THE PRESIDENT: Will you please repeat the volume, page and document again?
DR. TIPP: It is Document Book III, page 141, Leyser Document No. 49, and I offer this as Leyser Exhibit No. 4. now turn to the next document in this document book is page 143. This is Leyser Document No. 50 and I offer this as Leyser Exhibit No. 5. This is an affidavit by Mrs. Elizabeth von Kutzleben of Coburg which was sworn to on the 10th of October 1947 before a notary in Coberg. This affidavit also deals with Herr von Leyser's religious attitude.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: I don't have the page or document number.
DR. TIPP: Pardon me, It is page 143 of Document Book III.
MR. FULKERSON: It is the second document in Book III, your Honors. The page number seems to be missing but it is the second document in Book III.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: It is a little confusing to attempt to follow by pagination when pagination seems to be the exception rather than the rule.
DR. TIPP: I would like to point out, your Honors, as far as I can find out from my English document book, the pages are numbered at the bottom. It is quite possible, perhaps, that one or two pages aren't numbered. I am sorry; it has just been pointed out to me that the English page numbers are at the top in the middle of the page. It is page 143 of the original and it is Leyser Document No. 50, the second document in Document Book III.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: Proceed.
Q. General, after this interruption I would like to continue. You said just now that you were a member of the Party from 1932 until 1935. Did you later on in your military career, that is in your military promotions, get any kind of advantages from this membership?
A. No, I was promoted just the same as I would have been otherwise.
Q. And when did you join the Wehrmacht again, General?
A. At the beginning of 1936. At that time I was a lieutenant colonel in the Infantry Regiment No. 77 in Dusseldorf.
Q. And now, might I ask you to describe your military career until the beginning of World War Two?
A. In August, 1936 I was transferred to the Panzer Training School in Wuensdorf. In October, 1936 I became Commander of the newly formed Panzer Jaeger Battalion II in Stettin. In 1937 I was promoted to a colonel. In 1938 I became Commander of the Panzer Jaeger Truppen XIV, first with Group Headquarters IV in Leipzig and then in Magdeburg.
Q. And now, please give the Tribunal a description of your employment during the Second World War.
A. At the outbreak of the war, in September 1939, I became Commander of Replacement Training Regiment No. 6. In October, 1939 I became Commander of Infantry Regiment No. 169. And with this regiment I took part in the French campaign. After the campaign I went with the regiment to Poland to Jaroslau. In February, 1941 I was promoted to brigadier general. In March, 1941 I was appointed Commander of the 269th Division. And up until the beginning of the Russian campaign I was in charge of this division of the Russian campaign I was in charge of this division in the area of Tilsit, as frontier guard. And, first of all, I was subordinate to the XVIIIth Army there. Shortly before the beginning of the campaign I went with my division over to the Panzer Corps Reinhardt. This Panzer Corps was subordinate to General Hoeppner's Panzer Army.
Q. And then when was your first operation in the Russian area?
A. At the beginning of the Russian campaign I attacked in the area of Tilsit-Tauroggen with my division, as a part of Hoeppner's Panzer Army.
Q. A charge has been placed against various defendants on this point, and also against you. This is the Commissar Order which has been frequently discussed. This is contained in Document Book I, English Pages 48 and 49, and Pages 33 and 34 in the German Document Book. The two documents bear the Exhibit Nos. 13 and 14.
General, do you have this order in front of you?
A. I know it.
Q. And now might I ask you when and under which circumstances you got to know about this order?
A. Sometime before the Russian campaign there was a tactical conference with the VIIIth Army, and all the commanding generals took part in this conference and also the divisional commanders. And in this discussion we were told that there was going to be a war with Russia, and at the same time we were also told that a Fuehrer Order would be issued according to which all the Russian Political Commissars were to be shot when captured. At that time we generls objected to this because this was against our own feelings and because we didn't think that this order could be carried out.
Q. If I understand you correctly, General, during this discussion the Commissar Order was announced as being imminent.
A. Yes.
Q. And later on was it given to you as an order to be carried out?
A. As I have already said, shortly before the Russian campaign I went over to the Panzer Corps Reinhardt. General Reinhardt called the generals of his divisions together shortly before and told us about this order, but with the addition, and this is approximately what he said: "Certainly with the speedly advance of the Panzer troops we certainly wouldn't have any time to sort out the Commissars from among the prisoners. And a shooting of Commissars should therefore, not take place. All were to be treated as prisoners of war.
And were to be sent back to the rear area as customary." And in this statement he found complete agreement amongst all the divisional commanders. And so I think that practically this order was never passed on to the division and therefore also not carried out in the 269th Division, that is my division.
Q. And an additional question on this point, General: The Commissar Order was discussed frequently at that time and, therefore, I may assume that it was also known within your division?
A. This Commissar Order was known everywhere. Everybody talked about this Commissar Order and, of course, it was known amongst the division, which I learned from conversations with the commanders.
Q. And, with regard to this point, your Honors, I would like to refer to Document Book I and submit some documents from it. All these documents deal with the Commissar Order. The first one in this connection is the second document in Leyser Document Book I. It is Leyser Exhibit No. 6. This is an affidavit by the former General Hens Reinhardt, which was sworn to on the 14th of July 1947 in Neustadt Camp, before the Adjutant there, Captain W.L. Washburn. I would like to quote from this document, the first paragraph after the introduction:
"In the first part of the war against Russia, General von Leyser was Commander of the 269th Division, Together with his 369th Infantry Division, which had been employed in the Memel territory as border patrol, he came in the last days before this campaign started in this capacity under my command and took part in the advance on Leningrad as member of the forces of my 41st Armored Corps.
"During the preparatory period for this campaign the 'Commissarorder' was also issued by the Supreme Army Command. Whether this Commissar-order went also to the forces directly, that is whether it went officially and in writing into the hands of the Division Commanders at all, I do not remember any longer; I can not state with certainty to what extent this order from the Supreme Army Command distributed in printed form was issued to lower echelons. (That was also my testimony as witness before the small Tribunal in the proceedings against the Supreme Army Commander and General Staff, and other statements and affidavits bear similar witness during these proceedings.)
"At the time I rejected the contents of this Commissar-order and raised a protest against it during a conference which my Commander, General Hoepner, held in Allenstein with the oldest Commanders of his Armored-forces. General Hoepner agreed to the protest raised by me and the other commanding Generals, petitioned for an annulment or change of the order, but unfortunately without success. Then, as far as I recollect during a conference at Allenstein, I made an announcement to the Commanders of my Armored-Division to the following effect:
"'We hope to advance just as fast as we did in France and take many prisoners. Therefore we will certainly have no time to screen the prisoners taken, for 'Commissars'. This, to our mind untenable order, giving permission to soldiers to kill prisoners styled 'Commissars would, aside from this, endanger discipline in the highest degree. Shooting of Commissars would therefore have to be refrained from, all prisoners of war taken, are to be sent to the rear area'."
I will skip the next paragraph. And then General Reihhardt deals again with his testimony before the I.M.T. Committee. I quote again from the next paragraph, but one:
"I am not sure whether General von Leyser took part in this conference because he was not subordinated to me at first during the time of the concentration of troops and preparation. But I am sure that I instructed him in this sense yet before the attack started, if he did not take part in it. And I am equally sure that General von Leyser acted in his sphere of command in the same sense because General von Leyser is known to me as a human and justly thinking Commander who cares for the maintenance of his forces' discipline sympathetically but also strictly."
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
And now the next document in the same Document Book is Leyser Document No. 4. This is to be found on Page 7 of the German Document Book, and it receives Leyser Exhibit No. 7. This is an affidavit by Hans-Juergen Freiherr von Ledebur, which was duly sworn to on the 26th of July 1947 before a notary in Goslar. The affiant describes, first of all, in Figure 1, his military career, and this is is no interest here. Than, under Figure 2 he states, and I quote:
"At the beginning of the Russian Campaign 1941, I was 1. officer of the General Staff (Ia) with the 269th Infantry Division the commander of which then was General von Leyser. The division was first placed under the command of the 18th Army while protecting the frontier before the campaign, but was placed under the command of the Panzer-army Hoeppner, and within it the XXXXI. Armored-Corps, just before the beginning of the campaign.
The so-called Kommissarerlass (commissar order) about which we had heard after a conference with the division-commander with the 18th Army was in practice never forwarded to the division - perhaps on account of the change in subordination relationship. For this reason it also was not forwarded to the subordinated troops. No case became known to me either where a commissar was ever shot in the area of the division because this order was contrary to our soldierly conception."
The next document in this connection is Leyser Document No. 5, which is the next document in Document Book I. It is to be found on Page 9, and I offer it as Leyser Exhibit No. 8. This is an affidavit by the Amtsgerichtsrat Kurd Raabe from Uslar. And it was sworn to before the notary in Uslar on the 17th of July 1947. I quote:
"From 15 October 1940 until spring 1945 I was with the 269th Infantry Division as Court Martial Counsellor and Senior Staff Judge respectively.
At the end of March or beginning of April 1941 General von Leyser took over the command of the division and remained commander until his transfer about September 1942. At the beginning of the campaign against Russia I heard of an alleged FuehrerOrder according to which commissars of the Red Army should not be treated as prisoners of war but should be shot. I believe I can remember distinctly that I talked to General von Leyser about this order and its execution particularly since I was the legal adviser of the division. I myself hold the view that the generally recognized international law has to be complied with under all circumstances especially during war, and I think I am right in assuming that General von Leyser was of the same opinion and that therefore he did not want to execute the order here in question because of its being contrary to international law and to general soldier's honor, all the more so as so far as I can remember this order was said to be given only orally. This conception of General von Leyser corresponds to his entire gentlemanly way of thinking and his human sympathy towards the war-stricken countries. This I could observe on many occasions.
"Thus I had to carry through on instructions from the General several criminal cases against non-commissioned officers and privates of the Division who without order from their superior officers had made requisitions of victuals. Furthermore it is personally known to me that unclaimed cattle raving about which were brought in by a staff-officer of the Division had to be given back again to Russian inhabitants on order of General von Leyser, although they did not own the cattle, in order that the general food level of the inhabitants should not be lessened. Thereupon the requisitioning of castle was generally forbidden to the Division.
I could give still more examples which show the disinterested and completely unquestionable behavior of General von Leyser, especially his sympathy towards the inhabitants and prisoners.
Finishing I want to emphasize that no cases are known to me either officially or unofficially where commissars were shot within the area of the Division."
The next document is Leyser Document No. 6, in the same Document Book on Page 11. I offer it as Leyser Exhibit No. 9. This is an affidavit by Erich Freiherr Loeffelholz von Colberg. It was sworn to on the 10th of September 1947 by the Burgermeister in Schottenstein. In Figure 1 the affiant states that he was battery commander of the 4th Artillery Regiment 269, which belonged to General von Leyser 's Division. I would like to quote:
"I can remember that I heard of a Fuehrer-Order during the advance according to which commissars of the Red Army should not be taken prisoners but should be shot. I cannot say now exactly how I learned of it. During a visit of the Ia (tactical officer) of the Division, then Lieutenant Colonel Freiherr von Lodebur, who was known to me officially and personally from earlier times, I talked to him about this order and we agreed that it could not and would not be carried through in our area of command because it violated the honor of German officers and soldiers, whereto we would not give our names. This conversation eased my conscience in the matter of military duty because I now know that the opinion held by the staff of the Division was in conformity with my own."
Then the next document is Leyser Document No. 7. This is the following document in Document Book I. This is to be found on Page 12, and I offer it as Leyser Exhibit No. 10.
This is an affidavit by Major Karl Reetz. The affidavit was duly certified and sworn to on the 28th of July 1947 by the notary in Lueneburg. In Figure 1 the affiant describes, first of all, his service career during the war. He states that he was battalion commander of the Reconnaissance Battalion No. 269. And at the beginning of the war he was subordinate to the witness von Leyser's Division during the Russian campaign:
"It is known to me that at the beginning of the campaign against the USSR a Fuehrer-Order was made known according to which the the political commissars of the Red Army should be shot. As this order was contrary to the conception of honor of a German officer we were not ready from the very beginning to execute such an order. In order to restore the balance of our conscience in the matter of military duty disturbed by this, my commander, at that time, Major von Oertzen, spoke to Major Roenisch about the order, when General von Leyser was with the Reconnaissance Battalion accompanied by the II a (officer for personnel matters) of the Division, Major Roenisch, in the afternoon of the first day of war during the attack on Erzwilk, General von Leyser then told us that he was spoken already about this order by every unit of the Division and fortunately all the officers were of his own opinion that this order cannot be carried through.
"No single case is known to me where within, the sphere of the Division a political commissar was shot."
The next document in this connection is Leyser Document No. 8, which is the next document in Document Book I. It is on Page 14. This I offer as Leyser Exhibit No. 11. It is an affidavit by a certain Herr Juergen Justus. In Figure 1 of this document he again describes his service career. The importance of this for this case is only the fact that Justus was in the Reconnaissance Battalion of the 269th Infantry Division.
And then, the next paragraph, on the first page, I quote:
"At the beginning of the campaign against Russia, in June 1941, I was a Special Mission's Staff Officer in the staff of the Infantry Division No. 269, the commander of which, at that time, was Major General von Leyser.
"At that time, I heard about, and I remember quite well that a short time before the beginning of the campaign Russia, General von Leyser mentioned that a written order of the Fuehrer was expected, according to which the political commissars of the Red Army were to be shot when taken prisoner. Herr v. Leyser added by himself that for us, as soldiers, the shooting of prisoners was out of question, but, of course, would be done during the fighting only. I never saw such a written order, later on, though I had access to all incoming orders at the division. I therefore assume for certain that such an order never reached the division. As I remember quite exactly, I don't know anything about General von Leyser passing on such an order to the troops.
"In my capacity as a Special Mission's Staff Officer I was always on the road of advance with this or that regiment of the division, and I never saw or heard that commissars were picked out of the prisoners and that those (commissars) were shot."
The affidavit is duly sworn to and certified in Hamburg on the 20th of June 1947, before a notary. And I would like to point out to the Tribunal a mistake which has crept into the document here. The signature of the notary is missing from this affidavit. The original contains this signature, which is that of Dr. Gustav Muhle. I would like to ask perhaps that this mistake should be corrected in the Document Book.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: Is there any objection to that, Mr. Fulkerson?
I say is there any objection?
MR. FULKERSEN: No, your Honor.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: Very well. That may be done.
BY DR. TIPP:
Q. General, after this interruption we will continue. You said that the order was known to the German troops, as can also be seen from the affidavit, but nevertheless I would like to ask you whether you had the impression that this order also came in any way to the knowledge of the Russian troops.
A. Yes, during the course of the campaign we were often able to establish this fact that it was know amongst the Russians.
Q. Did this order have any kind of effect on the Russian troops as far as you could find out?
A. Yes. In my opinion, it had the effect of a boomrang because our own troops of course suffered under this and it cost our own troops very many lives because the Russian Commissars who knew about this fact that, as prisoners, they were to be shot and therefore the majority of them fought on to the very last to defend themselves, and everywhere where there were Commissars, the resistance of the Russian troops was especially strong. And the Commissars also who escaped capitivity and who remained behind their own lines or rather our own lines did not surrender as was usual amongst the Russian soldiers, but they tried to get into contact with Russian soldiers or the indigenous inhabitants and to set up nests of resistance and sabotage units.
Q. General, in this direction, did you make any kind of personal experience at all which you could tell the Tribunal about?
A. Yes, I can recount the following experience, from the first few weeks, I don't know the actual date of the Russian campaign, I went with my adjutant, Lt. Col. Roemisch, from the combat post to the forward troops. First of all, we were shot at from a machine gun which was rather near. Some signal troops who were there at the moment were collected together and we had nothing else to do except to take part in a small attack against this machine gun, and when we got nearer, the machine gun fire suddenly stopped and we saw two Russians running away and they were shot while running and then the machine gun was captured and later on I heard that one of these two Russians who was killed was a Commissar.
Such incidents frequently came to my knowledge during the course of the Russian campaign. The soldier at the front always had understanding for such courage but there was nothing else he could do if only for the fact of preserving himself. That, if there was no possibility of capturing them, he had to shoot them in battle and that is war and nothing can be helped.
Q. And, General, was such an incident in which a Commissar defended himself to the very end reported particularly by the troops?
A. Yes, of course that was reported. Such instances were also reported so that the higher quarters should see and that it should also be brought to their notice what effect this order had in the end on our own troops. That is, it actually didn't achieve what it was supposed to achieve, but the exact opposite, and in my opinion later on this order was therefore completely withdrawn.
Q. Well, witness, nothing can be said against this kind of warfare but more important is the additional question: can you please tell us anything about how captured commissars were treated by your troops?
A. The captured commissars, as the Commanding General or General Reinhardt had said, were of course treated as all other prisonersof-war, but I would like to point out the following here. Among these Commissars there were very many radical people who, as my Ic reported to me, often tried to influence the prisoners or some of the prisoners to mutiny and to take action against the guards who transported them away, and then of course these guards could do nothing else but resort to arms and they had to say this right from the very beginning; and furthermore, the escort guards because of the large number of prisoners which were made in the beginning in the Russian campaign were not very strong and perhaps the ratio was about one to fifty or one to a hundred and perhaps sometimes even more.
Q. Witness, if you had experienced such an incident, would the soldiers have reported such an incident?
A. Yes, of course that would be reported as well.
Q. Now, we can leave the subject of the commissar order and I would like you to state briefly your further military career.
A. As part of Hoeppner's Panzer Army, I went with my division as far as Petersburg and then later on towards the south of the Ladoga Lake. After the heavy defensive battles of winter 1941-42, my division came to the Wolchow sector.
In August 1942, I went to the Officer Reserve, then in October 1942, I became Major General and on the 1st of November, 1942, I was entrusted with the command of the 26th Army Corps. This was stationed south of the Ladoga Lake. In December, 1942, I was promoted to General of Infantry, and appointed Commanding General of the 26th Corps.
Q. And perhaps an additional question with regard to this, witness. If I have understood you correctly, you were with your division permanently in the frontline and as can be seen from the statements on the critical points of the fighting.
A. Yes, that is correct.
Q. And now, General, I would like to ask you here whether and what kind of decorations you received.
A. During the French campaign, I received the two clasps to the Iron Cross first and second class. In September 1941, I received the Knight's cross to the Iron Cross, and later on I received the German Cross in gold.
Q. And now a concluding question with regard to the Russian assignment. You have just said that in October, 1942, you were promoted to Major General and already in December you were promoted to General of the Infantry and with regard to this rather rash promotion, General, what was the reason?
A. Finally, I would like to say that it was due to the bravery of my soldiers my recognition and decorations for the operations of my troops in the defensive battle near Petersburg were given to me. At that time, my division was the first division from the whole army which was mentioned in the Wehrmacht report for special bravery. That was probably the reason.
Q. Before we leave Russia, General, and go over to another subject, I would like to talk about a special document. The Prosecution has offered Exhibit No. 53, Document Book II, English page No. 67, German page 52, which contains an order -- this is the famous order from the 16th of September, 1942, and this order is signed by Keitel.
The Prosecution sometimes called this order the so-called terror order. According to the subject, which is stated here, the order concerns the destruction of the communist insurgent movement in occupied territories. Did you receive this order during the Russian campaign, General?
A. No. I can't remember, because at that time, as I briefly described, we were involved in heavy defensive battles before Petersburg. That is at the front, and this order, in my opinion, according to its text, referred to occupied territory that is the rear area and not to the troops who were fighting at the front. At that time, thank goodness, I had nothing at all to do yet with fighting the bands and I also think that with regard to combatting the bands at this time there was a police regiment with us at the front.
Q. And might I ask the additional question with regard to that, General? Was this police regiment subordinate to you in any respect?
A. No, in no way.
Q. And to whom was it subordinate then, as far as you remember?
A. I don't know.
Q. And now to conclude this order which we have just mentioned, General, so that we need not have to come back to it again later on. I would like to ask you the following: Did you ever learn about this order of the 16th of September 1942 during your activity in Croatia with the 15th Corps or in Albania with the 21st Corps?
A. No, the order was then so far behind that I don't think I heard about it any more and also I think that it was superseded by new orders then.
Q. And then how did your service on the Eastern Front come to an end, General?
A. It ended one day, when I received the order that I had been appointed Commanding General of the 15th Army Corps and this 15th Mountain Corps was in the Balkans and it belonged to Army Group F.
At that time I was told that I had to report to Army Group F in Belgrade.
Q. When did you receive this order, General?
A. In October, 1943.
Q. According to the description which you have just given us of your service at the front, in late autumn 1943, you arrived in the Balkans for the first time and you have just said that you were appointed Commanding General of the 15th Army Corps and it is well known that this Corps was employed in Croatia and therefore might I ask you, General, to describe to us quite briefly once again the political situation which you found in an established fact when you arrived in Croatia?
A. The political situation in Croatia was approximately the following. The former Yugoslavian states contained two or perhaps three groups of people: The Serbs, the Croats, and the Slovenes. The latter group played no part at all in this sphere of my corps and therefore I need not say anything about it. Between the Serbs and the Croats, however, there was an enmity which had already been in existence for centuries which just in the last years had come to the fore by means of bloody murders on both sides, thus creating an unbridgable gap between the two groups. Through the collapse of the Yugoslav state and/or the capitulation of this state, the independent Croatian state had formed itself. That is, approximately.
DR. TIPP: I would like to interrupt here briefly, your Honor, and in order to bring rather closer to the Tribunal the situation in this time and the hatred between the two ethnic groups, I have here an affidavit in my document book. This is contained in Leyser document Book III. It is Leyser Document No. 51, German page 146, and I think it is probably the same page in the English. This is an affidavit by one of the greatest German experts on Balkan problems. It is a certain Dr. Franz Thierfelder from Munich and it has been sworn to before the bourgemeister in Graefelfing and I offer this document as Leyser Exhibit No. 12.
I would like to quote briefly from this affidavit. It is Leyser Document Book No. III, Document No. 51, on page 146. The Affiant describes first of all under figure 1 how he obtained his knowledge of the Balkans. I don't think I need to read this, and after this the expert states, and I quote:
"The Nation of the South Slavs, which today is united in the Yugoslav State, consists of three peoples: The Serbs, the Croats, and the Slovenes, who are not so much different from one another because of their racial origin, but because of their religious faiths, and a strongly divergent political, cultural, economic, and social development. These divergencies are responsible for the Serb-Croat differences, which became acute when, after the Danube Monarchy had been dissolved, the question arose who should take over the political and spiritual leadership in the newly created State of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. The quarrel for this claim to leadership has poisoned the past 30 years to such an extent that two opposing groups, Serbs versus Croats, formed who could only forcibly be prevented from clashing. It cannot be stated, for the time being, when these differences will be overcome."
"The orthodox Serbs, who for a certain period in the Middle Ages ruled the greater part of the Balkan peninsula and who can boast of a highly developed ancient peasant culture, have been subjected to Turkish rule for more than four hundred years, and were more strongly influenced by Oriental thinking than the Catholic Croats, whose northern provinces were not subjugated to the Turks, and who shared in the Occidental development within the Austrian-Hungarian State. As to their language there is such insignificant differences between the nations, that no difficulties are encountered at all which would impede common understanding. However, the Serbs use the Cyrillic and the Croats the Latin alphabet."
"The Serbs are a politically talented and active nation, full of national pride and the prototype of a soldierly people, who were the first in the Balkans to free themselves pf the Turkish yoke by armed force. In contrast, the Croats are of a passive nature, inclined to critical negation, without arriving at politically practical conceptions. As they were able, step by step, to secure their special rights against the other national groups within the Austrian-Hungarian State, based on legal titles, they were never in outright opposition to the Viennese Government. Their opportunism and their relatively high cultural development made them of the most reliable pillars of the poly-national state. Therefore, the Croats were determined only then to live in one State with the Serbs, if they, the Serbs, were prepared to accept an indisputable federalism. The Croats knew that they were the most important tax payers in the State, that their industries in the Save Valley and in Bosnia, their navigation in Dalmatia, were indispensable to the Yugoslav State as a whole, and that they themselves had a higher civilization than the Serbs, even up to the most recent times. On the other hand, it cannot be disputed that there is a certain inferiority complex towards the Serbs' active traits. The Serbs were convinced that the existence of the state in critical times depended on their army, and their enthusiastic love for their fatherland. The Serbs always considered the Croats unreliable separatists, while the Croats assessed the Serbs as ruthless imperialists, and an uncivilized Oriental people.
"Serb-Croat relations were severely even hopelessly, hampered by the national-political situation in Bosnia. Racially most of the Bosnian population is of Croat origin, but a considerable part are Moslems, and therefore separated both from the orthodox Serbs and the catholic Croats. In 1939, 46 percent of the total population were orthodox, 33 percent Moslems, and 20 percent were Catholics.
The compact Serb minority of many hundred thousands of people lived in the center of the country, and was forced to defend its independence against two fronts, so to speak. Thus national differences were added to the religious ones, and a catastrophe was unavoidable, as soon as the fight was brought out into the open.
"The first attempts to create a Serb-Croat federalism after 1918 failed. In the person of the Croat peasant leader Stefan Radic, who was filled with romantic ideals, the Belgrade government found itself confronted with an adversary, who was adored by the Croat people, whom he organized against the Belgrade Imperialism. "The attempt made by Kind Alexander, in whose person the SerbCroat differences actually appeared to have been reconciled, to solidify Yugoslav unity, either by dictatorial strictness or by leniency, were in 1928 successful to such an extent that Radic was willing to effect a conciliation by practical work within the cabinet. At that juncture, in summer 1928, he was shot in parliament by a Serb from Montenegine, and when he died shortly afterwards, the Croat hatred against the "Serbs' Dictatorship" reached the most extreme state. Active emigrants in Italy, Hungary, and the United States, inspired by the fanatical Lawyer Dr. Pavelic, attempted to overthrow Alexander's rule by bomb terror and propaganda. The assassination in October 1934, to which Alexander fell victim at Marseilles, has been executed by Croat terrorists, as could be conclusively proved."
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: Just a moment, we will take our recess at this time.
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is in recess until 11.15 (A recess was taken)
JUDGE BURKE: You may proceed.
DR. TIPP: To continue reading Exhibit 12, and I shall read on page 4 of the original, roughly in the middle of the page:
The enmity between the two peoples had become perpetuated by those two deeds of blood. Solely the fears inspired by a Central Europe which was becoming powerful, the lessening of French influence in Southeast Europe, and the social danger to the country by communist undermining tactics, kept the state together provisionally. Only a total reorganization of the state could instill some hope into Yugoslavia that it would be able to retain its independence in the approaching European conflict. This reorganization took place in August 1939 by concluding the so-called "Sporazum" (Agreement), in which Croatia was given a far-reaching autonomous status within the Yugoslav State. The noticeable relieving of the tension did not last very long for the Croat emigrants, supported by National Socialist propagands, doubled their efforts to weaken the Yugoslav State. When German troops marched into Yugoslavia, following the coup d' etat engineered by King Peter II, the Croats willingly severed the bonds that tied them to their state. Dr. Ante Pavolic became the leader of the Croat State, and used now his Ustascha units to let his stored up fury go rampant on the Serb minority in Bosnia, who were literally butchered. It cannot be denied that, on the other hand, the Serbs committed similar atrocities. It appears to be evident that the Serb-Croat Union of 1918 was premature. The small section of intellectuals in both peoples, steeped in the conviction that a union of the Slavs in the Balkans is imperative, are opposed by the broad masses, who, during the past 10 years, completely separated their existence from one another, and who are only waiting for the time when they can retaliate."
Q General, after this interpolation, which I hope has made the political situation clear, I would like to ask you now to give us briefly a description of the status of the country inasmuch as it was important to you as a soldier?
AAs I said before, in 1941 Croatia declared herself to be an independent state.