I could punish them, I could reward them, I could give decorations, I could admonish them and praise them, I could do all the things which a soldier wanted to do. I could order men, this I could do as division commander.
Q.- What I meant was did you to have to learn anything new about how to handle troops? After all you had been just a chief of staff and your experiences were somewhat different and you were limited from a commanding responsibility standpoint. I would like to know if you found the transition from that type of jog to the job of handling troops an easy or a difficult transition to make?
A.- It is always very easy to adapt oneself from worse circumstances to better, that is easier than to adapt yourself to the reverse. I have already said from the scope of a very limited responsible on the staff to be transferred to the scope of a broader responsibility, even if only a division, that was something which made me happy. Before I was only in a position to say I suggest, or to the superior authorities I warn you or something like that, now I could say that is how it is to be done in my own division. Of course there is a big difference, admittedly.
Q.- The kind of things which you dealt with as chief of staff, the problems, the situations, they were not so very different from those which you encountered as a troop commander; were they?
A.- Oh, yes, the different was enormous because as divisional commander, disregarding the fact that there were different theaters of war and completely different combat, but as divisional commander I had to make decisions which became necessary within my scope and my 1-A had to do the work and subordinate himself to me previously I had to do the work and had to subordinate myself and somebody else made the decisions. That is quite an essential difference.
Q.- Except for the fact as chief of staff you proposed and suggested to the commander and as the troop commander someone else proposed to you and you in fact gave the orders there was no difference between chief of staff and troop commander?
A.- Oh, yes, of course, there were any number of differences.
Q.- General Foertsch, isn't it true that the chief of staff and commander of troops are almost interchangeable, you as chief of staff became an army commander and troop commander, and, on the other hand, it was quite possible for a troop commander to assume the duties of chief of staff?
A.- Yes, if he had proper training in the general staff, but not every regimental commander without general staff training could become chief of staff.
Q.- Wasn't your duty as chief of staff to suggest and to propose and to recommend to your Commander in Chief; was it not?
A.- I was the advisor and helper of the commander in chief. I had to be in charge of the work of the staff.
Q.- Next to your commander in chief you were the most important single individual at headquarters; were you not?
A.- In my staff, yes. I would have been a bad chief if in my staff I had not been the man next to the commander in chief.
Q.- In April of 1941, General Foertsch, the headquarters of the 12th army was in Athena. Next to Field Marshal List you were the most important person at headquarters in Athens; were you not?
A.- No, not in Athens. At that time I was certainly not the most important man as I had just taken the position in my staff as chief of staff. I was the person who had to establish what had to be done and if you consider that power then in the staff I was the most powerful man.
Q.- How many persons were there on your staff and subordinate to you?
A.- Well, about with an assigned guard company and with propaganda people there might have been about 800 men perhaps. This is just a round figure.
Q.- Then it was the nerve center, the nucleus, the brain cell of the 12th Army; was it not?
A.- It was the center of work of the 12th Army.
Q.- That is where the tactical plans and the operational plans of the troops were outlined and decided upon?
A.- No, it is the center where the decisions which had been made either by a superior office or by the commander in chief were worked out and executed.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: The Tribunal will recess until Monday morning, October 20th at 9:30 a.m.
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is in recess until 9:30 o'clock Monday morning.
(A recess was taken until 0930 hours, Monday, 20 October, 1947.)
Official Transcript of Military Tribunal V, Case VII, in the matter of the United States of America against Wilhelm List , et al, defendants, sitting at Nurnberg, Germany, on 20 October 1947,0930 hours, Justice Wennerstrum presiding.
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the Courtroom will please find their seats.
The Honorable, the Judges of Military Tribunal V.
Military Tribunal V is now in session. God save the United States of America and this Honorable Tribunal.
There will be order in the Court.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Marshal, will you ascertain as to whether or not all the defendants are present in the courtroom?
THE MARSHAL: May it please your Honor, all the Defendants are present in the Courtroom except von Weichs, who is still in the hospital.
THE PRESIDENT: You may proceed with the cross-examination, Mr. Fenstermacher.
CROSS EXAMINATION (Continued) Defendant Foertsch
BY MR. FENSTERMACHER:
Q. General Foertsch, on Friday we talked about your functions and duties as Chief of Staff. Before we continue on that, I would like to ask you a few questions about the OKW. When Hitler took over from von Brauchitsch in December, 1941, as Commander-in-Chief of the German Army, OKW was already in existence?
A. Yes, it is correct.
Q. Would you say that the duties and functions of Fieldmarhsal Keitel as Chief of the OKW were, in effect, those of Chief of Staff to Hitler?
A. I do not know the relation between Hitler and Keitel. At least, not well enough to be able to give any judgment. I believe, however, that Keitel was a little more than just a Chief of Staff.
Q. Keitel, however, did nothing except with Hitler's permission. Isn't that true?
A. I am not in a position to judge because I was never part of the OKW.
Q. General Jodl was in charge of the operational and strategic plans of OKW, was he not?
A. Yes, I believe that was the most important part of his work.
Q. General Jodl was, in effect, the Ia or ope rations officer of Hitler, was he not?
A. I do not know how the work was divided up between Hitler and Jodl because I was only able to see things from a subordinate level.
Q. When you received orders from Keitel, you never doubted that they had Hitler's approval, did you?
A. That could be assumed, yes.
Q. So that in effect Keitel had no more power than a Chief of Staff so far as his relations with Hitler were concerned.
A. I can only repeat that I am not in a position to judge that, because I had no insight into the work and the relation between Hitler and his collaborators.
Q. Jodl -
THE PRESIDENT: Pardon me, Mr. Fenstermacher. Is it your thought that questions along this line are cross-examination?
MR. FENSTERMACHER: I have just one more question on this point, your Honor, and I think my theory will become clear to you.
THE PRESIDENT: Well you may proceed briefly but we don't want to get too far afield from the direct examination. Proceed.
BY MR. FENSTERMACHER:
Q. You never received any orders signed by Jodl, did you, General Foertsch?
A. I cannot say. that. I believe that I did read Jodl's signature on orders. In general, they were then signed "on behalf of" and then signature "Jodl" but I am not sure of this.
Q. In any event, they were always signed"on behalf of" Hitler?
A. I had to assume that.
Q. And Keitel's order as well was signed on behalf of Hitler?
A. Keitel signed even without that form "on behalf of." Sometimes he just signed his name.
Q. As Chief of Staff, General Foertsch, it was your duty to review the reports and make recommendations to your Commander-inChief?
A. When such recommendations became necessary, then it was my duty.
Q. And it was also your job to prepare drafts of orders and to submit them to your Commander-in Chief and talk them over with him?
A. Yes, that is correct.
Q. Did you ever disagree on basic policy with your various Commanders-in-Chief: Fieldmarshal List, General Kuntze, General Loehr, or Fieldmarshal Weichs?
A. There were, on repeated occasions, various problems where we disagreed but of course I had to succumb to the decision of the Commander-in-Chief.
Q. On what basic policy matters did you disagree with either of those four Commanders-in-Chief, in which you had to succumb? I am thinking now of matters connected with reprisal measures.
A. I know, for instance, that with General Loehr, I had a long discussion whether or not reprisal ratios should be fixed for the whole area. General Loehr decided then not to fix such reprisal quotas and to this extent he followed my ideas. But I cannot say whether that was done merely on the basis of my objections or whether he had discussed the matter with other people too. For instance, concerning the questions whether all illegal actions had to be retaliated with reprisal measures on principle, I maintained my own opinion in contrast to the one of the OKW.
My opinion was that it did not have to be done in every case and unconditionally. I had differences of opinion with Fieldmarshal List concerning the matter of the combatting of the insurrection but that was a question of the commitment of the forces. I just remember that on one occasion I disagreed on principle with General Kuntze regarding the question of the creation of the Russian protective Corps. However, these are only examples and I cannot say that these are the exhaustive facts because I do not remember the matters clearly enough.
Q. You did not disagree with respect to policy measures concerning reprisals with either of your Commanders-in-Chief, did you?
A. I am afraid I didn't quite understand the question.
Q. In respect to reprisal measures, you and List, you and Kuntze, you and Loehr, and you and Weichs saw eye to eye. There was no case in which you had one opinion and had to succumb to their ideas regarding reprisal measures.
A. Concerning the basic question of reprisal measures, the Commanders-in-Chief and I agreed to the effect that reprisal measures were not desired but were unavoidable. In individual cases, there could be no such difference of opinion because the individual cases were not decided by my Commanders-in-Chief.
Q. As a matter of fact, General Loehr, either of those Commanders-in-Chief could not act upon a basic policy matter without first consulting you?
A. Of course, the Commander-in-Chief could do that. He was by no means obliged to listen to my suggestion. If one can talk of an obligation at all, he was only obliged to listen to my opinion concerning tactical and operational matters, with regard to their execution they were not as much in the foreground in the Balkans as they would have been on a purely operational front.
Q. According to the manual for the general staff officer, the Commander-in-Chief had to first consult you and listen to you before he could act upon a basic matter.
True, he did not have to follow your opinion but he had to first consult you, isn't that correct?
A. That was generally the custom. Basic questions were discussed by the Commander -in-Chief and the Chief-of-Staff.
Q. You have told us about your regular conferences with your staff, particularly the ones you held on Mondays. Did you have a set time for conferring with your Commanders-in-Chief?
A. You mean set times of the day for discussions?
Q. Yes.
A. No, that depended on what work was there to be done. When oral reports became necessary and when it became necessary to get the decision of the Commander-in-Chief, then of course I had the right at all times to ring him up or to enter his office and to interrupt ether discussions that he might have. The daily reports were reported with a certain amount of regularity because they were in turn bound to set times.
Q. You wore the man in charge of the issuance and passing on of the orders, were you not? It was your job to see that -
A: Yes.
Q: It was your job to see that the orders were received by the subordinate units and you were also responsible to see that the orders were enforced, were you not?
A: No, I was never responsible for the fact that the orders were enforced. That is a matter of the Commanding Officers and the commanders of the subordinate units. I was responsible for the fact that orders were properly drawn up and were sent out in the proper manner. Of course, I was also responsible for a certain check whether these orders were received.
Q: Were you never sent on inspection trips to sec whether the orders were actually received and being enforced?
A: No, unfortunately I could only leave my desk on very rare occasions and then I undertook trips which were mainly for my own information. It was in the vast area very difficult to get a clear picture of the situation. Whether I received special commissions to check up on the enforcement of the orders I do not recollect.
Q: The Chief-of-Staff was in charge at least so far as current matters were concerned when the Commander-in-Chief was absent from headquarters.
A: He had a certain latitude concerning current matters. He did not deputize that isn't putting it quite correctly. Even when the Commander-in-Chief was present, he had a certain latitude concerning the work on current matters. These were affairs which already had been decided on principle.
THE PRESIDENT: Pardon me just a minute, Mr. Fenstermacher. May I make inquiry of the defendants in the box as to whether or not it is chilly over there? I notice some of you seem to be feeling a draft. Is there a draft from the windows?
DEFENDANT RENDULIC: Yes, from the top windows. They are broken, there is no glass in them, and the outer windows are broken too and so unfortunately we have a draft here. There is no window up there.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Marshal, will you see that is repaired during the noon hour if possible?
THE MARSHAL: Yes, sir.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.
BY MR. FENSTERMACHER:
Q: General Foertsch, regarding the three mass executions which took place in October at Valjevo, at Kraljevo and at Kragujevac, two of these took place when the Commander-inChief Fieldmarshal List was absent. Were you not in charge of head-quarters at that time?
A: I was in charge of my own staff as always but I did not deputize for the Commander-in-Chief.
Q: But you were always in charge of your staff even when the Commander-in-Chief was present. When the Commanderin-Chief was absent you were, in effect, in charge of headquarters, were you not?
A: I was in charge of the work of the headquarters but never of the decisions. We have to make a difference between the functions of the Commander-in-Chief and those of the Chief-of-Staff. The Commander-in-Chief makes the decisions and he makes resolutions and he has to keep his head clear for just this purpose. The Chief-of-Staff works on the incoming and outgoing matters and prepares the decisions of the Chief of Staff by giving him the pertinent information. The Commander in-Chief has to keep a clear head for his decisions and the Chief-of-Staff does the hard work.
Q: You had enough power and jurisdiction while Lise was absent to institute on inquiry regarding the mass executions at Kraljevo and Kragujevac, didn't you?
A: Authority is not the right expression.
Q: Were they not matters which came within current matters over which you did have authority when the Commanderin-Chief was absent?
A: The concept "current matters" and the concept "decisions" have nothing to do with each other. Current matters are affairs which on principle have already been decided.
Q: Who would OKW have held responsible during the period when List was absent and before Kuntze arrived?
A: Responsible for what?
Q: If anything went wrong at headquarters of which OKW disapproved?
A: If, for instance, the reports would not have come in on time in the OKW, then I would have been the responsible person. If, for instance, in the daily reports there would have been a whole passage omitted, let's say for instance concerning Greece, then again I would have been the responsible person. But concerning the actual events in the area, the actions that were carried out, activities, decisions, I could not be held responsible, according to the regulations, as I have described it during direct examination, only the individual commanders could be held responsible for that.
Q: Wasn't it strange, General Foertsch that when List went on leave in July, he appointed Felmy as his deputy but now when he became ill, he did not appoint Felmy according to your testimony?
A: No, the situation was somewhat different. When the commander-in-Chief went on leave, as was customary, he suggested to the OKW that General Felmy, the senior commander deputized for him.
Then the superior command said either "All right, we agree," or they said "No, we do not agree", for this period we will appoint another deputy." During the time of leave, the OKW happened to agree with that suggestion, but when Fieldmarshal List was operated on, the situation was entirely different. At that time, nobody could possibly know for what length of time the Commander-in-Chief could not be counted on. But since according to the army doctor, the period that Fieldmarshal List would be absent, might be quite lengthy, I asked the OKW to regulate the question of a deputy as soon as possible. Fieldmarshal List himself had no influence on that question whatsoever.
Q: General Foertsch, if a Chief-of-Staff had no authority and was not very important, can you explain why at the time of the Italian capitulation the Chiefs-of-Staff, the Italian Chiefs-of-Staff were executed the same as their commanders? Look at Exhibit 327 in Document Book XIII at page 61 in the German and 77 in the English.
A: I know what you mean.
Q: There is a report from the -
A: And I have already, because I sensed a hint of that kind at the time, mentioned my attitude concerning this during direct examination. It says here "attitude of the army" -that is the second Panzer army -- that is the attitude of one Specific authority in one specific case. Then it does not say "responsible are" but instead it says "co-responsible are generally." Besides, I personally consider this opinion not correct. In every individual case, a summary court martial procedure established who was actually guilty. If a Chiefof-Staff is actually guilty, then it can be assumed that he was sentenced but if he is not guilty he will be acquitted.
Q: General Foertsch, how could a Chief-Staff possibly be guilty if he had no command authority?
A: There are Chiefs-of-Staff who exceed their authorities and there are weak Commanders-in-Chief too who let themselves be guided by a Chief - of-Staff. I never experienced one in the German army but theoretically I can imagine that there are such Commanders-in-Chief.
Q: You think then in the case of the Italians, at least, it was a question of whether the Commander-in-Chief was weak and his Chief of Staff strong that should govern?
A: That depended on the personality. For instance, I remember exactly that in the case of Gandin and in the case in Kephalonia, it actually was reported to me at the time, the Chief-of-Staff was the man who went over General Gandin's head and who had a very much stronger influence in that particular case than his Commanding General, and that was within his authority. However, I do not know the basic regulations of the Italian army concerning the position of a Chief-of-Staff.
Q: Do you believe, generally speaking, that it is a question of personality that governs the responsibility of a Chief-of-Staff?
A: No, I didn't intend to say that. The responsibility of the Chiefs-of-Staff has been laid down clearly in the manual for general staff officers but theoretically I can imagine that in specific situations, for instance like the one in Kephalonia, the Commander-in-Chief let himself be guided by his Chief of Staff.
Q. Here, General Foertsch, in Exhibit 327 is on order of the 15th Mountain Corps to the SS Division, end it states, "Accomplices generally arc older commanders and General Staff Officers."
A. On what pope is that please?
Q. Page 61 of the German and page 77 of the English.
A. Yes, I have it.
Q. "Accomplices generally are elder commanders and General Staff Officers." Page 63 of the German and page 80 of the English it talks about proceedings: "Sentenced to death in absentia by summary court martial were: General Bacuzzi, Commanding Officer of Infantry Division Bergano, Col. Boschi Chief of General Staff, Division Gergamo, Admiral Bebesi." You disagreed with the conception of the Panzer Army regarding the Chief of Staff of the Italian Army?
A. No, I have already said that I do not share their opinion. If here as on page 63 it says "the Chief of Staff of Division Gerbamo was sentenced to death in absentia", then there must have been some special reasons for this fact. I believe there was an investigation, because it says in the last sentence; "records of investigation passed on by courier."
Q. The responsibility cf the Chief of Staff in the German Army is simply an internal German affair and has nothing to do with International law, so far as you know, has it?
A. I don't understand the question. It is not comprehensible to me.
Q. Do you know if there are any provisions in international law which relieve a Chief of Staff from responsibility or is that simply internal German Military Law?
A. International law, which of course I do not know in detail, will never intervene, in my opinion, in organizational matters and regulations of command of the individual nations. International law will never lay down who, in specific cases which cannot be overlooked by the International law, should be responsible. A law only estab lished that certain actions are in contradiction to law, and other actions are legal.
A law can never establish the how or why. That will always have to be subject of a thorough investigation.
Q. General Foertsch, by virtue of your experience in the pressebuero in Germany before 1939, and by virtue of having taught tactics in the Reich Military Academy before 1939, were you not in a particularly influential position in the 12th Army in the Balkans, where there is such a relationship between tectics and politics?
A. That has nothing to do with each other. My activity as a press expert in the Reich War Ministry, I might even say was an impediment for my later assignment, because it was not work of a general staff nature. Somebody might have done it, as well, who had not been to the War academy. One would overestimate the insight of the Armed Forces Office by far if one assumes that they would deliberate on all these matters. Unfortunately, they did not sufficiently into account the suitability of individual officers for particular assignment. My appointment as chief of staff of the 12th Army I might almost say was a matter of chance. The Chief of Staff of Field Marshal von Bock was withdrawn for reasons not known to me, and General von Greiffenberg, against the wishes of Field Marshal List was made his successor, and since I happened to be down in Athens I was put into that position, strangely enough on the very day when I expected to be called back to Germany.
Q. You don't believe that you exerted any particular influence on events in the Balkans between 1941 and 1944?
A. I have endeavored to exert influence on the events to the extent that according to my duties and according to my best knowledge and conscience I advised my Commander-in-Chief.
Q. If you had no particular influence in the Balkans, General Foertsch, can you explain why Himmler complained to Keitel about you in spring of 1944? General Warlimont talks about that in your affidavit in your Document Book I?
A. I know that, yes. Himmler had his agents all ever the place, and it is well possible that it struck him that within my staff I did not attach any importance to National Socialist attitude. Besides, for a long time Himmler was suspicious of me. That could be traced back to a remark I once made at the time when General Fritsch was dismissed where I said, without taking notice of my audience, "this whole affair of Fritsch has been instigated by the SS," and "In my own opinion, "I believe that is the way I put it, "it is a great shame." Besides, at one time I had the pleasure to read in the file of the SS office my own name, which was very awkward for the official concerned.
Q. Let's turn now to the Resistance of the partisan. You said, General Foertsch, as I recall, that you considered partisan activity illegal, first, because there had been a capitulation of the Greek and Yugoslavian Army, and second because the partisans didn't conform to the regulations stated under the Hague Rules of land warfare?
A. Yes, that is correct. Besides I said because the population, according to International law, was obliged to remain peaceful and to take no actions against the occupied forces.
Q. Did you ever feel that the War against Greece and Yugoslavia was an unjust war?
A. I could not judge it and I cannot judge it because I did not have the proper insight in the basic principles involved, and I haven't got it today, besides it was not my task to judge that.
Q. You have no ideas on that question even today?
A. I personally am particularly interested in historical events, and I have also concerned myself with the historical events of war. One of the main doctrines which I have deducted for myself, is the one that every judgment of a historical or war historical nature can only be made with a great caution, because only very rarely one knows the basic facts thoroughly.
Q. You know, General Foertsch, that in 1939 Hitler invaded Albania in March?
A. You mean Mussolini?
Q. Beg Pardon. You know Mussolini invaded Albania in 1939 then after the Polish and Western campaigns Roumania and Bulgaria were coerced to sign the anti-comintern pact with Germany?
A. I learned this as every other German, from the press and from the radio.
Q. And early in 1941 at Germany's instigation there was a Bulgarian-Turkey treaty of friendship to neutralize Turkey, do you remember that?
A. I do not recollect that. I assume it was that way. I am not aware of it.
Q. With Albania in possession of the Italians, Roumania and Bulgaria members of the pact, Yugoslavia was completely surrounded and asked to join the axis itself.
A. As far as I remember there was an agreement with Yugoslavia, I believe it was affected in March. I do not remember its contents exactly, but I believe that I do recollect that Yugoslavia too joined the Pact, or at least they undertook not to start any hostilities against Germany.
Q. Isn't it true that after the coup d'e'tatlie the Yugoslav Government signing the tri-parti treaty agreement Hitler invaded without getting any assurance from the new Government?
A. I don't know that. I didn't know it afterwards. At the time I was not informed about them and later on no information was available to me concerning these facts.
Q. You knew about the undeclared bombing of Belgrade on 6 April 1941, didn't you?
A. Whether there was a warning or not I don't know, but I know that it took place.
Q. And you know about the 100 to one order Field Marshal Weichs issued at the close of the campaign against Yugoslavia in April, did you not?
A. You mean the order which is contained in the documents, and of which we gained knowledge because we made inquiry about it, the order of 23 April--is that the one?
Q. That is the one I mean.
A. Yes, I gained knowledge of it, that is correct.
Q. You never felt that your armies were in Yugoslavia illegally and therefore any resistance by the Yugoslavs against you was legal activity?
A. That the armies were in Yugoslavia illegally is not the point at all, and I don't even know whether you can put it that way, that an army can be somewhere illegally. A war is waged in the manner that an army, invades the country against which war is waged, and if then the army is in that country it is there because of the events of the war. That is not a question of legality or illegality. It is a question of the consequence of the effects of politics on which a soldier, and especially a soldier not in a leading position has no influence whatsoever.
Q. You never tried to put yourself in the position of the Yugoslavs?
THE PRESIDENT: Are we interested in that, Mr. Fenstermacher?
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Perhaps it is a bit irrelevant.
THE PRESIDENT: Let's confine ourselves, if possible, to matters cf cross-examination, and not to theoretical matters, which in the main are not our concern except as you may limitedly develop them.
JUDGE CARTER: I may add to that, Mr. Fenstermacher, these defendants are charged with the commission of particular acts,--the issuance of illegal orders, the carrying out of illegal acts of war. Now, it seems to me that is the issue here. What they may have thought of International matters or even of the Nazi Party, although except as it might bear upon the intent of why they committed these acts, seems to me to be absolutely immaterial. Why shouldn't your cross-examination be limited to the things this defendant is alleged to have done, and his connection with the acts with which he is charged?
If we don't do that we will be here until Easter on matters which appear to me to be absolutely irrelevant.
Q General Foertsch, you said that the partisans never wore uniforms insignia?
A No, I said insignia or uniform we e occasionally worn, but I was never under the impression that there was a uniform clothing or a uniform identification by way of insignia which would have been recognizable from a distance, and I have said that this problem is less important than the question whether or not bands are altogether legal or illegal, because even a uniform band or band movement can be illegal.
Q General Foertsch, there are reports here from practically every month during the German occupation which refer to insignia of the partisans, refer to the Communists in Russian uniform with Soviet Stars, refers to Communists being shot who were fully uniformed, with reference to Cetnik companies and battalions lists of their units and leaders, and later in 1942 and 1943 references to the Yugoslav Home Army, of 150,000 men were under command of Mihajlovic and to an Army of National liberation 1 ad by Tito; in spite of this you believe there was no uniform insignia?
A On direct examination I believe I dealt with this subject in detail. I designated the frequent mention of uniform and insignia as an indication that a real uniform clothing and insignia was not there, and I have given the following reasons: If an army fights against a regular belligerent army, then one would never during such a campaign refer in reports and messages to remarks such as "The enemy was uniformed in a certain manner," and "a group of enemy wears a certain insignia", because it is a matter of course that an. enemy army wears a typical uniform, which is recognizable from a distance, even in spite of camoflage. The very fact that this is repeatedly pointed out in these reports before any action or operation to k place, "according to our intelligence the enemy wears part of a certain uniform, and probably certain insignias." This fact proves that there was no uniformity but that in each individual case the situation was different, and that before an operation took place intelligence had to report, and that before an action or operation took place our troops had to be informed accordingly, for instance to the effect "During the next two weeks you will probably find yourself faced with people who will probably wear certain clothing and certain insignia."