AAs a matter of principal SS units were made subordinate to the Army only for tactical purposes. That means, tactically for a certain definite combat purpose they had been attached to us but equally as a matter of principle they were not subordinate to the Army in disciplinary or judicial matters. Should, therefore, during that combat action when they were subordinate to the Corps, any irregularity occur neither the Corps nor the Army Group under whom they then were for tactical purposes could regulate this matter judicially or from a disciplinary point of view.
Q May I perhaps draw attention to the fact that maybe one word has been wrongly translated, as far as I understood, that the German word "Heeresteil" was translated "Army Group". It should be "part of the Army, German-English Interpreter: "part of the Army." Thank you very much. Witness, now the question was also very important how the collaboration with the plenipotentiary of the Reichsfuehrer SS was regulated. Was he subordinate and his agency subordinate to you and the Corps in any sense?
A The plenipotentiary of the Reichsfuehrer SS in Croatia had police tasks assigned to him. Any connection between the Operational Staff of the XV Mountain Corps and him did not exist.
Q If I have understood you correctly, Witness, he certainly was not subordinate to you?
A Certainly not.
Q. What about the SD? How were their channels of command? Were SD units ever under you?
A. No, they were subordinate to the SS and Police Leader Croatia but not to the Wehrmacht. Occasionally, in the event of operations, such as the "Operation Panther", about which we will still have to talk, SD units were detached for certain independent tasks and as such they were attached without this entailing their subordination to the Group.
Q. Witness, the Prosecution have submitted in Document Book XVI, on page 73 of the English version and page 117 of the German version, Exhibit No. 386. This Exhibit concerns an order of the 2nd Panzer Army under the 14th of March 1943 about channeling of orders in the Northern Crotian area. In the Document Book of the Prosecution there are only paragraphs 3 and 8 of this document contained. The fact that they have selected those two paragraphs leads me to the conclusion that the Prosecution wants to establish by this document the intimate connection between the Reich Fuehrer SS and the troops. In order to clear up this point I have included paragraph 1 and 2 of this document in my own Document Book. I offer it as Leyser Exhibit No. 20. May I show the photostatic copy of this document to you, General, and perhaps you can tell the Court what this order actually meant.
(DR. TIPP TAKES THE DOCUMENT TO THE WITNESS.)
A. Paragraph 1 shows that with the beginning of the "Operation Cannae" the General Command LXIXth and the Command of the XXIInd Mountain Corps were to be put under the immediate authority of Army Group F with respect to the course of their participation in the "Operation Cannae". All local operational and tactical tasks were to be left for a while. Paragraph 2 of this order arranges new regulations for the channelizing of command in the Northern Croatian area. May I say here that my own Corps, the XVth Mountain Corps, was not participating in the Northern Croatian area. Therefore, Paragraph 2 only mentions the first Cossack Division, which was to take over the area of the LXIXth Army Corps, and simply the Commander in Chief, Syrmia, but the XVth Corps is not mentioned.
DR. TIPP: My attention has just been drawn to the fact that the document is wrongly numbered in the English Document Book. Leyser Document No. 38 is contained in the English Document Book but not under that number. In the English Document Book it is simply included as the continuance of Document No. 37.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: And what page is it?
DR. TIPP: It is in Document Book II on page 112, if your Honors please. It says in the English Document Book II von Leyser, Leyser Document No. 37, and as the page number it says page 5 up on the top. In other words, it would be the 5th page of Leyser Document Book No. 37. May I perhaps ask that the English Document Book be corrected to the fact that on Page 112 it should be the first page of Leyser Document No. 38.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: I find it on page 108, Leyser Document No. 37, in Document Book II, and it is found on pages 108 and 109.
DR. TIPP: May I say in this connection that Leyser Document No. 37 starts in the English Document Book on page 108 and comprises the pages 100, 109, 110, and 111. On page 111 in the English Document Book there is the certificate which I signed, namely, that it is a true and correct copy, which shows that this is the end of that document. On page 112 the Translation Department, by mistake, continued with Leyser Document No. 37, and they called it page 5 of this document, but page 112 actually is the first page of Leyser Document No. 38, which consists of only one page.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: Thirty-eight. Document No. 38 on page 112, Exhibit 20.
DR. TIPP: Yes, and this is the document I have just offered as Leyser Exhibit 20.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: Exhibit 20.
DR. DR. TIPP:
Q. General, would you be kind enough to continue?
A. Therefore the 15th Mountain Corps was not included among the commanding agencies under figure 3 in the second paragraph of figure 3 the representative of the Reich Fuehrer SS is asked to contact the commanding agencies, the XVth Mountain Army Corps is not concerned.
Q. To clear up this point, Your Honors, I might say that Paragraph 3 to which General von leyser has just made reference is not included in my document book, but has been included by the Prosecution in their document booK. As I said before, this is Exhibit 366, NOKW-1352, on page 73 of the English Document Book. This order can only be understood, therefore, if one reads paragraphs 1 and 2 in my document book, and paragraph 3, as contained in the Prosecution's Document Book. Then, it becomes quite clear what General von Leyser said just no, namely, that this order did not concern the XVth Mountain Army Corps at all, but it was merely passed on to the XVth Mountain Army Corps for purposes of information.
Q. General, in this connection we should also discuss the next Prosecution Exhibit, which is Exhibit 387, contained in the same Document Book VXI, on page 75 of the English Document Book and page 119 of the German Document Book. It is Document No. NOKW-1353. The passage to which I have reference now is a radio message by the Second Panzer Army, addressed to the XVth Mountain Army Corps, of 17 March 1944. Under Paragraph 2 it says there that the representative of the Reich Fuehrer SS in Croatia is asked to contact the commanding agencies in the Croatian area, including the XVth Mountain Army Corps.
Why was this ordered, General, and for what purpose?
A. The purpose is described in Paragraph 2 of this document. As long as the "Operation Cannae" was to last all troops available in the Croatian area were to be united in order to safeguard vital communication lines to the utmost extent. For that reason, for this limited period of time, cooperation had been ordered with the plenipotentiary of the Reich Fuehrer SS.
Q. Did these orders ever come into effect at all, General?
A. No.
Q. Why not?
A. "Operation Cannae" was never carried out. As far as I have heard this was to be a preventive measure calculated for the event of Hungary's desertion.
Q. And Hungary did not desert, did she?
A. No, she did not. It was merely a matter of camouflage. Again, "Cannae" was a camouflage term.
Q. We discussed the units which were subordinate to you. We discussed the question of channels of command for the SS and the plenipotentiary of the Reich Fuehrer SS. I shall now come to the question of how far the so-called indigenous units were under you.
A. Indigenous formations were subordinate to me only for tactical purposes, if they were subordinate at all. Cooperation was extremely vague. Any incidents could be punished in disciplinary and judicial respect only through Croatian agencies. Indigenous formations could always avoid being used for tactical purposes by quoting orders from their superior agencies. These units were to be regarded as Allied units. What we are concerned with here is the Croatian militia.
Q. In order to make this quite clear, what indigenous units were there under the command of the Armed Forces?
A. What we had were the Domobrans which constituted the only really effective Croatian Armed Forces, but you had also to include the Ustasha units but they were organized in battalions.
Q. Would you please repeat the last part of your answer, General?
A. By indigenous units, we mean the Croatian Domobrans as they were called, which were really the Croatian Armed Forces. Then you have to include the Ustasha. battalions, but not the general Ustashas.
Q. May I ask you an additional question there, General? Is it true if I assume that the Ustashas, as such, were a party organization, whereas the Ustasha units or battalions can be regarded as a sort of SA or SS within that party organization?
A. The best comparison perhaps would be with our SS. The Ustasha. was the Allgemeine SS.
Q. There is in some documents reference to Cetnik units, General. What about them?
A. Cetnik units were units formed by Serbian volunteers in the Croatian area. Following a higher order--I forget who it came from, I believe by the OKW, units were to be disarmed, but for reasons at least reasons in my sector this was quite impossible because, otherwise, you would have exposed the Serba to the Ustashas who were their deadly enemies and there would have been a large scale butchering. For that reason, I at that time, contacted or had my Chief of Staff contact the loader of the Cetniks-only of the Croatian, Cetniks-and the resit of this was that these Cetnik units were in some cases made part of our units protecting the roads. When later on I reported to Fieldmarshal von Weichs, I explained this matter to him, to the effect that as conditions were in my corps area, it was not possible to disarm these Cetnik units. The Fieldmarshal told me thereupon that of course matters had to be adjusted to local conditions. Now, as for these Cetnik units, they were of course in certain cases more or less in contact with Mihajlovic but the leader of the Croatian Cetniks with whom I had to deal hoped, above all, that he would receive protection by the Wehrmacht against the Ustashas and this we achieved by negotiation.
We achieved this in such a way that we used them to protect the roads and supply lines against Tito's bands in Serbian villages.
These Cetnik units in some cases helped us in our fight against Tito' s partisans.
Q. Witness, were they a regular troop unit which was subordinate to you in any sense or how would you characterize these Cetnik units?
A. In the case of the Cetnik units, you can't speak of regular units just as little as you can't in the case of the Tito partisans. They were a local defense organization. They were local organizations for self-defense and had organized themselves for the joint battle against Tito bands and communists.
Q. Witness, from what the Prosecution have said here, we know that the Prosecution have taken the view that the Wehrmacht had exploited the battle of the ethical groups for purposes of its own. The Wehrmacht had played up the Serbs against the Croats and the Croats against the Serbs in order thus to decimate the population.
What can you tell us about that theory?
A. The Wehrmacht would be the last organization to follow such tactics. On the contrary, the Wehrmacht had great interest in maintaining law and order in this territory. Any policy of extermination was never our policy. As I explained before, we attempted with all the means at our disposal to stop this ethical battle. We wanted to prevent the Serbs and Croats from cutting their throats all the time. When the large bands were driven away from certain areas, I stationed only the Cetnik units in the Serbian villages and I did not permit that Ustasha units, as somebody intended, should also use these Serbian villages as bases. It was in other words our endeavor not to incite these people against each other.
On the contrary, we wanted to segregate them so that there would not be this mutual battle.
Q. About that point, I want to offer a document in conclusion. It is contained in Leyser Document Book II on page 127. I offer it as Leyser Exhibit 21. It is an affidavit by Hans Klein, a Lieutenant Colonel on the General Staff, the date is 15 September 1947, and the affidavit was sworn to on 15 September 1947 before a British or American officer in the Neustadt camp. This affidavit again contained a number of points connected with the material of this trial and in this connection I would like to read from this affidavit only paragraph 6. May I point out that paragraph 1 shows that Lt. Col. Klein was the Ia of the 369th Infantry Division in the area with which we are concerned and, as such, he was subordinate to General von Leyser.
Now to read from paragraph 6:
Cooperation with Croatian Army authorities: This cooperation was very difficult. The higher ranks may have been well-intentioned, but the troops were undisciplined, poorly trained, armed and clothed. There was no reliance to be placed in promises of Croatian Army authorities. The odd thing was that the Ustasha were the most unreliable element, hardly ever submitting to a law and least of all willing to obey a German order.
Ustasha units were tactically subordinated to the division and therefore, to the corps only for certain operations. The division submitted several reports about the conduct, the fighting qualities, etc. of these units in its command area. As a high ranking Ustasha officer came from Zagreb for an inspection on one occasion, I presume that the corps passed on the suggestions to his superior authority. However, all that did not bring about any basic changes in the conditions. This proves that neither the division nor the corps could assume responsibility for the actions of the Ustasha.
Paragraph 7 deals with the opponents of the Wehrmacht which we have discussed before. I can skip this point and shall now read from paragraph 8. It reads as follows:
"Cetniks: At the beginning of my assignment in Fall 1944 the division collaborated with the Cetniks. There was no doubt, though, that the Cetniks inwardly rejected us as the occupiers of their country, that they were adversaries of the Ustasha in whom they saw the most incompromising exponents of an independent Croatian state, while they wanted a unified Yugoslavia, and that they were no less hostile to the TITO-forces, because, in contrast to the latter, they aspired a unified Yugoslavia. leaning on the Western powers and not on Russia. Later on, when the Cetniks opposed the German forces, and obviously attempted to push to the coast in the Dubrovnik area, thus inviting the Western powers to effect a landing, TiTo concentrated superior forces and defeated then in the Bileja and Trebinje area. They thereupon then withdrew to the North."
I would like to offer this document about which I would like to say more later on as Exhibit No. 21. This, your Honors, brings me to a now chapter and I wonder whether it might be a good idea to have the recess until nine-thirty tomorrow morning.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 7 November 1947, at 0930 hours.)
Official Transcript of the American Military Tribunal in the matter of the United States of America against Wilhelm List, et al, defendants, sitting at Nurnberg, Germany, on 7 November 1947, 0930, Justice Wennersturm presiding.
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the Courtroom will please find their seats.
The Honorable, the Judges of Military Tribunal V. Military Tribunal V is now in session. God save the United States of America and this Honorable Tribunal.
There will be order in the Court.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Marshal, you will ascertain if all the defendants are present in the Courtroom.
THE MARSHAL: May it please Your Honor, all the defendants are present in the Courtroom except the Defendant von Weichs, who is still in the hospital.
THE PRESIDENT: You may proceed with the examination, Dr. Tipp.
WITNESS ERNEST von LEYSER - Resumed DIRECT-EXAMINATION - Continued BY DR. TIPP:
Q. General, last night we stopped our examination when we discussed the question of whether the Wehrmacht used the ethical conflict in the Croatian area in order, as the Prosecution alleges, to indulge in an extermination policy. In this connection you discussed also what we call the "indigenous formations." I don't think your answer in this respect was entirely clear. May I ask you, once more, to give us your comments on this point?
A. Nothing could be further from the mind of the Wehrmacht than an extermination policy. On the contrary it was in their interest to have this area in a state of law and order. As I explained before, we went to the limit to stop these conflicts as well as we could. To prevent the Croats and Serbs from going on with these bloody conflicts I ordered, after the area behind the coast had been cleared, that in the Serbian villages there must be no Ustasha units, in order to bring 5754a this fraternal battle to an end.
I said yesterday that I discussed with Field Marshal von Weichs that the disarming of the Cetniks in my area at the time would not be possible, but this must not be understood to mean that we were not able to do so. The point there was not a question of power, as I would like to put it, but it was purely a matter of expediency. The most important thing as I saw it at the time was that peace and order should reign in the hinterland so that I could carry out my main assignment, the defense of the coast and the safeguarding of the lines of supply. But I believe even that the man in charge of the Cetniks in that area, who was a cleric, also regarded this as a matter of expediency because he had to feel that, first of all, the Serbs in the Croatian area were greatly inferior in numbers in that part of the country. Now, should he have opposed us on top of that, he would have been faced, first of all, by the Wehrmacht, and secondly by the Ustasha, and thirdly by the Tito bands. He could never risk that. That is the reason why he decided that although he disliked us as the occupying power -- I am quite ready to admit that -- nevertheless it was the most expedient solution for him to be as close to the Wehrmacht as possible. In that case he was at least certain to be protected against the Ustasha, as well as against the Tito band, as far as possible. Now, I thought the most important thing for me to do was to subdue the fraternal battle between the Serbs and Croats, and I did not as the Prosecution alleges, indulge in political extermination. This might have been a simple thing for me to do if I had used the Cetniks. In that case I need not have used a single German soldier for the disarming of the natives, But I did not want to do that. And, therefore, I saw to it that the two should be segregated, but, at the same time, that put me under the obligation to see that the Serbs would be protected against the Tito bands, which I could do only by not disarming the Cetniks but by leaving them their arms so that they could fight back against the Tito bands and Communists. And that, as you might say, I used for my own purposes, for reasons of expediency, by using them for the defense of their own places so that my rear area should be more completely pacified.
Simultaneously I had to take into consideration that the order there to disarm them, which had come down from Higher Headquarters, became known to the Croatian Government and that it was the Croatian Ustasha which kept complaining that we had not disarmed the Cetniks, despite the existing order; but by putting these people in charge protecting places I could make it clear to the Croatian authorities why I did not disarm the Cetniks. I think that should be clear now, namely, that the Wehrmacht had no interest in exterminating the natives.
Q. General, an additional question to this: You are aware that the documents show that Cetnik units did certain things which had to be disapproved of by the Wehrmacht. You also said that the ethnic conflicts between the Serbs and the Croats led to excesses which the Wehrmacht was not able to suppress. Let me ask you this in this connection: In the reports which are available how are the Cetniks, these self-protective units of the Serbs minority, described? Could you tell us anything about that?
A. As a rule they are called Cetniks, but the local defense units were often described as Croat combat units. These were local defense organizations which, of course were not subordinate to us and did not amount to a military formation.
Q. Well, we will now leave this chapter, General, and talk about something else. You realize that the Prosecution mainly bases itself on orders issued and on reports which went from the troops to the corps and such reports which the Corps passed on to Higher Headquarters. In this connection I want to clear up one question first of all, namely, the way in which orders were issued. How were orders issued by the Corps, that is to say, you, to the subordinate units?
A. The most important operation orders were of course submitted to me for my signature. They then went out in writing to the divisions, but usually by teletype. All other orders of any importance were reported orally to me, and they were then passed on, having been signed by the Chief of Staff.
The usual form was: on behalf of the XVth Corps, the Chief of General Staff and then the signature.
Q. General, how were the channels of command regulated when you yourself were not at your battle headquarters?
A. If I had been absent for any length of time, for instance on leave, the question of deputizing for me would have had to have been regulated by the army. A permanent deputy would, in that case, have been appointed. But while I was down there with the XVth Army Corps this did not arise. Now, if I went away for a shorter period of time and if any important decisions had to be reached I would be telephoned or contacted by wireless, and my decision would be asked. In less important matters, which were not of basic significance, it was possible for the Chief of Staff to regulate these things in my absence. On my return the Chief of Staff would then report these matters to me orally, and that was that.
Q. You said just now that operational orders of a basic character were issued by you. Let me ask you this: When the Corps wanted to carry out an operation were you in a position to order that operation-were you in a position to order that operation independently, or did you have to obtain the approval of your superior agency for that purpose?
A. Large-scale operations, such as the "Operation Panther," which we shall discuss later on, needed the approval of the Army. Smaller operations could, needless to say, be carried out without the approval of the Army, but we had to report it to the Army.
Q. I believe, General, that the channel of command, i.e. from higher up to lower down is now quite clear. Now, let us discuss the reverse procedure. How was it that the Corps informed itself about events which had occurred within the scope of the subordinate units?
A. This was done by way of reports which the Corps received from the subordinate units. As a matter of principle these reports were sent through the official channels. For instance, the battalion would report to the regiment, the regiment would report to the division; and the division would report to the Corps.
Q. Were reports from units, which were subordinate to the division, that is to say, for instance, a report by a regiment to the division or a report by a battalion to a regiment, were these submitted to the Corps?
A. Not as a rule. The divisions would compile these reports by their subordinate units into a report of their own, which was then passed on to the Corps. Of course there were exceptions to the rule. So that when the divisions submitted reports to the Corps they would now and then include reports on combat engagements which the subordinate units had performed for reasons of illustrations.
Q. But, as a rule, you say the Corps would receive a compiled report by the division so that reports from the subordinate units would, as a rule, not reach the Corps?
A. Not as a rule, no, or at least in most cases they would not reach the Corps.
Q. Now, did only units report to the Corps which were subordinate to it?
A. No, aside from these subordinate divisions there were reports, for instance, from those formations which were no longer under the Corps. Let me give you an example: The 114th Rifle Division, while it marched to Italy, was no longer under the Corps. The reason for the fact that it nevertheless reported through the Corps was that the communication lines between the division and the Army would not have been sufficient, which is the reason why that division, during its march to Italy, with its somewhat inadequate wireless equipment, first reported to the Corps and then the Corps reported to the Army. Therefore if any unit stationed in the area of the Corps reported to the Corps that did not necessarily indicate a subordination to the Corps.
Q. General, we have discussed now who reported to the Corps. The next question is what sort of things were reported to the Corps.
A. As a matter of principle, anything which was of significance for future orders by the Corps was reported to it. For instance, the divisions would report all events which had occurred in their area, including oven those which were not of a tactical character and also incidents which had occurred with the enemy and the subordinate troops, with Allied troops, with the civilian population, or units which were not subordinate.
All these things would also be reported to the Corps. That was necessary so that the Corps would be informed about everything that happened within its area.
Q. Now, when the Corps passed on these things to the Army what was included in those reports?
A. The Corps would, of course, report all important events to tho army so that the Army would also be informed about them.
Q. Now, another question, General: In which way were you yourself informed about what sent on in the area of the Corps?
A. Incoming reports went, first of all, to the Chief of Staff, who would distribute them to the various experts concerned. Anything of special importance would be submitted to me immediately, after its reception, by the Chief of Staff himself orally. On the basis of in-coming reports the concerned compiled the most important details into the Daily Reports which were passed on to tho Army. The final edition of the Daily Report was up to the Ia, the first officer of the General Staff. On every day, late in the afternoon, there was a conference about the situation in my Corps. On those occasions the Chief of Staff, the Ia, the Ic, and the IIa were there, as a matter of principle. Also, those experts who had to report anything special were there. When we discussed the situation in those conferences, first of all, the Chief of Staff would report to me the most important events of the day in broad outlines. After chat every expert would report about his special field, and on those occasions the reports were submitted to me which had come from the divisions and also the Daily Report which we passed on to tho Army. On tho basis of those reports it was also reported to me what had come in by other divisions.
I would thereupon initial the Daily Report which We sent on to the Army without reading it in detail, I would like to say, because the contents had been reported to me orally If I was absent and returned only after the conference which was held nevertheless by the Chief of staff, the reports would be submitted to me after my return and again I would initial those reports. And here again the experts concerned would submit the most important matters to me.
Q. General, about the question of reports: The Prosecution have submitted a document which is contained in Document Book XV, on page 51 of the English and page 74 of the German. The Exhibit number is 369, and it is Document NOKW-1425, the English on page 51 of Document Book 15. It is an order by the XVth Mountain Corps of the 25th of January 1944. It concerns imports to Department Ia, and it is signed by the Chief of the General staff for Corps Headquarters. I do not want to discuss this long document with its somewhat boring contents with you, General, but there are one or two points which might be of significance for these proceedings here. Let me give you the document first.
(DR. TIPP HANDS THE DOCUMENT TO THE WITNESS.)
Let me ask you a few questions: Under Roman numeral "I" we have the over-all report, whereas under "II" we have the various details. Now, in that paragraph it is ordered under "Ia" that special events and incidents outside the fighting zone should be included in the Daily Reports. Let me interpolate. I believe that special passage is not contained in the English Document Book. General, let me ask you this: What is generally to be understood in German Wehrmacht terminology by the tern "Special events"? You know that a "special event" is a German military term, and I should be grateful if you could explain it to us.
A. Under "special events" or incidents, anything had to be reported that had occurred within the area of the reporting unit, in this case in the area of the divisions, during the time under review. This includes, among other things, events which had occurred with units which although they were stationed in the area of the division were not subordinate to the division and the Corps. By this order it was to be made quite sure that events and special incidents were reported so that the Corps would be kept up-to-date about anything which had occurred within the area in the time under review. For instance, what should be included under that paragraph was events that occurred with the Croat units, Cetnik units, SS formations, and so forth. The incident concerned, of course, had to be an important one, but quite independent of the fact whether or not the unit or formation concerned was subordinate to the division or not. Later on, we shall have, I feel, to discuss documents submitted by the prosecution where we shall see how important this principal is.
Q. Would you give me my document book back, please, General. I want to put something else to you in this connection, General. Unfortunately, the paragraph to which I have reference now is not included in the English document book. In order to make this quite clear, I would like to read it briefly. It is Roman II and Arabic 3. small b. It is on page 78 of the German book. This paragraph is cOncerned with the billeting cards which had to be submitted by the division to the Corps. This is what it says: "The troops, apart from our own Army, Navy and Luftwaffe troops, have to report about all other military units (Crotian Rifle Men and Mountain Troops, other Croat defense units, Ustasha protective troops along the railways and garrisons, volunteer units, etc.
May I ask you, General, why these troops had to report bad film to the Corps although the units according to what you have said were not subordinate to the Corps?
A. Well, these troops were stationed in the area of the Corps which is the reason why the Corps had to be informed about them.
Q. General, I do not wish to discuss the other details of this order. We shall have to speak quite a lot about the reports later on in these proceedings and on those occasions we can go into the principal matters. But there is one thing I would like to ask you now. Did the troops observe this order which is so detailed an order?
A. From the documents submitted, it seems to me that it becomes quite clear that in actual fact the troops acted this way. Of course, there is one important restriction I have to make here. The troops could carry out the order only in so far as they had sufficient technical equipment for the purpose. As the lines of communication were frequently disrupted, the reports very often did not come in. Any explanation had to be kept extremely short because the reports were usually passed on over the wireless.
Q. If the Tribunal please, in this connection, namely reports and lines of communication, I would like to have reference to two documents which I have already introduced but there are paragraphs included in them which I have not read yet and I have said that I should come back to them. The first document to which I have reference now is in Defense Document Book No. 2 on page 122. This is document Leyser No. 43, which I have offered as Exhibit 19. It is an affidavit by the former Brigadier General Reinicke, dated 22 September 1947. I would like to read from this affidavit. Paragraph 3 which deals with the matter of reports. It is on page 124 of the English document book:
3) To report regularly or even periodically often became impossible owing to the very bad lines of communications. The means of communications were very poor. As we were considered a minor theater of war, we did not receive the newest apparatus and losses were replaced only grudgingly. Telephone lines were constantly cut through partisan attacks. Thus only wireless remained which naturally resulted in a heavy overload of work. Frequent breakdowns, usually at night, cut the units off, completely, from Command H.Q. Thus it happened to me, as Divisional Commander, that I could not get in touch by wireless with a regiment near Nevesinje at a time when a very critical disengaging movement was in progress, neither was it possible anymore to get in touch with them in any other way as the only road available, was impassable for dispatch riders or lone cars.