A: On the 2nd page the Military Commander Southeast reports something which comes from the German in Albania that the SS Division Skanderbeg had arrested 300 Jews. I should say about that, that the SS divisions was being formed at the time. While I was there only one regiment had been established, and I heard that no more was done later. This division was under the authority of the representative and plenopotentiary of the Reichsfuehrer SS in Albania, in every sense of the word, while it was being formed. And during the forming period only from case to case and time to time elements of the division were used for fighting purposes by the 21st Group. These elements were thereupon for tactical purposes under their orders, but otherwise this formation while it was being formed had nothing to do with the 21st Group or the Army. Now, as it is reported here that these people had arrested 300 Jews, they can only have done so on orders by their experts along the channel which reaches up as far as Himmler, but never on orders given by the 21st Corps or the Army, which was not interested at all in things like that.
THE PRESIDENT: We will take our morning recess at this time.
(Thereupon a 15--minute recess was taken)
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Marshal, I wonder if we might have some fresh air in here. I think in the future at recess if we could get a little fresh air it might be advisable.
DIRECT EXAMINATION - Continued BY DR. FRITSCH:
Q General, we only have a few questions left concerning the problem of the Balkan area. Just recently we have discussed quite a number of Daily Reports of the Commander Southeast, and I would like to put one concluding question to you.
Did you read all of those reports at the time?
A You may rest assured that I did, on principle, not read the reports of the Military Commander Southeast, and I would not think that they were even submitted to me. As you have seen yourself, these reports did not contain anything that could be of possible interest to me. When I looked at the photostats I saw quite a number of these reports. All of these merely bear the initials of my Chief of Staff and there is not a single sign that I looked at them.
Q We then turn to Document Book XIX.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Fritsch, before we turn to Document Book XIX may I ask the Witness to again refer to Document Book XVIII, Page 89, and there is a comment there made as to the 300 Jews arrested in Kristina by SS Division Skanderbeg. I do not know what the German pagination is.
DR. FRITSCH: That is Page 86 of the German if you are referring to Exhibit 440, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. This was commented upon just before our morning recess.
BY THE PRESIDENT:
Q General Rendulic, I do not want to embarrass you by asking any question that might in some way embarrass you, but I would like to submit this question. You can answer it if you care to.
Under International Law, as I understand it, the Commander in Court No. V, Case No. VII.
Chief of a territory is responsible for the administration of that territory is he not?
A Concerning my own Army this did not apply. The administration of the area was the task of the Military Commander Southeast and his agencies. Those were the German General in Albania and the German Plenipotentiary General in Croatia. Those two General were not under me. They were only subordinate to the Military Commander Southeast. The administration of these two countries, Croatia and Albania, was in the hands of the countries themselves. They were independent states which were under a pact and a friendly relation with Germany.
Q Well, what I'm getting at, General, you or some German authority were in charge of Albania.
A Yes, but merely in a military respect. In this respect Albania was under the Second Panzer Army. That was the Army of which I was in charge. Concerning the sphere of administration, the Army had nothing to say or to do neither in Croatia nor in Serbia.
Q Well, as to the arrest of these 300 Jews by the SS Division, that was a part of the administration of the country of Albania was it not? That was during the administration or the handling of it in some military way, or the action by some military unit?
A To the best of my knowledge and judgment of the conditions this was an action by the representative of the Reich Fuehrer SS in Albania. That is, the SS leader Fitzthum who was previously mentioned in a document. This can only be a matter which fell into Himmler's sphere of interest and activity, never in the sphere of the Army.
Q What I'm getting at is that, as the Commanding Officer in charge of that territory, under International Law, there then arises a responsibility for the action taken by the various units in that territory. Is that a correct rule of International Law?
A Yes, he can only carry the responsibility if the units concerned are subordinate to him. But concerning the sphere of administration there was a special organization which was embodied in the Military Court No. V, Case No. VII.
Commander Southeast. He was the man who was solely responsible for all administrative matters, if no special affairs of Albania and Croatia are concerned which would fall into the sphere of sovereignty of those countries.
Q Well, can a Commanding officer in charge of a territory such as Albania relieve himself of responsibility for an act such as the arrest of 300 Jews by saying that action was taken by some other unit of which he, at least claims, over which he had no authority? Now, maybe I'm asking a question that you don't wish to answer, but I would like to get your conception of this problem of International Law.
A Yes, I'd very much like to answer it. There was, after all, one person who was to be held responsible as a result of the German organization, such as it existed in the Balkans. This person was to be responsible for everything that went on in the administrative sphere, and that was the Military Commander. Concerning everything that went on in a purely military respect the Army Group is responsible, and the Army in its corresponding area. This is the way it was ordered and regulated by the Supreme German leadership, and I think we have heard this here on several occasions. It would have been quite impossible for me to interfere with any administrative matters because I would then have overstepped my sphere of competency that was assigned to me. Now, concerning International Law, insofar as I can judge on the spur of the moment, I must say that the regulation that any military commander is responsible for events and that he is also responsible for the way the administration is arranged, the way it is provided for by the Hague Rules for Land Warfare, the German organization created this post of a man who was responsible. This post existed. It was filled by the person of the Military Commander, and there the way of organizing things down there, International Law was complied with. Unfortunately all this is not very clear because, as a result of the regulation of the channels of command, tactical leadership was completely separated from the administration.
THE PRESIDENT: Do other members of the Tribunal wish to question on this matter?
You may proceed.
DR. FRITSCH: May it please the Tribunal, I would like to continue in this line of questioning quite briefly. The Court will remember that yesterday on direct examination I submitted for identification the document Rendulic No. 1 and it was given identification number "1-a." This document is a map which gives a survey of the administration of that area.
Q General, do you have that sketch in front of you?
A Yes.
DR. FRITSCH: May it please the Tribunal, I tried yesterday on the basis of this sketch to illustrate the separation of authority.
Q Could I ask you, General, to explain to the Tribunal on hand of this sketch and other vertical lines which I made yesterday the folLowing? Will you please answer this question. Looking at the sketch and looking at the agencies which appear on the right of the vertical line, what did these agencies represent?
A On the basis of this sketch we see the relation between the tactical or operational leadership and the administration. This vertical line which goes through this sketch shows the complete segregation of the purely military and tactical leadership and the administrative agencies. We see on this sketch on the left of the vertical line the highest operational and tactical unit in the Balkans was Army Group F, Commander-in-Chief Southeast. On the right and segregated from it we see the Military Commander Southeast who only had a very loose connection with Army Group F; and on the right of this Military Commander South East we find the Higher SS and Police Leader. He again had only a very loose connection with the man on the left of him, the Military Commander Southeast.
These three highest agencies in the Balkans are parallel to each other and if we then turn to the 2nd Panzer Army with which we are concerned here we find that army was under Army Group F as demonstrated by the line connecting the two and we see no official channel to the other side of the vertical line. There is no connection to the Military Commander Southeast or to the administration represented by him.
We further see from this sketch how the administration was subdivided. The following agencies are subordinate to the Military Commander Southeast. In Serbia in his immediate area there are the Administrative Sub-Area Headquarters, et cetera; then the German Plenipotentiary Generals in Albania, in Croatia and in Greece. Those generals are subordinate to him.
This sketch does not show the very restricted spheres of influence which the generals in Albania and Croatia had which was a consequence of the fact that these two countries were not German administration but were independent, sovereign states which looked after their own administration.
Q General, may I now put a question to you? If we think of the conception of executive power where were the executive powers located, right or left of the vertical line?
A It is on the right of the vertical line where the Military Commander Southeast is mentioned but there again is an exception. In Croatia and Albania the German Military agencies did not have executive power. In these countries executive power was in the hands of the indigenous governments and the German Plenipotentiary Generals in these countries were only to represent the military claims of their agencies to the executive indigenous governments.
Q General, if now in conclusion of this question I may make a comparison, let us say, with for instance our own country, the chief of a large administrative area -- for instance, in Germany, a province -and within that administrative area we assume an army, the head of this army would the Commanding General.
Let us look at this comparison from peacetime and let us make a comparison with this sketch and how would you make this comparison?
A It is not very simple to follow your line of thought but I shall try.
Q Maybe I can put it a little clearer. Looking at this sketch, who would be the man who is the head of the province or let me take an example from the United States. Who is the governor of the state -on the right or on the left?
A That would be a person who would have to be on the right of the vertical line.
Q And the Commanding General of the Military unit which by chance happens to be in that area -- where would he be on this sketch?
A He would be on the left of the vertical line because he would have no connection with any administrative affairs.
Q I would then like to leave this particular complex. Previously, I had mentioned, General, that we don't particularly want to look at Document Book XIX. Instead we will turn to Document Book XX and there we will look at page 89. Will you please open your document book on that page? This is page 125 of the English text. That is Document Book XX, page 125 of the English text. This is Document NOKW 1556 which is Exhibit 477. I would like you to turn to the last page of this exhibit. You are charged with Counts 1 and 2 with reference to this document. The document concerns the arrest of band members, et cetera. Will you make brief comments on it?
A The report of the 5-SS Mountain Corps reports that a mopping-up operation has been concluded and the report further states that 332 band suspects were arrested and 10 were shot to death. I would like to say the following with regard to this document.
One has to concede that the arrest of band suspects in a larger number on the occasion of a mopping-up of an area is justified. The number of the band suspects undoubtedly depends on the size of the area concerned and on the number of the population in that area. The report further says: "10 shot to death." The troops were not consistent in the use of their designation. Sometimes a man shot in combat action was designated as shot and on another occasion a man who was shot for reprisal measures was also designated merely as shot. From this sentence, "10 shot to death," we cannot conclude whether these people were killed in combat or for any other reason.
If I may say here now in actual fact these things would have occurred, what would have happened if this report had been orally reported to me, then I would have been in a position to clarify whether these 10 people had been shot for any particular reason or whether they had been killed during combat. If such a report was not clearly expressed then the responsible officer, who in this case would have been the "I-a", made inquiry immediately what these 10 shot people were. He would have immediately tried to find out why were there 332 band suspects, were there several villages and for what reason were they arrested and he would have made inquiry so that he would be prepared for every question which I might ask because my officers had to give explanations when orders and reports came in and something was not clear. If the officers concerned could not give me the proper information immediately I would give him a piece of my mind in a very friendly manner. It was in order to evade this criticism of mine, that every unclear expression in every report was always clarified for me and if anything was contained in a report which was open to discussion this was immediately followed up.
Q General, I would now like you to have a look at Document Book XXIV. It will be given to you. What I want you to look at there is the photograph which you find there as Exhibit 536. That is Document NOKW-1807. It is on page 158 of the English text and on page 114 of the German text -- page 158 of the English text. I do not have to put an introduction or any question to this photograph. Would you explain it, please?
A This photograph shows five partisans in uniform. I can see here that the jackets of these men are of Italian origin. One wears a German pair of trousers and gaiters which are German or Italian. One of the men who is shown standing in the picture wears undoubtedly a German coat. There can be no question about that. Only the caps seem to be uniformly of Italian origin.
If this photograph is to show the fact that partisans wore uniforms, then I am afraid I will have to say that the wearing of these uniforms was a violation of International Law on the part of the partisans.
Q Witness, let's now turn to Document Book XXV. We will have a look at a document there which is on page 2 of both the German and the English text. Would you turn up page 2? You find Document NOKW-812 there which has the exhibit number 557. There is some talk here about prisoners in Serbian concentration camps. Do you know anything about this affair or did you know anything about this affair and if so what?
A Serbian concentration camp prisoners had nothing to do with the army. It is the first time here that I see this report. It appears to be an entry in a war diary. Even if this had reached the army nobody would have had the idea to submit anything of that kind to me. The transport of these prisoners from Albania to a mine in Serbia is discussed here. This mine again had nothing to do with the army. In accordance with my knowledge of the situation this could have been an affair of the Higher SS and Police Leader who would have approached the 21st Mountain Corps with the request to put the trucks for the transport at his disposal.
I would think that the corps complied in accordance with the order which existed for all agencies and for all areas to support each other where possible. There is nothing more I can say about this.
Q And now to another document in the same document book; it is NOKW-1790, Exhibit 558, on page 3 of the German and page 4 of the English text. This exhibit contains a number of reports by the 15th Mountain Corps dated October 1943. That was a period of time where this corps was commanded by General Lueters. Did you see this report?
A The first report I do not know. I never gained knowledge of it. Then on the fourth page of this document I see an entry of the 373rd Division according to which 7 hostages were arrested and two localities were burned down. The 373rd Division was a Croatian division. It was stationed in an area which required quite a number of operations because it contained a great number of partisan villages. The reason is not given here why these two villages were burned down. They might have been burned down during a combat action but it is also possible that they were burned down as reprisal measures -- yes, it does say here it is a reprisal measure. It says, "These two villages were burned down as a reprisal measure"; but in spite of this I would not be in a position to say -and I don't believe anybody would be in a position to say -- whether or not this measure was justified because the reason for the measure is not given here.
To refer back to a practice which I previously mentioned, the man who would have verbally reported this report to me would have immediately been in a position to know why all that happened. He would have been in a position to answer my question immediately so that I would have currently been informed whether actions taken were justified or not.
On the fifth page of this document we have a report which is of a unique nature in all documents which I have got to know here. It says here:
"Because of an attempted blowing up of a railroad line, 20 arrestees were hanged." This report is unique for the reason because it is completely unclear and the second reason is that it is a particular strong measure. It does not become clear here who these 20 arrestees are. It is here again very unfortunate that the troops are not consistent in the use of their designation. Were those people arrestees who were arrested for reprisal purposes and for this very purpose or were they people who were arrested on the spot? I would not feel inclined to believe this latter assumption because it would be in contradiction with the orders which existed and also with the use such as it was applied.
It is also unusual here that these people were hanged for an attempt to blow up the railway. Therefore, this report does not show anything clearly. It is just an unclear report. On the basis of my knowledge of the situation and the conditions, this may concern an attempt to blow up a railway line and reprisal measures might have been taken for the reason that at an earlier date the railway line had actually been blown up, so that in this instance measures were taken even though it was only an attempt.
In the document which I commented upon yesterday, Exhibit 375, where I went through all the daily reports, it was made clear that in no instance every individual attack was retaliated but that five or six acts of sabotage took place until finally reprisal measures were taken. Therefore. I would have to assume here that this attempted blowing up of the railway was preceded by the blowing up of the railway line which had actually been carried out before the agency concerned decided to take such reprisal measures.
A. ... There is one thing that I want to add here. If it says in this report "Hanged," the Army would, under all circumstances, he convinced that these people were hangled after court martial procedure, insofar as people were concerned who had been arrested immediately before or after the action. The designation "summary court martial" was, on principle, omitted in these reports because the reports from the troops were mainly passed on by radio, at least up to the division or to the corps, and only from there on--and then not always--there was a proper telephone communication line. Every radio message had to be coded, and there was a very strict order to me it every superfluous word. In accordance with our situation there the term "summary court martial" was entirely superfluous in such a report.
Q. General, we are now dealing with Document Book XXV, Exhibit 561 which is Document No. NOKW-1796. It is on page 13 of the German and on page 14 of the English text. In this document you are charged with Count 3 of the Indictment. This is an entry in a War Diary, and it talks about the arrival of General von Leyser and of the transfer of the command etc. Can you remember any events here which were in connection with the Count of the Indictment?
A. No, this Count of the Indictment also is inexplicable to me because not even the contents of the conferences are given here. These are conferences of people who have to reply on personal discussions. I cannot explain why I am charged with this at all.
Q. Then, would you like to look in this same Document Book XXV, on page 25 of the English text and on page 21 of the German text. It is Document No. NOKW-1746, Exhibit 562. You are charged on Counts 1 and 3 in connection with this document. Could you give us some brief comments on this fact?
A. The 187th Division makes a request to its superior agency, the LXIXth Corps.
The request is to transfer one battalion of the newly arrived 367th Infantry Division to Dubrava.
The reason given for this request is that Dubrava is a hot bed of Communist bands and that by transferring the battalion, the surprise attacks of the Communists might be decreased. This application is a matter of course. Then, it further says here that seizure of hostages is in some villages necessary because the villages contain up to 80% of house partisans. This affair also is a precautionary measure which was absolutely necessary under the conditions as they prevailed then.
Q. Well, then turn to Page 26 of the German text of this same Document Book and Page 33 -- three-- of the English Text. This Document is No. NOKW-766, Prosecution Exhibit No. 566. We have here several situation reports by the Plenipotentiary of the Reich Fuehrer SS for Croatia. You are charged with this document in connection with Counts 1, 3, and 4 of the Indictment. Would you take a look at the distribution list of this document and then possibly, with reference to what we discussed before, tell us whether the Plenipotentiary of the Reich Fuehrer SS for Croatia was subordinate to you or where, in accordance with the sketch we discussed before, he should be.
A. The Plenipotentiary of the Reich Fuehrer SS for Croatia was not under me. He was, only in the spring of 1944, temporarily tactically subordinated. That was at a time when the threats against the main-line of communication became so strong that temporarily all available forces had to be concentrated in order to protect this railway line. For this purpose the Plenipotentiary of the Reich Fuehrer SS for Croatia was, at the time, subordinate to me, but only in a tactical respect. This was the case for only a very few weeks. The document which we have here has no distribution list. It cannot be seen whether the Army ever received this document. It is a report of this police leader. Where he describes the events of the last few months, he does so it purely from the police point of view. He mentions combat actions with partisans. On page 2 of the document he mentions losses, and we can see that for the last month these losses amounted to almost 1,000 men.
And then there is one passage which I would like to point out, particularly where he judge ventures to the partisan warfare. He says, and this is in January, 1944, that in view of this situation there can be no longer any talk about partisan warfare in the common sense of the word; the fight which is waged here is a fight against regular enemy militia units. This designation can be traced back to the constant endeavor of the police units to bring their military activities into the line light. After this man had all his forces stationed in Zagreb and in Zagreb's nearest surroundings, he could not possibly have any insight into the whole area and conditions prevailing in the whole area. The opinion which he gives here has, apart from the mentioned ulterior motive, also the further restriction, that it could not have been formed on the basis of an opinion which covered a larger area.
Q. May I briefly draw your attention to page 4 of the document?
A. Yes, he also says here that Tito's organizations, for instance, were greatly influenced by the clashes with German units in the interior of the country. He talks about large and partly considerable losses on the side of the partisans, which they tried to compensate by compulsory drafts.
Q. I believe we can then leave this particular sphere. As far as it was possible we discussed all Counts of the Indictment concerning the partisan warfare; excepted are a few reports where the troops report reprisal measures. I shall not discuss all these reports individually and in every instance. Instead I would like to ask you generally, did you read all reports of the Corps concerning these reprisal measures?
A. No, that would not have been possible. My activity took me frequently away from my headquarters. On some occasions I was Absent 10, 12, and even more days in one month. I spent that time with the troops. It was very complicated to get there on account of the security measures which were necessary. The roads had to be searched for mines etc. which took up a great deal of time.
One troop, for instance, which I took from my headquarters to Zara in Dalmatia took 13 days to go there and return. When I was present in the headquarters, then the Daily Reports were orally reported to me on the occasion of the situation reports. Of course I was only informed of the most important incidents concerning the military situation. When I was away on official trips, then these reports were sent to me by telephone to the next place in a short except just summarizing the most important events. If there was such place, then they were sent by radio in even briefer forms.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn at this time until 1:30.
(THE TRIBUNAL ADJOURNED AT 1215)
AFTERNOON SESSION (The hearing reconvened at 1330 hours, 30 October 1947)
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the Courtroom will please find their seats.
The Tribunal is again in session DEFENDANT:
Lothar RENDULIC - Resumed DIRECT-EXAMINATION - Continued.
BY DR. FRITSCH:
Q. General, the last thing we discussed were the reports, and you gave us an explanation that quite definitely it was impossible for you to see every single report because it was not submitted to you. Let me ask you now, was it possible for you to form an impression of all the measures taken?
A. Well, I'm bold enough to assume that I formed a over-all picture about the conditions.
Q. And could you tell us what the picture was you formed?
A. The picture which arose in my mind was that the reprisal measures were kept at a very low standard and that they were used only in rare cases and were never used unless there was a distinct necessity for them. I knew my generals and most of my commanders. I knew their attitudes. I was in a position to examine what they did all the time. I frequently had the impression that in the case of most of them military necessity took by far second place to human considerations. But the orders on which the troops acted, as mentioned, had been with the troops long before our time, and nobody was in a position to rescind them. The only thing we could do was to act as mildly as we knew how and always to see to it that any harshness would be avoided which could be avoided. This was how it was handled throughout my command during the time I was commanding in my area.
Q. To conclude this matter, namely, the whole question concerning the Southeastern Balkans, I would like once again to go back to one question which was mentioned by the Court itself.
General, you indicated to us how the partisan warfare developed. Did you, at any time, have the feeling that partisan warfare tended towards barbarism and that you yourself acted in a barbarous manner?
A. I explained before that as the development of arms gave to the individual a enormously destructive power and that the methods of partisan warfare were based on cunning and cruelty. Counter measures were dictated by the impossibility of finding out who the perpetrators were and to apprehend them. Nothing can ever be changed in these facts. I frequently tried to think, at the time, whether there wouldn't be other means as to how to conduct that type of warfare and whether reprisals could have been avoided somehow. I did not find other methods. If I consider that all these methods and means seemed to me to be admissible under International Law and that I could not imagine any situation in which a measure dictated by military necessity could be described as barbarous, then I am bound to reach the conclusion that I cannot describe the war against the partisans as barbarous and that my Army and troops did not act in a barbarous manner. New limitations set by International Law as to counter measures would be only an encouragement for future partisans to fight still more cruelly. A state which could never be in the position of being invaded by the enemy and which could never be in the position to organize a partisan warfare on a large-scale, but whose Armies, in all probability, would have to face partisans, a state of that sort cannot be interested in imposing new restrictive measures in the field of reprisals in partisan warfare.
Q. Now, what is your attitude, General, towards the general aspect of the alleged barbarous development of warfare?
A. It is true that the development of military warfare tends to increased severity. If we think back to the beginning of the century when the machine gun was invented, where not the individual rifleman was of importance but where this gun mowed down whole rows of people; when soon after the sub-marine was invented, where you simply press a lever in order to sink large ships with thousands of men on them; when finally the air armadas with large bomb carriers were created; and when the development of military technique reached its climax in the atom-bomb -- then it becomes plausible that many people feel that war has become barbarous.
At closer analysis, however, it becomes clear that that development unhappily is a logical one. Man has become prisoner of technique, the prisoner of his own potentialities. In that development I am unable to see a criminal element and, therefore, further development in warfare cannot be directed by military tribunals, but only by the nations' remembering and bearing in mind the enormous latent dangers.
Q. May it please the Tribunal, may I, at this point, interrupt the examination of this Defendant as a witness and now submit Document Book I, which is already before the Court? Document Book I contains a number of documents of general value, but I have sub-divided it to the effect that Document Book I, with its supplements, describes events in the Southeast Balkans, whereas Document Book II will deal with matters in Norway. May I submit first Document Rendulic No. 4, which will become Exhibit No. 1
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Fritsch, have you not numbered these maps as an exhibit?
DR. FRITSCH: Your Honor, I described the maps as I-a, but now, as I am offering them in the document book, I shall give them their definite exhibit numbers.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you giving the maps and the other documents some different exhibit numbers?
DR. FRITSCH: Yes, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT : Very well.
DR. FRITSCH: In the case of Exhibit No. 1 we have an extract from the agreement concerning Land Warfare of 1907. The court will recall that in my Opening Statement I pointed out that I had my doubts as to the competence of a military tribunal for the sentencing of the cases here before this Court. In this connection I submit Article 8 of the Hague Land Warfare Conventions, which reads as follows?
"Prisoners of war are subject to the laws, regulations and orders which are in force in the Army of the State in whose custody they are.
I shall then submit Rendulic document number 5 which I offer as exhibit number 2. This is a document in the same context. Article 63 of the Geneva Convention of 27 July 1929 reads as follows:
"A judgment against a prisoner of war may only be passed by the same courts and in accordance with the same procedure as a judgment against the persons belonging to the armed forces of the detaining power."
In a similar context I offer Rendulic document 6 in volume 1 which I offer as exhibit number 3. This document is an extract in the English language and the translation I made myself in order to be able to read the important parts of it here. This is a manual for courts martial of the United States Army published by direction of the President and effective on April 1, 1928. The copy at my disposal was published in 1936.
"Appendix 1, The Articles of War. The articles included in this section (section 1, Chapter II, act of June 4, 1920) shall be known as the Articles of war and shall at all times and in all places govern the Armies of the United States."
Then, I have not gone into details of Preliminary Provisions, number 1, because they are not of interest here.
"II. Court Martial. Courts martial shall be of three kinds, namely: First, general courts martial; Second, special courts martial; and Third, summary courts martial.
"Article 4. Who May Serve on Courts Martial. All officers in the military service of the United States, and officers of the Marine Corps" --
THE PRESIDENT: With reference to subsection 4, that does not appear in my document book.
THE INTERPRETER: It is on the previous page, your Honor. These seems to be some mistake in the binding of the volume.