There was no way out except to burn down that village and settle the population elsewhere in order to eliminate that danger from the Railways.
Q Now, General, will you please take up Volume IV and on page 24 of the German and page 25 of the English there is prosecution exhibit 367. It is document NOKW-1331 and I think of particular importance are the subjects of discussion which have been used as incriminating evidence against you. In particular we are interested in point 6. Will you give us your comments about that, please?
A This is what I want to say about that. This document is dated 5 of November 1943. On the 1st of November the Commanding General of the 15th Army Corps arrived in the area and reported to Army Headquarters. I held a conference with him there and informed him about the most important points. This conference was as usual taken down by an A.D.C. The original is about two and a half pages long and from the conference minutes this point 6 has been extracted, and to that point 6 or paragraph 6, there are the following things which I wish to comment about.
It is out of the question that I made the remark in the way it is put down here because it says here "the Commander in Chief made a proposal." It is quite impossible for a superior officer to propose a matter to a subordinate, which he thinks is right. In such a case he orders it. To make a proposal would only mean a shifting of responsibility to the subordinate and that nobody can charge me with. On the contrary, I always assumed more responsibility than I had to take.
Q Did you have any other reasons?
A Yes, there is another reason why it is impossible for this entry to be correct. The headquarters of the 15th Corps at that time was in Banja-Luka. When we occupied the Coast after the disarming of the Italinas, the focal point of the corps had shifted towards the Coast and this made it seem a natural thing to have the headquarters of the corps nearer to the Coast.
When on 16 September I was in the Fuehrer's headquarters this matter was also brought up for discussion and Hitler emphasized particularly that if the corps should be transferred from Banja-Luka, Banja-Luka must not be allowed to fall into Tito's hands because Banja-Luka was the old historic capital of the Kingdom of Croatia?
It is highly probably that I told the Commanding General about this conference and that I stressed the importance of holding Banja-Luka even after the corps had left. Perhaps, I might even have used somewhat strong words in this connection but it is out of the question that a remark of this sort was made because it was by no means certain when the corps was to leave Banja-Luka. In actual fact, it only left it by the end of February 1944, and how could, following the wording of this entry, the certain possession of Banja-Luka be guaranteed after the Corps Staff had left, if, as it also says here, on the 5th of November, a thousand hostages were shot, I am unable to follow that logic and this connection between the shooting of a fictitious number of hostages and the holding of Banja-Luka. It is a highly confuses affair, it seems to me, and shows undoubtedly that the man who took down this conference completely misunderstood the meaning and simply noted something for the diary.
Q General, let us discuss Volume XVI now. I want to discuss Document NOKW-658 which is Exhibit 375, on page 11 of the German, page 5 of the English. May I point out to the Tribunal first that this exhibit contains about 80 pages in the German version and in the English only 32. For that reason I have included this exhibit as a defense document and will submit it as such as, in my opinion, full knowledge of all daily reports contained in this document is unnecessary. These are daily reports by the 69th Reserve Corps which, needless to say, concerning the actual ratio of reprisals are of considerable importance.
Q General, may I first ask you: did you read all those reports at the time?
A No that is certainly not the case. The important details of the reports were reported to me orally during the situation conferences and of course, that was as far as my knowledge went.
Q Far be it from me, General, to add up figures here but may I ask you General, to give us your comments about this document and the ratios it mentions?
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
A This document comprises 95 days, from the 23rd of September until the 16th of December. For those 95 days there are, in this document, 32 Daily Reports. In other words, 63 Daily Reports are missing. In order to show how reprisal measures were carried out I would like to read some of these Daily Reports.
Here is the Daily Report of the 20th of September, and it says that on 18 September in the morning a passenger train on such and such a line was attacked and set on fire. Much of Croatian Panzer Regiment 202 has been attacked on this road. Two machine guns were stolen; one Croatian soldier was killed, and one was wounded; 5 houses were burned down in reprisal. On the same day street bridge across the Cesma River has been destroyed; 30 hostages have been arrested.
Then, on the 21st of September there is a belated report concerning the 19th of September -- an attack on the main railroad line, several explosions, and 40 telegraph poles have been blown up. A Croatian patrol was attacked. I wanted only to draw attention to the fact that the term "attack" is not a good translation for "Ueberfall." We always used the term "surprise attack" to render the German term "Ueberfall". Five dead, 11 wounded, and 10 missing.
Then, under the 24th of September the blowing up of a railway is reported. A surprise attack on an estate; German and two Hungarian employees shot; 93 German policemen ambushed; 3 dead, 1 wounded, and not a single retaliation measure.
Then, it goes on under the 25th of September where an attack by mines on the main line is reported; patrols near the railways were shot at; one railway security train drove across a mine; 4 officers of the Ustasha Brigade, two railway officials, and the whole crew dead; one Ustasha officer badly wounded; the train was set on fire by the bandits; near Birovitica shots were fired from private houses; 100 hostages were apprehended; one policeman wounded.
According to the report of the 26th of September a battery of the Croatian Regiment 96 was ambushed in a wood; 3 dead; 7 wounded;
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
and as a reprisal for a surprise attack of an earlier date one village is being burned down; then it says attempt to blow up the main line on the same day; and a private care was fired at from the wood; one German soldier was wounded on the spot.
On the night of 24-25 September a railway junction was attacked; two German soldiers were killed.
Then, on the first of October, after this long period of time, there is a reprisal measure for the attempt on the Wehrmacht transport train reported in the Daily Report of the 28th of September, where one man of the escort personnel was killed; the police, not the Wehrmacht, executed 15 hostages on the spot.
Since the last retaliation measures, if one adds up all the losses from these surprise attacks and ambushed on the part of the Germans and Croatians, there were 20 dead, 26 wounded, and 3 cases of blowings up. And these were losses not suffered in combat. These losses resulted only from surprise attacks or mines. If you count surprise attacks by bands on the goods train, there were 3 killed and 4 wounded, another surprise attack on a goods train, a railway station was attacked and set on fire, one German and one Croatian soldier killed, one German and one Croatian soldier missing.
Then, on the 4th of October a reprisal measure is mentioned for the surprise attacks on railways committed in the last days, as it says here, and this report has reference to a Daily Report of 3 October which is not included among the documents and one does not know whether losses had been suffered. Forty hostages were shot. Since the last reprisal measures there had been on the German side 5 killed and 6 wounded; two surprise attacks and, moreover, there must be counted the losses contained in the Daily Report of the 3rd of October but these do not appear in these documents. I did not wish to continue with this, but I merely wish to state the following: If in the same manner as before one counts only the attempts and surprise attacks and the losses suffered on those occasions and adds them up, one finds Court No. V, Case No. VII.
33 surprise attacks, 66 cases of blowing up, 59 people killed, and 159 wounded. On the other hand, there is the shooting of 253 hostages. Bloody German losses amounted to 218, and if you take only one hostage for one case of blowing up or one surprise attack, you will arrive at a ratio of less than one to one. But that picture is not correct. As for the time under review only 32 reports are available for the 95 days, and the 63 reports, I am sure, do not contain a reprisal measure, but they do contain reports on losses and attempts made. If we in that sense still include the 63 Daily Reports we arrive at a ratio of one to 0.3. I believe that I, at least have endeavored to give a picture of how the reprisal measures in Croatia were handled, that is, in the area where the largest number of attacks took place, and there consequently the largest number of reprisal measures were taken.
Q You want to say, General, in other words, that this document, even in its complete form in which it was submitted here, does not give a true picture?
A No. If we count with probable figures as we have to seeing the fact that a large number of reports is missing, the figure of the German losses should be treble compared to the figures expressed in the document. And only if we had all the Daily Reports at our disposal would it be possible to arrive at a true judgment about the reprisal measures. But this document as it is shows already that the reprisal measures were taken on an extremely limited scale and that I, taking the Army's point of view, never had any doubt regarding the military necessity of these measures and I never conceived the idea that here we committed a violation or an excess.
Q I shall leave this point now and shall ask you to look at Page 104 of the German text, in the same volume 16, which is page 55 of the English text. This is Document No. NOKW-674, it is Exhibit 381. It is an order by the Second Panzer Army concerning the evacuation of the islands and the preparations for the evacuation of the coast. We have touched upon this question before. Let me ask you here, did you sign that order?
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
A I did not.
Q Did you gain any knowledge of the order?
A I certainly knew its essential contents because that order could not be issued without my being informed first of the more important points and my approval being obtained. This order concerned the defense of the coast. Of course, not every detail mentioned there has been reported to me.
Q What were the reasons for this evacuation?
A The evacuation of the islands is explained in the order itself. It says there, "In the event of an enemy landing, the large number of men of military age constitute a menace to the defense, and in the event of an attack would impede defensive measures." Such a motivation of an order is without doubt a highly exceptional thing to do, but it was given here so that the men, the troops, saw the point of these measures which affected the civilian population and because undubitably in view of the contact between the troops and civilian population several questions would be put by the population to the troops, so that they would be in a position to answer and give their explanation. Otherwise we would not have included this explanation in our order.
Q Do you know whether in other theaters of war by other powers the population was evacuated from battle areas?
A To evacuate the population from battle areas was done very frequently in many cases; in our own country, in Germany, the population in the area of the Western wall was completely evacuated; in France in the area of the Atlantic Wall; in Central Russia, the Russians evacuated a 50 kilometers broad zone. We did not understand why and thought perhaps that this was a preparation for a gas attack. In Italy, the Allies and the Germans evacuated all of the population from the fighting zone.
This, no doubt, is a military necessity; and if the army here confines itself temporarily to the evacuation of the islands alone, that is to say the most exposed parts, and the preparation of the evacuation of the other part of the population is laid down for the time being only Court No. V, Case No. VII.
on paper, this is a limitation which might just be bearable.
Q What was your idea as to how the evacuation should be carried out?
A The OKW wanted to evacuate the entire population of the islands and the coastal area. This would have been, no doubt, the most intelligent thing to do from the point of view of defending the Coast but it would have meant that hundreds of thousands would have been on the move. That practically speaking was not feasible. We could not have accommodated or supplied these people anywhere else, and then of course we had to realize that from among those people Tito's bands would swell. That is the reason why the army decided on that limitation and kept it up until the end.
Q What was to be done with the people who had been evacuated from the islands?
A Paragraph I, numeral I, shows that the younger classes were to join the Croatian Armed Forces. Others were to work on the fortifications of the Coastal Area.
Q Was that admissible?
A Well, I explained once before that from the point of view of work done for military purposes, the population can be called in quite legally. Drafting into the Armed Forces was regulated by a Croatian Military Service Law. Conscription prevailed in Croatia at the time. Needless to say, those elements who had to do work of military importance were free workers who were paid accordingly and their families looked after.
Q General, will you please look at Exhibit 383 which is also in Document Book 16, on page 110, and page 63 of the English? It is Document NOKW-673, a letter by the Plenipotentiary General in Croatia addressed to the Croatian Minister for Armed Forces and the Minister of the Interior. What was the purpose of that letter?
A It was to obtain the approval by the Croatian government for the evacuation measures along the coast, and secure their cooperation Court No. V, Case No. VII.
because in that field we depended on the Croatian government.
Q Will you please look at page 63 in the English book now? It is 113 in German. It is Document NOKW-1112, Exhibit 385. On page 63 in the English book. Will you forgive me one moment? I shall hold this back a little in order to make some inquiries. General, in Volume 16 there is on page 117, page 73, 74 of the English text, Document NOKW-1352, it is Exhibit 386, it is an extract from an order given by the Second Panzer Army. Why was that order issued?
A The purpose of the order was to take measures for a better protection of the most vital railway lines.
Q In this order, reference is made to the plenipotentiary the Reichsfuehrer SS. Can you tell us anything about that?
A We were looking for any forces which could be raised and hoped to put them into a service of protection of railways and this representative of the Reichsfuehrer SS was in charge of all police forces in Croatia, and as far as I can remember, he probably had ten or 12 thousand men, police, under him. He was requested here to use his forces as well to protect the railways.
Q How was he subordinate to you?
A Well, this representative of the Reichsfuehrer was not subordinate to me. He was only for a time subordinate to me for tactical purposes and this is contained on the next page of his order as I have just seen. This is Exhibit 387 on page 75 of the English book.
Q The Document Number is NOKW-1353. General, what do you mean by subordination for tactical purposes?
A By that subordination, one understands usually subordination only concerning military employment. All other fields of activity concerning subordination in disciplinary measures, judicially, in personal matters, are not included when someone is under you for tactical purposes. Only military orders can be given to such a subordinate.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: The Tribunal will recess until 9:30 tomorrow morning.
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
(A recess was taken until 30 October 1947 at 0930 hours.)
Official Transcript of the American Military Tribunal in the matter of the United States of America against Wilhelm List, et al defendants, sitting at Nuernberg, Germany, on 30 October 1947, 0930. Justice Wennerstrum, presiding.
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the courtroom will please find their seats.
The Honorable, the Judges of Military Tribunal V. Military Tribunal V is now in session. God save the United States of America and this honorable Tribunal. There will be order in the courtroom.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Marshal; Will you ascertain as to whether or not all the defendants are present in the courtroom.
THE MARSHAL: May it please, Your Honors, all defendants are present in the courtroom except the defendant von Weichs, who is in the hospital and the defendant Lanz who has been excused.
THE PRESIDENT: Are we ready to proceed?
MR. RAPP: Your Honor, I would like to make a statement on behalf of the United States prosecution, I am having reference to document book 13, page 56 in the English, page 42 in the German.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you please give the numbers again?
MR. RAPP: Page 56, document book 13. I am referring to NOKW 910. prosecution exhibit 327. If Your Honors please, I am now having reference to the sixth and seventh line from the top on this particular page, where it says:
"The Commanding General of this Corps is to be given orders as follows."
It is page 56, Your Honor, NOKW 910.
"For this purpose, the Commanding General of this Corps is to be given orders as follows....."
Now yesterday the defense pointed out to the Court some substantial error in translation from the original document into the English. I first of all want to state that we concede this particular translation error. We have of course, acted in good faith. These documents were supposed to be checked, but this particular document slipped up.
In view of this mistake, which we have made, I would like now to have Your honors refer to Count 3 of the Indictment, sub-section i, and this particular count, Your Honors, we have alleged that on or about 11 September 1943, the Commander in Chief and the Chief of Staff of Army Group F and Supreme Command Southeast, the Commander in Chief Second Panzer Army, that is the defendant Rendulic, the Commanders of the 68th Infantry Corps, the 26th Mountain Corps, the 69th Reserve Corps and the 15th Mountain Corps, and the Military Commander of Serbia and Military Commander Southeast, issued, executed and distributed to troops under their command and jurisdiction an order for the execution of one staff officer and 50 men of each Division of the surrendered Italian Army which, prior to its surrender, had sold, given away, or destroyed its weapons, and for the execution of one officer and 10 men of each such Division which, prior to its surrender, had made a motor vehicle unusable.
We would like now to motion to have the particular word "an order" in this phrase of the indictment changed to read "directives," rather than "an order" and that is in view of the translation mistake which has occurred, so that the words "an order" should be changed in the indictment to read "directives". That is all I have Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: May I make this inquiry? Do the rules provide as to the change of the wording or statement in the Indictment, and if so in what respect and in what manner may they be changed?
MR. RAPP: Your Honor, I have checked the ordinance, and I have found no particular thereto. However, if the Court desires that we should follow this up with a written motion in addition to the announcement that I have made, now, we are, of course, only too glad to do this.
THE PRESIDENT: Is there any objection on behalf of Counsel to this proposed change?
DR. FRITSCH: May it please the Court, at this moment, I do not wish to raise an objection, but I should be grateful if I could reserve the right to come back to these things during my presentation of evidence General Rendulic. At this moment I am not in the position, I must confess, to give my comments on this point.
THE PRESIDENT: As I understand it, Dr. Fritsch, you do not wish to comment one way or the other, or consent, or agree at this time?
DR. FRITSCH: Yes, I would be grateful if I could give my comments to perhaps tomorrow. But I would appreciate it if the suggestion made by the Court could be complied with, and the Prosecution would put down their motion in writing.
THE PRESIDENT: Inasmuch as the Defense Counsel suggests the advisability of putting the motion in writing, the Court orders that before final consideration of this matter is given, to advise the Tribunal that the Prosecution submit it in writing.
MR. RAPP: Very well your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: Before we proceed to other matters may we have again, Mr. Rapp, the full translation of the suggested change that you desire to have made?
MR. RAPP: Yes, Your Honor, I am referring to Page 13.
THE PRESIDENT: Of Exhibit 327.
MR. RAPP: I have not given Your Honors, up to now, a translation as it should be; however, the translation as it was read into the record yesterday by the Interpreter on the suggestion of Defense Counsel, is, in our opinion, the correct translation. If the record Your Honors wish that we have it once again repeated I will hand it to the Interpreter now and have him do it again.
THE PRESIDENT: If you please.
(MR. RAPP TAKES THE DOCUMENT IN QUESTION TO THE INTERPRETER AND POINTS OUT THE PASSAGE TO BE TRANSLATED)
MR. RAPP: If I may suggest, Your Honors, that we enter this translation now on Page 56 of Document Book XIII the way it comes over the ear-phones? Will the Interpreter please be so kind and tell us where you are starting?
THE COURT GERMAN-ENGLISH INTERPRETER: I'm starting on Page 14 of the original, at the bottom. It's the last sentence on the bottom of Page 17 of the original document, which is on Page 56 in the Document Book.
MR. RAPP: I believe the pagination which you have read right now is not the pagination the Prosecution followed. You will find a Page 4 on the top of that original document written on the document. The Page 14 that you have referred to is the number the Germans have inserted, and we have followed our own pagination.
THE COURT GERMAN-ENGLISH INTERPRETER: Yes, and it is on Page 56 in the document book. Now, the sentence should read in English: "For this purpose the Commanding Generals of the Corps are to be given orders, the meaning of which should read approximately as follows."
MR. RAPP: Would you be so kind and repeat this again because we're trying to write it, and you were speaking a little bit fast.
THE COURT GERMAN-ENGLISH INTERPRETER: "For this purpose the Commanding Generals of these Corps are to be given orders, the meaning of which should read approximately as follows."
MR. RAPP: Now, you see that brings up the point where I believe Defense Counsel and Prosecution together, for once, have a somewhat different opinion from the Interpreter. I don't think that the word "Weisungen" is properly translated with "orders" It should probably be translated with directives". I think that Dr. Fritsch and I, if I am not misquoting him, go along on that. So will you please be kind and reconsider the translation in view of this suggestion?
THE COURT German-English INTERPRETER: The German term used is "Auftraege" not "Weisung". It is "Auftraege", which of course is less stronger than would be "Order."
MR. RAPP: But "Auftrag" would be "mission" would it not?
THE COURT GERMAN-ENGLISH INTERPRETER: "Mission" or "assignment" perhaps.
DR. FRITSCH: It seems to me, Your Honor, that the translation which was given yesterday does not coincide with the one we have heard today concerning the term "sinngemaess" and the term "Etwas."
THE COURT GERMAN-ENGLISH INTERPRETER: May I say something about this, Your Honor?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Sir.
THE COURT GERMAN-ENGLISH INTERPRETER: The term I have used for "etwa" was "approximately", and I think that any dictionary would bear that out; and "sinngemaess" I translated with "the meaning of which". It means simply that the order "means the following" -- the meaning of the order is this or that.
MR. RAPP: That is certainly acceptable to us. Now, just to get the record straight, would you now be able to repeat it once in view of the various changes?
THE COURT GERMAN-ENGLISH INTERPRETER: "For this purpose the Commanding Generals of these Corps are to be given assignments, the purpose of which should read approximately as follows."
MR. RAPP: That was the translation I had reference to, and in view of that we had motioned and will follow it up in writing of course that the word "order" in the indictment be changed to "directives."
THE PRESIDENT: You may proceed, Dr. Fritsch.
DEFENDANT LOTHAR RENDULIC - Resumed DIRECT-EXAMINATION - Continued BY DR. FRITSCH:
Q General, yesterday we had stopped discussing various documents which we have followed in their chronological order, and we discussed them briefly.
May I ask you to take up Volume XVI of the Prosecution documents, and there look at Page 113 on the English version, which is Page 67 in your book. Correction: It is Page 67 in the English version and Page 113 in the German. It is Exhibit 385, Document NOKW 1112, with which you have been charged under all four counts of the indictment.
Does this document concern your area?
A No, this document concerns what was known as the operational zone of the Adriatic coastal area. That area was to the north of the Army area and did not belong to the Army Group F. This document, therefore, does not concern me at all. The partisans which are being referred to there was Tito people.
Q. General, in order to illustrate the situation this document gives a certain number of clues although it does not concern the area under your jurisdiction. Would you, therefore, please read the passage which I have marked for you on the next page?
A. That passage describes how the partisans fought and it reads as follows: "They terrorize the population, steal the cattle and food supplies, recruit followers, largely by compulsory drafting. They murder German soldiers from ambush, raid motor cars and columns, blow up railway lines and bridges, plunder food supply transports, destroy cable and wire connections, massacre prisoners, and desecrate the corpses of German soldiers."
Q. Thank you very much. Now another matter; in a number of individual reports, it is reported that hospitals of the bands were burned down. Do you remember that?
A. Yes, and I can give you the reason too. I want to state, above all, what one must understand by the word "hospitals of the bands." These were barns or huts where a number of beds were put. In some cases, they had mattresses but mostly it was simply straw, heaps of straw. In very few cases these hospitals were accommodated in solid buildings such as schools or anything like that. Only in one case there was a hospital which was somewhat better equipped, but the essential point in this was that these so-called hospitals were in the most filthy condition, which was caused by the fact that the partisans used the places which were not used for sick or wounded for their own accommodation. It was known that the partisans were completely full of lice. It was also known that typhus prevailed in many areas.
Reference in the documents shows that there were villages which were full of typhus dead and all you could do was simply burn them. The partisans took people suffering from typhus to these hospitals. These so-called hospitals -- at least, the troops called them hospitals--were an immense danger for infection. Any disinfection was not feasible in these wooden buildings.
Any precautions to this effect were not possible. It was therefore necessary and also a matter of course that those huts and barns which at that time served for the accommodation of wounded and ill partisans and which in every case fell empty into our hands had to be burned down. This was a measure for protection which we took as a matter of course to prevent infection both of our own troops as well as of the population.
Q. Now about another document which is in Volume 16; it is Exhibit 388, on page 120, and in the English book it is on page--excuse me a moment, 77. This document NOKW-948--this document contains notes of a conference between the Commanding General of the XXI Army Corps who at that time was General Fehn and the representative of the Reich Fuehrer SS Fitzthum as well as a representative of the German General in Albania. From this document, the prosecution have incriminated you under Count 4. Now was Fitzthum or the German General in Albania under the Second Panzer Army?
A. No, Fitzthum was the representative of the Reichsfuehrer SS for Albania. He was not under me. Nor was the German General in Albania under the Second Panzer Army. As to the XXI Army Corps, they were in charge of the whole of the Albanian territory. This conference of which we have notes here - that however came never to the knowledge of the Army was a purely internal matter of the XXI Army Corps. These notes contain matters concerning the Albanian territory.
In paragraph 7 - reference is made to a visit which Fitzthum paid on Minister Neubacher, and the matters discussed on that visit are being put down here. All these are matters which could not concern the army and about which the XXI Army Corps was informed only for the reason that it all occurred in its area.
Q. Would you please read out paragraph D and tell us briefly what the evacuation of the Serbs mentioned therein is supposed to mean?
A. This can only be the following matter which I can suppose on the basis of my general knowledge of the position.
The Albanian Kossovo area was on the border between Serbia and Albania. It was populated by a Serbian minority between the Serbs and the Albanians there was great hatred. The Serbs who formed the minority were frequently killed, despite the protection which the German occupation afforded them, and the perpetrators as a rule could not be found. The document shows that they were evacuated into the Serbian area and that that Serbian area finally could no longer receive any more people. Thereupon, these people decided to transfer the Serbs from the Kossovo area to the Reich, a matter with which the Army had nothing to do nor could they take any influence on it.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Fritsch, may I make an inquiry please and interrupt?
BY THE PRESIDENT:
Q. General Rendulic, you and the other defendants and your respective counsels have from time to time made a distinction as to the authority of these various groups down there. The SS, the SD, and the Rosenberg Group, and various other organization that were in this particular area in the Southeast. What was the respective authority of first the Army, the Wehrmacht, the SS, the SD, and these various other organizations and who was in charge of the whole operation and was there any conflict of authority and if there was a conflict of authority who had the final word?
A. May I give you my answer?
Q. I want it purely for information purposes on my own part.
A. From a purely military point of view the Balkan Area was as far as the protection of the area was concerned under Army Group F and the units under it such as for instance the Second Panzer Army, Army Group E, etc. In other respects, in that area, other agencies had their sphere of work in that area. For instance, the plenipotentiary for Economy.
Q. Let's start with the SS.
A. In the SS we must make a distinction between what was known as the Waffen SS and the Police Formations. The Waffen SS was subordinate to military agencies only in tactical respects. That is to say, they were only subordinate to military agencies as far as combat tasks were concerned they would receive orders only for the fighting and its preparations.
From among the units of the SS, there were in the Balkans the 7th SS Mountain Division, the 5th SS Mountain Corps and then later on, the 13th SS Division, and the SS Division Skanderbeg in Albania which was about to be formed.
These divisions and troops were under the Second Panzer Army in purely military respects. They were not subordinate in judicial disciplinary and personnel matters and in all those fields where they had special assignments which they received from their highest superior and their highest superior was the Reichsfuehrer SS. As to the Police Formations, there were in the Balkans police regiments and also elements of the SI. These elements were not under the German troops, but they had their special assignment, they received from their special superiors their orders and the German troops were not in a position of preventing the carrying out of these orders which these special groups of the SS had received, or even to forbid them.
Q. Why do these references to them come into these orders then?
A. Because it might have been possible and I believe I gave an example yesterday--that units of the SD could be asked to support the troops in carrying out some of their tasks such as the screening of those parts of the population who were suspected of being members of bands. For that purpose, the troops did not have sufficiently trained and versed officials, and for the rest there is mention of those units now and then because they took certain liberties and claimed privileges to which they were not entitled so that they then had to be told where their limits were.