The Chief of State, Dr. Pavelic, who called himself the Poglavnik was the head of state. Whether this establishment of a state and the actual running of the country was a happy one or not I do not wish to comment upon here. As far as I as a soldier was concerned all that mattered was the political situation as it existed and as such Croatia was an independent political entity. Moreover, Croatia had not only been recognized by Germany and her allies, but also by a number of neutral states. For instance, as I remember it, Switzerland and Sweden had their diplomatic representatives in Zagreb. Territorial and legislative power in Croatia lay with the Croatian Government, and for the administration of the country there were Croatian Government departments.
DR. TIPP: If the Tribunal, please, as for the question of foreign representatives in Croatia, I should like to offer a document in order to make the situation quite clear. It is in my document book III, page 151, and is Leyser Document No. 52. This is an affidavit by Willy Bein, who is a business man living in Ansbach, and he swore to this statement on the 18 of October 1947 before me here in Nurnberg. I should like to quote paragraph one therefore:
"I know that the neutral countries Sweden and Switzerland maintained consular representations in Zagreb, and that these consulates continued, even after the autonomous 'Independent Croat State' was established. Unfortunately, I cannot recall the names of the Consuls. On the other hand Croatia also maintained consular representations in Switzerland, as I can remember that a female employee of my firm moved to Zuerich in the fall, in order to start employment with the Croat Consulate there."
In paragraph 2 and 3 the affiant gives a few details to show how he remembers these things, and I do not think I need read it here. This document is offered as Leyser Exhibit 13.
Q General, what was the authority which under that legal status a commander of German troops held in Croatia?
A From the legal situation it becomes clear that he did not hold executive power. Croatia was not an occupied enemy country. She was an allied and friendly state. All measures taken by the German troops therefore had to take into consideration what the Croatian state wanted and had to adjust themselves accordingly.
Q How was the cooperation between German troops on the one hand and the Croatian state on the other handled?
A When I was down there the liaison officer between the German troops and the Croatian departments was General von Glaise-Horstenau. He was the plenipotentiary German General in Zagreb. All matters concerning the Croatian state had to be handled through General von Glaise-Horstenau, and then passed on to the Croatian authorities. I would like to add here that the Corps itself was not allowed to have direct contact with General von Glaise-Horstenau as the Plenipotentiary General in Zagreb. Any questions and complaints by the corps had to be passed on through the 2nd Panzer Army and it was the 2nd Panzer Army which passed it on to General von Glaise-Horstenau. It was only minor local affairs which were handled by the divisional corps, that is the liaison officers who were with them.
Q Nov, we have anticipated a little here, General. May I ask you now to continue with the chronological order. You told us last that you had received the order to report to Army Group F in Belgrade. Would you please tell us how you were informed about this new situation, which I take it was new to you at the time?
A When I, in October 1943, reported to the Army Group F in Belgrade the Commander in Chief, General von Weichs was not present. His Chief of Staff, General Foertsch, informed me briefly about the military situation. This is what he told me approximately, -- the main task for the 15th Army Group is the occupation of the Coast and the islands before it in order to establish there a defensive position as one counted on the possibility of an invasion. Of equal importance was, of course, to secure the lines of supplies and communication to those defensive positions.
For the rest he said I would be more clearly informed by the 2nd Panzer Army.
Q Let me ask you one additional question here, on that occasion or later on did you receive any political tasks?
A No, political assignments of any sort were not given me and as a soldier I would have had nothing to do with them.
Q Did you report to Field Marshal von Weichs?
A No, I said that the Field Marshal was absent on an official trip and I therefore could not report to him on that date but later on I made up for it.
Q If I understand you correctly, General, you were to be given more detailed information as to your assignment from the 2nd Panzer Army?
A Yes, the Commander in Chief at that time was General Rendulic.
Q Now was that done, how were you informed in the end?
A General Rendulic informed me briefly about the over-all military situation in the Balkans and in Croatia in particular. He told me that originally the Coast line had been occupied by Italian troops, that now after the capitulation of the Italian Army, it was to be occupied and guaranteed by German troops. The measures against the Italian Army had been concluded in September, but it was the same as the army group told me, that an enemy invasion or landing at the coast should be expected. He summed up the orders for the 15th corps in three points.
First, after new forces had arrived in the sector held by the corps there would be first on the right sector, the coast should be reached first of all and there I should expect enemy resistance as the Italians had left a large number of arms with the bands in that area.
Second, the main assignment of the corps was to occupy the coastal area and to establish a defensive position on the coast.
Third, it was important in that connection to secure the lines of supply and communications. In addition it was important to disperse and smash the bands in that area so that if possible they would be eliminated before the expected invasion would occur.
For the rest, General Rendulic told me that first of all I should form an opinion about the corps itself and then later I was to contact the army again a second time so that the most important measures could be discussed.
Q Did you do that in fact later on General?
A Yes, this is an entry in the war diary. It can be seen that on 5 November I had a second conference with the Army.
Q What was that second conference about General?
A The agenda of that conference is part of the documents. The most important thing was....
Q May I interrupt you briefly, General? May I draw the Tribunal's attention to one point. This agenda of the conference, which the General has made reference to just now, the prosecution submitted an extract of is in exhibit 367. This document is in book 15 on page 25 of the English version and page 224 of the German book. There is only a part of the agenda included in the books i.e. paragraph 6. I may repeat, it is in document book XV, exhibit 367 on page 35 of the English book and page 24 of the German. In order to make it quite clear what this conference was about, I have in my document book the whole agenda of this conference, which was contained in the original exhibit. This is in document book Leyser 1, on page 18 and it is document 10.
JUDGE BURKE: It has been given as exhibit No. 307 and later 367 which is correct.
DR. TIPP: 367 is correct.
JUDGE BURKE: Very well.
BY DR. TIPP:
Q General, let me give you the photo static copy of this agenda and you might tell the Court briefly what was mentioned at this conference.
A This conference was concerned first with the replacement of the 114th Rifle division and a number of tactical questions. As far as point 6 is concerned, which the prosecution submitted, I would like to say this. I can still remember that the intended transfer of the staff of the corps from Banja Luka was discussed. I also remember that General Rendulic drew my attention to the special importance and significance of Banja Luka, the position of that place therefore was essential for reasons of prestige.
Furthermore it was well known, even then, that the bands wanted to conquer Banja Luka and this is in my opinion why this remark is made here.
Q Could you also tell us why the position of Banja Luka for reasons of prestige was of importance to both sides?
A Banja Luka used to be the old capitol of Croatia and that is the reason why both sides thought it most important to hold the town.
Q Under paragraph 6 in this document it is stated that General Rendulic suggested to shoot 1,000 suspected as hostages at once and to arrest another 1,000; can you remember that particular remark?
A I cannot remember that too well. If General Rendulic gave me figures at all at this time, then he merely mentioned them jokingly. He did not mean it seriously. You must bear in mind that Banja Luka is a small town of four to five thousand inhabitants, which fact alone makes it clear, as I said that in a small town of that sort you cannot arrest 2,000 suspects and shoot them.
Q The most important thing in this connection. Was Banja Luka later abandoned as the basis for the staff?
A Yes it was, Banja Luka was abandoned by the end of February and the corps staff went to Knin.
Q And was it on that occasion that any hostages were apprehended or even shot?
A No, it was not necessary, there was no reason to do so.
Q May I now offer Leyser document 10 as exhibit 14? To correct this part of our discussion, you will note there is an initial at the end, "E.B"; can you tell us who initialed it?
A I asked myself that question when I read the document here again and I cannot find out. All I could say is perhaps that from other documents, perhaps the name might be Ebbinger or something like that, but no such man was on my staff, therefore, I could not state what these initials stand for.
Q Now let us to on with our chronological tale; when did you leave the XV corps for the first time?
A I believe according to an entry in the war diary it must be 3 Oct. 1943. I arrived at the airport and was welcomed by the chief of staff, Colonel Pfaffreth, and the adjutant.
Q Your predecessor General Lueters was present I suppose on that occasion?
A No, he was not present. My predecessor, General Lueters was just drafted at that time, that is to say he was in charge of a large scale operation. He used that period of time between my arrival and the time I took over in order to find out how the land lay.
Q. From a number of documents it becomes clear that General Lueters was at first called commander in chief of the German troops in Croatia, his staff had been transmitted to the staff of the XVth army corps and that change was done a few weeks before your arrival. Could you tell us, General, what the decisions which your predecessor was in charge of as commander of the German troops in Croatia and what changes there were in his sphere of tasks just before you took over command?
A. In the coastal area there were originally no German troops. Through the capitulation of the Italians this situation changed and the German troops had to take over the protection of the coast, which meant a complete reorganization and the agency Commander of the German Troops in Croatia was dissolved and changed into the staff of the XVth Mt. Corps was purely a troop staff whose tasks were purely tactical ones. They had no territorial authority of any kind and all tasks arising from the territorial commission from the position of the Commander of German Troops in Croatia were, as the reorganization went on, transferee to General von Clause Horstenau, he was the German Blenipetentiary General in Croatia. To whom there were subordinate all Administration Sub Area Headquarters.
Q. You say witness do you that unlike General Lueters you held no territorial authority?
A. No, I no longer held these powers. The commander of the XVth. Mountain Corps was a purely tactical position without territorial authority without any judicial authority. My tasks were purely tactical ones.
Q. Let me ask you an additional question, you said gust now you had no judicial authority; do you mean by that that you hold no judicial authority over German troops?
A. No, I had no judicial authority as far as German troops or any other troops were concerned.
Q. When did you finally take over the command of your corps?
A. I see in an entry in the war diary I finally took over the corps on 1 November 1943.
Q. Let me ask you in this connection, General, a question which was of importance before in this trial, did you as commander of the XVth Mountain Corps hold the famous executive power?
A. No, in no sense of the word this became clear also from the description which I gave about the legal status of Croatia. Only in very special cases would it have been possible to transfer executive power into my hands.
Q. When did you for the first time concern yourself with these questions. I mean by that your collaboration with the Croatian authorities and the whole problem of executive power?
A. Well, I think it was fairly early in the first days when I was not even officially in charge of the corps, yet one day the Minister of Interior called on the staff of the corps, together with the Envoy Kasche, they informed me about the political situation and explained to me about executive powers.
Q. Kasche, if I am correctly informed, was the German Envoy?
A. Yes, he was the German Ambassador in Croatia.
Q. General, will you now tell us about the conversation you had in the early days of your stay down there, may I point out that this conference is laid down in a document, which the prosecution has offered. It is part of the war diary of the XVth corps and the passage I have reference to is in document book XXV, page 15 of the English and page 13 of the German.
It is prosecution exhibit 561. This is an entry of 23 October 1943. General, let me hand you this document and ask you to tell the Tribunal briefly about this conversation?
A. The entry in this document shows that on 23 October 1943, that is to say before I was actually in charge of the corps, the German Minister Obergruppen Fuehrer Kasche, the Croatian minister of the interior Norkovic and the Minister for the Devastated Areas arrived at the corps headquarters. As we can see from the entry, Minister Dr. Bonac, who was the chief of the civil administration and representative of the Croatian government with the corps were present, that alone shows that I had no administrative authority in this area.
Q. Is it true witness that Minister Dr. Bonac, as the document says, was designated as chief of the civil administration in the operation area.
A. Yes, he was the chief of the civil administration in the operation area of my corps.
Q. Then, General, you also mentioned another Minister, that is the Minister for the Devastated Territories; can you tell us what these territories were?
A. That was territory devastated in the Croatian area. This devastation had been extended and made worse by the Italian troops when they left the country, but this title of the minister and his tasks prove that these devastations were not carried out by the German Wehrmacht as has been alledged.
Q. You mean, witness, that a state would hardly send a minister with that title to the armed forces of another state it the devastations were carried out by the armed forces of the very state with whom he is accredited as a Minister plenipotentiary; is that correct?
A. Yes, quite.
Q. May I now ask you, witness, to tell the Tribunal briefly what the point of the conference was?
A. When we had this conference with the ministers, we made it clear that executive power in my area was not invested in my person or the Wehrmacht as such, but in the Croatian authorities and only should there be a serious emergency I was promised and told that executive power would be transferred to me. That would be done for purely military reasons. In such a case it was planned to declare a state of emergency and once on a later occasion I had to avail myself of that possibility in Banja Luka.
Q. I think we have made that clear now, General, and perhaps you could now tell the Tribunal the following; you stated that such detailed information as was necessary for you, you were to be given by your staff, that is the staff of the XVth corps; how did you avail yourself of information about the military situation from your officers who held the various posts?
A. When taking over a new position it is my custom that first of all I leave everything as I found it and acquaint myself at first with both the persons and the facts of the matter until I finally decide on a change. When I ask the various experts to call on me, they will then tell me everything about the most important currant events within their scope. They will talk for about ten or fifteen minutes and then I always endeavor to go to the spot and find out about everything.
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
Q. I take it you followed that custom on the occasion, too.
A. Yes.
Q. Now, we should briefly deal with the military situation in your area. In order to make all this quite clear, I included in my document Book I, on page 21, Leyser Document No. 11, a number of sketches which I offer as Leyser Exhibit No. 15. In order to make these maps and sketches easy to lock at, your general put a few places in certain colors. Perhaps I can show the prosecution a a copy of this map and the other three copies I have handed to the Tribunal. Let me ask one question to make the record clear; did you make the sketches?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. And do they contain, to the best of your knowledge and belief the military situation as you found it at the time?
A. They do, indeed. Yes, this is now I remember the military situation at the time.
Q. Do you have the sketches in front of you, witness?
A. Yes, I have.
Q. May I now ask you when you explain the tactical situation to us to refer to the maps and tell the Court what your chief of staff has told you about the military situation at the time?
A. The Chief of Staff together with the Ia told me what the military situation in the corps area was. What I found at the time is shown on sketch No. 1. This map shows the sector of the XVth Mountain Corps when I took over on 1 November 1943. Borders of the Corps Area are shown by dots and dashes on the left and right. Now, the red markings on the sketch represent the areas after the Italian capitulation which were then threatened by the bands. This shows that even there almost the whole of the former Italian area, including the islands, had to be cleansed of the bands to begin with in order to carry out the main assignment of the corps; namely, to fortify the defensive positions on the coast.
Our own troops are shown on the sketch with blue markings. This shows that on the right in the right sector of the Corps the coast between Nowi -to spell that, N o w i, Senj -- S e n j, and Zablanac -Z a b l a n a c, Karlobag -- K a r l o b a g, and Obravac had not been reached by our troops yet. The places of Karlovac and Glina in the northern part of the map were occupied by Croatian troops or Ustascha troops.
In the left sector of the corps, the left half, as it were, after the Italian capitulation there were only the three big coastal towns of Zara -- to spell it, Z a r a, Sibenik -- S i b i n i k, and Split -- S p l i t, which were occupied by the 115th Light Infantry Divisions. These three harbor towns were equipped for defensive fighting as fortresses, can be seen by the sketch. This all-around defense in the case of these two towns was meant against a possible landing from the sea.
I draw special attention to this because later on when the evacuation began it became important.
As far as this left sector was concerned, there was at first only one supply road which lead through the mountains from Bihac, which is in the center of the sketch, via Kuin to Sibenik and that road was secured by our own troops. Zara and Split were without any line of communication.
North from Kuin as far as Bihac to Banja-Luka, this area was to be secured by the 373rd Division. I wish to draw special attention to the railway line Bihac-BanjaLuka and Bihac-Sisah-Zagreb because that will become of great importance later on.
Q. Now, your main task was, as you have just said, to extend the fortifications of the coast against the expected landing. Can you tell us briefly how this assignment was to be carried out?
A. May I have reference here to Sketch No. 2?
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: As a matter of information to the Tribunal, you have given a number of exhibit numbers 15. Do you wish to designate -- and you have handed four copies of a map to the members of the Tribunal -- do you wish to designate them in successive order by an initial or sub-number?
DR. TIPP: Yes, your Honor, These sketches have been summed up into the one document, so to speak, Document 11, and the entire document is offered as Exhibit 15. The four sketches, therefore, have only one exhibit number.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: And that number is the four sketches?
PR. TIPP: Yes, your Honor.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: Very well.
A. From that sketch it becomes clear that extending the defensive position on the Coast and the safeguarding of the line of communication were the aims and assignment of the corps. I have said before what things looked like when I took over the corps. First of all, a large area under the corps that had before been occupied by the Italians had first to be occupied by us and made safe. Sketch 1 showed that wide areas were endangered by the bands, particularly in the right sector held by the corps. There we had the region of Petrova-Gora -- to spell it, P-e-t-r-o-w-a - G-o-r-a, and Samarica -- S-a-m-a-r-i-c-a. Both of these areas were bases for the bands and that was the first area which we had to clean from bands.
The assignment was to have a first defensive position along the coast and for that purpose the islands before the coast were to be occupied as a sort of advanced position, as it were. The orders which the corps received at the time frequently changed. Once we had the order that all islands were to be occupied. On another occasion we were ordered to occupy only a few of the more important ones which explains why so often orders changed when the islands were evacuated and I shall have to explain that later on. Also a second defensive position was planned along the foothills of the mountains which the sketch also shows.
The line of supply there for those two defensive positions had to be secured. This the sketch also shows and these positions were extended as strong points.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: Just a moment. Before adjourning for the noon recess the Presiding Judge Wennerstrum desires to make a statement.
THE PRESIDENT: At this morning's session of the court we have been favored with the presence of one representative of the prosecution. The head of the prosecution staff, whichever individual he may be is not present nor has he asked to be excused We have had three representatives of the defense counsel present including Dr. Tipp who is representing the defense now on the stand.
The other defense counsel, with the exception of two, have not asked to be excused.
The Tribunal does not know whether the lack of the attendance on the part of counsel is indicative of their interest in this case or their attitude towards the Tribunal. Suffice it to say, at least as far as I am concerned, it is not looked upon with favor. The Tribunal asks to be remembered to the absent individuals.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: The Court will adjourn until one-thirty this afternoon.
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is in recess until 1330 hours.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 1330 hours.)
AFTERNOON SESSION (The hearing reconvened at 1330 hours 6 November 1947)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: You may continue.
ERNST von LEYSER - Resumed DIRECT EXAMINATION - Continued BY DR. TIPP:
Q. General, before the recess we were discussing your tactical tasks and you stated what defense positions were planned and described the first defense position to which the islands belonged as a kind of outpost, and I would like you to continue to describe the second defense position.
A. In addition there was a so-called second defense position. This position lay in the foothills, and in the sketch this is the blue line from the right flank to the left flank towards Sinie; and I can conclude this short tactical statement with this; and I think that this sketch two, gives and should give an impression of the enormous work which had to be done in order to reconnoitre and to build up these positions, and, therefore, the great extensions within the sphere of the corps. Every division had about 100 to 150 kilometers to consider and I think from Sketch 2 one can see that the main activity of the tactical leadership of the 15th Mountain Army Corps did not consist in carrying out reprisal measures or in exterminating the population, but our main worry was, rather more to extend and develop the defense positions and to make them as complete as possible before the expected invasion took place. The combatting of the bands themselves was primarily a matter of secondary importance.
Q. And now, General, I would ask you to put the sketches aside. Sketches 3 and 4 will be discussed later. And now let's go over to another question, and that is: who was your enemy, first of all, in this sphere?
A. I stated the main task of the corps was to consolidate the coastal defense positions and, connected with this enemy No. 1, was the Allied Troops whose landing we expected on the coast.
Enemy No. 2 was the bands.
Q. Now, General, let's talk about the band situation and especially band warfare. You only came relatively late to this area -- that is, at the time in which the band fighting had already been going on for some years and therefore, you were told what the officers of your staff knew about band warfare and band tactics.
Please, would you describe, first of all, quite briefly, what you hoard from your competent staff officers about combatting the bands in your area?
A. This was the task of the Ic. The Ic showed me, by aid of a map, the enemy situation. This, I must say, looked rather rough. And for me it was terribly confusing at first because I was only used to thinking about warfare in connection with fronts, but in this case the enemy was everywhere and nowhere and that was the horrible and uncanny thing about it; and then the Ic also talked about brigades and divisions and then he said in answer to my question: "Those are only the designations which the bands give themselves in order to give their groups some kind of military appearance," and then he said in answer to my question how he knew this: "This we learn mostly from the enemy radio, and we ourselves use these terms so that we always know in the enemy reports which bands they are talking about."
Q. With regard to the band situation, and the band warfare, one preliminary basic question: General, you know that Count 3 of the Indictment charges you, as well as all the other defendants, with refusing to recognize regular troops as a belligerent power although after the collapse of their own army, these troops just continued the fighting.
Now, my question is: were these actually regular troops who continued the fighting with the German troops in 1941 and afterwards, or how did the situation appear to you?
A. One can't speak at all about regular enemy troops as regards the bands.
The Jugoslav Army had capitulated for a long time. Croatia was completely occupied. It was an independent state which was allied to Germany and the only regular troops in my sector were the German troops and the troops of the allied state, and before that one could have also have included the Italian Army, but they were no longer there when I arrived.
Q. Did these bands wear a standard uniform, as has often been asserted here?
A. I was there until 1945 and I can say that at no time did the bands wear regular and standard uniforms. The prosecution states that some documents contain reference to uniforms and, therefore, that this proves that the bands adhered to one of the four provisions of the Hague Land Warfare Convention. In my opinion, these documents proved exactly the contrary; namely, that these questions of uniform were exactly the exception, and they were only reported if some person in the bands wore a uniform. If the bulk of the bands had worn uniforms, proper uniforms, then, in my opinion, this would never have been reported, the same as the French or the Russian war reports received never stated that they wore the corresponding uniforms. This is a matter of course in a regular army, but here amongst the bands this was an exception.
In addition if they wore a uniform at all, it was not a standard uniform, they wore all possible kinds of uniform in the world; and with regard to their arms, they had no standard weapon at all. They had American arms, English arms, captured German arms, captured Yugoslav weapons, and all weapons one could possibly think of. In our operations we were able to determine this when we pushed forward into their positions and found there equipment and weapons of all kinds.
Q With regard to this question, Witness, a number of Prosecution documents have been submitted, and I would like to discuss them briefly with you. The first document concerned here is in Document Book XIV -one, four. It is on English and German Page 1, and it is Exhibit No. 337.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: Dr. Tipp, in giving the citations please go a little more slowly. It's necessary for us to secure the books.
DR. TIPP: Yes, Your Honor, I will do that.
BY DR. TIPP:
Q I am now referring to Document Book XIV, submitted by the Prosecution. And the document to which I wish to refer is the first document in this book, Document NOKW-1391. This is Exhibit No.337. The report to which I refer here is on Page 1 of this Exhibit. This is a teletype, dated the 25th of August 1943, and the sender cannot be seen from the document, but its contents are a Daily Report, dated the 25th of August 1943. It reports on communists from Skander-Parkov. It states that these communists wore black uniforms.
Could you state anything additional about this, Witness, to what you have already stated?
A First of all, this teletype is before my time. It is dated the 25th of August 1943, and I only arrived on the first of November 1943. And for the rest, this is everything which I have already mentioned.
Q The next document I wish to refer to is contained in the same Document Book and it is the following Exhibit, No. 338; Document NOKW 1423. The report to which I wish to refer is on Page 3 of the German and English Document Book. This is a teletype of the 44th Division to the headquarters of the XVth Mountain Army Corps. The date is the 31st of August 193. And the contents refer again to enemy in gray uniform. And in the same document, on Page 4 of the English Document Book, there is a teletype of the 337th Division, dated the 30th of August 1943, to the XVth Mountan Army Corps, and here it states that the enemy was the Herzegovinian Brigade. I think I can assume that the Prosecution submitted this document in order to show the regular character of these units and to stress this fact.