I hope that this particular book you have, witness, is paginated.
A Yes.
Q Your Honors, have you Document Book 14, page 17?
I am having there again reference to NOKW 509.
Witness, you ordered in connection with this particular order:
"The rule for reprisal measures is for one German killed, fifty hostages shot; one German wounded, twenty-five hostages shot."
In this connection, you made a statement that this was merely to to be applied as a rule and that lower commanders could make exceptions to this rule if they saw fit, depending on circumstances, and thus, it was not a binding orders.
Did you make a statement like that?
A Yes, but I just want to get this thing correct. I did not order this ratio of one to fifty, but I only included, in this existing order, collective order and this order I mitigated in the sense that I set down here at the highest figure that figure which was contained in the Fuehrer order as the lowest figure, and I even extended this mitigation by setting this down, not as a binding order, but as something rather more free, and, as practice showed, this was also interpreted in this way. The highest figure was not even approximately reached as I have already stated in detail.
Q. Witness, just for a minute I would like you to take a look at Document Book 2, Exhibit 53, NOKW 258.
A. Could you please give me the page?
Q. I don't have the German page in that particular volume. I am sorry. It is 68 in the English, it is NOKW 258. That is the famous Keitel order, the 50-to-1 and 100-to-1 Keitel order. Now I believe on page 2 of this particular order, Keitel makes a statement which I will quote now verbatim: "In such a case the death penalty for 50-to-100 Communists be in general deemed appropriate, in retaliation for the life of a German soldier."
Now I would like to ask you now whether the expression, "in general deemed appropriate" is about as loose a language as the words, "as a rule"? Would you interpret it than way, General?
A. With regard to this, I must say that I heard this interpretation for the first time during Mr. Fenstermacher's cross-examination of General Foertsch. We never thought that this contained anything loose at all, because we know Hitler and we knew Keitel. The expression used here could never gloss over the fact in our mind that this was a strict, binding order, and if you are of this opinion today, then you are in opposition with the IMT verdict against Keitel, because this verdict never regarded this order as a "loose order " at all.
Q. Now, General, if I understand you right, then you say everyone know what you meant by the word, "rule" and everybody else knew what Keitel meant by, "deemed appropriate" "generally deemed appropriate"?
A. I have also proved that my commanders understood this order exactly. For instance, I mentioned as an example, an order of the 369th Division, which expressed my order in an even milder form. Therefore, I was certain that my orders had been correctly understood by my troops and the whole practice of reprisal measures demonstrated this.
Q. Witness, the words,"as a rule" theoretically speaking, could also mean that instead of going below 50, they could also go above 50 if they wanted to do that?
A. Yes, that is being rather a case of sophistry, to state such a thing: the troops would never have arrived at such a thought. I have proved the correctness of my words in the facts which are reported by the dozen here.
Q. If I understand you right, witness, you say that in no particular instance, have we proven to you that you did execute, or your commanders executed in compliance with this rule, at a ratio of 50 to 100; is that what you meant?
A. Yes, I know of no single case, and if there had been such a case, it must have been very particular exception, and if it had come to the knowledge of the army, then the army would certainly have tried to find out the reasons for it. Also I could not have been able to prevent any stubborness of any kind, because this man could always refer to the Fuehrer order at any time, and I could never make this order invalid.
Q. After having seen all of these documents which have been presented by the prosecution against you, did you get the impression that the Allies or the American Forces found all of the documents, or did you rather get the impression that we only got some of them?
A. My impression is that they found all of the documents, but that you only gave those which incriminates us.
Q. Witness isn't it rather strange that you leave the decision as to how many hostages should be executed, to lower commanders in a rather loose generalization, whereas an army commander of your caliber, as has been proven by these documents, speaks in a clear-cut and decisive language? Does the German army know of the rule, or of the usage that the desire of a general is about the same as an order? Is that particular phrase known in the German army?
A. In my purely military orders, if they were orders for attack, or orders for defense, then the orders were very clearly set down. There was nothing loose in them. It was ordered. But in such a case as reprisal measures, with which we were in opposition, but in regard to which we had binding directives, then the orders given had to be formed loosely, if we did not want the orders to be rigidly carried out, and that was, of course, what we did not want.
I would like to make a comparison here; an order can only be judged if one knows how it was interpreted, in the same way as it was with the best of text books, on English Government, but from this book one still docs not know how the Government is carried out in practice, one must know how the laws are interpreted and how they are actually carried out, and in the same way, one must also know how the orders are understood and the sense in which they are given. Then one can interpret them correctly.
This order was given in the sense from which it could be seen that the Army did not want these reprisal measures to be applied as it is ordered, but it leaves to every man the freedom to apply whatever mitigation he possibly can, and practice shows that these orders were also interpreted in this way.
Q. Witness, let's look for the last time now at Document Book 14, to this Exhibit 340, that is NOKW 509, page 17 of the English, Your Honor, page 12 of the German. Now let's go very shortly together over this order, and summarize just what it actually contained, so far as retaliation measures are concerned.
Now I have studied this order and I got the following impression, and I want you to tell me whether or not I am right. It says first, "The circle of persons who can be shot in connection with this order are all those who were captured within regular engagements, male bandits under 16 and over 55 years of age, including women," and finally, so far as labor allocation is concerned, "these male bandits capable of work who were wearing either the German uniform or the uniform of a German ally". Did you follow me, and am I right up to now?
A. I don't know which point you are referring to here.
Q. I am having no reference about any particular one point, but I have studied this order in all its points, and I included that what you said in this order; for instance, to illustrate it, it is true that male bandits under 16 and over 55 years of ago, who were captured in engagements could be shot outright, because you say the opposite by saying that those between the ages of 16 and 55 should be taken prisoner. That leaves open those who are below 16, and above 55, doesn't it?
A Please tell me where this is which you are reading?
Q What order do you have before you?
A The order of the 15th of September.
Q I will make it simpler for you, witness. Your Honor, I am submitting now NOKW 731 to become Prosecution Exhibit 603. Now, witness, in studying this particular letter ---
A May I please read it first of all?
Q Yes, please, I want you to first. - Now witness, have you finished this letter?
A No, it is very confused.
Q Before you finish it let me tell you one thing so we won't waste too much time. I have taken the contents of this letter and started to to ask you some of the questions which General Neidholdt expressed in this letter. Since he served under you he was probably more capable of talking about these things than I am today here. There is one particular reference, however, I don't want you to overlook when you study this letter. Will you please turn to page 2 of this letter. In there he has reference to another order by the 2nd Panzer Army, Ia 707/43 dated 27 September 1943, and he says there that the arrest of hostages and the carrying out of reprisal measures is to be stepped up in compliance with this order. Now that order you won't find in any other document books that have been submitted against you. I don't think that it would have been a very favorable order looking at what General Neidholdt says, but we have never found that order and we don't have it.
A Yes, perhaps if I had the order I could explain it.
Q Now just try and make reference to this document that I have handed you now, and let us know whether or not General Neidholdt is right when he summarizes the reprisal measures as contained in your order dated 15-9-43 which is Exhibit 340.
A I cannot understand this Neidholdt order at all because everyone can compare Neidholdt's order with the order of the 15th of September.
Q Pardon me, just a second. You call this an order; this is not an order; this is a letter, isn't it?
A Well, this letter. When Neidholdt states here, according to this order, that is the 15th of September, the circle of persons to be shot is very great, he includes, with the exception of those who are taken prisoner outside combat, all the captured male bandits under 16 and over 55 years; could you please tell me if this kind of thing can be read from the order of 15th of September? It is complete nonsense to maintain that it is forbidden to shoot the people between 16 and 55 but all those who are younger than 16 and older than 55 can be shot. He is an absolutely illiterate who can read anything like that from this order.
Q Witness, now just to set the record straight, this Neidholdt was a General in the German Army who commanded the 369th Croatian Infantry Division which was a part of your Army, as a matter of fact it was in the 5th SS Corps under Phleps and if this General Neidholdt doesn't understand your order which you claim is so clear-cut that every General understands what you mean by as a rule, you can't really be surprised that other people don't understand your order either; so isn't it rather true that instead of saying Neidholdt doesn't make any sense, saying that your order wasn't clear enough to be understood even by a General?
A No, my order was sufficiently clear, and I would like to meet the man who is in a position to get the impression of the order such as Neidholdt received. Neidholdt was undoubtedly a sensible man, but he didn't even sign this himself. This whole matter was done by some kind of small official who probably showed it very quickly to Neidholdt, and then it went to the corps. The corps, which had a much better insight, really could have only laughed at this letter. I Would ask you to compare these things yourself. Where does it state that such things are ordered? And the fact that Neidholdt correctly understood this order, particularly with regard to the words "as a rule" can also be seen from this document here, Book 14; I don't know the page,-yes, on page 58, NOKW 944. This is another order by Neidholdt and signed with his own handwriting, and this contains the absolutely correct interpretation of my order of the 15th of September.
- I don't know the English page. - This is complete nonsense written by an illiterate which Neidholdt never saw. You could give this order to a very small boy and ask him if he could interpret from this what Neidholdt is supposed to have interpreted. He would laugh about it.
Q Now, witness, we will continue. Witness, I am now handing you Document Book 12. I am having reference, your Honor, to page 112 in Document Book 12, NOKW 155, Prosecution Exhibit 306; on page 112 in the English. Do your Honors have that? Witness, during your direct examination you stated that you were opposed to transporting captured partisans for slave labor to Germany, that is, not because you knew that they were to be used as slave labor in Germany but rather because you needed such captured partisans for work in your own territory. Did you make that statement?
A Yes.
Q Your Honors, I am now having reference to 744 PS which was handed to the court as an insert in the same document book, Exhibit 302. It was given to the court as an insert. Now, witness this order I have handed you now is a Hitler order, is it not?
A Yes.
Q And this Hitler order directs that certain measures be taken in connection with partisan warfare about the transporting of captured partisans for labor employment to the Reich.
A Yes.
Q Will you tell us now, since you have said once before, that the Hitler order is binding, how you were in a position to oppose this Hitler order?
A Yes, that is very easy. When we found a chance to circumvent these kind of unpleasant orders then of course it was easier for us than if there was no chance at all of doing this. The position with regard to the transport of prisoners for labor in Germany was rather vague. If we were against this deportation and if we were ever liable to be made responsible for this, then we could always use the excuse that the conditions were very vague. I can give you quite clear proof of this if you would give me Document Book 16. In Document Book 16, on page 143-
Q Witness, this--
A This is a document from which one can see the way in which this Hitler order could be circumvented.
Q What page did you say, witness?
A Page 143, NOKW 1418.
Q Page 97 in the English, Volume 16. The judges have volume 16. Will you continue witness.
A From this order of the 15th Corps which is against the transport of bandit suspects to employment in the Reich, it can be seen that offices of the Four Years Plan were entrusted with the recruiting of the labor, and that this whole transport was to be carried out in agreement with Croatia Government authorities by reason of a German Croatian agreement dated 1943.
That is, this agreement was concluded about three or four months before the Fuehrer order. The Croatians were against the transport of workers, and the vague conditions which arose through this agreement could be utilized by us in order to circumvent the rigid orders for transport of the bandits. In order to keep up the appearance, it is ordered here that captured bandits or deserters are as formerly to be sent to the camps available for this purpose of work. The offices of the Four Years Plan were allowed to get labor from these camps in some way or other; I don't know actually how this was done. But you see the conditions here are very vague and very unclear because lots of Reich officers were mixed up in the matter, and then there was the German-Croatian agreement, and the Croatians were against this transport. We were also against it, and by clever application and exploitation of these conditions the order was able to be circumvented.
Q Witness, all I wanted to get from you is the fact that under certain conditions Hitler orders could be circumvented if conditions permitted?
A If the conditions were as favorable as they were here, where the corresponding reasons could be found at any time, then this was possible; but this is the only case which I know about, and it is also a rather subordinate case, not of very much importance.
Q Witness, didn't you tell us during your direct examination that on account of the friendship pact between Croatia and Germany it was erroneous on the part of the Prosecution to assume that these Croats were used for forced labor because working for the German war effort was the same as working for the Croatian war effort. You made a statement along these lines, didn't you?
A Yes, I am still convinced that this statement is correct.
Q Will you then explain to us how come that the German High Command did not realize that because they did not exempt, in view of the explanation you have given here in this court, these Croats from slave labor in Germany, they should have thought about that too, shouldn't they?
A Well, I don't know what they thought about it. The German officers probably knew more about the urgent needs of the Reich than those of Croatia. My point of view was that if the German Wehrmacht was supported by such measures then the German Reich would also be supported, and I thought that this support on the spot was at least just as important as the work in Germany.
Q Witness, we are not talking about the relative importance of the work to be accomplished. We are talking about the fact that the German government did not realize, obviously, that it had a pact with Croatia and consequently could not force the Croatian government to send slave labor to Germany. In other words your explanation you have given here in this court holds only true for the 2nd Panzer Army but is not applicable to your superior officers. By that I mean the German government - I don't mean Army Group F.
A Yes, but it still isn't quite correct, because this was a matter of captured bandits. According to the regulations in force until this order, all captured bandits had to be shot, and in any case they would not have been given to the Croatian labor assignment and now Hitler in a way allowed the prisoners a certain pardon and sent them to forced labor. He disposed of them, these people, and I think I am right about this, couldn't have got the impression that German interests were being placed before Croatian interests.
Q. Witness, what do you understand by tactical subordination?
A. Tactical subordination is a subordination exclusively for combat purposes and for everything connected with the fighting.
Q. Witness, do you consider reprisal measures taken by members of units of the 2nd Panzer Army a tactical necessity as long as they were carried out by these troops?
A. I can't describe it as a tactical necessity, but I can describe it as a military necessity.
Q. Witness, what I am driving at is to have you explain to us whether or not there is a deference, if these reprisal measures are being carried but by your troops, that is to say tactical units, or if they are to be carried out by the police in rear areas as a security or police measure; there is a difference, isn't there?
A. In the purpose of the reprisal measures I think there is no difference at all. In any case there must be a necessity, and I assume that is justified. In the case of reprisal measures.
Q. Witness, you told us here that the Skanderbeg Division was under your command for tactical employment only, didn't you?
A. Yes, and only a certain case and not the whole of the Division, only parts of the Division, and the Divisional Staff, I think not at all because an employment of the Divisional Staff was impossible because the whole division had nothing more than one regiment.
Q. That one regiment you have reference to which fought under the name, so to speak, of the Division Skanderbeg, was part of the 21st Corps occasionally, wasn't it?
A. If it was subordinate it was to the 21st Corps or one of its divisions.
Q. And the 21st Corps was part of the 2nd Panzer Army, isn't that right?
A. Yes, that is correct.
Q. Now, suppose this one Regiment of the Skanderbeg Division, while being a part of this 21st Corps carries out reprisal measures, isn't that in the long-run your responsibility?
A. As far as reprisal measures are concerned in execution of my order then I carry the responsibility, but one must however remember that these SS troops received their orders through their own service channels, and, in addition, in this particular case here, the Skanderbeg Division was in the process of being set up and it was made subordinate to the Plenipotentiary of the Reichsfuehrer SS in Albania in every respect.
Q. Witness, I am very well aware of all these facts you have cited, but the point I am driving at is, if this regiment of the Skanderbeg Division, as part of the 21st Corps carrys out a reprisal to the 2nd Panzer Army, it would be rather far-fetched to say, would it not, that this particular reprisal measure then was ordered by Fitzthum and not by you?
A. No, it wouldn't occur to me like that at all. If a reprisal measure is carried out by reason of an Army order, then of course this falls within the responsibility of the Army, but if a reprisal measure is not carried out within the scope of such an order then the Army has nothing to do with it.
MR. RAPP: Your Honor, I am submitting now NOKW 809, Prosecution Exhibit 604. This is a daily report from the 3 July 1944 from the 21st Mountain Corps to the 2nd Panzer Army, and under paragraph 2, it says: "SS Division Skanderbeg". There two communists were hanged in retaliation for the dynamiting of a bridge and various telephone lines; now, witness, is this particular retaliation on the part of the 1st Jaeger Regiment a responsibility of the 21st Corps or a responsibility of General Gullmann, the German Military Commander in Albania, or possibly of the SS Gruppenfuehrer Fitzthum, just see who you would like to pin it on this time?
A. In order to judge this one must see the Army Group Order of the 22nd December 1943. By reason of this order the troops in Croatia and in Albania, are authorized to apply for reprisal measures with the competent Albanian or Croatian offices, and the Croatian and Albanian offices have to decide about these reprisal measures, this order I think--
Q. No, it won't be in this particular---
A. I think it is in Document Book 16.
Q. Witness I know the order you have reference to, would you care to see that particular order?
A. No, but then you have to believe me if I don't read it, because it states expressly in this that the Croatian and Albanian offices arc the only people competent for reprisal measures, and the troops have to apply to those offices. The decision about this lies with the Albanian and Croatian offices. And with regard to this report I would like to say that it is dated the 3rd of July 1944, and I had already been away from the Balkans for two weeks. I left the Balkans on June 24, that is 10 days before.
Q. Witness, I have handed you now Document Book 14, and I am having reference to page 10 in the English, page 8 of the German, Exhibit 339, NKW 880, -- page 10 of the English, page 8 of the German, Document Book 14, Exhibit 339, NOKW 880. I just have two questions in connection with this document. Was the First Mountain Division ever under your command, witness?
A. Yes it was subordinate, I think, in December or January 1943 for an operation in Bosnia, and in February or March 1944 for an operation in Albania. That is, it was subordinate to me on two occasions.
Q. Witness, during your direct examination you stated that the First Mountain Division was never under your command, at least that is what the transcript reads.
A. Then it must be a mistake, because in my various examinations I said that the division was at least twice temporarily under my command; but with reference to this charge here I said that at this time in September 1943, the Division was not subordinate to me. It is quite im possible that I could ever have consciously said that the division was never subordinate to me.
The division even played a rather important part on these two occasions, so that I could not have even thought that they had never been subordinate to me.
Q. I have checked you statement that at that time the First Mountain Division was not a part of your command within the Second Panzer Army, and I found your statement to be true and correct, and for that reason we withdraw NOKW 880, as far as you are concerned. In other words you are not implicated in the document. It was an error on our part. That is Exhibit 339, Your Honor. Did you understand what I said, witness?
A. Yes.
MR. RAPP: Exhibit 339, Your Honor.
Q. Witness, was it ever suggested to you and subsequently approved by yon to disguise killed hostages in British uniforms fully identified with British papers and drop them around Marshal Tito's Headquarters to give the impression as if those men had been genuine British parachutists who overtook a misfortune when they landed, and they were full of explosives? They carried a letter to Tito, and if that letter would have been opened it would have blasted the headquarters apart, and for this particular purpose two killed hostages were used, and they were fully disguised in British uniforms; I would like to ask you in this connection two questions, firstly, have you ever heard of this plan, and secondly, if so, would you consider if a permissible use of land warfare? Please answer these two questions?
A. I certainly can't remember any case of this kind. If anyone could ever have thought that was necessary or expedient in order to lead the enemy astray, why should this action be prohibited?
Q. Witness, I am merely asking you whether or not under the rules of land warfare to the best of your knowledge it is a permissible ruse; if you don't know, it don't answer it?
THE PRESIDENT: Is this defendant being charged with this particular offense, or is it a part of the indictment?
MR. RAPP: Well, I am cross-examining him on something for which I am at the present time laying a foundation, Your Honor, and I don't want to give that away at this time.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
A. I would just like to say the following: I know of no provision in the laws of warfare in which such an action is prohibited.
Q. Witness, were your troops ever instructed in counter-partisan warfare or how to combat partisans, did they learn down there by application or were they especially picked and trained for this particular warfare?
A. No, the troops who were there from the beginning trained themselves by reason of their experience. The troops who came fresh to this area got the corresponding information about the experience from the other troops, and the superior officers also gave them information about it. The most important experiences for band warfare were set down in the regulations for band warfare, and those regulations were available in large numbers of copies to the troops.
Q. Witness, will you tell us now who was in the area of the 2nd Panzer Army charged with the mission of selecting the victims which were to be used in connection with reprisal measures?
A. They were the local agencies, divisions, and this had to be done in the closest agreement with the Croatian authorities or the Albanian authorities, and these Albanian and Croatian authorities took the decision on this selection.
Q. Did the SD have anything to do with these things?
A. The SD only had to do with these matters insofar as where the troops were not quite clear about band suspects, in certain cases they called in the SD in order to determine how far the man concerned was a band suspect or not; but the SD had no other kind of activity in this connection.
I have also seen from the documents that there was another case, I think it was one incident,--I can't remember which incident it was, in which such a reprisal hostage camp was not especially set up by the troops but the hostages were given over to an SD camp. I found this out from the documents here, and this could also be another point of contact, but there were no other points at all.
Q. Now, something else, witness, who carried out the executions?
A. Either the Croatian agencies, the Croatian police, as expressly stated in the order, and perhaps where these people were not available on the spot the troops carried out the measures themselves.
Q. The German Troops?
A. Yes, the German troops. I can't imagine it any other way.
Q. And how was it in all those areas outside of Croatia which were under your command?
A. Well, I had only areas which were independent states, where for instance the same conditions were valid in Albania as for Croatia, and only Montenegro possessed a German Military administration and was administered by an administrative sub-area headquarters, and of course there only German agencies came into the question.
Q. Did the SD help out or was it all done by soldiers and police?
A. Well, I can't remember that the SD had anything to do with this at all. I cannot think that it could ever become necessary.
Q. Witness, in connection with the operation Panther you stated that the Samarica area was a notorious area where dozens of Tito partisans hang out; you also told us this area was cleaned out three times, but in every instance the partisans were able to return; you also told us that the partisans were engaged in recruiting the civilian population either voluntarily or by force? Did you make these statements?
A. Yes, Samarica belonged to the most notorious band area. It had been cleaned out at least three times, and then they reformed again.
Q. Isn't it apparent from these statements you made that the partisans must have been pretty strong in that area to enforce the drafting of civilians into their ranks, and that as a matter of fact you did not control that area at all times or at any time you pleased?
A. Of course I could not place German troops in every village and every valley, but nevertheless we were able at any time to get to any place which we wanted to get to. In those places or in those areas in which we were not present, it was not very difficult for the bandits to carry out this kind of forced recruitment. They only needed to be energetic enough. For instance, in the area of Samarica, since they had been left alone there for some time they were able to build up numerous stocks and they certainly had enough forces to secure and to guard these stocks, and from our point of view they were not terribly strong, because we had already thrown them out within a few days.
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
THE PRESIDENT: You may proceed.
BY MR. RAPP:
Q. Witness, you stated that the Commando order was issued sometime in the fall of 1942 and at that time yon were still in Russia; is that correct?
A. Yes, that is correct.
Q. You further stated that the commando order as far as you knew was not applicable for the Russian theater of operations; is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And finally you said that upon your arrival in the Balkans in August, 1943, this commando order had already been issued and passed down to lower units: that is correct too?
A. Yes, that was before my time. yes.
Q. Witness, you further stated that this commando order was not carried out by units under the 2nd Panzer Army while you were in command of that army; is that correct?
A. Yes, I know of no case, but I know evidence to the contrary effect.
Q. Did you consider the commando order in violation of international law?
A. I must say that I saw this commando order for the first time here in Nurnberg, with all its motivations. The commando order contains two parts, it deals with sabotage troops and the so-called commando troops it only deals with at random. As far as sabotage is concerned or rather sabotage troops, the commando order itself says that these men who appeared as civilians did not take prisoners but murdered whoever stood in their way, and when they found no way out they referred to the Geneva convention, put on their uniforms and then gave themselves up as soldiers. This is a decided misuse of the Geneva convention. The measures which are contained in the commando order against these sabotage troops can be called reprisal measures, for there can be no doubt that the way in which those troops acted was in violation of the law and illegal.
As far as the actual commando troops are concerned, this order wants to put them on the same level as the sabotage troops for the reason that by those commando troops numerous illegal actions were carried out. That has been explicitly described during the trial before the international Military Tribunal and on the basis of these illegal actions on the part of the commando troops, Hitler decided to issue this order. I think it can be proved that this order was not illegal or at least has a chance of one ot one. It can be proved just as well that this order was legal as it was attempted here to prove that it was illegal.
Q. Then, witness, in view of your opinion why was it not carried out?
A. In my field of activities, the order was not carried out for the reason firstly because there were no sabotage troops and those commando troops which appeared in my territory acted and fought as decent straightforward soldiers.
Q. The next question, did you ever reissue the commando order or make reference to it in any way, saying that the full meaning of the commando order should be applied in every and all instances where commandoes landed within the area which you commanded?
A. No, I know nothing about it.
Q. Let me take a look at NOKW 1030, it is being offered, Your Honor, as prosecution exhibit 605. Now, witness, here is a report from the first Cossack Division with an enclosure. The report is dated 25 October 1943, the enclosure is called secret and under paragraph 6 of this enclosure, that is the last page of the original, that I have handed you, it says:
"In the fight against invading commandos, proceed with the same ruthlessness as the enemy!