Q: Do you know what methods the S.D. used in order to be sure that they selected the right people?
A: I don't know that. The S.D. never informed us concerning these facts.
Q: Did your commanding officer or his or you ever supervise and check on the S.D. that these blank instructions, which your commanding general gave, were carried out properly by the S.D.?
A: The right to check up police measures was not given to any armed forces commander and whether in any particular instance my commander ever did it, I did not know. I never had the audacity to do that.
Q: You have gotten a little bit off the track. It is clear that your commanding general delegated tne authority to select reprisal prisoners to the SD; is that correct? Originally it was his prerogative?
A: When I arrived in Belgrade there had been an order of the commander, I believe it was dated the winter of 19411942, according to which order the S.D. was to be consulted when band prisoners were taken, besides the police was commissioned by their chief, Himmler, to undertake tne police security measures in Serbia. The police never informed us and at least did not inform me how many prisoners they made on these occasions.
Q: Witness, you clearly recognize do you not that the selection of reprisal prisoners is an integral part of the entire reprisal measures scheme and that your commanding entire was the one and only man who could order reprisal measures; is that correct?
A: Yes, it is.
Q: Consequently, it is correct is it not that your commanding general at all times exercised supervision over the selection of reprisal prisoners even if he did not choose to invoke such prerogatives; is that correct?
A: Yes, it is. I would assume that he would have the necessary confidence in those agencies whom he had given the order.
Q: Witness, you said that reprisal measures contributed to a great extent actually even prevented the outbreak of an organized revolt in Serbia; is that correct?
A: Yes, they did contribute.
Q: Isn't it true that more and better troops, more and better equipment would have been a more effective way to combat a threatening revolt?
A: Reprisal measures were directed against the surprise attacks and sabotage acts, etc. My commander maintained that quality and quantity of the troops had to be of a better standard in order to make the population respect the occupying forces, moreover if that had been the case the surprise attacks and other incidents would nave possibly not occurred and thus the reprisal measures would have been superfluous. That is now the situation actually was. It is not that even if more troops had been present, reprisal measures would have been superfluous, that is not proper. The actual fact was is better troops, German troops, had been present it might have been possible to strengthen the authority of the occupation forces to the extent that the surprise attacks would not occur.
Q: Witness, you testified that from the middle of 1943 on allied planes, doth during the night and the day supplied the Tito and Mihajlovic forces with weapons, uniforms, supplies, ammunition and the like; did you say that?
A: Yes, I did, but I don't t ink I said it was only as of the middle of 1945, it was much earlier.
I don't know, I cannot say when it started. I believe it was as early as the winter of 1942-1945.
Q: That would move it back to the winter of 1942-1045. - in connection with this statement you went on to say that had such supplies by the Allies not come into existence and had they not reached the Tito and Mihajlovic forces, the letter would have died a natural death; did you make a statement to that effect?
A: Yes, I think I expressed myself in a similar manner and that above all applied to the Mihajlovic movement.
Q: Witness, did it ever occur to you or your commanding general that it would have been much more effective to get more anti-aircraft guns, to get more fighter planes to shoot down these Allied planes, rather than to wage a war of terror and intimidation against the civilian population?
A: Those two tings had nothing to do with each other. We vary often tried to get fighter planes, they however were never there when they were even more necessary than in Serbia. Our air force was always short of personnel and equipment. We would have very much liked to have planes if we only could have gotten some, but we could not.
Q: But you don't think, if I understand you correctly, that this increase in planes and guns and manpower would nave had any bearing on the reprisal measures which you were forced to institute?
A: Ye would have had to have an air force which would have been so enormously strong as it never existed in the whole of Germany. It is well-known that isolated flights cannot ever be prevented, especially not at night time and that is quite impossible from the point of view of anti-aircraft defense.
The dropping of equipment had the purpose of supporting an open insurrection and it was also to serve for explosive sabotage acts on railway lines, etc.
Q: Witness, what would have happened to General Felber or General Bader if the OKW had found out by chance that these daily reports, which you were sending up there, were mere frauds, as far as the execution of hostages were concerned; what would have happened to these two officers?
A: Only frauds? I think that is going too far.
Q: By confining my statement merely to the number of people executed or the number of people not executed in connection with the so-called shadow measures, you admit they were fraudulent?
A: These reports were not correct. I am convinced that my commanders would have been put before a court martial if anything had been found out.
Q: Witness was there anybody at your Headquarters who was in charge of keeping the true figures of the execution as distinguished from those which you reported to higher headquarters; in other words if the commanding general at a moment's notice wanted to know how many people he had executed up to a certain period, whom would he consult inasmuch as the reports were all faked?
A Not all the reports wore faked. To the best of my knowledge, on the military commander knew what was true and what was not true.
Q We are not now concerned with the fact who know or who didn't know whether these reports were accurate or not accurate. I am merely asking you whether there was any single individual at your headquarters who could provide your Commanding General with the necessary information that is, the accurate information as distinguished from one which you reported to higher headquarters in connection with reprisal measures. There was no log kept?
A I don't believe there was anyone. I think that only the Military Commander would be in a position to do that. Even I didn't know anything about it.
Q Well, the mere fact that you didn't know it doesn't prove anything because you already have stated that you had nothing to with it. Is that right?
A I didn't say that I had nothing at all to do with it because, after all, I participated in the basic discussion. Only the Military Commander reserved the right to himself as far as I know.
Q Would you know by any chance the ratio between real executions and mock executions approximately?
A No, I wouldn't. I have told you that mock executions we could only execute concerning matters which were dealt with in Belgrade centrally.
Q Witness, you stated that many inaccuracies and mistakes had occurred in connection with the keeping of your war diary at your headquarters. Is that right?
A I did not say that. In my affidavit which had not yet been accepted as an exhibit it says -
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: Just a minute. If the testimony of the witness is of sufficient importance to make a record, perhaps, it should be translated as he goes on. If you will advise the witness please to await the opportunity of the translator, the interpreter, it would be a more intelligent record.
Q Will you please speak slowly?
A Will you please tell me there I have said anything like that?
Q Very well.
A In the affidavit which has not yet been submitted something is contained concerning these facts and the assertion there refers back to the war diary of the 704th Division and I am stating a few examples but I am not referring myself to my own war diary.
MR. RAPP: Your Honors, I have just made reference to these two affidavits which I wanted to cover during this cross examination in. order to avoid having to go over them again. However, in view of the testimony of the witness, I will drop this particular phase at this time inasmuch as the affidavit is as yet not known to the Tribunal.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: But you wish to reserve your right to continue examination? I think it was agreed with Dr. Sauter this morning that would be all right.
MR. RAPP: That's right your Honor.
THE WITNESS: I have said that it is possible that discrepancies are contained in the war diaries, that it is also possible that there may be inexact reports. I did not say, however, that there were many such things contained in the war diaries. In the next sentence I said that this is the case, for instance, concerning the war diaries of the 704th Infantry Division which later became the 104th Rifle Battalion.
MR. RAPP: Your Honors, may I move that this portion of the witness's testimony in answer to my last question, in view of the statement I have made previously, be stricken from the record?
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: Well, the Tribunal will reserve judgment on it until such cross examination as you may desire to offer may obviate any possible objection to it.
MR. RAPP: Very well.
Q Witness, were there any units of the Einsatzstab Rosenberg attached to your headquarters?
A I don't remember anything of that kind at the moment. I believe it was only here that I learned anything about this Einsatzstab Rosenberg.
Q Consequently, you do or did not know what they were doing?
A No, I didn't know that.
Q Just to refresh your memory, witness, I will now hand you NOKW-1441, Prosecution Exhibit 600. Now, there is a -- just a second, witness, if you please. There is a here a letter signed in your name for the Commanding General Serbia giving under paragraph 6 certain references and it states here:
"In addition, the Office Special Detachment Reichsleiter Rosenberg, Einsatzstab Southeast, is reported. Strength of the Detachment: 9 people. No exact data is available here."
Now, attached to this letter, if you please, you will find a copy of a copy and it says on top there:
"Enclosure 2) To Commanding General and Commander in Serbia Ia No. 1068/43 secret 29 March 1943" and what they were doing is explained in the body of this communication:
"The fight against Jews and Freemasons as well as against the powers which are ideologically allied with them is a high priority task of National Socialism during the war?
And then it outlines their duties. It says:
"Searching of public libraries and archives and of the chancelries of the High Church authorities as well as of Freemasons lodges and Jewish associations for political material directed against the Reich and having such material confiscated, and so forth."
From this information it seems to clearly indicate that you at that time had certain liaison knowledge what this Rosenberg unit was doing. Is that right, witness?
A Yes, but I didn't remember it any more. It slipped my mind.
Q Witness, do you recall whether or not captured partisans were evacuated to Norway?
A Whether or not it happened I do not know. In any case, in March 1942 there were some orders which said that prisoners captured during partisan combat actions were to be deported to spheres of German interests and this was to be effected by the Higher and SS Police Leader.
Q And then, I assume, a German sphere of interest as Norway could be included as part of that last?
A I would assume that, yes.
Q Witness, to the best of your knowledge did the defendant Kuntze ever protest to General Bader about reprisal measures the way General Bader carried them out? Do you know about that or not?
A I do not remember that he protested but I do remember that at the time of my arrival in Belgrade I was told that General Kuntze had decreased the ratio figures. That is what I was told.
Q Did Field Marshal Weichs ever protest to General Felber about the reprisal measures the way he carried them out?
A I do not know anything concerning a protest. All I know is that Field Marshal von Weichs endeavored to regulate these matters in a different way and that he and Felber agreed on these points.
MR. RAPP: Your Honors, I have no further questions for crossexamination at this time.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: Very well, the Tribunal will stand adjourned until tomorrow morning at nine-thirty.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 23 October 1947, at 0930.)
Official Transcript of Military Tribunal V, Case VII, in the matter of the United States of America against Wilhelm List et al, defendants, sitting at Nurnberg, Germany on 28 October 1947, 0930 hours, Judge Wennerstrum, presiding.
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the Courtroom will please find their seats.
The Honorable, the Judges of Military Tribunal V.
Military Tribunal V is now in session. God save the United States of America and this Honorable Tribunal.
There will be order in the Court.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Marshal, will you ascertain if all the defendants are present in the Courtroom?
THE MARSHAL: May it please, Your Honor, all the defendants are present in the Court room, except the defendant Felmy who has been excused and the defendant Von Weichs, who is in the hospital.
THE PRESIDENT: Is there any further direct examination?
DR. LATERNSER: May it please the Tribunal, I have been asked to announce the following to the Tribunal, I have been informed that the cells in the prison have not been heated up to today. That is very difficult for the defendants and makes their preparation of their defense difficult for them. I wanted to inform the Tribunal of this fact so that something can be done about it.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal, Dr. Laternser, will report your suggestions and your comments to the proper authorities. We are conscious of the fact that we nave no authority over the condition of the jail, but as interested members of this Tribunal, we will report it for the consideration of the proper authorities.
Is there any further direct examination, Dr. Sauter?
REDIRECT EXAMINATION Defendant Curt Ritter von Geitner (Resumed.)
BY DR. SAUTER:
Q. May I please put a few questions to the defendant von Geitner?
Witness did you personally participate in any fights against the bands?
A. Twice I had an opportunity through my military commander to observe band fights from very close quarters.
Q. Did you observe anything special on those occasions, which moved you and impressed you particularly, especially concerning the method of warfare used by the partisans?
A. The first time or the first occasion was during the first days of July 1943, the locality was Zwornik on the river Drina. This locality was endangered ny the Tito bands. The German General in Croatia had asked us to occupy a bridge-head there. We did not have the forces to do that and General Bader refused to do it. He sent me down there, to see how the land lay. I arrived there during the hours of the morning, together with the commander of the sector. We approached the forest border near Zwornik, which is on the eastern bank of the River Drina. The mountain heights near Zwornik were occupied by Reds. Colonel Neumann and myself had to enter the locality of Zwornik, I beg your pardon, not Zwornik. We had to enter the positions of a Russian company on the eastern bank of the Drina opposite Zwornik. That was a diffucult task, because the road was under constant fire. We had hardly reached this Russian position when terrific firing started. I say at a distance of about 100 meters that the occupiers of Zwornik, amounted to about one company of Domobrans and those were members of the Croatian armed forces, crossed the bridge fleeing toward the Serbian bank of the River.
Tito's forces, which were on the mountain heights in the immediate vicinity of the town, started to fire for all they were worth on those Serbian soldiers and the Croatian soldiers who were followed by parts of the population, women, men and children and the Reds shot into these masses of people in the same way as they had shot into the columns of the Croatian soldiers. The bridge and the eastern bank of the river presented a horrible picture. Zwornik was then occupied by the Reds and there was a continuous fire battle with the Russians.
After tilings had calmed down somewhat I made some inquiries. Thereafter I left the position and on the way back I had an opportunity to see the wounded members of the population, among which there were women and also children. That was one occasion which I mentioned.
Q Did you see anything else of a similar kind, witness, but you can be brief?
AAt the beginning of May, 1944, some forces of Tito threatened to approach Valjevo from the south. General Felber sent me there in order to see what the situation was like. On the first day I found myself in Valjevo, on the second day I tried to get ahead on the road Valjevo Uzice. I tried in the morning hours to reach the combat group Weil. This combat group consisted of one or two companies of Brandenburg and of the Mihajlovic Cetnicks, who were fighting against the Reds. I got stuck on the way and found myself caught in the firing. I had to send my cars back for cover. I reconnoitred and when I heard the noise of battle, I continued alone on the road in order to find the staff Weil.
On the road I saw dead people. There were two people whose throats were cut. Immediately afterwards I met elements of the Brandenburg companies and of the Cetnicks. These men had crossed the road further south. They asked me to enter a mill further southward and there I met the staff Weil. On that occasion I heard that a security group of the Cetniks had been attacked during the night and that the Reds had cut the throats of some of the people who were wounded. It can be assumed that those were the people whom I had seen lying in the road. Those are my own observations in land warfare.
Q Witness, you were asked yesterday whether the troops, which were under the jurisdiction of your commander in his area, were sufficient to combat the acts of terror and you answered this question negatively. Would you like to make it quite clear now just what was the immediate consequence of the fact that your commander did not have sufficient, and not very good, troops in his area?
A The first consequence of the inadequate quantity of the troops and above all the presence of Bulgarian troops in the area was that the authority of the German occupying forces suffered and this lack of authority incited the population to excesses. The consequence of these excesses was then in turn reprisal measures, but I would like to say immediately that even the very strongest troops would not have guaranteed absolutely the stopping of these surprise attacks and excesses on the part cf the population.
That can be seen from the fact that the strong Allied forces in Germany saw themselves forced to threaten similar measures and partly perhaps even apply similar measures.
Q Witness, yesterday during the cross-examination there was some discussion of the shadow shootings?
A Yes.
Q And you were told of a statement, which General Felber made here as a witness, a statement to the effect that shadow shootings did not take place before 12 October 1943. Yesterday you attempted to prove the contrary and pointed out an entry in your war diary from the 28th of May 1943. This entry will be submitted to the Tribunal in document book No. 4, von Geitner, on page 27 under Document 93. Now I would be interested in the following; do you have any other reasons to assume that there were shadow shootings even before 12 October 1943 and that they took place especially before General Felber took over office in the area and that the question of these shadow shooting had been dealt with prior to these dates. Do you have any documentary proof for these facts?
A Before the time of General Felber's tenure, I have no documentary proof, all I have is this entry in the war diary, which refreshed my memory concerning these things.
Q You do have the document, don't you; where there is a handwritten note concerning shadow shootings?
A That is a document which originates from the time of General Felber.
Q All right, what date?
A 15th October 1943.
Q And what is the file number?
A There is a file note.
Q I believe it is W.B.
A Yes, it is W.B./1068/6.
Q And what did General Felber personally write into this document of 15 October 1943?
A It is almost illegible, but it does say something about shadow shootings.
Q Is General Felber's initial on it?
A Yes, it is.
Q And when did General Felber appear in Belgrade?
A I believe on the 28th or 29th of August 1943.
Q But then that was a few weeks before this document was dated?
A Yes, that is correct.
Q Witness, you were also asked yesterday a question concerning the relations between the commander and the chief of his staff and you answered to the effect that this relation had in many instances depended on the personality of the commander and on the personality of his chief of staff; was that the way you expressed it?
A Yes. Yes, I said it depended on the personalities concerned.
Q Now, would you like to make a comment concerring the following, were your two commanders General Bader and General Felber strong personalities, next to whom the chief of staff was as in actual fact only of secondary significance or were those two generals weak personalities, who let themselves be influenced by their chief of staff; would you like to make a brief comment to this question?
A I can say quite frankly that both men concerned were very strong personalities. It was not easy to influence them, quite apart from the fact that both of them were far more experienced as soldiers.
Q Witness, yesterday the question was brought up whether in the Manual for the General Staff Service in War Time there is any prevision contained concerning the fact that reprisal measures constitute part of the executive power and that for that reason the ordering of reprisal measures was the right only of the Commander himself. You answered this question to the negative.
A I said "No."
Q That is how I understood it. I now ask you, how do you make out that the order for reprisal measures was not the right of the Chief of Staff but only the right of the Military Commander himself?
A That is laid down in the Manual. That is a matter merely of the holder of the executive power, that he alone has the right to order these measures.
Q You take that from the Manual for the General Staff Service?
A Yes, I do.
Q Witness, yesterday you also said that you had assumed that an order from the OKH would be examined properly before it was issued so that there could be no doubt with regard to the legality of such an order. Is it known to you whether the OKW, the High Command of the Armed Forces, and the OKH, the High Command of the Army, had their own legal department which would examine such problems and where there would be legal experts to examine these problems?
A There were legal experts with the OKH and there was also an Armed Forces Legal Department with the OKW. For these reasons I naturally had to assume that an OKW order would be thoroughly examined concerning the question of its legality.
Q Herr von Geitner, you were asked yesterday whether you con cerned yourself with the food supply of the arrested people in the camps.
You answered this question in the negative. I would like to ask you in this connection, did you yourself ever enter any of these camps?
A No.
Q Did you ever try to visit such a camp in order to convince yourself of the conditions in these camps?
A I would have only been able to do that if my Commander had ordered me to do that. To make the request to visit the camp in Semlin, such an idea never entered my head because of the experiences which I had in connection with my attempt to get sanitary officers to visit the camp.
Q Can you tell us briefly what were the experiences that you had on the occasion of trying to get the medical officers to enter such a camp?
AAt first it was refused to let them enter.
Q Who refused that?
A Meyssner did. If I remember correctly, it became possible only after the Commander intervened.
Q Witness, you were asked yesterday what would have happened to General Bader if the OKW had by some chance found out that he issued fake reports in order thus to prevent the shooting of too many hostages. Your answer was that you were convinced General Bader would have been put before a court martial. Was that your answer?
A Yes.
Q I see. Well, witness, in this connection I would like to clear up one point which is of interest for the Tribunal as well as for the broad public. I have here in front of me a compilation, a statistics concerning the fate of German generals during the Second World War. Do you know this statistics?
A If that is the same that you gave me -
Q Yes, it is.
A Well, then I knew it.
Q Can you tell the Tribunal briefly how this compilation was made but very briefly?
A In the summer months of last year there were in Dachau in IW Enclosure 29 several hundred generals and General Staff Officers as prisoners of war. A survey was made there concerning the fate of German generals and General Staff officers. Everybody was to make a contribution towards this survey who was in a position to do it. The purpose was to gain a picture cf the actual facts in order to counter rumors and criticisms. At that time such a compilation was made from the information which we had.
Q I see. Well, now, witness, one preliminary question: to the best of your information you can tell us that it is approximately correct that the peacetime rank list of the generals -- I mean of the generals of the army, not including the ones of the air force -- that this rank list comprised about 400 generals in peacetime and 1242 during wartime.
MR. RAPP: Your Honors, I object to this line of questioning. Dr. Sauter ought to ask the witness whether he knows the number of German generals in the army before the war and not give him the answer in this question.
THE PRESIDENT: The question is quite leading, Dr. Sauter.
DR. SAUTER: This is merely a figure which can be established from the rank list without any trouble. It is not a figure which the witness is inventing, but we don't even need this figure. I can do without it and I will ask the witness something else.
THE PRESIDENT: I am not trying to limit you in your questioning. I am merely stating to you that your question was leading. You can ask the witness as to what he knows and he can tell us, I am sure there will be no objection on the part of the prosecution.
DR. SAUTER: Thank you, your Honor. I shall have this question answered by submitting the Army Rank List of the German Generals and then we can immediately and authentically ascertain the number of German generals before the war and during the war.
Q Witness, can you tell us, on the basis of this compilation to which you contributed, how many Generals were killed in battle during the war. That is according to this compilation?
A On the basis of our survey, there were 231 -- that is, if I remember correctly.
Q There German Generals had accidents or were killed, during who war Is that correct?
A Yes, that is correct in accordance with the information which we had at that time.
Q How many Generals died during the war? How many German Generals were sentenced to death during the World War by German courts martial? I shall repeat my last question. How many German Generals were killed during the Second World War at the front through sickness and disease? Will you please repeat your answer?
AAccording to our information, there were 97.
Q How many German Generals were sentenced to death during the Second World War?
AAccording to our information at the time, there were 22 who were sentenced to death.
Q Can you tell us why those 22 German Generals were sentenced to death during the Second World War?
A Some of them were sentenced to death because they disobeyed orders and others were sentenced to death because they participated in the Hitler plot of July 1944.
Q What was the date of this plot?
A The date was the 20th of July 1944.
Q How many German Generals committed suicide during the Second World War?
AAccording to our informations, 58.
Q Do you assume, witness, that amongst these 58 German Generals who committed suicide there were some who committed suicide because they were afraid to be put before a court martial because they disobeyed orders?
MR. RAPP: I object, Your Honors, the witness should be asked whether or not he knows the facts about these people who committed suicide and only then should he be required to answer the question.
Q Witness, I withdraw the question because everybody can make their own opinion why these people committed suicide. I shall now put to you a last question: how many German Generals were missing until Summer 1946 when this compilation was made?
AAt the time our information said that there were about 80 who were missing.
Q I see. Did the fear to be put before a court martial because of disobeying orders, because of not obeying them during the course of the war rest heavy on the German generals?
A I can well say that I had that impression on several occasions. We had orders from Hitler in which some threat was contained concerning court martial procedure if certain matters would not be followed up. At the time while I was active with Any Group Central I experienced the Hoeppner Case.
DR. SAUTER: Your Honors, I have no further questions to put to the witness.
DR. LATERNSER (Counsel for defendants List and von Weichs): Your Honors, I would like to put some questions in the case with reference to Field Marshal Weichs. I should be able to do this within a few minutes. There is one point I would like to clarify which came up during cross examination.
BY DR. LATERNSER:
Q General von Geitner, were the areas of jurisdiction of the Military Commander Southeast and of the Commander-in-Chief Southeast of a different nature?
AAre you talking about the territorial spheres?
Q Yes, I mean the territorial areas.
A To the best of my recollection, only inasmuch as, for instance, the Military Commander didn't have anything to say at all in Rhodos and in Crete he didn't have anything to way either; but, apart from that, they more or less coincided.