that I put troops into every tiny hamlet or village; it is quite sufficient if I control this area and that was an absolute fact in my sector.
Q: General, after these operations on a larger scale, let's now discuss some more of the individual incidents. I would like to discuss the prosecution documents with you as far as we haven't done this already, according to the units by which they were submitted and within these units again in chronological order. We have mentioned quite a number of the divisions subordinate to you, amongst these on the occasion of the operation Panther, we mentioned the first Cossack Division which already has played a large part here. Therefore let's start with this division. My first question is: when was this first Cossack division subordinated to the 15th Corps?
A: When we talk about the first Cossack division, we have to distinguish between the two Cossack brigades. One of these brigades and the division staff were subordinated to the 15th Corps around the 5th of December for the purpose of the operation Panther because this operation started on the 7th of December. The other brigade was at a later date subordinated to the Corps, and then during the march to the area to which it was assigned it carried out an operation, the operation Brandfackel.
fackel.
Q: Then we have to distinguish, General, between these two brigades. What was the assignment of the first brigade when it first became subordinate to you?
A: The first brigade took part in the operation Panther. That is just what we discussed.
Q: And what was the further task of the brigade, General?
A: After the operation Panther was completed, this brigade was assigned for safeguarding the railway and then later, I think that was also in January, the second brigade was also used for this task, and this second brigade when it was added to the division, was committed to carry out the operation Brandfackel.
Q: From the documents, can we see, General, just about when this second brigade was added?
A: No, I don't think we can see that. I believe it was January. I wouldn't know which document would show it. I can't say that because I haven't got that very document, but I think some of the documents show it.
Q: All right then, we will determine the time factor later on when we deal with these individual documents. Can you also tell us, General, which were the operations that the second brigade was to carry out when it became subordinate to you?
A: Yes. As I have said before, this second Cossack brigade had received an order from the army to mop up the areas of Bosna and Syrbas. This was an operation which had been given the code name Napfkuchen and, subsequently, this brigade was also to act in my corps sector. The operation which took place in my corps sector was carried out under the code name Brandfackel.
Q: These facts, General, can be seen from one document of the prosecution which again we find in Document Book 15 on page 44 of the English text and page 45 of the German text. I have reference to prosecution Exhibit 369 which is NOKW-1425. In this document, on the pages 44 of the English text and 45 of the German text, we find an action report of the first Cossack division. Have you got that report in front of you, General? Or can you give us some details about the operation Brandfackel?
A: To the best of my recollection, the operation Brandfackel dealt with the following. In the Northeastern part of he corps sector, there was the Kozara area. This is a mountain area which I have just mentioned. In earlier times, this had been a training ground for troops, I believe as early as in the days of the Austrian-Hungarian monarchy. At this period we are concerned with now, it was a bandit area from which constantly attacks and surprise attacks took place on the railway line to Banja-Luka. However, all the time I left sufficient forces of my own to mop up this woodland area, but all the time the corps had numerous reports, also Q reports -- those are intercepted radio reports -- saying that there in these training grounds the bands had camps and depots and stores. It was further reported that large stores of hay had been accumulated in that area. For all these reasons, I have found it very suitable that the second Cossack brigade was put at my disposal. And thus, I gained the opportunity to mop up this banned area. I would like to stress here that this is an uninhabited area which was used as a training ground for troops. In this case, it was the area where the band strongholds were to be found.
Q: I have just before mentioned, General, that this action report of the first Cossack division can be found on page 44 of the English and page 45 of the Document Book 14. This report might serve as a further incrimination of your person. On page 55 of the English text and page 57 of the German text, the divisional commander mentioned that on the occasion of the operation whole areas were supposed to be destroyed. Maybe you can explain this sentence which is a little incomprehensible to me.
A: An order of mine to destroy whole areas has never been given by me. As a matter of fact, I was never in a position to do that as I have just explained now because this operation Brandfackel concerned an area which was not inhabited and which was merely a training ground. Therefore, when one talked about this operation, one could not destroy whole districts.
Q: The remark of the commander of the Cossack division has been mentioned at a previous time. Maybe you can now give your comments to this remark.
A: General von Panwitz was a very bravo officer, always ready for action, and he was well known as such, but on the other hand he also was a very ambitious officer and he was very sensitive and touchy. He was inclined to throw around with high-sounding expressions. This brigade had received from me the assignment to mop up this terrain which was mountainous and difficult to negotiate. And they took things a bit too easy by just mopping up the areas on the right and left of this district which were a little easier to reach and I reproached the divisional commander with this fact. It can also be seen that this operation did not take its course in the same way as we had expected it to do. This is shown from the document by a handwritten note saying that the result was not in accordance with the expectations.
Q: I would like to add this sentence. This handwritten remark which is mentioned by General Leyser here is contained on page 54 of the English text of Document Book 15 and on page 82 of the German test. The exhibit is 370. You can continue now, General.
A: I can only imagine now that he used as an excuse this rather high-sounding expression in order to hide the fact that he hadn't done all that was expected of him but as I have said before there has never been such a thing as the order to destroy whole districts.
Q: I have just referred to Exhibit 370. This was Document NOKW-1430 contained in Document Book 15. In this document on the pages 54 of the English and 82 of the German text, we have the final reports concerning the operation Brandfackel which we have already mentioned. This report is dated the 22nd of January, 1944. On page 1 of this document it is mentioned that one hospital with 100 beds and two small ammunition depots were destroyed. The destruction of this hospital is one of the reports which has been submitted by the prosecution on several occasions. Besides being contained in this document which I have mentioned now, it is again shown in the same document on page 53 of the German Document Book and page 56 of the English Document book. There we find it in the daily report of the 15th Mountain Corps dated the 13th of January, 1944. The destruction of this hospital we find again this time in a different document book, namely in Document Book 16. There we find it in Exhibit 395. Here we have a War Diary entry of the 15th Corps, dated the 21st of January, 1944. This is on page 99 of the English text and page 144 of the German text.
This entry again has as its subject the destruction of the hospital. Therefore, it has been mentioned in three different places. After having explained this, General, will you give us your comments on the actual facts concerning this destruction of the hospital?
A: Basically, I have the following to say to the subject. In the areas in Croatia where the band fighting took place, we had for the most part uninhabited areas. These woodlands were -- there were hardly any settlements as we think of them in the mid European sense of the word.
The bands had their strongholds and their depots. There were also the munition depots and the stores of the bands and besides there were also a few barracks which had buncks in them. This was about all which you could find in band strongholds of this kind. The significance of these barracks was at the best that wounded were received there before other people were. In actual fact, these barracks were used by the bands as quarters. Now, we intended to deprive them of these accommodations and to make it more difficult for them to hide in this territory and that was partly the purpose of these anti band actions which we had to carry out down there and, therefore, a tactical necessity. Besides, there was the danger of infection because these huts and barracks were full of lice, as has been previously mentioned by General Rendulic. There was not only the danger of infection of the troops but also a danger for the civilian population, and in fact has been confirmed by a document of the army doctor of the army at that time.
Q I believe this is more or less clarified, this particular question, and I would now like to ask you what was the assignment of the Cossack division other than these band operations?
A The main assignment of the Cossack Division was the safeguarding of the railway line and from the localities where they were stationed they carried out their smaller or medium-sized operations for the safeguarding of the railway line.
Q May I ask you additionally here which were the railway lines mainly in the area of this division?
A The division was mainly concerned with the railway line to Zagreb and to Karlovac. The other railway line which was in my corps sector belonged to the sector of the 373rd Division.
Q We will deal with that one later. When we are talking about the safeguarding of the railway line by the first Cossack division, I would like to show you another document, General, and this is already contained in Document Book 14. Here on page 43 of the English text and page 26 of the German text, we have an entry which is rather important here.
This entry is contained in prosecution Exhibit 340 which is Document NOKW-509. The document which I have reference to is an inquiry of the corps headquarters of the 69th Reserve Corps, dated the 25th of November, 1943, and addressed to the 15th Mountain Corps.
The 69th Corps states here that the constantly repeated attacks on the railroad line Zagreb-Karlovac seemed to make it desirable to evacuate all villages close to the line and if necessary to destroy them in so far as these villages cannot be garrisoned with railroad security troops and in particular with the first Cossack division. Further, the 69th Corps asked for information as to the intentions in this respect. Can you remember this affair, General? And mainly can you remember what was the answer given to the 15th Corps to this inquiry?
A I cannot remember this inquiry in detail. All I can say is that in my area, no villages were destroyed unless it was necessary for military and tactical reasons.
Q Will you for the time being remain with the question of the securing of railroad lines by the Cossacks? I believe there is also a daily report of the 13th of January, 1944, which refers to this sphere. This report is contained in Document Book 15 on page 56 of the English text and 83 of the German text. This is Exhibit 370 and it says here in the daily report of the 13th of January, 1944, under the first Cossack division, "area 18 kilometers south of Zagreb, village taken after firing of shots, band suspects arrested." Can you give us your comments to this sentence?
A This undoubtedly is an operation with the intent to secure the railroad line. The division had undoubtedly ascertained that from this village frequently surprise attacks and dynamitings of the railroad line had been carried out and that possibly a band was quartered in that village. Then this division would have attacked the village and after brief fighting it would have conquered the village and since the bands were not uniformed, all those people who in some way were suspected were arrested first of all. It was not possible to do it in a different way because the bands didn't wear any uniforms.