I always felt that we were not faced by a fair opponent in our Section of military operations. Particularly in my capacity as minister for hospitals and as Burial officer I had the opportunity to note that the mutilation of German soldiers by the enemy was not unusual. I recall that on several occasions in the summer of 1943 I buried mutilated German dead. I also still remember clearly two photo pictures which were once given to me by the unit of two dead soldiers as a piece of evidence in the Breke/ Serbia sector. According to these photos both dead were found stark naked; the one showed besides the shotwound a complete splitting of his skull, presumably executed with an axe, while the other had his whole abdomen cut open. Yet another case is fresh in my memory: In the summer of 1943 as garrison priest I buried 2 German flyers of the airbase Zagreb in the military cemetery in Zagreb. They had been ambushed and shot down, defenseless and without weapons while they were bathing in a lake near the airdrome.
Figure 2 of the document deals with the Commando Order, and I would like to come back to this figure later on in another connection.
The next document which has reference here, 2nd which I would like to offer, comes from Document Book II, page 122. It is Leyser Document No. 43, and this receives the Exhibit No. Leyser 19. This document is an affidavit by Brigadier General George Reinicke living near Munich, and the affidavit was duly sworn to before a notary in Munich on the 22nd of September 1947. This affiant also states a number of facts which are of interest for the various counts in this trial, and here I am concerned with figure 2 of this affidavit.
First of all, I would like to draw the attention of the Tribunal to figure 1. Under this figure, the affiant describes why he is able to give information about General Leyser and the Croatian area. He states that he had contact with him as Army Engineer officer of the 2nd Panzer Army and that from January, 1945, General Leyser was the immediate superior of the affiant when he was Commander of the 369th Infantry Division.
In figure 1, General Reinicke states further facts about General von Leyser's personality, his chivalrous attitude towards the troops and the civilian population, and I would like to draw this to the attention of the Tribunal without quoting from it.
Figure 2 describes the methods of fighting in the Croatian area and I would like to quote:
2. "As to the methods of battle in the Croatian area in the time under discussion I can say the following: Only in the year 1945 did I meet regular enemy units in the Croatian area, who had come from the coastal area. Previously the enemy was so to speak, invisible, he changed into harmless peasants, lived right among the population and in the inaccessible forest and mountainous districts. In small numbers, he ambushed lone cars and leave trains; looted transports, destroyed rail tracks, bridges, telephone wires; the enemy were typical guerillas. He would not meet regular troops; if one was with them, that was safest. The individual incidents became so numerous, that they were part of the daily news. Two incidents, personally witnessed, might throw a light on the methods used by these bands. On a journey from the billets to the Army via Visegrad to Sarajevo a grenade was thrown at my car from an ambush in a lonely spot and one of the officers accompanying me, was wounded. On another journey, from Skutari towards Kotor, I met a German lorry, which had been ambushed and which lay on the road, burned out. The occupants of the lorry had been killed by a hand grenade. Behind the ledge of a rock, there lay a dead civilian, next to him there were still some unexploded grenades and the rifle was hidden behind the rock. This attack had taken place shortly before my arrival and a soldier who had got away by a timely jump off the car confirmed my conclusions drawn on the spot, namely that this was the case of a treacherous attack in a road which was otherwise quite safe. The perpetrators were in no way recognizable as soldiers, as was confirmed by the appearance of the body left behind.
"In this area there raged a battle of each against everyone else. For instance in Visegrad the Serbs had murdered all Moslems with their wives and children. During the time of my predecessor, the Croats in my division had refused to fight with the Cetniks against the partisan bands, as they considered the Cetniks their enemies. During the period of my command, the Ustasha burned down a village near Mostar and killed the population.
The German Commander could in no way influence these happenings. These old quarrels were fought out, without anyone knowing anything about it, until afterwards."
I would like to come back to the other passages in this document again later on.
BY DR. TIPP:
Q General, now we will continue with the discussion about the fighting down there, and I would like to ask you what was your impression of the aims of the bands when you were first with the 15th Army Corps.
A Through the capitulation of the Italian army, the bands obtained large stocks of weapons, ammunition and food; therefore, in the isolated mountain districts where they had their camps, large depots were set up. And during the first months when I was there for this reason, they were able to carry out attacks against larger localities. Mostly these were localities which were occupied by Croatian troops, and they even had some partial success here which, however, was made up for later on. They evaded the fighting with regular German troops because they were not equal to the German troops. Therefore after they had suffered very serious losses everywhere, they preferred to retire into their hiding places into the band quarters in the mountains in order to re-organize and to retrain themselves there, since they realized that with this bad leadership and with these badly trained troops they could never carry out a successful fight, against the German troops. They did this primarily so that when the invasion took place they would be ready and prepared to attack the Germans from the rear. Above all, then it would be most important the to occupy the supply lines to the coastal defense positions and prevent supplies reaching these positions.
Q Witness, then you said that these band centers would be chiefly a danger if these troops attacked the fighting German troops at the coast from the rear when the allied landing took place. I asked which measures then did the German leadership plan to take this danger?
A This was part of my commission which I had received from the army.
The aim was that this organization and the training and development of the so-called troops or army or whatever they called it, should be destroyed before the allied landing, and their depots and camps were to be destroyed so that they would have no kind of reserves.
In addition, of course, the bandit territories had to be cleared of the bands. Principally those territories which were near the coast or near the defense positions.
Q And was this aim achieved, General? This aim you have just described.
A One can say yes, but of course, this is only important when -- I would like to say yes, in that respect when I went, there were of course only six months available and first of all there were bandits all over the territory and this territory had first of all to be cleared, but I can really say that afterwards this territory was so cleared, but I can really say that afterwards this territory was so cleared of the large bands that the communication between the large towns which I described in sketch I was so created and also the real area from the coast to the foothills that there communication between the troops existed.
In addition, through these operations, which we took against these bands, it was shown that on principle there where we had advanced right into the centers, the depots of the bands an act of sabotage or shall we say larger attacks by the bands did not take place.
Q And If I understood you correctly, General, you want to say that the centers of the bands were actually destroyed?
A Yes.
Q And the fighting of the bands, witness, when you came to the Balkans was rather new to you; but on the other hand, it was nothing new for the fighting in the Balkans, as such. In this trial here, as you know, the reprisal measures taken against members of the bands or at least which were connected with this fighting of the bands, play a very important part. Now, we must come to this chapter of the reprisal measures and I would like to ask you, first of all, to tell us what was your first impression about these things. First of all, why were these measures necessary?
AAs I said, the bands and principally the small bands carried out sabotage acts on railroads, roads, and communication lines. In addition, these bands attacked trains, individual soldiers, small troop units, vehicle columns, and principally wounded transports. These were daily occurrences. The troops tried with all the means at their disposal to guard against this, mainly through the security service, by informing the population through pamphlets, and by installing confidence agents and finally the population was told that those kinds of happenings could only contribute to their own disadvantage. Then if all these measures were without success, then in the end, in the interests of the troops, reprisal measures had to be taken. As such, there came into the question the taking of hostages, the destruction of the band quarters where these people gathered together to commit these acts of sabotage, and in the most extreme case of emergency the shooting of hostages.
Q. The whole system, General, was already in progress when you arrived in the Balkans in October/November 1943, and I would like to ask you what the situation was when you arrived, who was responsible then for the carrying out of reprisal measures.
A. At that time this was of course regulated fundamentally by Fuehrer Orders. The carrying out of reprisal measures was given over to the divisional commanders on their own responsibility, and, in agreement with the Croatian liaison authorities these commanders had to carry out these reprisal measures if they occurred at all, but in any case first of all this was how the position was when I took over the corps.
Q. During the course of the proceedings the reprisal measures and the orders for carrying out these reprisal measures have played a very important part. You know what a large number of orders were the subject for discussion here. When you took over the corps were any fundamental orders of this kind submitted to you?
A. Yes, but if I had been given all the fundamental orders which had been issued before my time and if I had had to read them all, then I would never have gotten rid of all this mountain of paper. For me the most important thing was thoroughly to learn to know my troops and the terrain there. For after all I was a soldier and I had to carry out tactical tasks. But of course, I was told about the fundamental valid and important orders by my expert, so that I knew about them.
Q. General, I would like to save time for the Tribunal, and for all, and therefore I don't want to talk about all the basic orders here. But there is one order which we can't get away from and this is the order of the 2nd Panzer Army dated the 15 of September 1943, which General Rendulic already discussed extensively here a few days ago. This order was submitted by the prosecution in Document Book 14, English page 15, German page 11, and it is Exhibit 340, the Document number is NOKW 509. General, do you need this order, or do you know the outlines of it?
A. Yes.
Q. Might I ask you, General, if this order as set down in the document book was known to you at that time?
A. Yes, it was certainly submitted to me in fundamental outlines, but whether it was contained amongst the many documents or whether I read it at that time, I don't know, but at any rate I knew about it.
Q. General, perhaps it might seem rather strange that you can't remember this kind of important order; this order is a compilation of all the orders issued on these lines. Can you perhaps explain your gaps of memory?
A. It is perhaps understandable, if I say, that during the first November days when I arrived many things were submitted and reported to me, and as I have already stated, first of all I wanted to know all about my troops and the area and then in November the preparations began for the first large operation. At the beginning of December the operation itself, the Panther operations took place, and then this order was already rescinded. A new order came, and therefore that is perhaps why I can't remember this order exactly. Of course it was only valid for a short time, while I was there.
Q. Now, a fundamental question which is not confined to this order. Witness, you know that the shooting of hostages was mainly not in agreement with International Law, as asserted by the prosecution, because the reprisal ratios, in individual cases were much too high. You know also that the famous ratio of one to 100 played an important part. General Rendulic, a few days ago, during this case stated that reprisal measures of this kind was never carried out in his sphere of command. Now to bear out this testimony, might I ask you whether in the sphere of the 15th Army Corps during your time any kind of extremely high reprisal ratio was ever carried out? I don't want to bind you to any figures, I just mean extremely high ratios?
A. No, in my sector such incidents never occurred. I think that all the documents which have been submitted by the prosecution show this quite clearly.
Q. We will talk about all these documents later on, witness. Now quite generally another question; were reprisal measures carried out for every raid and for every sabotage act?
A. No, and the documents show this too; not for every case, and if it occurred at all, it occurred very rarely and only when absolutely necessary.
Q. And now as we are talking about the order, General, I would like to ask you a fundamental question. It is the standard question, which has frequently been put here, namely as to the carrying out of issued orders, might I ask your opinion about this?
A. My opinion is the same as every soldier in the World. Issued orders have to be carried out. That is a matter of principle. But of course it is natural that within the scope of the order given the local and other possibilities have to come into the question.
Q. And now lets get back again to the order of 15 September 1943. I would like to ask you whether this order was carried out in accordance with the principles you have just made?
A. Yes, and it was just in the case of reprisal measures that the circumstances of the individual case and the local and factual considerations played a very important part for every judgment of the question whether and to what extent reprisal measures were to be carried out.
Q. I think that is sufficient for this point, and now another question. You arrived newly in the area and you had to form some kind of opinion; what was your personal opinion of reprisal measures, quite generally speaking?
A. I was confronted with this question for the first time in Croatia. Band warfare was a completely new territory for me. With regard to the reprisal measures themselves I would like to say that no soldier likes carrying out reprisal measures. They are quite alien to a soldier's nature, but reprisal measures, in view of the attitude and the conditions in the Balkans, I think I can say were unfortunately unavoidable.
They had become necessary through the attitude of the civilian population and the bands. And we weren't actually the reason why reprisal measures were ordered and had to be ordered, but exclusively the otherside. Croatia was an independent state, and the maintenance of peace and order in this area was an affair of the Croatian state, and if in the territory of this state the population carried out sabotage acts and raids, then this was an action against their own state, against their own government, and against those members of the Allied German troops. The security of the troops and the peace and order in the country demanded for security and intimidation reasons the carrying out of reprisal measures, and my troops were also of the same opinion, but as the last resort such reprisal measures were necessary because of the attitude of the population and of the bands. We could not decide whether we were to carry out reprisal measures or not, this was exclusively an affair of the attitude of the other side. If raids and sabotage acts were carried out inspite of all warnings threats to the population, then, in order to maintain the security of the troops energetic measures were necessary. The provisions of the Hague Land Warfare Convention, against which we are supposed to have committed violations, are after all not set down to protect the bands or the guerrillas, but to protect the peace loving population and to protect the soldier who had to do his duty in the foreign country. And I would like to say that the attacks on the railroads, on the supply lines, etc. hit the peaceful population as well as the German troops. For all these reasons reprisal measures, as were carried within the sphere of my corps, could not be avoided. They were militarily necessary.
JUDGE BURKE: We will take our afternoon recess.
THE MARSHAL: Court will be in recess until 1515 hours.
(Thereupon a 15-minute recess was taken.)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
BY DR. TIPP:
Q. General, the last thing you told us was the attitude you took toward reprisal measures, you said that they were a military necessity to the extent that they were taken in your area; is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. A few more single questions about this point. I ask you, General, in the event of an act of sabotage or a surprise attack did the troops report what reprisal measures they intended to carry out in that particular case?
A. No, this was entirely up to the divisional commanders and the decision was arrived at in agreement with the Croatian Plenipotentiary and that was what the order ordered. If the troops reported at all that they intended to carry out reprisal measures, then they would report in a very general way, but never the details.
Q. If I have understood you correctly, General, your answer amounts to the fact that you in your capacity as a Commanding General were never informed beforehand what measures were taken by the individual troop units under your command; is that correct?
A. Yes, that is quite correct.
Q. Witness, as a matter of principle were there any inquiries made before a reprisal was carried out, whether and to what extent reprisal measures were to be carried out?
A. No, the decision as I have explained, was with the divisional commander in connection with the Croatian Plenipotentiary.
Q. Did you yourself ever order the carrying out of a reprisal measure in an individual case?
A. No, never at all.
Q. Did you within the area of your Corps issue any basic orders concerning reprisals?
A. No.
Q. Witness, let us leave the question of reprisal measures for a bit and come to the field of tasks which you had, I mean your military tasks; what was your idea as to how the coast would be defended against enemy landings, how the lines of communication were to be safeguarded because you told us that you took reprisal measures only as the ultimate method to achieve your aims?
A. The situation, which I found, I have already described when I explained Sketch No. 1. That is why I first of all had to get hold of the area which was necessary for me if I wanted to carry out my order, i.e., the area along the coast and in some cases the rear areas were also of high importance for the safeguarding of a smooth run of supplies.
Q. What were your plans, General, as to the carrying out of your tasks?
A. Well, one could be of a different opinion about them. After I had been there for some time and had become acquainted with the operation "panther", about which more later on, I sent a report to the 2nd Panzer Army. The Army was not entirely happy with what I told them, but that is not unusual in military life and as a soldier, I was used to comply with orders. Moreover the reasons, which motivated me to send that report became obsolete by the fact that the Army did not have the forces which I needed for my purposes. They had been taken a way from there and I had to be content with the lesser forces and I had to see to it that I would still carry out the order which I had been given.
Q. As we are here concerned with tactical problems, General, which are not really pertinent for this trial, it seems to me that this should be sufficient.
May I draw attention to the fact that the report which you mentioned, the one to the 2nd Panzer Army, has not been submitted by the Prosecution, but what they have submitted is the reply by the Army. This is contained in Document Book 25, where it is Exhibit 570, on page 53 of the English, and page 42 of the German book, it is document NOKW 1772, but I don't think that from this document we can see anything that is of relevance to these proceedings.
Let me ask you in what manner was the occupation of the coast and the pacifying of the inner land actually carried out in the ensuing period of time?
A. As I did not have sufficient forces at my disposal, any large scale operations such as had taken place before were no longer carried out , or rather, they could not be carried out anymore. Instead of that operations in the strength of battalions and regiments were carried out with the distinct order to reach the depots and band centers in order to, as I said before, establish a basis to disperse the bands and destroy their places by depriving them of their depots where they had stored arms, supplies, food, etc. This was to deprive the bands of the possibility of becoming an active factor in the area.
Q. If I understood you correctly, Witness, you said already in reply to another question that this aim on the whole was achieved?
A. Yes.
Q. After this, General, let us please go on in the chronological order of things. When we discussed the reprisal orders we left the chronological order for a bit -- You said before that the order of 15 September 1943 was substituted shortly after you took over by another basic order of that kind; what order did you mean by that?
A. I mean the order by the Commander in Chief Southeast of 22 December 1943, signed by General Loehr.
Q. That order has been introduced by the Prosecution, Witness. It is contained in Document Book 16, page 47 of the English, 98 of the German version, it is prosecution document NOKW 172 offered as Exhibit 397. This basic order has been discussed before I do not think that we need to discuss it once more with you. I would merely like to ask you a few important questions in this connection, which were important to you as the Commanding General of the Corps. Who, according to this order, was responsible and/or authorized to order and carry out reprisal measures?
A. What this order says is "Divisional Commanders in agreement with the sub-area headquarters concerned", therefore the Corps had nothing to do with it directly.
Q As far as the area of the 15th Corps, i.e. Croatia, was concerned were there any special regulations in this order?
A Yes, the carrying out of reprisal measures has been regulated in this order, it says there under the paragraph, "Who is permitted to carry out reprisal measures." I think it reads something like that, "In Croatia representatives of the Croatian Government and of the German agencies entrusted with all decisions concerning reprisal measures," that is to say reprisal measures were carried out after an agreement had been established between the Divisional Commander and the representative of the Croatian Government. The decision about this was with the Croatian liaison officer.
Q Now, were there with your divisions such representatives of the Croatian Government, whom as you say were charged with the decisions on reprisal measures.
A Yes, with every divisional staff there was a representative of the Croatian Government.
Q Can you, on the basis of this order, tell us something about the purpose of these reprisal measures; would you like to see the order, General?
A Yes, please, I don't know it offhand.
Q What I asked you last was what do you see in the order about the purpose of the reprisal measures?
A There again the order is very informative. By inflicting reprisal measures future surprise attacks were to be avoided and the order states this unequivocally in the introductionary remarks.
Q Did you yourself issue any basic directives connected with this order, what I mean is not any obvious formal additional remarks, I mean something like basic additions?
A Well the order was so clear in itself that no additional remarks were necessary. I always informed my divisional Commanders and other officers when I visited their units that they must never carry out reprisal measures independently. They should always remain within the scope of given orders.
Q Did you yourself make sure that reprisal measures were only carried out if and when there was a necessity and only to the extent which was necessary from the point of view of the purpose which you have just mentioned?
A Yes, as I said before I enlightened my commanders on the fact that reprisal measures must be in a reasonable proportion to the act which calls for retaliation. I also pointed out to them that needless to say there must not be an act of reprisal for every small act of sabotage, but that reprisal measures were the last resort and should remain the last resort and the purpose should be achieved with the smallest means. This task was made easy for me by my Divisional Commanders, because both the commanders and the troops were not in favour of reprisal measures. They thought it would be a much better idea to apprehend the perpetrators to cleanse the districts where there was much band activity by means of own operations because they thought the bandits were the perpetrators, but in only a few cases which were of so obvious a nature were reprisal measures reported. This I think, is also born out by the document concerning my Corps.
Q Did you ever have an opportunity, General, to make sure that these principles were observed in individual cases?
AAs far as I had the opportunity, I checked up on them and found out what the facts were, but when I checked up I could never find out that my men had acted arbitrarily or cruelly. For the rest, I was their tactical commander and my hands were so full with my operational assignments that I need hardly say it was not possible for me to bother about every small report and every small detail. As for the carrying out of reprisal measures, this was, as I said before, entirely in the hands of the divisions and my Divisional commanders, whose attitude I have touched upon just now, were experienced troop officers on whom I could rely and I felt that I could rely on them without reservations. In the final analysis we were concerned little with reprisal measures in the Croatian area.
They were measures taken by the Croatian State against its own nationals as the decision lay with the representatives of the Croatian Government. What I could do and had to do in order to supervise all these things, I am quite sure I did do.
Q Now, as far as that question is concerned, were there any difficulties with the Croatian authorities, were there complaints on the part of the Croatian authorities concerning those measures.
A Complaints of that sort did occur on occasion, yes. They were investigated of course, but it was usually shown that the Croatian complaints were without foundation and in most cases the Croatians apologized afterwards when they saw themselves that the complaint had not been justified.
Q General, to this point i.e. complaints by Croatian agencies, a few documents have been submitted. They are included in Document Book 15 of the Prosecution. On page 61 of the English text, Exhibit 371. This is document NOKW 1419. Now within the scope of that document the Prosecution has submitted a letter which is on page 63 of the English Document Book and on page 90 of the German. This is a letter by the German Plenipotentiary General in Croatia of 6 December 1943, it is addressed to the 15th Mountain Corps. The contents of the document show that on 12 December 1943 the letter was passed on to two subordinate divisions, which were the 264th Division and the 114th Rifle Division. General, do you remember that document?
A I do.
Q Well, let us discuss two points which I take from this document. First there is a complaint by the representative of the Civilian Administration of Dalmatia concerning the distribution of the booty of war. The Croatian Plenipotentiary complains about the fact that the Wehrmacht has considered too much of the captured material, booty of war; what can you tell us about that?
AAs far as this booty was concerned this was by no means Croatian private property, but Italian Armed Forces property and we captured it after the Italian capitulation. As the document shows these complaints which were made when this letter was written i.e. at the beginning of November 1943, that is to say, a few days before I took over the Corps, these complaints had become obsolete by then because as the report says the situation was now much clearer and therefore the complaint really had no foundation anymore.
Q Then, there is another complaint in this letter. I might say first that the letter is dated 8th of November 1943, that is to say a period of time when the order of 22 December 1943 did not yet apply. The complaint made by the Croatian representative there is that the German troops on some occasions because they were not familiar with conditions would take too strong measures. He suggests a closer cooperation with Croatian Military and civilian agencies. What can you tell us about that complaint?
A There maybe a grain of truth in this. I don't think this applies to the period of time when I was them. As I said I told my commanding officers on frequent occasions that they must cooperate with the Croatian authorities. I cannot recall that any such difficulties arose again later on. As to the request of the Croatian authorities that before any operation the higher Croatian authorities should be informed, that was a request I could not comply with. First of all it is a military principle to treat matters of that sort as secret and not to inform people about them when one does not know what use they will make of it. And it was also well known that with these authorities there were people who sympathized with the bands and therefore might perhaps betray our military plans and matters. That was the reason why I could not possibly comply with that request.
Q Well, after all, General, you passed on this document to the divisions and if I have understood you correctly you said that later on, during your period of time, no further difficulties arose in that respect.
Is that correct?
A Yes, quite, by passing this on to the divisions I wanted to express my hope that no such difficulty would ever arise again.
Q In the same document, NOKW 1419, there is on page 65 of the English version, on page 93 of the German, a report by the Civilian Administration of the independent State of Croatia reporting the alleged burning down of a village by the German troops. The date of that letter is 11 August 1943. On Page 67 of the English and page 95 of the German book there is the reply by the Corps Headquarters of the XV Mountain Corps of 16 September 1943 addressed to Minister Benac. What can you tell us about those two documents?
A In August 1943 my predecessor General Lueters was in charge of the XV Mountain Corps. As far as I remember it was also General Lueters who wrote the reply.
QQuite. The reply letter has been signed by Lueters. Now to conclude discussing this document, one more question. On page 69 of the English version which is page 97 of the German Book there is a letter dated 22 August 1943. It is a letter by the Commander in Chief Southeast directed to the Commanding General of the German Troops in Croatia. This letter concerns collective fines. Perhaps you can give us a brief explanation of that letter.
A This letter which is dated 22 August was of course written before my time. At the most it might have been shown to me when I took over the Corps, but I believe there is a file note included which shows that such an action was never carried out in Croatia, that we desisted from carrying out such a measure in Croatia and that is why I think I haven't seen the letter.
Q I suppose you refer to the file note of 3 September 1943, that is on the third page of this document, it says there that no written orders to the divisions will be issued pursuant to the report by the Chief of Staff. If I have understood you correctly the question of collective fines was of no relevancy at all in your area?
A No.
Q Well, this brings us to the conclusion for the time being of discussing reprisal measures and collecting fines and let us turn now to your tactical tasks. Let me ask you first, General, who were the troops that were subordinate to you at this time?
A When I took over the Corps there were under me the 114th Rifle Division, the 373rd Croatian Division, which, as far as I remember, was in charge, tactically speaking, of a number of militia battalion and also the 264th Infantry Division which was then just arriving in the area. Later on a number of other divisions were also under me. Now and then I had to lend one of my divisions to neighboring independent units for certain purposes.
Q Witness, the troops which were under your command were they suitable for the carrying out of the tasks that had been assigned to you?
AAlthough some of the men in the divisions were of the older classes the troop, in my opinion, was very suitable nevertheless to combat bands. It was the older people who understood much better the cares and worries of the civilian population. As far as the actual fighting is concerned they were first rate and did their duty to the fullest extent. This was particularly difficult for these men as not all of them were trained and well equipped for combat in this difficult mountain terrain.
Q Witness, you talked about the divisions which were under you. May I ask you in this connection whether also units of the SS were under you?
A Possibly, when I took over first, the beginning of November, I believe that then one SS Regiment of the SS Division Prinz Eugen was stationed in Split and was then subordinate to the Corps, but it was soon returned to its division as the 264 Division was approaching and the 114 Rifle Division was relieved.
Q Now, let us talk about the question which we discussed before, namely, the old question of subordination of SS units, General. Can you tell us a few things about that.