If they were subordinate that was only a subordination with respect to tactical matters; that is, they were subordinated for certain tactical aims; but concerning jurisdiction, personnel matters or disciplinary matters or concerning the appointment or dismissal of commanders, they were not subordinate to German command.
Q Did the subordination exist during the time the Ustasha units carried out operations?
A That is possible.
Q You have talked also, General Foertsch, about SS units in the Southeast.
A Yes.
Q Is it your opinion that SS units were more responsible for excesses in the Southeast than were German army units?
A I could not express it in this way. For instance, the SS Division, Prince Eugen, which consisted mainly of members of the Southeastern area, Volksdeutsche, and other people of that kind, was certainly more inclined towards excesses than a German Wehrmacht unit. That cannot be doubted.
Q Look at Document Book XIX, General Foertsch, at Exhibit 228, on page 52 of the English and page 65 of the German. This refers to a conference of the Chiefs of Staff which was held at Salonika on October 1942.
A Yes, I have got it.
Q I presume, you presided over that conference.
A That is not certain but it might have been a conference of that kind; but it might also have been a conference between just the chiefs -- that is in small circle. I don't know that any more now.
Q Do you know the statement: "If the division seem to have a pro-Serbian attitude, the SS will offer an example." Did you mean the Prinz Eugen Division by any chance?
A No, I could not have meant the Prinz Eugen Division by this. You mean the next sentence? "The SS will offer example" -- whether that means the SS Division Prinz Eugen? I don't know that because this sentence does not express our opinion. It was the opinion of the OKW. It is possible, that the "Prinz Eugen Division" was meant.
Q Did you endorse that opinion of the OKW to the fact that the SS troops would furnish an example for the army units?
A No, on the contrary, I have already said and have already pointed out that the Commander in Chief Southeast continuously asked for better troops and for reinforcements. However, he did not get them. Instead the SS again and again set up their own formations. I personally did not welcome the creation of new SS divisions, especially divisions created from the area itself. I considered it a very unfortunate measure.
Q You talked also in your direct examination, General Foertsch, about excesses committed by the Bulgarian occupation troops.
A No, I don't believe that I was understood correctly. I talked -- rather. I was asked by my defense counsel whether I knew how the Bulgarians thought about reprisal measures and measures of that kind. In answer I said that the Bulgarians in our occupation area that is mainly in Serbia -- were bound to our orders and directives. However, in their own area of supremacy they frequent applied more vigorous measures and I was then asked for an example. I named an example which took place in Croatia somewhere near the city of Drama.
Q There can be no doubt, General Foertsch, that the Bulgarian units in the German occupied areas were completely subordinated to German commanders, can there?
DR. RAUSCHENBACH: I have to point out an error in translation in the previous answer. There was some talk about the harsh measures of the Bulgarians in Thrace not in Croatia.
A The Bulgarians were subordinate just the same as the Ustashas which I previously mentioned, only to a tactical extent. There was no disciplinary or judicial influence.
The administration of the area occupied by the Bulgarians had remained German. There were German administrative sub-area headquarters and German district headquarters but Bulgarian units.
THE PRESIDENT: We will take our afternoon recess at this time.
THE MARSHAL: The court is in recess until three-fifteen.
(A recess was taken.)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
THE PRESIDENT: You may proceed.
BY MR. FENTERMACHER:
Q General Foertsch, regarding the Bulgarian occupation troops, stationed in the German occupation areas of the southeast, there can be no doubt that the Bulgarians were not permitted to take any reprisal measures without first securing the approval of the German Commanders there; is that correct?
A Yes, that is how it was ordered, but I do not know whether in individual cases Bulgarian troops committed excesses.
Q You also spoke, General Foertsch, about measures taken by the Italina occupation troops. Is it your opinion that the Italina measures were more severe, or less severe than the German measures?
A I cannot give a clear judgment about this, because the Italian measures in general and above all the Italina orders were not known to me. That might have varied.
Q Did you ever hear protests from the Italians to the effect that German measures were too severe?
A I cannot remember anything about that. I also would not know why the Italians should protest against measures in German occupied territory, but it is possible that such protests were made.
Q If you will look at this document, General Foertsch, NOKW 1887, which is offered as Prosecution's Exhibit 596, this is an exchange of communications between the Italina 11th Army Headquarters and the German 1st Mtn Division. You will note on the first page the reference concerning "shooting of bandits." A new Fuehrer order is at hand, which will be transmitted. Bandits taken in battle are to be shot. Other bandit suspects, etc, are to be arrested and evacuated for the "Sauckel labor service." That is from the German General Staff to the Italina 11th Army Headquarters, dated in August 1943.
A Excuse me, but I read something rather different here. Here it states that bandits fighting are to be shot.
This means those who are found during the fighting to be bandits, and other bandit suspects are to be captured and to be evacuated for the "Sauckel" labor service.
Q Will you look at the next communication, General Foertsch, the German Chief of the General Staff, with 11th Italina Army.
"The division has complied with the orders for mopping-up operations on the large area with reference to the Fuehrer order according to which bandit territories are to be combed most severely and the male population is to be shot and/or seized in entirety and evacuated. The Commanding General is raising an objection to the Division order, forbidding these measures, and refers to his sovereign rights".
The reference there is to the Italina Commanding General is it not, General Foertsch?
A Yes, probably.
Q Now will you turn to page 5 of your document, page 3 of the English, your Honors. This is a teletype from the 11th Army Headquarters, "Affair of Reprisal measures and Internment of Greek nationals brought to the attention of the Supreme Command.
Whilst awaiting a decision, all subordinate units have to regard the orders of my radio telephone message of 19 July, and my circular of 5 August."
This is signed, "General Vecciarelli". Do you know who he was, General Foertsch?
A Yes, he was the Commander-in-Chief of the 11th Italina army.
Q Now will you look at the last communication, on page 5 of your document? This is a teletype from the 11th Italina Army, to the 26th Corps, dated 18 August, 1943:
"There are no scruples against mopping-up actions of the German mountain division in the Igumenitsa-Yoannina-Prevesa area with the support of the 2nd Alpini Valle Group. I am not in agreement with the aim of the operation and give the strictest orders that the male population from 18-50 years capable of bearing arms is not to be evacuated.
but that the mopping-up action may only be for the purpose of looking for arms and ammunition of the bandits, destroying the bandits themselves and their ration dumps, to arrest actual and basically suspicious elements or those who are carrying out activity inimical to the Axis. I further order that the mopping-up action must be ended by 1 Aug 43 in order to guarantee the assembly of the troops for further contemplated actions in the area of Pindozu."
This is signed, "Commanding General of the 11th Army."
Did this protest of the Italian Commander ever reach you, General Foertsch?
A No, it was not sent to us. The last-mentioned teletype went to the 26th Corps. This corps had the supreme rights in the area of the 1st Mtn Division.
Q Did the first German Mountain Division ever report that the Italian Commander was against the methods which the German Division proposed to use?
A I don't know. The 1st Mountain Division was subordinate probably to the Commander of Salonika and Agean administratively and therefore it would have reported first of all to his office, but whether the commander then reported further to the Commander-in-Chief southeast, I cannot say. It is possible.
Q General Foertsch, you also spoke in your direct examination about knowing nothing regarding activities taken against the Jews in Greece, - at least prior to 1943, - is that correct?
A I said that this one report, I think in July or August, 1941, came to my knowledge, It ran approximately "Rosenberg Einsatz staff, has started Jewish operations in Salonika", or something like that, and I cannot remember anything about the fact that before '43, any kind of measures were taken against the Jews in Greece, with regard to deportation, etc., but I also stated that during the first 6 months of 1943, it became known to me by personal observation that the Jews in in Salonika, were driven into a special part of the town and were marked.
I was asked to make the field police and gendarmerie available to help in this action. I forbade this in my area, i.e. for my staff.
Q Now regarding the Jews in Yugoslavia, you knew of the Jew and Gypsy camp at Semlin, did you not?
A. I knew from reports that Jews and Gypsies and other suspected, persons, and persons who were suspected of sympathizing with the bandits were collected.
Q. Did you believe that the Jews and Gypsies were all in one camp all by themselves at Semlin, or did you believe that there were other partisan suspects there as well?
A. With regard to the distribution into the various camps, I did not think at all, because this was an affair within the sphere of Commander of Serbia.
Q. Was it within the sphere of the 12th Army after June, 1942, General Foertsch?
A. I didn't understand. Oh, Serbia, yes, Serbia belonged to the sphere of the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast, yes.
Q. When you received about the Jewish Camp in Semlin. Didn't you wish to investigate to determine whether Jews were being segregated there by themselves?
A. No, I don't think that I had this idea. At any rate I do not remember.
Q. I also want to ask you, General Foertsch, about asking the peoples in the occupied countries to work on fortifications. Do you recall that?
A. In this special case, it was a question of work on the security installations of the railroad.
Q. Were these peoples in the occupied countries oaid whenever they did work for the German Army?
A. Yes, if they worked for the German Wehrmacht they were paid, or they were compensated some way in food, which they preferred to have rather than the money. For instance, for working on air fields.
Q. Will you look at this document, General Foertsch, NOKW 1800, which is offered as Prosecution's Exhibit 597?
A. Yes.
Q. This is an order of the 22nd Infantry Division dated 10 February, 1943. This division was on Crete at that time, was it not, General Foertsch?
A. Yes.
It was subordinate to the Commandant of Crete, and the Commandant of Crete was subordinate at this time, - Crete was still subordinate to the Commander Greece, and the Commander Southern Greece as subordinate to the Commander Southeast, because I think it was directly subordinate to the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast.
Q Look at Division Order No. 8, paragraph 2 of this order, concerning Labor employment of the Greek population:
"Labor employment of the Greek population Since part of the unit still has mistaken concept concerning the employment of the Greek population for labor Commandant Fortress Crete has repealed the following orders which had been issued heretofore concerning this matter.
1.) As a matter of basic principle the troops are not to employ: forces regularly employed by the District Headquarters for Wehrmacht work. These forces are not affected by the directive below.
2.) Sphere of duties for the commitment of the local population:
a) Reconstruction into fortresses of Localities in which troops arc billeted.
b) Road maintenance ..................
4.) Employment of the local population without regard to profession, age and sex.
5.) No remuneration for labor. The work is to be carried our within the demands made by the occupying power.
6.) The execution of the work demanded by the occupying power (local troop commander) is in the first place the affair of the civilian local authorities. The unit demands from the community that for instance a fortress wall between the houses or a connecting trench, embrasures, fox-holes etc is to be constructed in locations designated by the troops or that a certain assigned length of road is to be kept in repair.
It is the affair of the community to fulfill this demand. For the time being it is not desirable to employ German soldiers for guard duty.
Should the community not fulfill the demands due to negligence or bad will within the time limit set, then District Headquarters are to enforce fulfillment of the demand with all the means at the disposal of the Occupying Power. Communities who acquire particular merit in this additional labor employment are to be reported to District Headquarters for any possible benefit (distribution of rations, exemption from levies)'.. It is signed, "Mueller".
Did you receive information either of this order itself, or of its contents, as Chief-of-Staff, General Foertsch?
A. The order itself, I almost certainly did not see. Whether, and how far I was acquainted with the fundamental side of such requested labor, I do not know at the moment, but it was probably so as the division ordered here, that the communities were given certain commissions, and these communities handed them on.
Q. You will note here in paragraph 5, General Focrtsch, there is to be no remuneration for labor. Did you ever have -
A. Yes, for this work, not for this community, and work of the communities, but the other labor forces which, as is probably meant up here in figure (1), they were paid. That I know exactly because this question of payment in money or food has been discussed very frequently.
Q. The labor referred to, General Foertsch, is labor tacks mentioned in paragraph 6, is it not? the building of connecting trenches, and foxholes, and fortress walls?
A. I assume so, because it is down here in the order.
Q. Did you believe that it was permissible to ask occupied peoples to construct trenches on behalf of the German army?
A. I think, or perhaps I should say I know -- correction, I don't know the regulations about this, but I believe that in a modern war, such a measure is not unusual.
Q. Are you familiar with the Hague regulations on this point, General Foertsch?
A. No, I am not certain.
Q. General Foertsch, you were asked some questions regarding the duties of General Felber, and you were asked certain questions regarding his subordination to Field Marshal Weichs, and on the other hand, questions regarding his independence from Field Marshal Weichs. We will turn to your Document Book 4, and to exhibit 351, page 89 of the English, page 65 of the German. This you will recall, General Foertsch, refers to the command authority in the Southeastern area as of 30 November 1943. You will note now on page 92 of the English, page 67 of the German, that General Felber was subordinate to Field Marshal Weichs, in all questions of security. That Spears from paragraph 2-e.
A. Yes.
Q. And you will note also that all security units are subordinate to the commander-in-chief, that is Field Marshal Weichs, in the territories in which they are stationed; that is in paragraph 4-c. And now, if you will turn to page 71 in the German, page 97 of the English, you will note that the commander-in-chief, that is Field Marshal Weichs, -- has command authority over civilian offices, as well as over non Wehrmacht units in the Southeast area.
Is it your opinion, General Foertsch --
A. Excuse me, the last thing is not quite clean to me. Where does it say anything about civilian population?
Q. Civilian offices, I meant, General Foertsch. It is on page 71 of the German, and page 97 of the English, paragraph 3. The Commander-inchief Southeast, ---
A. Yes, but with that restriction "within the scope of the coastal defense."
Q. General Foertsch---
A That is, of importance is laid on this point, I shall point out this matter by giving an example.
Q I am more concerned with the subordination of General Felber regarding security.
A Yes.
Q Is it your opinion, General Foertsoh, that reprisal measures are matters of security?
A Reprisal measures, as such, belong in my view, not immediately in the sphere of securing the country, but they can have some effect on the securing of the country.
Q Do you recall, General Foertsch, General Felber's testimony to the effect that he, General Felber, considered security-withdrawn. Do you recall General Felber's testimony to the effect that reprisal measures were matters of security?
A Yes, I know that Felber said something rather in the sense of that, but I also know that this testimony of his is very problematical, shall we say. I tried to illustrate this very complicated question by one example in my direct examination.
Q Do you agree or disagree with General Felber's conclusion?
A No. At any rate, in regard, -- or since it was such a long time ago, that I heard Felber, I do not want to be so brief about it.
If Felber says that the reprisal measures are an affair of the security of the country, insofar as they fall under the responsibility of Weichs, then I do not agree with him, but I think that reprisal measures are the result of executive power, and until August, 1943, this lay with the Commander-in-Chief Southeast, or the subordinate commander, and after the appointment of Weichs, with the Military Commander Southeast.
Q Is it your opinion, General Foertsch, that reprisal measures should be taken in order to secure and protect the German troops stationed in a particular occupied area?
A Reprisal measures have the aim of deterring the population from continuing their illegal actions. The fact that this indirectly also has some effect on the troops is clear because if the illegal acts stop, then the troops are safer as if the illegal actions were continued.
Q In order that you might not misjudge General Felber I should like to read one answer to the very last question which he was asked. This is on page 1867 of the English Transcript for the 13th of August, 1947, of the pertinent questions.
Witness, as a last question I would merely like to ask you whether the so-called reprisal or retaliation measures were a securing, or if you like, security measure?
A This question I answer in the affirmative."
Would you have answered that question in the negative, General Foertsch?
A I would have answered it as I have just answered, that reprisal measures after all have an effect on the security of the troops, but should not be taken with the aim of security. I think here one must differentiate between "aim" and "effect". If I can give a very simple example, -- The weather has no purpose with regard to a tactical measure but it has an effect on the tactical measure.
Q Would you say, General Foertsch that reprisal measures are matters or combat and of tactics, or rather matters of administration?
A There is no doubt that on principle, it is not a tactical question, but as I said, a result of executive power.
Q Are you acquainted with the order of General Loehr, which is dated July, 1943, in which he states that reprisal measures are not -
A The 10th of August, 1943.
Q Thank you, the 10th of August, 1943, in the first paragraph of which he states, "Reprisal measures are not of combat, -- and not of administration?
A Yes.
Q Do you agree or disagree with General Loehr.
A In answer to the question, by my defense counsel, in direct examination, I explained the meaning of this introductory paragraph, The reprisal measures were to a competency of the commanding general, and of the police officer or of the government official.
Q That was a definitely defined paragraph laid down for acute reasons?
A If I remember correctly, the immediate cause was an incident which happened somewhere in the sphere of Salonika, but I may be mistaken, in any event, this definition at that time, had an acute, practical meaning, and it was not something merely theoretical.
Q Two last questions, General Foertsch. You spoke in your direct examination, about hostages being executed in Berlin in 1945, or perhaps you said you heard that the execution of hostages at that ratio was ordered about at that time. May, I believe you said, in 1945?
A I stated expressly that I know, an announcement of the Berlin magistrate, and then my defense counsel asked me afterwards, "Do you know whether these measures wore carried out?" whereupon I said, "No, I hope that it was not necessary because the population was sensible enough to take the warning, "and I think I added "I hope they are sensible enough not to give the Commanders in Chief there as much troubles as my commander had at the time in the Southeast."
Q Did you see the announcement to which you refer?
A I read it in an official news bulletin of Berlin.
Q Do you know who signed the announcement and when it was dated?
A I think it was Hay 1945, but I am rather uncertain about the date, and it was signed or announced by some kind of a German Magistrate's Office, not directly by the Russian commander in chief. He is clever enough to push the German magistrates to the fore, but there can be no doubt that the German Berlin magistrate, who certainly had no authority over any kind of armed forces, certainly couldn't order it himself.
Q Did you learn about that announcement in a German newspaper, General Foertsch?
A No, I certainly read it, if I am not wrong, in a copy of this official newspaper, or bulletin, and I had that paper in my hands.
Q Who put out that official news bulletin? What was its title?
A I can't say exactly. It was kind of a compilation of official announcements of the City of Berlin, some sort of an official gazette. For instance, it talked about the distribution of food for the next period, and there was something about the opening of schools and other administrative matters.
Q How many pages did this bulletin contain that you saw?
A I can't say. At any rate it had more than two pages.
Q How did it come to your attention? Were you a subscriber or was it delivered to you?
A I got it from one of my comrades. I think he had it sent to him.
Q Do you know the name of the comrade?
A If I am not mistaken it was General Kuntze, but I could be mistaken.
Q If you would try and identify it a little more accurately, GeneraL Foertsch, perhaps we could make a search for it.
A I think probably one of the defense counsel have a copy of it. If I am not mistaken Dr. Laternser mentioned it in his opening statement and I assume he has a copy of it.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: We will wait then for Dr. Laternser to introduce it into evidence.
Q One final question, General Foertsch, you mentioned something about paragraph 44 of the Italian and American treaty of capitulation, and I believe you stated that that paragraph opened the door for the execution of hostages and the taking of reprisal measures by American troops in case the Italians didn't behave; is that correct?
A No, I did never express it like that I said, -- I must establish the following first of all, the connection was the question of my defense counsel as to whether I believed that the necessity for reprisals was independent from the strength of the occupation troops, whereupon I answered something like "reprisals are a consequence of the attitude of the population, and are independent from the strength of the occupation troops, although the strength of the occupation troops has naturally an indirect influence on the behavior of the population," and then I was asked how I arrived at this rather strange assumption, whereupon I answered something like "this was a consideration by me which was supported by two examples outside the Southeast area." I mentioned the example of Berlin, which you have just mentioned, and then I said something like "I believe that also the Commander in Chief of the Allied Forces in Italy was acting on such thoughts when he concluded the treaty with Badoglio at the end of September, and included the following in the concluding paragraph: that if action is taken against this treaty then the Allied Supreme Authority reserve to themselves the right to take certain measures, for example further occupation of other territories and punishments such as punishment actions by the air force, or other measures." I think that is how I expressed myself.
Q Would you look at paragraph 44 of the document to which you refer, General Foertsch, -- paragraph 44 reads, "The present instrument may be denounced by the United Nations with immediate effect if the Italian obligations thereunder are not fulfilled, or as an alternative the United Nations may penalize contravention of it by measures appropriate to the circumstances such as the extension of the areas of military occupation on air or other punitive action." Is there anything in this order about the execution of hostages, General Focrtsch, rather in this paragraph?
A No.
Q Is there anything in this paragraph about the burning of villages?
A No. This could possibly occur in connection with actions of the air force. We have experienced that, but I have never maintained that there is any mention here about the killing of hostages, but I have only maintained that reprisals are independent from the strength of the troops and in this context I worked on the idea that punitive action by the air force especially when punishment is being talked about, is a kind of reprisal. But I would be rather pleased to be convinced of the contrary.
Q Did you over hear, General Foertsch, about the execution of hostages by either the American of the British armies?
A No, I never hoard this. I only heard recently hero that Dr. Laternser asked to be allowed to look at certain documents which announced something similar, but of course I did not quite grasp what it was all about because of the speed of talk.
Q But other than that you have never heard anything about the execution of hostages by the British or the Americans?
A In that direct sense, no, but I don't know whether there is a largo difference between the killing of people who have previously been warned that their countrymen arc to be taken and used as reprisal, and the air attacks of a modern war which are unavoidable, because they are a part of the war and which kill people who have not been warned beforehand.
Q You believe then that the execution of hostages is as unavoidable as the death of persons in an air raid?
A The killing of reprisal hostages is unavoidable if the population do not come to their senses in any other way, but in this case the individuals are so to speak "counted", that is for the attack and for the operation so and so, so and so many people will be shot in reprisal. In the other case, in the case of an air raid the commander in chief, even one whom has the greatest feeling of responsibility, cannot tell how many people will fall victims to the order which he gives. Both, I believe, are unavoidable in modern warfare and the words apply which I used in my direct examination. "Modern and total war once started, follows but its own laws".
A Of course, there are very many differences.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: I have no further questions, Your Honor.
REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY DR. RAUCHENBACH:
Q Witness, first of all few questions which are more to serve the purpose of correctness and to bring out points which don't quite come out in the translation, or questions which perhaps you didn't understand correctly. At the beginning of cross-examination in a connection which is no longer interesting here, you were asked whether you knew what had happened to Himmler, what had happened to Goering, Ribbontrop, etc. and then you said with regard to Ribbontrop, Keitel, etc. that also Goering had been killed, and so that it is correct in the record, I assume that you missed this in your answer, didn't you hear that Goering had committed suicide?
A Yes, of course.
Q And then you were repeatedly asked something on the following lines: what would you have done to combat the bands if there had been no orders of the OKW in existence, -- that is hypothetical question. And you gave you opinion on it, now a factual question about this -- could you order anything at all if the OKW hadn't given the respective order -
I mean you yourself?
A I personally, no, I have repeatedly stated that here, and I repeat it that outside of my staff I had no authority to command.
Q And then in further cross-examination you were asked again and again hypothetical questions, why wore thus and thus measures taken, and what sort of measures would you have taken, etc. i.e. you yourself, and then you stated your opinion about it, and now I have the following question; in your answer did you make it a pre-condition that all the participants would understand your answer correctly, -- you did not want to say that you yourself would have been able to take those kind of measures?
A Since these questions were hypothetically put, of course, I assumed that the answers would be hypothetically understood, and I believe that in most cases I always stated at the beginning that I, of course, was not authorized to take such measures.
Q: and then you were asked repeatedly about the so-called directives for the combating of bands. And then, by these questions and answers, the impression could arise as if you yourself were immediately concerned with this. Therefore, I would like to ask you the following question: Did you issue the directions?
A: No.
Q: And did you pass on these regulations to the offices subordinated to your commander in Chief?
A: No.
Q: The Prosecutor then asked you the following in connection with those directions for the combating of bands, and also in connection with other OKW orders, about the possibility of circumventing orders or using play which was given in the formulation of the orders. Could the Commander in Chief Southeast or even you with regard to an order of the OKW or a distributed regulation of this kind influence the troops to circumvent this or to interpret it in such a way that in practice the very contrary was done?
A: No he was not authorized to do this.
Q: The directions of the Community Party of Serbia about band warfare were also submitted to you. And you yourself read the paragraph from it which spoke about revenge for fallen comrades. How did you think about this when you saw these Communist regulations for the first time for combating the bands?
A: I can't say with certainly, but I think that I understood it as being rather free.
Q: And free in which respect?
A: In the treatment of German soldiers and then as it practically happened later on.
Q: and how did it happen practically?